Justia U.S. 5th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff is a devout Rastafarian who vowed to “let the locks of the hair of his head grow,” a promise known as the Nazarite Vow. During his brief stint in prison, Plaintiff was primarily housed at two facilities, and each facility respected Plaintiff’s vow. With only three weeks left in his sentence—Plaintiff was transferred to RLCC. Plaintiff explained that he was a practicing Rastafarian and provided proof of past religious accommodations. And Plaintiff also handed the guard a copy of the Fifth Circuit’s decision in Ware v. Louisiana Department of Corrections. The guard threw Plaintiff’s papers in the trash and summoned RLCC’s warden. When the Warden arrived, he demanded Plaintiff hand over documentation from his sentencing judge that corroborated his religious beliefs. Guards then carried him into another room, handcuffed him to a chair, held him down, and shaved his head. Plaintiff brought claims under RLUIPA and Section 1983. He also pleaded state law claims for negligence, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and violations of the Louisiana constitution. The district court agreed with Defendants and held that those claims were moot. Plaintiff appealed.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed. The court concluded that while Sossamon I RLUIPA’s text suggests a damages remedy, recognizing as much would run afoul of the Spending Clause. Tanzin doesn’t change that—it addresses a different law that was enacted under a separate Congressional power with “concerns not relevant to [RLUIPA].” Accordingly, the court held because Sossamon I remains the law, Plaintiff cannot recover monetary damages against the defendant-officials in their individual capacities under RLUIPA. View "Landor v. Louisiana Dept of Corrections" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to possession with intent to distribute a mixture or substance containing a detectable amount of methamphetamine and was sentenced to 188 months of imprisonment, to be served consecutively to any sentence imposed in two unrelated state proceedings, and three years of supervised release. The Fifth Circuit dismissed his appeal, and the Supreme Court denied certiorari. Defendant then filed a 28 U.S.C. Section 2255 motion seeking relief from his plea. The district court denied the motion, and Defendant appealed.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed the denial of the Section 2255 motion. However, the court noted that this case reveals uncertainty in its caselaw regarding argument forfeiture, ineffective assistance of counsel (“IAC”) in guilty pleas, and the nature of non-constitutional appeals in Section 2255 proceedings. The court explained that there are three issues. First, whether Defendant forfeited his argument that his counsel was ineffective in advising him about his guideline range. The court held that the answer was no. Second, the court explained that assuming that it reaches the merits of Defendant’s claim, whether he can prevail on it. Again, the court answered no. And third, whether Defendant is entitled to a COA on whether the district court abused its discretion by denying discovery.  The court explained that by treating Defendant’s request for a COA as a direct appeal, the district court did not abuse its discretion. Moreover, the court explained that it has now rejected Defendant’s guidelines-advice claim, and there is no indication either in his briefing or in the record that the discovery he seeks would conceivably produce a different result. View "USA v. Lincks" on Justia Law

