Justia U.S. 5th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff was repeatedly tased while he was a pretrial detainee at the McLennan County jail in Waco, Texas. Plaintiff insists that he did nothing to warrant the use of force—that he was neither threatening nor resisting the officer who tased him. The principal question on appeal is whether Plaintiff has presented sufficient evidence to defeat summary judgment on his ensuing civil rights claims.   The Fifth Circuit reversed summary judgment on Plaintiff’s excessive force claim against Defendant and remanded that claim to the district court for trial. The court reversed and remanded the district court’s grant of summary judgment on Plaintiff’s policy and practice claims to afford Plaintiff the opportunity to discover evidence relevant to those claims. But the court affirmed the dismissal of Plaintiff’s deliberate indifference claim. The court denied the motion to dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. The court held that a rational jury could find that Defendant’s decision to tase Plaintiff was not justified by any exigency, in which case Defendant’s qualified immunity defense would not shield him from liability because the court’s precedents clearly establish that resort to force in such circumstances is unconstitutional.   Further, the court wrote that it was inappropriate for the court to then dismiss Plaintiff’s policy and practice claims on the ground that Plaintiff failed to present “adequate summary judgment evidence of any official or unofficial policy,” depriving him of his rights. If a jury finds, as it could, that Defendant tased a non-threatening, compliant inmate, then he is not entitled to qualified immunity. View "Boyd v. McNamara" on Justia Law

Appellant was indicted for intentionally causing the death of another by setting her on fire during a robbery. The jury found him guilty of capital murder, as alleged in the indictment. Appellant challenged the validity of his conviction and sentence in a state habeas proceeding, and the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals denied relief. Appellant filed an application for a certificate of appealability and appealed the district court's denial of his motion to recuse.   The Fifth Circuit denied the application for a certificate of appealability and affirmed the district court’s denial of the motion to recuse. The court explained that Appellant cited no governing legal authority recognizing the right to delay his briefing until the final day of AEDPA’s one-year statute of limitations. On the contrary, it is firmly established that a district court has “the inherent authority to manage their dockets and courtrooms with a view toward the efficient and expedient resolution of cases.” The district court noted that Appellant’s counsel might be acting contrary to Rule 11(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which requires counsel to certify that “the claims, defenses, and other legal contentions are warranted by existing law or by a nonfrivolous argument for extending, modifying, or reversing existing law or for establishing new law.” Given the district court’s explanation, the court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Appellant’s motion to recuse. Accordingly, the court held that these do not debatably give rise to a claim for relief. View "Johnson v. Lumpkin" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs claimed law enforcement officers violated the Constitution when they responded to a detainee’s epileptic seizure in a jail cell by restraining and tasing him several times. The district court either dismissed or granted summary judgment on all claims in favor of the Defendants.   The Fifth Circuit reversed the grant of qualified immunity for the individual Defendant Officers as to the Section 1983 claims and the grant of summary judgment on the claims for bystander liability. The court affirmed the grant of summary judgment on municipal liability and on the claims under the Americans with Disabilities Act and Rehabilitation Act. The court explained that the record is insufficient to support a jury question that the use-of-force and ECW policies were so vague that they amounted to no policy at all. These policies “may have been inadequate,” and while a jury might conclude that the City was negligent in not requiring Plaintiffs’ specified actions, “that, of course, is not enough under Section 1983.” The court explained that without evidence showing that the higher level of care was obviously necessary, we cannot see how the jury could conclude that the use-of-force and ECW policies were deliberately indifferent. Accordingly, there was no substantial evidence that such a policy would obviously lead to the violation of pre-trial detainees’ constitutional rights. Further, the court found that Plaintiffs cite no binding caselaw in which liability under the ADA and RA has been extended to a context similar to this one. View "Austin v. City of Pasadena" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a Section 1983 civil rights suit in Louisiana state court against Louisiana Department of Public Safety and Corrections Secretary James LeBlanc. Among other claims, Plaintiff argued that LeBlanc violated his constitutional rights by misclassifying him as a sex offender and thereby illegally extending his detention in prison for 337 days past his release date. LeBlanc sought dismissal based on qualified immunity, but the district court denied the motion. LeBlanc argued that this complaint did not adequately allege the requisite “pattern” of constitutional violations by untrained employees “ordinarily necessary” under Connick to establish deliberate indifference for purposes of failure to train.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed. The court agreed with Plaintiff that his complaint sufficiently alleges the requisite “pattern” of constitutional violations by untrained employees to establish deliberate indifference for purposes of failure to train. Further, the court held that there is sufficient clearly established law regarding the constitutional right to a timely release from prison and that Plaintiff has sufficiently argued a violation of the right. Accordingly, construing the allegations in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, the court agreed they are sufficient to support the argument that LeBlanc had fair warning’ that his failure to address this delay would deny prisoners like Plaintiff their immediate or near-immediate release upon conviction. View "Parker v. LeBlanc" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to drug offenses and assaulting or impeding U.S. Border Patrol agents. The district court sentenced him within the guidelines range to a total of 46 months of imprisonment, three years of supervised release, and a $225 special assessment. Although Defendant’s presentence report (“PSR”) listed no conditions of supervised release, the district court, at sentencing, specifically imposed “the standard and mandatory conditions of supervision … including the conditions that the defendant shall not commit another federal, state, or local crime during the term of supervision.”   The Fifth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that the well-grounded and legally-sound procedure for imposing “standard” and “mandatory” conditions of supervised release listed in a court’s standing order is: 1. The probation officer should either include the court’s standing order in or append it to the PSR, or preferably both. 2. Defense counsel must review and explain the conditions in the court’s standing order with the defendant before sentencing. 3. The district court must (a) confirm with the defendant that he or she saw the standing order and had the opportunity to review it with defense counsel; (b) ask the defendant whether he or she has any questions about the conditions listed in the standing order; (c) orally pronounce that it is imposing the conditions detailed in a specific standing order, and (d) provide the defendant with an opportunity to object. Nonetheless, in this case, the district court did not plainly err in imposing the standard and mandatory conditions detailed in the court-wide standing order and two special conditions. View "USA v. Baez-Adriano" on Justia Law

