Justia U.S. 5th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Defendant was found guilty by jury of conspiring with intent to distribute cocaine and distributing a detectable amount of a substance containing cocaine base. Defendant was sentenced under 21 U.S.C. 841(b)(1)(A), which requires the Government must show that a defendant knew that the conspiracy involved a minimum quantity of the controlled substance. Defendant was sentenced to 480 months imprisonment on the first count and 240 months on the second.Defendant appealed on several sentencing-related issues: (1) the district court imposed a “trial penalty” in sentencing him; (2) the district court erred in determining the quantity of drugs attributable to him, (3) the propriety of the jury charge and verdict form; and (4) the district court imposed a substantively unreasonable sentence.The Fifth Circuit affirmed. The judge's comments referring to various codefendants' cooperative efforts did not indicate the court imposed a trial penalty. Further, a participant in a drug conspiracy is responsible for all drug quantities with which he was “directly involved,” as well as for quantities “involved in transactions carried out by other participants. Moreover, there was overwhelming evidence that Defendant “knew or should have known [the drug amount that] was involved in the conspiracy[.]” View "USA v. Hill" on Justia Law

Petitioner was convicted of capital murder by a Texas jury and sentenced to death. He later filed an application in district court for habeas relief. In an earlier appeal, because his initial counsel had a conflict of interest, the Fifth Circuit remanded for appointment of additional counsel and further development of potential claims of ineffective trial counsel. An amended application was filed, but the district court rejected all the new claims.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment and denied Petitioner’s motion for a Rhines stay. The court explained that as to the four claims for which the district court granted a COA, Petitioner has not shown that trial counsel’s actions in investigating, compiling, and presenting mens rea and mitigating evidence fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. As to the remaining claims for which the court granted a COA, the court found that Petitioner has not shown that trial counsel was ineffective for presenting the expert witness’s testimony, and Petitioner’s request for a Rhines stay is plainly meritless in this context.   The court explained that the expert’s testimony was not so unreasonable, as the expert also testified that Petitioner was still an adolescent and that his brain would not be fully developed until his mid-twenties, helping to explain his psychological condition. Further, the expert opined that Petitioner “has the potential to develop a sense of self and the potential for rehabilitation and some type of spiritual conversion.” Viewed as a whole, it was not deficient of trial counsel to believe this testimony would help Petitioner. View "Mendoza v. Lumpkin" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed the terms of his supervised release arguing that there is an impermissible conflict between the district court’s oral pronouncement and written judgment. In the presentence report, the probation officer recommended various mandatory and standard conditions of supervision. The probation officer also recommended a special condition, as Defendant was a legal alien permanent resident, but his arrest would have rendered him subject to deportation proceedings. The district court imposed a guidelines sentence of imprisonment for 95 months with three years of supervised release. The court orally adopted the special conditions recommended in the presentence report and orally informed Defendant that he must be legally authorized to reenter the country, as is reflected in the written judgment. Defendant appealed, arguing that the work-authorization condition in the written judgment conflicts with the oral pronouncement of his sentence and that the written judgment should be amended to conform to the oral pronouncement.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed. The court held that there is no conflict between the district court’s oral pronouncement of Defendant’s sentence and its written judgment. The work-authorization condition does not broaden the restrictions in Defendant’s supervised release already in place under the oral pronouncement. The court wrote that the purported “conflict” is then best described as an ambiguity— one that can be resolved by looking to entire record to determine the sentencing court’s intent in imposing the condition. The court explained that the record makes sufficient reference to Defendant’s immigration history to discern the district court’s efforts to ensure that Defendant complied with the relevant immigration laws. View "USA v. Pelayo-Zamarripa" on Justia Law

After pleading guilty to one count of receiving child pornography, Defendant was sentenced to a 168–month term of imprisonment followed by a 15–year term of supervised release. During Defendant’s term of supervised release, the district court modified a number of the special conditions imposed. Defendant appealed, challenging the district court’s jurisdiction to modify his supervised release conditions and contesting the substantive reasonableness of the conditions imposed.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that the district court has jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. Section 3583(e)(2) to modify conditions of supervised release and that the district court did not abuse its discretion in fashioning these conditions. The court explained that a district court cannot modify an unlawful condition under Section 3583(e)(2) if the illegality of that condition is the basis for modification, regardless of whether it was the defendant or government who brought the motion challenging the conditions. In the case at hand, however, Defendant’s appeal fails because the government did not move for modification solely on the basis of illegality, and the district court did not premise its ruling on the illegality of the special condition.   Next, Defendant contended that even if the district court’s ruling was not based on the illegality of a condition, the district court still lacked authority to modify his conditions of supervised release because there was not a “change in circumstance” that precipitated the modification nor was there a “compelling cause” for the modification. The court explained that it has found no cases requiring a “change in circumstance” or “compelling cause” to modify a condition of supervised release. View "USA v. Caillier" on Justia Law

The issue before the court is whether Plaintiff, an inmate incarcerated in Gatesville, Texas, has a right to be heard before the prison decides whether to approve or deny her request to transfer money from her inmate trust account to an outside bank account. The district court answered no and granted summary judgment to the Appellees.   The Fifth Circuit vacated and reversed. The court wrote that Plaintiff provided evidence that her procedural due process rights were violated, which precludes summary judgment. The court explained that Plaintiff’s property interests were undoubtedly at stake, and, considering the evidence that was before the district court, it cannot be said as a matter of law that the procedures were adequate, there were alternative safeguards, or that the administrative burden would be too great. It is up to a factfinder to determine whether Plaintiff can prove her case. Accordingly, the court held that the district court erred in not vacating the judgment and granting Plaintiff leave to amend her pleadings. View "Calhoun v. Collier" on Justia Law

