Justia U.S. 5th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff challenged the constitutionality of Texas Government Code Section 808. He contends that Section 808’s divestment requirement violates the First Amendment and the Due Process Clause. The district court concluded that Plaintiff lacked standing and dismissed his claims against the Texas Comptroller and the Texas Attorney General (collectively, “Defendants”).   The Fifth Circuit affirmed. The court wrote it agreed with the district court that Plaintiff lacks standing to pursue his claims. Article III grants jurisdiction to federal courts only over actions involving an “actual case or controversy.” The court concluded that Plaintiff’s alleged injury is—at most—speculative; he has wholly failed to allege that any risk of economic harm is “certainly impending.” Because Plaintiff cannot show how any investment or divestment decisions will affect his future payments, he cannot show that he has suffered an injury. Further, the court found that Plaintiff has failed to allege facts demonstrating that Section 808 causes him an injury by violating his own personal Fourteenth or First Amendment rights. View "Abdullah v. Paxton" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted by a jury of depriving two persons of their constitutional rights under color of law in violation of 18 U.S.C. Section 242. The district court sentenced Defendant to concurrent terms of 12 and 360 months of imprisonment and ordered Defendant to pay $10,000 in restitution to one of the victims. Defendant appealed, arguing that the government failed to disclose impeachment evidence in violation of the Brady rule, and he sought a new trial on that basis.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed, holding that the withheld evidence was not material. The court explained that there is no reasonable probability that if the government had disclosed the evidence of the victim’s arrest and pending criminal case, the result of the proceeding would have been different. Further, the court wrote that Defendant’s theory of how he would have used evidence of the victim’s arrest and pending criminal case to impeach the victim rests on speculation. Defendant does not point to any evidence that federal prosecutors could have influenced the Texas prosecutor’s conduct before the grand jury or the grand jury’s findings.   Moreover, the court concluded that Defendant is incorrect in sentencing him the district court “drew an adverse inference” from his silence that “may have resulted in added imprisonment.” Defendant does not point to any specific foundation in the record for his claim that the district court relied on his lack of remorse in determining his sentence. Any inferences the district court drew from Defendant’s refusal to comment at the sentencing hearing did not adversely impact his sentence and did not burden his Fifth Amendment privilege. View "USA v. Sepulveda" on Justia Law

A Texas jury convicted Defendant of murder and sentenced him to death. After his direct appeal and habeas petitions were both denied in state court, Defendant raised 31 claims in a federal habeas petition. The district court denied all his claims and also denied a certificate of appealability (COA). Defendant asked the Fifth Circuit to issue a COA on eight of those claims, which he presents as posing five distinct legal issues.   The Fifth Circuit denied Defendant a COA on all of his claims. The court first found that it is beyond debate that Defendant’s claim would still be unexhausted for failing to fairly present the Confrontation Clause claim to the state habeas court. Further, the court explained that the state court concluded that Defendant’s counsel was not ineffective for failing to use a peremptory strike against these jurors. Defendant has not identified any clearly established federal law that would allow reasonable jurists to debate this conclusion. Moreover, the court wrote that Defendant failed to rebut the prosecution’s fifth stated reason for striking a juror at all. Therefore, the district court’s rejection of Defendant’s Batson claim is not debatable. Next, the court found that the habeas court conducted an extensive argument-by-argument review of Defendant’s comparative juror analysis argument. It considered each argument that Defendant said should have been raised. It found that each of these arguments was meritless and that, as a result, Defendant’s appellate counsel was not ineffective for failing to raise them. View "Harper v. Lumpkin" on Justia Law

the Biden Administration issued an executive order that re-established an interagency working group (“Working Group”) to formulate guidance on the “social cost of greenhouse gases.” That order directed the Working Group to publish dollar estimates quantifying changes in carbon, methane, and nitrous oxide emissions (collectively, “greenhouse gases”) for consideration by federal agencies when policymaking. Working Group has since published “Interim Estimates” based largely on the findings of its predecessor working group. The Plaintiffs-States (“Plaintiffs”) challenge E.O. 13990 and the Interim Estimates as procedurally invalid, arbitrary and capricious, inconsistent with various agency-specific statutes, and ultra vires. They obtained a preliminary injunction in the district court. Defendants appealed, and the Fifth Circuit panel stayed the injunction.   The Fifth Circuit dismissed this action because Plaintiffs have failed to meet their burden to prove standing. Plaintiffs’ allegations of “injury in fact” rely on a chain of hypotheticals: federal agencies may (or may not) premise their actions on the Interim Estimates in a manner that may (or may not) burden the States. Such injuries do not flow from the Interim Estimates but instead from potential future regulations, i.e., final rules that are subject to their own legislated avenues of scrutiny, dialogue, and judicial review on an appropriately developed record. View "State of Louisiana v. Biden" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, his wife, and his three children are Libyan citizens who have resided lawfully in the United States for over a decade. Plaintiff filed an I-140 petition seeking a waiver of the labor-certification requirement of his visa because he is a “professional holding an advanced degree whose work is in the national interest of the United States.” While the petition was pending, Plaintiff and his family filed I-485 applications for status adjustment to legal permanent residents (“LPRs”) under 8 U.S.C. Section 1255(a). Section 1255 grants the Attorney General the discretion to adjust the status of certain aliens to LPR status if they have met certain statutorily specified conditions. The USCIS granted the family’s I-485 petitions prematurely. The district court found that it had no subject matter jurisdiction to review the original denial of the I-140 because Plaintiffs had not exhausted their administrative remedies.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed the order of dismissal. The court held that it does not have subject matter jurisdiction to review a status-adjustment decision by the USCIS under either the APA or the INA because the alien retains the right to de novo review of that decision in his final removal proceedings. Thus, the court found that Plaintiffs have not yet exhausted administrative remedies and the court may not exercise jurisdiction. View "Elldakli v. Garland" on Justia Law