Defendant, a rap artist as well as a convicted felon, owned a company that hired a videographer to film Defendant throughout his life for eventual use in a music video. One day, an anonymous 911 caller reported several men with “Uzis” and other guns walking down a residential street in Baton Rouge, Louisiana. Police arrived, detained Defendant, the videographer, and others. Police seized a memory card from the videographer, as well as several firearms from the nearby area. There was a video on the memory card of Defendant holding a firearm.The district court reasoned that Gaulden had a protectable Fourth Amendment interest in the videos on the memory card, although he lacked a Fourth Amendment interest in the memory card itself. The court also found the warrant fatally defective. Accordingly, the court suppressed the footage of Defendant in possession of the firearms.The Fifth Circuit reversed. Defendant's right to Fourth Amendment protection turns on whether he has a constitutionally protected property interest or a judicially conferred reasonable expectation of privacy in the place or thing searched or seized. To the extent Defendant can have a distinct property interest in the video footage, he never proved that he acquired such a right. Defendant himself did not testify and there was no written contract giving Defendant ownership of the video footage. And Defendant's company, not Defendant himself, hired the videographer. Thus, Defendant did not have an established property interest in the footage.The court also held that Defendant lacked a reasonable expectation of privacy in the footage. View "USA v. Gaulden" on Justia Law

