Justia U.S. 5th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Local telephone companies initiated twenty separate suits against Halo before ten state public utility commissions (PUCs) and Halo filed for bankruptcy as a result of this collective action. The telephone companies requested that the bankruptcy court determine that the various PUC actions were not subject to the automatic stay provided by the Bankruptcy Code at 11 U.S.C. 362(a), because they were excepted under section 362(b)(4), or that the bankruptcy court modify the automatic stay for cause, pursuant to section 362(d)(1). The court agreed with the bankruptcy court's holding that the exception to the automatic stay in section 362(b)(4) applied to the state commission proceedings, allowing the telephone companies to proceed with their litigation in the PUCs, but holding that the state adjudicative bodies could not issue any ruling or order to liquidate the amount of any claim against Halo, and that the bodies could not take any action that affected the debtor-creditor relationship between Halo and any creditor or potential creditor. View "Halo Wireless, Inc. v. Alenco Communications, Inc., et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs brought an enforcement suit against defendants under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 29 U.S.C. 1001-1461. Plaintiffs alleged that defendants' practice of offering reimbursements for telephone services to retirees who lived outside of defendants' service region constituted a "pension plan" under ERISA. Judge Rodriquez was assigned to the claims at issue here and to Boos v. AT&T, a case involving similar claims. After ruling that the concession at issue in Boos was not a pension plan under ERISA, Judge Rodriquez reconsidered Judge Justice's interlocutory order with respect to plaintiffs' claims in this case. He concluded that the program of retirement benefits was not a pension plan under ERISA and he then entered a final judgment. Because the court concluded that Judge Rodriquez did not abuse his discretion by revising Judge Justice's interlocutory order, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Stoffels, et al. v. SBC Communications, Inc., et al." on Justia Law

Petitioners, the City of Arlington and the City of San Antonio, sought review of a Declaratory Ruling and subsequent Order on Reconsideration that the FCC issued in response to a petition for a declaratory ruling by a trade association of wireless telephone service providers, CTIA. In the proceeding before the FCC, CTIA sought clarification of Sections 253 and 332(c)(7) of the Communications Act, 47 U.S.C. 253, 332(c)(7), regarding local review of wireless facility siting applications. Both cities claimed (1) the FCC lacked statutory authority to establish the 90- and 150-day time frames; (2) the FCC's 90- and 150-day time frames conflicted with the language of section 332(c)(7)(B)(ii) and (v); (3) the FCC's actions were arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with the law; and (4) the FCC violated the Administrative Procedures Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. 500 et seq., because its establishment of the 90- and 150-day time frames constituted a rulemaking subject to the APA's notice-and-comment requirements. Arlington also raised a procedural due process claim. The court denied Arlington's petition for review on the merits. The court dismissed San Antonio's petition for review because the court lacked jurisdiction because San Antonio did not timely file its petition for review.

Plaintiffs, a trade organization representing incumbent cable operators in Texas and an incumbent cable provider, appealed the district court's grant of summary judgment dismissing their claims that Senate State Bill 5 violated the First and Fourth Amendments of the Constitution or was preempted by federal law. SB 5 was aimed at reforming the cable service industry in Texas by creating a new state-level franchising system that obligated the Public Utility Commission (PUC) to grant a franchise for the requested areas if the applicant satisfied basic requirements. New entrants could obtain a single statewide franchise that avoided the expense and inconvenience of separate municipal franchise agreements across the state. Overbuilders could terminate their existing municipal franchise agreements in favor of the convenience of the statewide franchise. Incumbent cable providers, however, could not similarly opt out for the statewide franchise, until after the expiration of the municipal license. The court held that because the statute unjustifiably discriminated against a small number of incumbent cable providers in violation of the First Amendment, the court reversed.

Defendant, a technology company that sold data centers, appealed the district court's judgment on a jury verdict in favor of plaintiff, a company that purchased defendant's fiber management systems and intelligent fiber systems, in plaintiff's suit for breach of contract and fraudulent inducement. At issue was whether the district court erred in denying its motion for judgment as a matter of law. The court held that because plaintiff failed to present sufficient evidence that defendant had no intent to perform under the "best efforts" provision of the contract and failed to present any evidence of damages on its other claim, the judgment of the district court was reversed and remanded to the district court to enter judgment in favor of defendant. Accordingly, the court did not reach the other issues raised by defendant on appeal.

Plaintiffs brought an enforcement suit against defendants under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 ("ERISA"), 29 U.S.C. 1001-1461. At issue was whether the district court properly granted summary judgment in favor of defendants, concluding that defendants' practice of offering discounted telephone services to employees and retirees ("Concession") was not a pension plan in whole or in part. The court affirmed summary judgment and held that the district court did not err in holding that Concession was one plan, at least as it regarded to all retirees; in refusing to examine the out-of-region retiree Concession in isolation; in concluding that although Concession did provide income to some retirees, such income was incidental to the benefit, and was not designed for the purpose of paying retirement income; and in holding that Concession did not result in a deferral of income.

Plaintiff filed suit against defendants, Wayne Hagan and James Joubert, alleging that Joubert was negligently excavating on a backhoe and severed plaintiff's underground fiber-optic cable in violation of the Louisiana Damage Prevention Act, LA. REV. STAT. ANN 40:1749,11 et seq., and that Hagan was vicariously liable because Joubert was acting as his agent at the time. At issue was whether the district court erred when it refused to give the jury plaintiff's proposed instruction on trespass. Also at issue was whether the district court erred when it excluded statements made by Hagan's attorney to plaintiff's employee under Federal Rule of Evidence 408; when it refused to certify plaintiff's witness as an expert; and when it held that defendants were entitled to attorneys' fees and costs. The court certified the first issue where the Louisiana Supreme Court had not previously determined what standard of intent was used for trespass to underground utility cables and the issue was determinative of whether plaintiff was entitled to a new trial on its trespass claim. The court held that the statements made by Hagan's attorney to plaintiff's employer could have been excluded on other grounds given that it was inadmissible hearsay against Joubert and therefore, the court declined to remand for a new trial on this ground. The court also held that the district court did not commit a reversible error where plaintiff did not proffer the substance of plaintiff's witness' excluded testimony. Finally, the court deferred addressing the attorneys' fees issue pending the Louisiana Supreme Court's decision on the first issue.