Justia U.S. 5th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin ordered all members of the Armed Forces to be vaccinated against COVID-19. Secretary of the Navy Carlos Del Toro followed suit soon after, mandating vaccination for all Navy servicemembers. Plaintiffs are thirty-five members of Naval Special Warfare Command units. Each sought an exemption due to a sincere religious objection to the Navy’s authorized vaccines. Plaintiffs sued Secretary Austin, Secretary Del Toro, and the Department of Defense (collectively, “the Navy”), alleging that the mandate violated the First Amendment and RFRA. They also sought a preliminary injunction to block enforcement of the policies described above. Specifically, they asked the court to enjoin “any adverse action” based on their vaccination status, such as job loss, ineligibility to deploy, and restrictions on promotion and training opportunities. The district court granted a preliminary injunction. The district court twice enjoined the Navy’s policies as likely illegal under RFRA. After the entry of those injunctions, however, Congress ordered the military branches to rescind their mandates. The Navy complied with that directive and then rescinded all the challenged policies and formally announced that COVID-19 vaccines would not be imposed on any servicemember.   The Fifth Circuit dismissed the appeal and remanded. The court explained that the interlocutory appeal is moot because the Navy’s vaccine policies challenged here have been rescinded and because no exception to mootness applies. That does not end the litigation, however, and Plaintiffs’ case remains before the district court, which will decide in the first instance whether any of Plaintiffs’ claims are justiciable. View "U.S. Navy SEALs 1-26 v. Joseph Biden, Jr." on Justia Law

Petitioner was convicted of capital murder and sentenced to death for his involvement in the robbery and murder of a pastor. After exhausting his state remedies, Petitioner filed a federal habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. Section 2254 and sought investigative services under 18 U.S.C. Section 3599. The district court rejected his petition for relief, concluded that investigative services were not reasonably necessary, and denied a certificate of appealability (COA). Petitioner then petitioned this court for a COA. We granted that petition on a single issue: Whether Petitioner’s trial counsel was ineffective for failing to investigate and present at the penalty phase of the trial, two alleged accomplices’ participation in the robbery and murder.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed and held that Petitioner’s attempt to reframe his Sixth Amendment counsel ineffectiveness claim in federal court does not save it from the strictures of AEDPA review. The court explained that Petitioner cannot demonstrate a reasonable probability that at least one juror would have recommended a life sentence had his trial counsel investigated the co-conspirators’ involvement and presented evidence about the same at sentencing. He was not prejudiced, and his ineffective assistance of counsel claim would fail even if it were not assessed under the rigorous standards of AEDPA Section 2254(d). View "Nelson v. Lumpkin" on Justia Law

Defendant is a medical doctor. He contracted with two hospitals, one in Mississippi and one in Alabama. He usually made $30,000 to $40,000 per month. Because he was a contractor, the hospitals did not withhold any wages for tax purposes— Defendant was solely responsible for satisfying his federal tax obligations. From 2006 through 2012, Defendant did not pay any income taxes or file any timely tax returns. A jury found him guilty of tax evasion in violation of 26 U.S.C. Section 7201. Defendant raised two claims on appeal: first, that the evidence at trial was insufficient to support a conviction for tax evasion under Section 7201; and second, that the district court abused its discretion by denying his motion for a mistrial.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that even if it was legitimate for Defendant to deduct IRS garnishments from his income, that does not explain why Defendant neglected to mention key assets on the form—such as the $50,000 gun collection and the corporate bank accounts that he used to pay personal expenses. Moreover, the prosecution presented evidence suggesting that he manipulated his wages to artificially depress his income at the time he submitted Form 433-A.   Further, even assuming that the district court was right to sustain the defense’s objection, Defendant offered no reason to believe that the questions incurably prejudiced the jury. Given the weight of evidence presented to the jury in this case, there is no “significant possibility” that these two questions had a substantial impact on the verdict. View "USA v. Crandell" on Justia Law

