Justia U.S. 5th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The issue before the court is whether Plaintiff, an inmate incarcerated in Gatesville, Texas, has a right to be heard before the prison decides whether to approve or deny her request to transfer money from her inmate trust account to an outside bank account. The district court answered no and granted summary judgment to the Appellees.   The Fifth Circuit vacated and reversed. The court wrote that Plaintiff provided evidence that her procedural due process rights were violated, which precludes summary judgment. The court explained that Plaintiff’s property interests were undoubtedly at stake, and, considering the evidence that was before the district court, it cannot be said as a matter of law that the procedures were adequate, there were alternative safeguards, or that the administrative burden would be too great. It is up to a factfinder to determine whether Plaintiff can prove her case. Accordingly, the court held that the district court erred in not vacating the judgment and granting Plaintiff leave to amend her pleadings. View "Calhoun v. Collier" on Justia Law

Defendant, a lawful permanent resident of the United States, was charged with importation of a controlled substance in violation of 21 U.S.C. Section 952(a). Her lawyer told her that if she pleaded guilty, it was “very likely” that she would be deported. She nonetheless entered the plea. Defendant then learned that her offense did not just possibly make her deportable, it automatically did so. She then moved to withdraw her plea, alleging that if she had known the full scope of the immigration consequences of her plea, she would not have entered it. The district court denied Defendant’s motion and sentenced her. Defendant appealed. At issue is whether a lawyer’s warning of “very likely” deportation satisfies the right to effective assistance of counsel.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that when defense counsel tells an alien client that a conviction will have serious immigration consequences, including “very likely” deportation, that defendant has received sufficient advice to make an informed plea decision, as required by the Sixth Amendment. The court explained that there is some ambiguity about what specific words Defendant’s lawyer used when explaining to her the immigration consequences of the plea. But the district court’s factual finding—which is reviewed only for clear error—suggests the following bottom line: Defendant’s lawyer put her on notice of the risk of serious immigration consequences, including deportation. Accordingly, the court concluded that the district court therefore did not abuse its discretion in denying Defendant’s motion to withdraw her plea. View "USA v. Armendariz" on Justia Law

Plaintiff brought an action against Defendants-Appellees Holy Cross College, Inc. and Congregation of Holy Cross Moreau Province, Inc. (collectively, “Holy Cross”) in the district court. Plaintiff alleged that he suffered from sexual abuse carried out by Holy Cross teacher on two separate occasions while attending summer camp at Holy Cross as a 10- or 11-year-old boy in either 1968 or 1969. Plaintiff asserted that Holy Cross is liable for the teacher’s conduct under the doctrine of respondeat superior. At the time of the alleged abuse, such an offense was subject to a one-year liberative prescriptive period. Plaintiff invoked the Revival Provision as his basis to bring a suit. The district court granted Holy Cross’s motion and dismissed Plaintiff’s complaint.   The Fifth Circuit vacated and remanded. The court explained that while the appeal was pending, the Louisiana Supreme Court issued its decision in T.S v. Congregation of Holy Cross Southern Province, Inc., 2023 WL 4195778. The court wrote that with the benefit of the T.S. decision, the court is now certain as to how this case should be resolved under Louisiana law. As previously noted, the facts of both cases are nearly identical. Therefore, it is apparent that the district court should not have ruled on the Revival Provision’s constitutionality. Instead, it is now clear that the Revival Provision’s wording makes it inapplicable to Plaintiff’s claims. Accordingly, his complaint should be dismissed for that sole reason. The court directed that on remand, the district court may consider whether Plaintiff should be provided with leave to amend his complaint. View "Lousteau v. Holy Cross College" on Justia Law

A school resource officer tased a special-needs student who physically struggled with school staff while attempting to leave school following a violent episode. The student’s mother sued the officer and the school district, bringing constitutional claims under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 and disability discrimination claims under the Americans with Disabilities Act and the Rehabilitation Act.  The district court granted summary judgment to the officer and school district.   The Fifth Circuit concluded, based on recent Supreme Court precedent, that the district court incorrectly subjected the disability discrimination claims to administrative exhaustion. On the merits, however, the district court correctly granted summary judgment to the officer and school district. The court explained that the officer’s use of his taser in this situation was poor judgment, especially after Plaintiff’s son had ceased struggling. However, the court explained that Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act and Title II of the ADA are not the proper vehicles for remedying “all unreasonable, inappropriate, unprofessional, and/or unduly harsh conduct by public agents. View "W. v. Paley" on Justia Law

Plaintiff y filed suit under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983, alleging violations of his First and Fourth Amendment rights when he was arrested as a terrorist for a post on Facebook. The district court granted Detective Randall Iles and Sheriff Mark Wood’s motion for summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds and dismissed Bailey’s claims with prejudice.   The Fifth Circuit reversed the grant of summary judgment. The court held that Plaintiff’s post was constitutionally protected speech and that the grant of summary judgment was improper. The court explained that regardless of the unnamed deputy’s comment, Iles admitted that he arrested Plaintiff at least in part because of the content of his Facebook post, rather than for some other conduct, i.e. Iles admitted that the arrest was at least “substantially motivated” by Plaintiff’s speech. Further, there is t no dispute as to the second element, as Plaintiff’s speech was chilled when he deleted his Facebook post in response to the arrest. Thus, when Iles arrested Plaintiff, he violated Plaintiff’s clearly established First Amendment right to engage in speech even when some listeners consider the speech offensive, upsetting, immature, in poor taste, or even dangerous. View "Bailey v. Iles" on Justia Law