Defendants Cpl. John Lee and Cpl. Derek Barker appealed the district court’s denial of their motion for summary judgment seeking qualified immunity from Plaintiffs’ unlawful entry and excessive force claims. The Fifth Circuit unanimously concluded that Lee and Barker are not entitled to qualified immunity from Plaintiffs' unlawful entry claims. However, the court held that Lee is entitled to qualified immunity for any force employed from the moment he entered Plaintiffs' house. The court explained that, including the significant fact that the dog was deployed as a wholly duplicative means of detention, no precedent establishes under analogous circumstances how long a bite is too long. Thus, a jury could not find that every reasonable officer would have known that a K9-trained dog had to be released more quickly. Even if Officer Lee mistakenly permitted Dice to bite Plaintiff for a minute, qualified immunity shields him from suit as well as liability. View "Smith v. Lee" on Justia Law

A disabled public school student was sexually assaulted by another student with known violent tendencies. Despite knowing of this attack, the victim’s teachers let both her and her aggressor wander the school unsupervised, and she was again assaulted by the very same student. The victim’s mother sued the school district under Title IX and various school officials under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983. In her Section 1983 claim against the school officials, she alleged liability under the so-called “state-created danger” doctrine. The district court denied that motion and stayed proceedings on the Title IX claim pending this interlocutory appeal of the Section 1983 ruling.   The Fifth Circuit reversed and remanded with instructions to dismiss the Section 1983 claim. The court explained that the Circuit has never adopted a state-created danger exception to the sweeping “no duty to protect” rule. And a never-established right cannot be a clearly established one. As for whether to adopt the state-created danger theory of constitutional liability moving forward, the court was reluctant to expand the concept of substantive due process for two reasons: (1) the Supreme Court’s recent forceful pronouncements signaling unease with implied rights not deeply rooted in our Nation’s history and tradition; and (2) the absence of rigorous panel briefing that grapples painstakingly with how such a cause of action would work in terms of its practical contours and application, vital details on which the court’s sister circuits disagree. Rather than break new ground, the court ruled instead on a narrower ground, one that follows the court’s unbroken precedent. View "Fisher v. Moore" on Justia Law

Defendant pled guilty to conspiring to transport and transporting undocumented immigrants resulting in serious bodily injury and death. He appealed a two-level sentencing enhancement under U.S.S.G. Section 2L1.1(b)(8)(A) for involuntarily detaining a migrant through threat or coercion.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that here Defendant did not continue to drive in order to prevent L.G.G.G. from escaping—he continued to drive in order to avoid apprehension. That Defendant’s continued driving was not for the purpose of detaining L.G.G.G. is buttressed by his prior instruction to L.G.G.G. and A.M.A. to exit the vehicle and run should they be pulled over by law enforcement. L.G.G.G. was involuntarily detained, but he was not involuntarily detained through threat or coercion. The district court erred by applying this enhancement to Defendant’s conduct. However, the court wrote that Defendant failed to show that the error was plain. Because Defendant’s claim of plain error failed the second prong of the relevant text, the court declined to examine the remaining prongs. View "USA v. Buendia" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to two counts of distribution of child pornography and one count of possession of child pornography involving the sexual exploitation of minors. He was sentenced to 60 months in prison on each count, to run concurrently. The district court also imposed a life term of supervised release. Defendant was released from prison in August 2010. And he successfully completed his sex offender treatment. Since his release, he has maintained a clean record and complied with his registration requirement. The government appeals the district court’s order granting Defendant’s request to terminate his obligation to register as a sex offender.   The Fifth Circuit reversed the district court’s order granting Defendant’s request. The court held that the unambiguous language of the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act deems Defendant a tier II sex offender and that status demands that his registration continues. The court explained that because he was convicted of distribution of child pornography, Defendant’s crime falls under Section 20911(3)(B)(iii), and so he is a tier II sex offender. Consequently, he “shall” register for 25 years from the date of his release from prison. Furthermore, he is not entitled to any reduction of the required registration period under SORNA. 34 U.S.C. Section2 0915(b) (providing reduction for tier I and tier III sex offenders, but not tier II). View "USA v. Nazerzadeh" on Justia Law