Petitioner Cactus Canyon Quarries, Inc. (“Cactus Canyon”) appeals a decision by an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) of the Federal Mine Safety and Health Review Commission (“Commission”). In 2020, Cactus Canyon was issued three citations by the Mine Safety and Health Administration (MSHA).   The Fifth Circuit denied Cactus Canyon’s petition, holding that the ALJ properly interpreted Section 56.14101(a)(3) to include the low brake pressure alarm as a component of the truck’s “braking system.” Cactus Canyon contends that the alarm is not such a component because it has no effect on the braking system’s ability to stop and hold equipment. But the plain language and purpose support the inclusion of the alarm in the “braking system.” The court concluded that the braking standard unambiguously supports the Government’s interpretation. Since a “system”—by definition at the time of the standard’s passage—is composed of parts, the Section’s reference to “braking systems” extends to its related components, including those that do not simply function to stop and hold the vehicle. View "Cactus Canyon Quarries v. MSHR" on Justia Law

In 2019, after a nine-day jury trial, Defendants C.M. and D.P. were convicted on several counts related to their involvement in a drug trafficking organization. On appeal, C.M. challenged only her kidnapping conviction, while D.P. raised several challenges to each of his convictions.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed. The court held that it was not an error for the district court to instruct the jury that the offender’s own interstate or foreign travel could supply the jurisdictional hook. However, in instructing the jury, the district court did not clarify that the offender’s travel must be “in committing or in furtherance of the commission of the offense.” Nonetheless, the court found that this error does not warrant a plain error reversal. Further, the court found that the same evidence supporting D.P.’s conspiracy conviction supports his possession conviction on an aiding and abetting theory of liability. From that evidence, a reasonable jury could conclude that, by calling in the car so that the sham cocaine could be seized and the real drugs successfully sold, D.P. associated and participated in the drug trafficking venture in a way calculated to bring about its success. Moreover, here, D.P.’s arguments as to his motion for a new trial are essentially the same as those raised in his sufficiency challenge. Thus, the court found the evidence sufficient to support each of his convictions. Accordingly, the court concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying D.P.’s motion for a new trial. View "USA v. Polanco" on Justia Law

In 2019, after a nine-day jury trial, Defendants C.M. and D.P. were convicted on several counts related to their involvement in a drug trafficking organization. On appeal, C.M. challenged only her kidnapping conviction, while D.P. raised several challenges to each of his convictions.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed. The court held that it was not an error for the district court to instruct the jury that the offender’s own interstate or foreign travel could supply the jurisdictional hook. However, in instructing the jury, the district court did not clarify that the offender’s travel must be “in committing or in furtherance of the commission of the offense.” Nonetheless, the court found that this error does not warrant a plain error reversal. Further, the court found that the same evidence supporting D.P.’s conspiracy conviction supports his possession conviction on an aiding and abetting theory of liability. From that evidence, a reasonable jury could conclude that, by calling in the car so that the sham cocaine could be seized and the real drugs successfully sold, D.P. associated and participated in the drug trafficking venture in a way calculated to bring about its success. Moreover, here, D.P.’s arguments as to his motion for a new trial are essentially the same as those raised in his sufficiency challenge. Thus, the court found the evidence sufficient to support each of his convictions. Accordingly, the court concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying D.P.’s motion for a new trial. View "USA v. Meyer" on Justia Law

Plaintiff sued Forensic Laboratory, Inc., KHS, the KISD Police Department, the KISD Board of Trustees (“KISD Board”), and a number of KHS, KISD, and KISD Police Department employees in their individual and official capacities. That suit was filed in the state district court in Fort Bend County, Texas. McClelland alleged (1) violations of 42 U.S.C. Section 1983; (2) violations of his procedural and substantive due process rights; and (3) various state law claims, including defamation, spoliation, and civil conspiracy. The district court granted Defendants motion to dismiss and denied several other pending motions.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that the district court correctly analyzed Plaintiff’s void-for-vagueness claim and did not err in dismissing it. It is well settled, in the educational context, that a plaintiff must allege a protected property interest. Plaintiff’s second amended complaint is devoid of any such allegations. And, even if he had alleged lack of participation on the football team or team captainship in connection with vagueness, he still would not prevail. Further, the court wrote that the district court did not err in dismissing Plaintiff’s substantive and procedural due process claims because Plaintiff did not allege the deprivation of his property or liberty interests. View "McClelland v. Katy Indep Sch Dist" on Justia Law

Plaintiff is a Houston lawyer who has appeared before Judge Newman, a former probate judge in Harris County. It is undisputed that Judge Newman used his private Facebook account to support his campaign for reelection as well as share news about his personal and family life with the public. Plaintiff commented on three of Judge Newman’s posts that related to his campaign for reelection. The comments accused Judge Newman of having “court cronies” and doing “favors for them at the expense of other litigants.” He also commented that he would not vote for Judge Newman and accused him of favoritism. Judge Newman deleted the comments and blocked Plaintiff’s account. Plaintiff sued Judge Newman under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983, alleging that he violated his First Amendment rights. The district court denied his motion to amend his complaint and granted Judge Newman’s motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), holding that he failed to plead facts sufficient to show that Judge Newman acted under the color of state law as required by Section 1983.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed. The court held that because Judge Newman was not acting under the color of state law when he blocked Plaintiff and deleted his comments, the court held that Plaintiff has not met his burden under Section 1983. The court further held that the way in which Plaintiff sought to amend the complaint would not overcome its deficiencies. View "Kallinen v. Newman" on Justia Law