Plaintiff sued two Texas state officials, asserting that they violated his right to procedural due process when they notified him that he was required to register as a sex offender under Texas law. After a bench trial, the district court entered judgment in Plaintiff’s favor.   The Fifth Circuit vacated and remanded. The court concluded that Plaintiff’s suit is barred by sovereign immunity. The court explained that Sovereign immunity under the Eleventh Amendment precludes suits by private citizens against states in federal court. This bar extends not only to the state itself, but also to claims against “state officials” in their official capacity when the state is the real party in interest. The court explained that here, Plaintiff is suing state officials who have not waived sovereign immunity. Accordingly, his claims are barred in federal court unless an exception to sovereign immunity applies. Moreover, the court explained that because the district court’s order invalidated a federal statute—instead of affirming it—invoking the exception here would not advance Ex parte Young’s aim of “promoting the vindication of federal rights.” View "Tawakkol v. Vasquez" on Justia Law

Defendant was indicted for knowingly possessing “material”— a cell phone—that contained child pornography. Even though the phone had thousands of such images, the indictment specifically described only four. Defendant pleaded guilty under a plea agreement. After sentencing, the district court ordered Defendant to pay restitution to several individual victims whose likenesses appeared in some images from Defendant’s phone. But these images were among those that the indictment did not specifically describe. Defendant argued that restitution is available only to victims who appeared in the four images specified in the indictment.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that the indictment charged Defendant with a crime, but Defendant has identified no rule or statute that would require the indictment to also include descriptions of all the images or all the victims. The court explained that, on the contrary, the indictment tracks the statute’s language: “Specifically, Defendant possessed one Motorola Moto G Stylus android cellular phone that contained the following described image files visually depicting a prepubescent minor engaged in sexually explicit conduct . . . .” The object of the possession in the indictment is clearly the “Motorola Moto G Stylus,” not any of the images. The court wrote that the statute criminalizes possession of material containing child pornography. The phone was that “material,” no matter whether it contained one image or twenty thousand. Thus, the court concluded that there was no error with the district court’s finding and amount of restitution. View "USA v. Bopp" on Justia Law

Louisiana challenged the district court’s grant of habeas relief to an inmate who had been convicted of first-degree murder and sentenced to death in 2009. The district court held that the ineffective assistance of trial counsel prejudiced the defense. The State argued that the district court applied the incorrect standard of review under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 and that the district court improperly granted habeas relief due to ineffective assistance of counsel under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).   The Fifth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that in reviewing an ineffectiveness claim, the court must weigh the evidence that was unaffected by the alleged error, along with the evidence that was affected by the error and the degree to which it was affected, and then assess whether the petitioner “has met the burden of showing that the decision reached would reasonably likely have been different absent the errors.”   Here, the State argued that because a jury might have found that Petitioner shot at law enforcement vehicles during the police chase, it would have imputed specific intent to kill the victim. The court wrote that it agreed with Petitioner that this theory is not supported by Louisiana law. Further, the court explained that the three key pieces of evidence, at the very least, create a “reasonable probability that, absent the errors, the factfinder would have had a reasonable doubt respecting guilt.” Accordingly, the court concluded that Petitioner has carried his burden of proving there is a reasonable probability that his convictions and death sentence were prejudiced as a result of his counsel’s deficient performance. View "Neal v. Vannoy" on Justia Law

Defendant was one of Pizza Hut L.L.C.’s largest franchisees in Pennsylvania, operating 43 restaurants there (plus one in Connecticut). Ultimately, though, Defendant failed to fulfill his contractual obligations, so Pizza Hut terminated the parties’ various franchise agreements. Hoping to keep the restaurants open, Pizza Hut entered into two post-termination agreements with Defendant for him to continue operating the restaurants while the parties tried to find a buyer. The first agreement was unsuccessful. The second ended in this litigation. After several rounds of pleading, Defendant demanded a jury trial. Pizza Hut moved to strike the request under the second post-termination agreement’s bilateral jury waiver. The district court enforced the waiver, and the case continued to a bench trial in which Pizza Hut prevailed. The only issue on appeal is whether the district court erred in striking Defendant’s jury demand.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed. The Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial is unassailable but not unwaivable. Courts have long honored parties’ agreements to waive the jury right if the waiver is knowing and voluntary. The court explained that it follows its sister circuits in holding that general allegations of fraud do not render contractual jury waivers unknowing and involuntary unless those claims are directed at the waiver provision specifically. Because Defendant failed to show that the jury waiver was unknowing and involuntary. View "Pizza Hut v. Pandya" on Justia Law

Defendants, game wardens with the Texas Parks and Wildlife Department, appealed the district court’s denial of qualified immunity as to Plaintiff’s Section 1983 claims against them.   The Fifth Circuit reversed and rendered judgment for Defendants. The court concluded that Plaintiff has not plausibly alleged that Defendant violated his constitutional rights. The court explained that because Plaintiff does not allege that Defendants knowingly withheld relevant, material information from the grand jury, he has not shown that the independent intermediary’s deliberations or decisions were tainted. Accordingly, the independent-intermediary doctrine defeats Plaintiff’s allegations that there was no probable cause to prosecute him and insulates Defendants from liability. The court wrote that this conclusion applies with equal force to Plaintiff’s claims for both retaliatory prosecution and prosecution without probable cause. View "Trevino v. Iden" on Justia Law