Justia U.S. 5th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Without a plea agreement, Defendant pleaded guilty to carjacking resulting in serious bodily injury and discharging a firearm in furtherance of a crime of violence or a drug trafficking crime. The district court sentenced him to 30 years in prison. Defendant challenged the sufficiency of the factual basis to which he pleaded guilty and the reasonableness of his sentence.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed. The court held that the factual basis supports Defendant’s guilty plea, and the district court’s imposition of an upward variance was neither procedurally nor substantively unreasonable. The court concluded that the district court articulated the fact-specific reasons in support of a non-Guidelines sentence, committed no legal error in the procedure followed in arriving at the sentence, and gave appropriate reasons for its imposition. Accordingly, the sentencing court is owed “great deference,” and Defendant has not shown that his sentence is procedurally unreasonable.   The court further explained that Defendant did not show that the court’s analysis failed to take into account a factor that should have received significant weight, gave weight to an irrelevant or improper factor, or represented a clear error of judgment in balancing the sentencing factors and other relevant considerations. Thus, in applying a deferential standard of review to the district court’s consideration of the totality of the circumstances, as required, the court held that the district court’s upward-variance sentence was substantively reasonable. View "USA v. Jones" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm and received a sentencing enhancement for possessing a gun “in connection with” drug trafficking. Defendant raised two challenges to his sentence.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed, holding that the district court applied the Sentencing Guidelines and did not clearly err in its factfinding. The court explained that Defendant correctly received a four-level sentencing enhancement if he possessed a firearm in connection with a drug trafficking offense. The court reasoned that a firearm is “automatically” connected to drug trafficking if it is found in close proximity to drugs or drug paraphernalia, and there is no serious dispute that Defendant’s firearm was in close proximity to his drugs, grinder and scale.   Further, Defendant argued that the automatic enhancement prescribed by Application Note 14(B) is an unreasonable expansion of the Guidelines’ text under Kisor v. Wilkie. The court noted that first, the district court was entitled to find that Defendant committed a drug trafficking offense. Mere possession of a controlled substance with an intent to distribute qualifies as a “drug trafficking offense.” Moreover, Defendant alleged that he expressly told the officers at the traffic stop that the drugs were just for personal use. But there is nothing in the record to support that. Finally, Defendant reasoned that because he was homeless, he was less capable of trafficking. But the United States cites Defendant’s lack of gainful employment as evidence for trafficking—he had an obvious motive to turn drugs for profit. View "USA v. Choulat" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to one count of identity theft and one count of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. The district court found the calculated guidelines range of 15 to 21 months to be “woefully unreasonable” and varied upwards to a total of 72 months of imprisonment, which consisted of a sentence of 36 months for the identity theft offense and a concurrent sentence of 72 months for the firearm offense. On appeal, Defendant challenged only the substantive reasonableness of the 72-month sentence for the firearm offense.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed. The court concluded that Defendant has not shown that the district court abused its discretion. The court also concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion by giving significant weight to Defendant’s prior marijuana importation offense, which is the predicate offense for his firearm conviction, and to the statements of the victim of the identity theft. Finally, Defendant has not shown that the district court made a clear error of judgment in balancing the sentencing factors of Section 3553(a), and the court declined to reweigh those factors. View "USA v. Cortez-Balderas" on Justia Law

A grand jury indicted a doctor and two pharmacists (collectively, “Appellants” or “Defendants”) for roles in a “pill-mill” operation. Prosecutors charged Appellants with three drug-distribution conspiracies that each spanned from 2011 to 2020. The pharmacists, who both owned pharmacies, were also charged with possession with intent to distribute controlled substances. At trial, the Government offered extensive evidence, including text messages, wiretaps, surveillance, cooperator testimony, and records from Defendants’ businesses and homes. The jury found Defendants guilty on all counts. The district court sentenced the doctor and one of the pharmacists to 240 months imprisonment and the other pharmacist to 151 months. Defendants timely appealed.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that there is sufficient evidence for a jury to draw reasonable inferences to support Appellants’ convictions. The pharmacist and doctor failed to make the showings necessary to warrant plain error reversal. The pharmacist’s refusal to be represented by her retained attorney amounted to a knowing and voluntary waiver of counsel. The pharmacist failed to show the necessary prejudice for her challenges to the denial of a continuance, as well as permitting a DEA agent to authenticate her signature as a lay witness. The Government’s closing argument was consistent with the evidence. The record is not sufficiently developed to evaluate the doctor’s IAC claim. View "USA v. Capistrano" on Justia Law

