Justia U.S. 5th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in Constitutional Law
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Defendant was convicted of transporting illegal aliens and conspiracy to transport illegal aliens. But the government used inadmissible evidence to prove that the person being transported was in the United States unlawfully. Defendant challenged the district court’s ruling admitting the G-166F into evidence based on the Federal Rules of Evidence and the Sixth Amendment.   The Fifth Circuit vacated Defendant's conviction for transporting illegal aliens but affirmed Defendant’s conviction for conspiracy to transport illegal aliens and remanded for resentencing. The court explained that an alien-smuggling investigation report is not “essentially ministerial” as this court found the I-213 to be in Noria. 945 F.3d at 860. Instead, it is a criminal investigation report—the sort of document the Federal Rules of Evidence. The court therefore found that the district court abused its discretion by admitting the G-166F into evidence under the Federal Rules of Evidence. Moreover, the court explained that it is the government’s burden to establish that using the challenged investigative report was constitutional. The government has not met that burden here. Therefore, admitting the G-166F into evidence violated Defendant’s Sixth Amendment rights. However, the court explained that whether the men in Defendant’s car were actually illegal aliens is not relevant to any element in the conspiracy to transport illegal aliens charge. Accordingly, the court affirmed Defendant’s conviction for conspiracy. View "USA v. Foreman" on Justia Law

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Defendant asserts that he is required by his religious faith to abstain from psychiatric medication. Defendant raised a religious objection to being involuntarily medicated without identifying a particular source of law. The district court denied the objection, concluding that: (1) the Government had a compelling interest in prosecuting Defendant’s crime, which was not outweighed by Defendant’s religious liberty interests; and (2) the Government satisfied the four Sell factors. Defendant appealed.   The Fifth Circuit vacated the district court’s order and remanded. The court explained that Defendant faces a pending civil-confinement hearing in North Carolina. Moreover, he asserts that his religious belief as a Jehovah’s Witness prevents him from taking medication. He further asserts that forcible medication would violate his “constitutionally protected liberty.” The Government does not dispute that Defendant’s religious faith can qualify as a “special factor” under Sell. See Red Br. at 13–15; cf. Ramirez v. Collier, 595 U.S. 411, 426 (2022). Defendant’s religious beliefs, combined with his lengthy detention and his potential civil confinement, thus lessen the Government’s interests under the first Sell factor. The court emphasized that it holds only that religious liberty can constitute a “special circumstance” under Sell and that Defendant properly raised a religious objection to forcible medication here. That well-taken special circumstance, combined with other factors identified above, necessitates the district court’s reevaluation of the Government’s efforts to forcibly medicate him. View "USA v. Harris" on Justia Law

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Defendant was convicted of sex trafficking of a child in violation of 18 U.S.C. Section 1591(a)(1) and (b)(2). On appeal, he challenged the introduction of evidence pulled from his cellphone using Cellebrite technology. He claimed that the district court erred by permitting a police investigator to introduce the Cellebrite extract without first being qualified as an expert under Federal Rule of Evidence 702.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that when law enforcement uses Cellebrite to pull information from a phone, and a lay juror would require no additional interpretation to understand that information, the party does not need to introduce the evidence through an expert. The court explained that all the investigator testified to was how he downloaded the information from the phones using Cellebrite technology. At no point did he speak to the reliability of the software, except that he double-checked some of the reports by looking directly at the source material in the phones themselves. To that end, he did not state any information on how Cellebrite operated in a technical sense, nor information that was beyond the knowledge of an average cell phone user. Without a showing of specialized knowledge, the mere use and understanding of a Cellebrite extract at trial is insufficient to require an expert. Operating a Cellebrite device and understanding its report require knowledge in the realm of a reasonably tech-savvy layperson, regardless of the investigator’s testimony that he was a “certified” operator and analyzer. View "USA v. Williams" on Justia Law