At issue in this case are three such Texas laws: Texas Election Code sections 61.003, 61.010, and 85.036 (collectively, the “electioneering laws”). Plaintiff filed this action, alleging that she was unconstitutionally censored under the electioneering laws when she voted in 2018 and that the statutes unconstitutionally “chilled” her right to free speech by criminalizing political expression within polling places. The district court, adopting the magistrate judge’s report and recommendation, upheld section 61.010 as constitutional, but concluded that sections 61.003 and 85.036 are facially unconstitutional under the First Amendment. Both sides appealed, contesting jurisdictional issues as well as the merits.   The Fifth Circuit reversed the district court’s holding denying Texas’s Secretary of State and Attorney General sovereign immunity under the Eleventh Amendment and dismissed those defendants for lack of jurisdiction. The court affirmed that Plaintiff has standing to bring her claims against the remaining two Defendants. The court also affirmed the district court’s holding that section 61.010 is constitutional. However, the court reversed and rendered the district court’s holding that sections 61.003 and 85.036 are unconstitutional and instead uphold all three electioneering laws. Finally, the court affirmed the district court’s denial of nominal damages. View "Ostrewich v. Nelson" on Justia Law

Defendant has two state convictions for indecent exposure to children. The government contends that those convictions “clearly” relate United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit “to the sexual exploitation of children,” so Defendant should be subject to the enhancement. Defendant countered that “sexual exploitation of children,” in this context, applies only to offenses relating to child pornography, so his sentence is not subject to the enhancement.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed. The court held that 18 U.S.C. Section 2251(e)’s use of the phrase “relating to the sexual exploitation of children” refers to any criminal sexual conduct involving children. Defendant’s convictions for indecent exposure to a child neatly fall within that broad category. View "USA v. Moore" on Justia Law

Plaintiff sued Nueces County and Wellpath for “County/Municipal Liability” under Section 1983. Specifically, he alleged that the county was liable because it “sanctioned the custom, practice, and/or policy or procedure of failing to protect and/or ignoring the serious medical needs of those entrusted to [its] care.” The original claim was not specific about how Wellpath was supposedly liable. The county and Wellpath moved to dismiss. The district court granted both motions but permitted Martinez to file a “Motion for Leave to Amend his Complaint.” Plaintiff appealed the dismissal of his claim against Nueces County and the denial of leave to amend as to Wellpath.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed. The court held that because Plaintiff had not properly alleged a custom or policy that was the moving force of his injuries, the district court was correct to dismiss his claims against Nueces County. Further, the court found that from the face of Plaintiff’s pleadings, there is no reason to conclude that Wellpath, at an organization-wide level, had a policy of deliberate indifference that was the moving force of Plaintiff’s alleged constitutional violation at the Nueces County Jail. This is doubly so because of Plaintiff’s failure to allege, with sufficient detail, what happened to him at the jail. View "Martinez v. Nueces County" on Justia Law

Plaintiff sued the Austin Independent School District (“AISD”) on behalf of her minor son, A.H., alleging that AISD violated Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), and 42 U.S.C. Section 1983by employing an individual assigned to help A.H. accommodate his disabilities, but who instead verbally harassed him and threw a trash can at him, hitting him and causing injury. After the incident, the parties settled all of A.H.’s Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (“IDEA”) claims outside of court but agreed that Plaintiff still had the right to file a separate action containing A.H.’s claims arising under Section 504, the ADA, and Section 1983. Heston then brought these claims in a suit filed in 2018. The district court dismissed the suit without prejudice for Plaintiff’s failure to exhaust the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act’s (“IDEA”) administrative remedies.   The Fifth Circuit vacated the district court’s judgment and remanded it to the district court for further consideration in light of Luna Perez v. Sturgis Pub. Schs., 143 S. Ct. 859 (2023). Since Plaintiff appealed and the Parties’ briefed the case, the Supreme Court decided Luna Perez, concluding that the IDEA does not require administrative exhaustion “where a plaintiff brings a suit under another federal law for compensatory damages.” This constitutes a “modification in controlling legal principles . . . rendering a previous determination inconsistent with the prevailing doctrine.” View "Heston v. Austin Indep" on Justia Law