Defendant was indicted on one count of being a felon in possession of a firearm. He moved to suppress the evidence of the weapon, claiming that the gun was the fruit of an unlawful seizure because the officer lacked reasonable suspicion to initiate a “Terry stop.” The district court orally denied the motion to suppress after a live hearing based on testimony from the officer and the tipster. Defendant entered a conditional guilty plea, reserving the right to appeal the denial. After the court entered a judgment of conviction, Defendant timely appealed.The Fifth Circuit concluded that the police had reasonable suspicion to seize Defendant and thus lawfully obtained the incriminating evidence from his car. The court further affirmed the judgment of conviction. The court explained that the contemporaneous tip, the visual details that the officer confirmed, the high-crime area, and Defendant’s evasive response to police presence was enough to give an officer articulable suspicion that crime was occurring (or was about to occur). To conclude otherwise would raise the bar of reasonable suspicion and hamper law enforcement from engaging in essential investigatory actions. View "USA v. Wright" on Justia Law

The Jefferson Parish School Board (JPSB) separately suspended two students for individually having a BB gun visible during virtual school. Each student’s family sued the school board, in part seeking a declaration that the school board’s virtual learning disciplinary policy is unconstitutional. Louisiana intervened, agreeing with the families on the constitutionality of JPSB’s policy and separately challenging JPSB’s disciplinary actions as ultra vires. JPSB settled with the families, ending the private suits. Louisiana wants to continue the case, citing its broad interest in compliance with its laws. The question before us is whether Louisiana has standing to do so.   The Fifth Circuit concluded that Louisiana does not have Article III standing and remanded the case to the district court to send back to the capable Louisiana state courts. The court explained that this case lies outside the limits of Article III standing. States undoubtedly have an interest in enforcing their laws. But when it comes to federal courts, Louisiana must claim an injury to a traditional, sovereign interest to invoke Article III jurisdiction. The two are distinctly dissimilar. Louisiana fails to point to “any precedent, history, or tradition,” establishing that its interest in compliance with its laws is the equivalent of an Article III sovereign interest in maintaining its right to govern in the face of competing authority. The state similarly fails to establish an injury to an established quasi-sovereign interest sufficient to show parens patriae standing. Louisiana’s claim of injury to a proprietary interest also falls short. View "LA State v. Jefferson Parish Sch" on Justia Law

Plaintiff was repeatedly tased while he was a pretrial detainee at the McLennan County jail in Waco, Texas. Plaintiff insists that he did nothing to warrant the use of force—that he was neither threatening nor resisting the officer who tased him. The principal question on appeal is whether Plaintiff has presented sufficient evidence to defeat summary judgment on his ensuing civil rights claims.   The Fifth Circuit reversed summary judgment on Plaintiff’s excessive force claim against Defendant and remanded that claim to the district court for trial. The court reversed and remanded the district court’s grant of summary judgment on Plaintiff’s policy and practice claims to afford Plaintiff the opportunity to discover evidence relevant to those claims. But the court affirmed the dismissal of Plaintiff’s deliberate indifference claim. The court denied the motion to dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. The court held that a rational jury could find that Defendant’s decision to tase Plaintiff was not justified by any exigency, in which case Defendant’s qualified immunity defense would not shield him from liability because the court’s precedents clearly establish that resort to force in such circumstances is unconstitutional.   Further, the court wrote that it was inappropriate for the court to then dismiss Plaintiff’s policy and practice claims on the ground that Plaintiff failed to present “adequate summary judgment evidence of any official or unofficial policy,” depriving him of his rights. If a jury finds, as it could, that Defendant tased a non-threatening, compliant inmate, then he is not entitled to qualified immunity. View "Boyd v. McNamara" on Justia Law