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Defendant was charged with and convicted of (1) producing child pornography, (2) committing that offense while being required to register as a sex offender, (3) possessing child pornography, and (4) sex trafficking of a child. All four charges involved his conduct with “Minor Victim-1” or “the Minor.” Defendant appealed his conviction for Count 4, sex trafficking of a child. He maintains that in light of Bond v. United States, 572 U.S. 844 (2014), 18 U.S.C. Section 1591 should not be interpreted to reach his conduct, which he terms a “purely local sex offense.”   The Fifth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that overturning Defendant’s conviction under Bond requires him to show three things: (1) that allowing his conviction would “significantly change the federal-state balance,” (2) that Congress has not included a clear indication that they meant to reach “purely local crimes,” and (3) that his is a purely local crime. The court explained without expressing any view on (1) or (3), it determines that Defendant failed to demonstrate (2). Congress included a clear indication that Section 1591 is meant to reach “purely local crimes.” The court explained that it is not alone in adopting a broader interpretation of Section 1591 despite Bond. Because Congress included a clear indication that Section 1591 is meant to reach “purely local crimes,” Defendant’s argument under Bond fails. View "USA v. Renteria" on Justia Law

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Plaintiff, then an Assistant Athletic Director at Louisiana State University (“LSU”)— internally reported Head Football Coach Les Miles for sexually harassing students. LSU retained outside counsel—Taylor, Porter, Brooks & Phillips LLP (“Taylor Porter”)—to investigate the matter, culminating in a formal report dated May 15, 2013 (the “Taylor Porter Report”). Matters were privately settled, and Miles stayed on as head coach until 2016. Lewis alleges that Defendants, members of LSU’s Board of Supervisors (the “Board”), leadership, and athletics department, along with lawyers at Taylor Porter (“Taylor Porter Defendants” and, collectively, “Defendants”), engaged in a concerted effort to illegally conceal the Taylor Porter Report and Miles’s wrong-doings. Plaintiff also alleged workplace retaliation for having reported Miles. She brings both employment and civil RICO claims. The district court dismissed Plaintiff’s RICO-related allegations as time-barred and inadequately pleaded as to causation.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed. The court considered when Plaintiff was first made aware of her injuries. It matters not when she discovered Defendants’ “enterprise racketeering scheme”—she alleges that this happened in March 2021 with the release of the Husch Blackwell Report. Plaintiff’s allegations make clear that she was made aware of her injuries much earlier. She was subject to overt retaliation after “Miles was cleared of any wrongdoing” by the Taylor Porter Report in 2013. Plaintiff alleged numerous harmful workplace interactions from that point forward. Given that Plaintiff filed her original complaint on April 8, 2021, her claims for injuries that were discovered—or that should have been discovered—before April 8, 2017, are time-barred. View "Lewis v. Danos" on Justia Law

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Plaintiff was arrested and charged with interfering with the duties of a public servant. Eight hundred fifty-six days later, she brought suit under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 against Harris County and a number of law enforcement officials, asserting a series of alleged constitutional rights violations. The district court found the applicable statute of limitations barred all claims and granted all Defendants’ respective motions to dismiss. On appeal, Plaintiff challenged the dismissal of her claims of false arrest, false imprisonment, and failure to train, supervise, and discipline. She also asserted the district court erred in denying leave to amend her complaint. Finally, Plaintiff requested reassignment to a different district judge.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that a false arrest claim accrues when charges are filed. Similarly, because a Section 1983 claim for false imprisonment is “based upon ‘detention without legal process,’” limitations run once “legal process [is] initiated.” Limitations had long lapsed by the time Plaintiff sued. The false arrest and false imprisonment claims are time-barred, and she concedes that no basis for tolling applies. Further, the court explained that Plaintiff’s proposed amendment includes twenty-three examples of arrests conducted by Precinct Seven officers that resulted in criminal charges later dismissed for lack of probable cause. They are of no use. All twenty-three lack critical factual detail. That, in turn, precludes Plaintiff from showing that the pattern of examples is sufficiently similar to her incident. Consequently, Plaintiff’s complaint—even as amended—would not survive a motion to dismiss. View "Johnson v. Harris County" on Justia Law