The Verona Police Department twice arrested L.B. for his connection to violent shootings. Both times, however, he was released while his charges were pending. Just five months after his second arrest, L.B. drove to Annie Walton’s house and opened fire—killing Annie Walton and injuring her grandson, Aliven Walton. Annie Walton’s wrongful death beneficiaries (collectively, Plaintiffs ) believe the City of Verona and the Verona Chief of Police, J.B. Long, are responsible for the shooting at Annie Walton’s home, so they sued under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 and the Mississippi Tort Claims Act. At summary judgment, the district court initially dismissed all claims. But Plaintiffs filed a motion for reconsideration, and the district court reversed course—finding the City of Verona was not entitled to sovereign immunity under the Mississippi Tort Claims Act. Plaintiffs and the City of Verona subsequently filed interlocutory appeals.   The Fifth Circuit dismissed Plaintiffs appeal for lack of jurisdiction and reversed the district court’s finding against the City regarding sovereign immunity. The court explained that Long had no special duty to protect Plaintiffs besides his general duty to keep the public safe as the City’s Chief of Police. The court explained that the only evidence that demonstrates Long had knowledge of any connection between L.B. and Plaintiffs comes from Long’s investigative file, where there is a copy of a trespassing complaint that Annie filed against L.B. in 2016. Accordingly, the court held Long did not owe a duty to protect Plaintiffs from L.B.’s drive-by shooting. Thus, Plaintiffs cannot sustain their negligence claims or their MTCA claims against the City. View "Walton v. City of Verona" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs—three doctors, a news website, a healthcare activist, and two states—had posts and stories removed or downgraded by the platforms. Their content touched on a host of divisive topics. Plaintiffs maintain that although the platforms stifled their speech, the government officials were the ones pulling the strings. They sued the officials for First Amendment violations and asked the district court to enjoin the officials’ conduct. In response, the officials argued that they only “sought to mitigate the hazards of online misinformation” by “calling attention to content” that violated the “platforms’ policies,” a form of permissible government speech. The district court agreed with Plaintiffs and granted preliminary injunctive relief. In reaching that decision, it reviewed the conduct of several federal offices but only enjoined the White House, the Surgeon General, the CDC, the FBI, the National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases (NIAID), the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), and the Department of State.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed in part, reversed in part, vacated the injunction in part, and modified the injunction in part. The court explained that the White House officials, in conjunction with the Surgeon General’s office, coerced and significantly encouraged the platforms to moderate content. As a result, the platforms’ actions “must in law be deemed to be that of the State.” Further, the court held that the CDC officials likely significantly encouraged the platforms’ moderation decisions. However, the court found that for the NIAID officials, it is not apparent that they ever communicated with the social media platforms. View "State of Missouri v. Biden" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty, pursuant to a plea agreement, to conspiracy to participate in a racketeering enterprise. Defendant waived the preparation of a presentence report (PSR), and the district court determined that a PSR was not necessary. The district court proceeded to sentencing directly after taking Defendant’s guilty plea. Pursuant to the Rule 11(c)(1)(C) plea agreement, Defendant was sentenced to 360 months of imprisonment and 5 years of supervised release. As part of his supervised release term, the district court stated that Defendant was “subject to the standard conditions.” Defendant’s written judgment included a list of the fifteen “standard” conditions of supervision listed in the Southern District of Texas’s standing order. Defendant appealed.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that it discerned no error in the district court’s oral imposition of the standard conditions of supervised release contained in the district’s standing order, which mirror the conditions then listed in the written judgment. Furthermore, the court explained that even if it assumes the first three prongs of the plain-error test, Defendant has not met his burden in demonstrating that any claimed error affected “the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” View "USA v. Reyna" on Justia Law

Plaintiff brought a claim under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 and Louisiana state law against Louisiana Department of Public Safety and Corrections (“DPSC”) supervisory officials Tracy DiBenedetto, Angela Griffin, and Sally Gryder in their individual capacities alleging that he was wrongfully detained for sixty days after the expiration of his prison sentence. The district court denied qualified immunity at the motion-to-dismiss stage for DiBenedetto and Gryder but found Griffin enjoys qualified immunity. DiBenedetto and Gryder appealed, arguing that they are entitled to qualified immunity because they neither violated Plaintiff’s constitutional rights nor acted unreasonably in light of clearly established law   The Fifth Circuit affirmed. The court first explained that Plaintiff’s right to timely release was clearly established under these particular circumstances because governing law required DPSC to follow the state court’s orders requiring them to credit the Arkansas time. Further, the court found that Plaintiff plausibly alleged that DiBenedetto and Gryder were direct participants in violating his right to timely release from prison. According to the complaint, DiBenedetto reviewed all of Plaintiff’s ARPs, knew he was not being credited for the Arkansas time, yet did not take any action to correct the error. Indeed, she personally informed Hicks that her (incorrect) calculation was correct and refused to modify it despite Hicks’ pointing out that his Arkansas time was not credited. View "Hicks v. LeBlanc" on Justia Law

Defendant was found guilty by jury of conspiring with intent to distribute cocaine and distributing a detectable amount of a substance containing cocaine base. Defendant was sentenced under 21 U.S.C. 841(b)(1)(A), which requires the Government must show that a defendant knew that the conspiracy involved a minimum quantity of the controlled substance. Defendant was sentenced to 480 months imprisonment on the first count and 240 months on the second.Defendant appealed on several sentencing-related issues: (1) the district court imposed a “trial penalty” in sentencing him; (2) the district court erred in determining the quantity of drugs attributable to him, (3) the propriety of the jury charge and verdict form; and (4) the district court imposed a substantively unreasonable sentence.The Fifth Circuit affirmed. The judge's comments referring to various codefendants' cooperative efforts did not indicate the court imposed a trial penalty. Further, a participant in a drug conspiracy is responsible for all drug quantities with which he was “directly involved,” as well as for quantities “involved in transactions carried out by other participants. Moreover, there was overwhelming evidence that Defendant “knew or should have known [the drug amount that] was involved in the conspiracy[.]” View "USA v. Hill" on Justia Law