Appellant was indicted for intentionally causing the death of another by setting her on fire during a robbery. The jury found him guilty of capital murder, as alleged in the indictment. Appellant challenged the validity of his conviction and sentence in a state habeas proceeding, and the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals denied relief. Appellant filed an application for a certificate of appealability and appealed the district court's denial of his motion to recuse.   The Fifth Circuit denied the application for a certificate of appealability and affirmed the district court’s denial of the motion to recuse. The court explained that Appellant cited no governing legal authority recognizing the right to delay his briefing until the final day of AEDPA’s one-year statute of limitations. On the contrary, it is firmly established that a district court has “the inherent authority to manage their dockets and courtrooms with a view toward the efficient and expedient resolution of cases.” The district court noted that Appellant’s counsel might be acting contrary to Rule 11(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which requires counsel to certify that “the claims, defenses, and other legal contentions are warranted by existing law or by a nonfrivolous argument for extending, modifying, or reversing existing law or for establishing new law.” Given the district court’s explanation, the court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Appellant’s motion to recuse. Accordingly, the court held that these do not debatably give rise to a claim for relief. View "Johnson v. Lumpkin" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs claimed law enforcement officers violated the Constitution when they responded to a detainee’s epileptic seizure in a jail cell by restraining and tasing him several times. The district court either dismissed or granted summary judgment on all claims in favor of the Defendants.   The Fifth Circuit reversed the grant of qualified immunity for the individual Defendant Officers as to the Section 1983 claims and the grant of summary judgment on the claims for bystander liability. The court affirmed the grant of summary judgment on municipal liability and on the claims under the Americans with Disabilities Act and Rehabilitation Act. The court explained that the record is insufficient to support a jury question that the use-of-force and ECW policies were so vague that they amounted to no policy at all. These policies “may have been inadequate,” and while a jury might conclude that the City was negligent in not requiring Plaintiffs’ specified actions, “that, of course, is not enough under Section 1983.” The court explained that without evidence showing that the higher level of care was obviously necessary, we cannot see how the jury could conclude that the use-of-force and ECW policies were deliberately indifferent. Accordingly, there was no substantial evidence that such a policy would obviously lead to the violation of pre-trial detainees’ constitutional rights. Further, the court found that Plaintiffs cite no binding caselaw in which liability under the ADA and RA has been extended to a context similar to this one. View "Austin v. City of Pasadena" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a Section 1983 civil rights suit in Louisiana state court against Louisiana Department of Public Safety and Corrections Secretary James LeBlanc. Among other claims, Plaintiff argued that LeBlanc violated his constitutional rights by misclassifying him as a sex offender and thereby illegally extending his detention in prison for 337 days past his release date. LeBlanc sought dismissal based on qualified immunity, but the district court denied the motion. LeBlanc argued that this complaint did not adequately allege the requisite “pattern” of constitutional violations by untrained employees “ordinarily necessary” under Connick to establish deliberate indifference for purposes of failure to train.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed. The court agreed with Plaintiff that his complaint sufficiently alleges the requisite “pattern” of constitutional violations by untrained employees to establish deliberate indifference for purposes of failure to train. Further, the court held that there is sufficient clearly established law regarding the constitutional right to a timely release from prison and that Plaintiff has sufficiently argued a violation of the right. Accordingly, construing the allegations in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, the court agreed they are sufficient to support the argument that LeBlanc had fair warning’ that his failure to address this delay would deny prisoners like Plaintiff their immediate or near-immediate release upon conviction. View "Parker v. LeBlanc" on Justia Law