Justia U.S. 5th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Defendant pleaded guilty to possession of a firearm by a felon in violation of 18 U.S.C. Section 922(g)(1), and he was sentenced to 235 months’ imprisonment. His sentence reflected the district court’s imposition of a sentencing enhancement under the Armed Career Criminal Act (“ACCA”), which is triggered when a Section 922(g) offender has three prior convictions for “violent felonies” or “serious drug offenses” that were “committed on occasions different from one another.” Defendant appealed his sentence, arguing that the ACCA enhancement violated his constitutional rights because the facts establishing that he committed his previous violent felonies on different occasions were not charged in the indictment and either admitted by him or proven to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed. The court wrote that the parties argue that the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Wooden v. United States instructs that the ACCA enhancement here was a constitutional error.1 142 S. Ct. 1063 (2022). But in Wooden, the Court explicitly declined to address the issue that Defendant raised. Wooden is, therefore, “not directly on point” and thus does not “alter the binding nature” of Davis and White. View "USA v. Valencia" on Justia Law

Defendant and his co-defendant entered a CVS pharmacy through the store’s front doors to commit an armed robbery. When police officers arrived, they encountered Defendant and Parson attempting to exit the CVS. Defendant and co-Defendant retreated into the store while the officers sought cover outside the front door and in the parking lot. Defendant and co-Defendant then ran out of the store as they shot at the police officers. One police officer sustained a gunshot wound to the shoulder area. Co-Defendant sustained multiple gunshot wounds and was arrested immediately following the robbery. Defendant appealed the four-level sentencing enhancement for abduction to his base offense level under U.S.S.G. Section 2B3.1(b)(4)(A).   The Fifth Circuit affirmed. Defendant contended that the district court erred in applying the abduction sentencing enhancement for three reasons. First, Defendant argued that he “did not force the victim to ‘accompany’ him anywhere” and that forcing the cashier from the cashier area to the restroom “does not qualify as the type of ‘forced accompaniment’ required by the abduction enhancement.” The court disagreed. Defendant pointed a gun at the cashier and forced him to walk with Defendant from the cashier area to the restroom, where Defendant zip-tied the cashier’s hands. Thus, Defendant forced the cashier to accompany him.   Second, Defendant challenged the district court’s determination that the “different location” requirement of Section 2B3.1(b)(4)(A) was satisfied when he moved the cashier to the bathroom. Here, Defendant forced the cashier from the cashier’s area at the front of the store to the restroom. Accordingly, the different location requirement was also satisfied. Accordingly, the court concluded that the district court did not err in imposing the abduction enhancement. View "USA v. Sansbury" on Justia Law

The district court initially sentenced Defendant to a twenty-year term of imprisonment followed by a five-year term of supervised release (“SR”). Later, however, the court vacated that sentence and imposed ten years in prison and three years of SR. Defendant fully served that reduced prison term and began his SR. But because he violated the conditions of SR, the district court revoked it and imposed additional terms of imprisonment and SR. After serving a new prison term and beginning the new term of SR, Defendant again violated the conditions, so the court revoked SR a second time.   The Fifth Circuit vacated Defendant’s revocation judgments in consideration of the court’s earlier vacatur of his ten-year sentence. The court explained that the statutory framework and applicable precedent indicate that vacatur is warranted here. Defendant’s revocation judgments were part of his ten-year sentence. That sentence was vacated. The revocation judgments are therefore legally void and should be vacated as well. View "USA v. Lipscomb" on Justia Law

Petitioner was convicted of capital murder and sentenced to death by a Texas court in 1991. The United States Supreme Court ordered Petitioner resentenced in 2007. After he was sentenced to death a second time, Petitioner exhausted his state remedies and then petitioned for federal habeas relief. The district court denied his petition and did not certify any questions for appellate review. Petitioner sought a certificate of appealability (“COA”).   The Fifth Circuit denied Petitioner’s application for a COA. The court explained that the district court found the state court’s rejection of prejudice to be reasonable under Strickland, especially considering the jury’s opportunity to assess Petitioner’s credibility in light of the eyewitness description of the crime’s brutality. No reasonable jurist could find the district court’s assessment debatable or wrong. Further, the court reasoned that reasonable jurists could not debate the district court’s conclusion that, as evidenced in extremely thorough opinions by the state court and magistrate judge, the state court reasonably applied Strickland in holding that trial counsel was not ineffective in preparing and presenting a mitigation defense. View "Brewer v. Lumpkin" on Justia Law