Petitioner was convicted of capital murder by a Texas jury and sentenced to death. He later filed an application in district court for habeas relief. In an earlier appeal, because his initial counsel had a conflict of interest, the Fifth Circuit remanded for appointment of additional counsel and further development of potential claims of ineffective trial counsel. An amended application was filed, but the district court rejected all the new claims.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment and denied Petitioner’s motion for a Rhines stay. The court explained that as to the four claims for which the district court granted a COA, Petitioner has not shown that trial counsel’s actions in investigating, compiling, and presenting mens rea and mitigating evidence fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. As to the remaining claims for which the court granted a COA, the court found that Petitioner has not shown that trial counsel was ineffective for presenting the expert witness’s testimony, and Petitioner’s request for a Rhines stay is plainly meritless in this context.   The court explained that the expert’s testimony was not so unreasonable, as the expert also testified that Petitioner was still an adolescent and that his brain would not be fully developed until his mid-twenties, helping to explain his psychological condition. Further, the expert opined that Petitioner “has the potential to develop a sense of self and the potential for rehabilitation and some type of spiritual conversion.” Viewed as a whole, it was not deficient of trial counsel to believe this testimony would help Petitioner. View "Mendoza v. Lumpkin" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed the terms of his supervised release arguing that there is an impermissible conflict between the district court’s oral pronouncement and written judgment. In the presentence report, the probation officer recommended various mandatory and standard conditions of supervision. The probation officer also recommended a special condition, as Defendant was a legal alien permanent resident, but his arrest would have rendered him subject to deportation proceedings. The district court imposed a guidelines sentence of imprisonment for 95 months with three years of supervised release. The court orally adopted the special conditions recommended in the presentence report and orally informed Defendant that he must be legally authorized to reenter the country, as is reflected in the written judgment. Defendant appealed, arguing that the work-authorization condition in the written judgment conflicts with the oral pronouncement of his sentence and that the written judgment should be amended to conform to the oral pronouncement.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed. The court held that there is no conflict between the district court’s oral pronouncement of Defendant’s sentence and its written judgment. The work-authorization condition does not broaden the restrictions in Defendant’s supervised release already in place under the oral pronouncement. The court wrote that the purported “conflict” is then best described as an ambiguity— one that can be resolved by looking to entire record to determine the sentencing court’s intent in imposing the condition. The court explained that the record makes sufficient reference to Defendant’s immigration history to discern the district court’s efforts to ensure that Defendant complied with the relevant immigration laws. View "USA v. Pelayo-Zamarripa" on Justia Law

After pleading guilty to one count of receiving child pornography, Defendant was sentenced to a 168–month term of imprisonment followed by a 15–year term of supervised release. During Defendant’s term of supervised release, the district court modified a number of the special conditions imposed. Defendant appealed, challenging the district court’s jurisdiction to modify his supervised release conditions and contesting the substantive reasonableness of the conditions imposed.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that the district court has jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. Section 3583(e)(2) to modify conditions of supervised release and that the district court did not abuse its discretion in fashioning these conditions. The court explained that a district court cannot modify an unlawful condition under Section 3583(e)(2) if the illegality of that condition is the basis for modification, regardless of whether it was the defendant or government who brought the motion challenging the conditions. In the case at hand, however, Defendant’s appeal fails because the government did not move for modification solely on the basis of illegality, and the district court did not premise its ruling on the illegality of the special condition.   Next, Defendant contended that even if the district court’s ruling was not based on the illegality of a condition, the district court still lacked authority to modify his conditions of supervised release because there was not a “change in circumstance” that precipitated the modification nor was there a “compelling cause” for the modification. The court explained that it has found no cases requiring a “change in circumstance” or “compelling cause” to modify a condition of supervised release. View "USA v. Caillier" on Justia Law