Defendants were among 24 individuals indicted on various charges in connection with their involvement in the Sinaloa Cartel. Defendants were jointly tried during a 10-day jury trial. One defendant was convicted on five counts, while another was convicted on 12 counts. Each received concurrent life sentences for all counts on which they were convicted. Defendants raised various challenges to their respective convictions and sentences on appeal.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed the convictions, vacated the sentences that exceed their respective statutory maxima and remanded the case for resentencing on those counts only. The court explained that the maximum term of imprisonment that may be imposed for either Count IV—Conspiracy to Launder Monetary Instruments or Count V— Conspiracy to Possess Firearms in Furtherance of any Crime of Violence or Drug Trafficking Crime is 20 years. 18 U.S.C. Sections1956(a)(2), 924o. The maximum term of imprisonment that may be imposed for Counts VI, VIII, or X—all VICAR convictions—is 10 years. Nevertheless, both Defendants were sentenced to concurrent life terms of imprisonment on Counts IV and V, and one defendant also received concurrent life sentences for Counts VI, VIII, and X. These sentences all exceed their respective statutory maxima. Therefore, the life sentences imposed for Counts IV, V, VI, VIII, and X are vacated, and the case is remanded for resentencing on those counts only. View "USA v. Urquidi" on Justia Law

This litigation challenges the bail practices of one Louisiana parish. The claim is that money bail is required for pretrial detainees without consideration of alternatives, violating the rights of indigents to substantive due process and equal protection. The district court denied all relief.   The Fifth Circuit held that abstention is mandated and remanded in order that the district court may dismiss the suit. The court explained that Texas courts are neither unable nor unwilling to reconsider bail determinations under the proper circumstances, thus providing state court detainees the chance to raise federal claims without the need to come to federal court. Here, Plaintiffs have failed to show that Louisiana is unable or unwilling to reconsider bail determinations. How quickly those can be reconsidered is irrelevant because “arguments about delay and timeliness pertain not to the adequacy of a state proceeding, but rather to ‘conventional claims of bad faith.’” View "Little v. Doguet" on Justia Law

Two Texas employers: Braidwood Management, Inc. (“Braidwood”) and Bear Creek Bible Church (“Bear Creek”), filed suit, as per their closely held religious beliefs, asserting that Title VII, as interpreted in the EEOC’s guidance and Bostock, prevents them from operating their places of employment in a way compatible with their Christian beliefs. Plaintiffs have implicitly asserted that they will not alter or discontinue their employment practices. all parties admitted in district court that numerous policies promulgated by plaintiffs (such as those about dress codes and segregating bathroom usage by solely biological sex) already clearly violate EEOC guidance. Both plaintiffs also contend that they are focused on individuals’ behavior, not their asserted identity.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s conclusion that plaintiffs’ claims are justiciable; reversed the class certifications; affirmed the judgment against Bear Creek; affirmed the ruling that Braidwood is statutorily entitled to a Title VII exemption; vacated the judgment that Braidwood is constitutionally entitled to a Title VII exemption; and vacated the judgment regarding the scope-of-Title-VII claims as a matter of law. The court reasoned that under the facts presented, it cannot determine a more appropriate, limited class definition for any of the classes presented here. Accordingly, the court held that both Braidwood and Bear Creek have standing and bring individual claims. Further, the court explained that the EEOC failed to show a compelling interest in denying Braidwood, individually, an exemption. The agency does not even attempt to argue the point outside of gesturing to a generalized interest in prohibiting all forms of sex discrimination in every potential case. View "Braidwood Management v. EEOC" on Justia Law