Defendant, a lawful permanent resident of the United States, was charged with importation of a controlled substance in violation of 21 U.S.C. Section 952(a). Her lawyer told her that if she pleaded guilty, it was “very likely” that she would be deported. She nonetheless entered the plea. Defendant then learned that her offense did not just possibly make her deportable, it automatically did so. She then moved to withdraw her plea, alleging that if she had known the full scope of the immigration consequences of her plea, she would not have entered it. The district court denied Defendant’s motion and sentenced her. Defendant appealed. At issue is whether a lawyer’s warning of “very likely” deportation satisfies the right to effective assistance of counsel.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that when defense counsel tells an alien client that a conviction will have serious immigration consequences, including “very likely” deportation, that defendant has received sufficient advice to make an informed plea decision, as required by the Sixth Amendment. The court explained that there is some ambiguity about what specific words Defendant’s lawyer used when explaining to her the immigration consequences of the plea. But the district court’s factual finding—which is reviewed only for clear error—suggests the following bottom line: Defendant’s lawyer put her on notice of the risk of serious immigration consequences, including deportation. Accordingly, the court concluded that the district court therefore did not abuse its discretion in denying Defendant’s motion to withdraw her plea. View "USA v. Armendariz" on Justia Law

Plaintiff brought an action against Defendants-Appellees Holy Cross College, Inc. and Congregation of Holy Cross Moreau Province, Inc. (collectively, “Holy Cross”) in the district court. Plaintiff alleged that he suffered from sexual abuse carried out by Holy Cross teacher on two separate occasions while attending summer camp at Holy Cross as a 10- or 11-year-old boy in either 1968 or 1969. Plaintiff asserted that Holy Cross is liable for the teacher’s conduct under the doctrine of respondeat superior. At the time of the alleged abuse, such an offense was subject to a one-year liberative prescriptive period. Plaintiff invoked the Revival Provision as his basis to bring a suit. The district court granted Holy Cross’s motion and dismissed Plaintiff’s complaint.   The Fifth Circuit vacated and remanded. The court explained that while the appeal was pending, the Louisiana Supreme Court issued its decision in T.S v. Congregation of Holy Cross Southern Province, Inc., 2023 WL 4195778. The court wrote that with the benefit of the T.S. decision, the court is now certain as to how this case should be resolved under Louisiana law. As previously noted, the facts of both cases are nearly identical. Therefore, it is apparent that the district court should not have ruled on the Revival Provision’s constitutionality. Instead, it is now clear that the Revival Provision’s wording makes it inapplicable to Plaintiff’s claims. Accordingly, his complaint should be dismissed for that sole reason. The court directed that on remand, the district court may consider whether Plaintiff should be provided with leave to amend his complaint. View "Lousteau v. Holy Cross College" on Justia Law

A school resource officer tased a special-needs student who physically struggled with school staff while attempting to leave school following a violent episode. The student’s mother sued the officer and the school district, bringing constitutional claims under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 and disability discrimination claims under the Americans with Disabilities Act and the Rehabilitation Act.  The district court granted summary judgment to the officer and school district.   The Fifth Circuit concluded, based on recent Supreme Court precedent, that the district court incorrectly subjected the disability discrimination claims to administrative exhaustion. On the merits, however, the district court correctly granted summary judgment to the officer and school district. The court explained that the officer’s use of his taser in this situation was poor judgment, especially after Plaintiff’s son had ceased struggling. However, the court explained that Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act and Title II of the ADA are not the proper vehicles for remedying “all unreasonable, inappropriate, unprofessional, and/or unduly harsh conduct by public agents. View "W. v. Paley" on Justia Law

Plaintiff y filed suit under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983, alleging violations of his First and Fourth Amendment rights when he was arrested as a terrorist for a post on Facebook. The district court granted Detective Randall Iles and Sheriff Mark Wood’s motion for summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds and dismissed Bailey’s claims with prejudice.   The Fifth Circuit reversed the grant of summary judgment. The court held that Plaintiff’s post was constitutionally protected speech and that the grant of summary judgment was improper. The court explained that regardless of the unnamed deputy’s comment, Iles admitted that he arrested Plaintiff at least in part because of the content of his Facebook post, rather than for some other conduct, i.e. Iles admitted that the arrest was at least “substantially motivated” by Plaintiff’s speech. Further, there is t no dispute as to the second element, as Plaintiff’s speech was chilled when he deleted his Facebook post in response to the arrest. Thus, when Iles arrested Plaintiff, he violated Plaintiff’s clearly established First Amendment right to engage in speech even when some listeners consider the speech offensive, upsetting, immature, in poor taste, or even dangerous. View "Bailey v. Iles" on Justia Law

Plaintiff sued two Texas state officials, asserting that they violated his right to procedural due process when they notified him that he was required to register as a sex offender under Texas law. After a bench trial, the district court entered judgment in Plaintiff’s favor.   The Fifth Circuit vacated and remanded. The court concluded that Plaintiff’s suit is barred by sovereign immunity. The court explained that Sovereign immunity under the Eleventh Amendment precludes suits by private citizens against states in federal court. This bar extends not only to the state itself, but also to claims against “state officials” in their official capacity when the state is the real party in interest. The court explained that here, Plaintiff is suing state officials who have not waived sovereign immunity. Accordingly, his claims are barred in federal court unless an exception to sovereign immunity applies. Moreover, the court explained that because the district court’s order invalidated a federal statute—instead of affirming it—invoking the exception here would not advance Ex parte Young’s aim of “promoting the vindication of federal rights.” View "Tawakkol v. Vasquez" on Justia Law