Defendant was a local law-enforcement agent who worked as a taskforce officer with the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA). Defendant was charged with stealing money and property from arrestees, as well as destroying evidence of those activities. A jury found Defendant guilty on all counts. Following the verdict, Defendant asserted that one of the jurors (“Juror”) had failed to disclose his acquaintance with Defendant and Defendant’s wife, and Defendant moved for a new trial on the basis of juror bias. The district court denied the motion and sentenced Defendant to twenty-seven months of imprisonment. Defendant argued that the Juror’s prior romantic relationship with Defendant’s wife necessitated, at a minimum, a questioning before the court.” Defendant asserted that such questioning would reveal that the Juror was actually biased, entitling Defendant to a new trial.   The Fifth Circuit remanded for the district court to hold an evidentiary hearing on the question of juror bias. The court explained that although not every claim of actual bias on behalf of a juror militates a hearing, the district court here abused its discretion by ruling on the motion for a new trial without holding an evidentiary hearing. Defendant has established that the Juror and Defendant’s wife were friends in high school, that the Juror attended Defendant’s wedding, and that the Juror and Defendant’s wife communicated over social media up until Defendant was indicted. The Juror failed to reveal any of this information during voir dire. Accordingly, the court held that Defendant made a sufficient showing to entitle him to a hearing on his juror bias claim. View "USA v. Gemar" on Justia Law

Plaintiff spent more than twelve years in state prison because of his wrongful conviction for two murders. In 2015, the state district court granted the Harris County District Attorney’s motion to dismiss the charges against Plaintiff and Plaintiff was released from prison. Plaintiff filed a petition with the Texas Office of the Comptroller for compensation under the Tim Cole Act, which provides state compensation to individuals who have been wrongfully convicted of state crimes in state courts. His petition was denied because (1) it was not based on a finding that Plaintiff was “actually innocent,” (2) Plaintiff had not received a pardon, and (3) the district attorney had not filed a qualifying motion. While Plaintiff was pursuing compensation under the Tim Cole Act, he brought a 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 action in federal district court. The federal district court granted summary judgment in favor of Defendants and dismissed the remainder of Plaintiff’s 1983 claims.   The Fifth Circuit previously certified a question to the Texas Supreme Court in this matter, asking whether the Tim Cole Act bars maintenance of a federal lawsuit involving the same subject matter that was filed before the claimant received compensation under the Tim Cole Act. Having received a response from the Texas Supreme Court in the affirmative, the Fifth Circuit affirmed. In light of this clarified meaning of Section 103.153(b) of the Tim Cole Act, the court analyzed the district court’s grant of Defendants summary judgment motion and found that Plaintiff’s federal lawsuit is barred by his acceptance of Tim Cole Act compensation. View "Brown v. City of Houston" on Justia Law

SR Construction held a lien on real property owned by RE Palm Springs II. The property owner is a corporate affiliate of Hall Palm Springs LLC, who had financed the original undertaking for a separate real estate developer. The latter requested leave of the bankruptcy court to submit a credit bid to purchase the property from its affiliate, which the bankruptcy court granted. The bankruptcy court later approved the sale and discharged all liens. The construction company appealed the bankruptcy court’s credit-bid and sale orders. Finding that the lender was a good faith purchaser, the district court affirmed the bankruptcy court and dismissed the appeal as moot under Bankruptcy Code Section 363(m).   The Fifth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that the pandemic dramatically changed not only the lender’s plans for the Property but it also severely impacted the affiliate’s ability to market and sell a hotel, particularly an unfinished one. In sum, these two factors must also be weighed in considering whether any of the actions or procedures, particularly with regard to pricing or timing issues, were performed in bad faith or as a result of sub-optimal external forces beyond the lender’s control. The court explained that the record facts, framed by the external context and circumstances, make plain that there is no error in the judgments of the able bankruptcy and district courts. Accordingly, the court held that the lender did not engage in fraud and was a “good faith purchaser.” View "SR Construction v. Hall Palm Springs" on Justia Law