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Communities can therefore regulate the so-called “secondary effects” of sexually oriented businesses (or “SOBs”), like crime and blight, without running afoul of the First Amendment. The City of Dallas passed Ordinance No. 32125 in 2022. The Ordinance requires licensed SOBs, such as cabarets, escort agencies, and adult video stores, to close between 2:00 a.m. and 6:00 a.m.. Plaintiffs, a group of SOBs and their trade association, challenged the Ordinance under the First Amendment. After a hearing, the district court found that the City lacked reliable evidence to justify the Ordinance and that the Ordinance overly restricted Plaintiffs’ speech. It therefore preliminarily enjoined the Ordinance.   The Fifth Circuit vacated the preliminary injunction and remanded. The court explained that under longstanding Supreme Court precedent, the Ordinance is likely constitutional. The City’s evidence reasonably showed a link between SOBs’ late-night operations and an increase in “noxious side effects,” such as crime. The court explained that it cannot say that the Ordinance substantially or disproportionately restricts speech. It leaves SOBs free to open for twenty hours a day, seven days a week, while also, in the City’s reasonable view, curtailing the violent crime and 911 calls with which the City was concerned. View "Assoc of Club Exct v. City of Dallas" on Justia Law

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When an armed fugitive held a 15-year-old girl hostage inside Plaintiff, City of McKinney (the “City”), police officers employed armored vehicles, explosives, and toxic-gas grenades to resolve the situation. The parties agree the officers only did what was necessary in an active emergency. However, Plaintiff’s home suffered severe damage, much of her personal property was destroyed, and the City refused to provide compensation. Plaintiff brought suit in federal court alleging a violation of the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution, which states that private property shall not “be taken for public use, without just compensation.” The district court held that, as a matter of law, the City violated the Takings Clause when it refused to compensate Baker for the damage and destruction of her property. The City timely appealed.   The Fifth Circuit reversed and remanded. The court explained that as a matter of history and precedent, the Takings Clause does not require compensation for damaged or destroyed property when it was objectively necessary for officers to damage or destroy that property in an active emergency to prevent imminent harm to persons. Plaintiff has maintained that the officers’ actions were precisely that: necessary, in light of an active emergency, to prevent imminent harm to the hostage child, to the officers who responded on the scene, and to others in her residential community. View "Baker v. City of McKinney" on Justia Law

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Plaintiff and Defendant had two children together. After the couple separated, the children remained in Mexico with Galaviz. In July 2021, Defendant took the children to El Paso and refused to return them. Plaintiff filed an action in the district court requesting the return of the children to Mexico under the Hague Convention. Defendant raised two affirmative defenses claiming that returning the children would violate their fundamental right to an education and would expose them to a grave risk of harm or an intolerable situation. The district court concluded that Defendant had satisfied his burden and denied Plaintiff’s request for the return of the children. Plaintiff appealed.   The Fifth Circuit reversed and remanded. The court explained that in the present case, the district court’s findings regarding the children’s healthcare, including the children’s cognitive decline, the fact that they remained non-verbal, or their regression to using diapers, may be supported by evidence that would be sufficient in a custody dispute. However, this evidence falls short of meeting Defendant’s clear and convincing burden. Finally, Defendant presented no evidence that unsuitable childcare would expose the children to a grave risk of harm. He merely expressed concern that Plaintiff often left the children with her older daughters, and they did not take care of the children. This is not clear and convincing evidence of a grave risk of harm. View "Galaviz v. Reyes" on Justia Law

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Plaintiff was convicted of the 2000 murder of an 80-year-old woman. After the jury found him to be guilty of the offense, evidence of his future dangerousness was offered at sentencing. Among the evidence was testimony from the victim of another vicious crime who identified Plaintiff as her attacker. Plaintiff was not tried for that offense. Plaintiff is now seeking DNA testing of evidence from that other crime that he argues could exonerate him. A different district court agreed with a similar argument and declared that Texas must provide testing if a sufficient basis is shown that it would have affected sentencing and not just the finding of guilt. The district court relied on the pendency of a decision in Gutierrez as a reason to grant Plaintiff a stay of execution. The State of Texas sought to vacate the stay of execution.   The Fifth Circuit agreed with the district court that a stay is appropriate at least until a decision in that case. The court explained that at that time it will order additional briefing. Accordingly, the court entered no ruling on the motion to vacate the stay at this time. The related appeal has similar issues that could affect the proper resolution in this case. Waiting for that decision is not required by any general procedural rule or by rules of the court. Nonetheless, the court explained that it should wait for that decision unless there is some basis to distinguish the present appeal. View "Murphy v. Nasser" on Justia Law