This appeal arises from Plaintiff’s suit against the City of Harahan (“the City”) for its alleged deprivation of his Fourteenth Amendment right to due process. In October 2019, the Harahan Police Department (“HPD”) Chief of Police determined that Plaintiff was guilty of numerous offenses. Plaintiff was entitled to a fifteen-day appeal window of the Chief’s disciplinary determinations. Plaintiff exercised his right to appeal a week after the charges. However, the Chief emailed the Jefferson Parish District Attorney’s office (“JPDA”) to inform it of his disciplinary action against Plaintiff before he exercised his right. Plaintiff brought a civil rights suit against the City for violation of his procedural due process rights, stigma-plus-infringement, and defamation. He included Louisiana state law claims for defamation, invasion of privacy, and negligence. The City moved to dismiss his Section 1983 claims under Rule 12(c). The primary issue is whether the district court erroneously determined that Plaintiff had a liberty interest in his “future employment as a law enforcement officer.   The Fifth Circuit reversed the district court’s denial of the City’s Rule 12(c) motion and dismissed Plaintiff’s due process claim. The court explained that Plaintiff’s alleged liberty interest in his career in law enforcement has no basis in Supreme Court or Fifth Circuit precedent. Moreover, he does not provide a different constitutional anchor for this proposed liberty interest. Because he fails to state facts supporting the violation of a cognizable liberty interest, he fails to plead a due process violation. Furthermore, the court declined to address the adequacy of the process he received. View "Adams v. City of Harahan" on Justia Law

During a routine traffic stop, Houston Police Officer fatally shot a man. Plaintiffs, including the parents and estate of the victim, brought multiple claims against the officer who fatally shot the man, two other police officers, and the city. The individual defendants claimed qualified immunity. The district court, in ruling on a motion to dismiss in response to Plaintiffs’ complaint, dismissed Plaintiffs' claims. Plaintiffs appealed the dismissal and requested reassignment to a different district judge. The Fifth Circuit agreed with Plaintiffs that the dismissal of the Section 1983 claims against Defendant for excessive force, denial of medical care, and unlawful arrest was an error. The court reversed and remanded those claims. The court explained that taking as true that Defendant had no reason to believe the man was armed and that the shooting officer knew the man was seriously injured and likely could not move, a police officer would know, under these precedents, that to handcuff the man was an arrest without probable cause under clearly established law. The court affirmed the dismissal of Plaintiffs’ remaining claims is affirmed. The court denied, as moot, Plaintiffs’ request for reassignment to a new judge. View "Allen v. Hays" on Justia Law

Louisiana passed the Truth in Labeling of Food Products Act (the “Act”) to “protect consumers from misleading and false labeling of food products that are edible by humans.” The Act bars, among other things, the intentional “misbranding or misrepresenting of any food product as an agricultural product” through several different labeling practices. Turtle Island Foods, S.P.C. (d/b/a Tofurky), markets and sells its products in Louisiana. Tofurky believes it operates under a constant threat of enforcement. Tofurky sued Louisiana’s Commissioner of Agriculture and Forestry, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment, and the district court sided with Tofurky. It held that Tofurky had standing to challenge the Act and that the statute was an unconstitutional restriction on Tofurky’s right to free speech. The State appealed.   The Fifth Circuit reversed. The court explained that nothing in the statute’s language requires the State to enforce its punitive provisions on a company that sells its products in a way that just so happens to confuse a consumer. The State’s construction limits the Act’s scope to representations by companies that actually intend consumers to be misled about whether a product is an “agricultural product” when it is not. This interpretation is not contradictory to the Act, and the court thus accepted it for the present purposes of evaluating Tofurky’s facial challenge. The district court erred in ignoring the State’s limiting construction and in implementing its own interpretation of the Act. View "Turtle Island Foods v. Strain" on Justia Law