Justia U.S. 5th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs, nine children in the custody of PMC, filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 against three Texas officials, in their official capacities, seeking to represent a class of all children who were now, and all those who will be, in the State's long-term foster care. The gravaman of plaintiffs' complaint is that various system-wide problems in Texas's administration of its PMC subjected all of the children in PMC to a variety of harms. Applying the standards announced in the Supreme Court's recent opinion, Wal-mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, the court held that the district court failed to conduct the "rigorous" analysis required by Rule 23 in deciding to certify the proposed class. The court also held that the district court abused its discretion by certifying a class that lacked cohesiveness under Rule 23(b)(2). Accordingly, the court vacated the district court's class certification order and remanded for further proceedings. View "M.D., et al. v. Rick Perry, et al." on Justia Law

This consolidated appeal arose out of an alleged multi-billion dollar Ponzi scheme perpetrated by R. Allen Stanford through his various corporate entities. These three cases dealt with the scope of the preclusion provision of the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act (SLUSA), 15 U.S.C. 78bb(f)(1)(A). All three cases sought to use state class-action devices to attempt to recover damages for losses resulting from the Ponzi scheme. Because the court found that the purchase or sale of securities (or representations about the purchase or sale of securities), was only tangentially related to the fraudulent scheme alleged by appellants, the court held that SLUSA did not preclude appellants from using state class actions to pursue their recovery and reversed the judgment. View "Roland, et al. v. Green, et al.; Troice, et al. v. Proskauer Rose, LLP, et al.; Troice, et al. v. Willis of Colorado Inc., et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, and other owners of Dell Inc. common stock, alleged that defendants violated the securities laws between by fraudulently inflating reported revenues, engaging in erroneous accounting, and disseminating false information to the public. The district court granted defendant's motion to dismiss with prejudice and plaintiffs appealed. While the appeal was pending, plaintiffs moved in the district court for class certification and approval of a proposed settlement agreement. The district court certified a class and approved the class-action settlement. Two groups of objectors to the settlement subsequently appealed, claiming numerous deficiencies in the proceedings. The court held that appellants have demonstrated their membership in a class and have standing to bring their objections; the district court did not abuse its discretion when it systematically analyzed the proposed settlement under each of the Reed factors and found that none counseled against approving the settlement; the district court did not abuse its discretion in certifying the class as defined; the district court did not abuse its discretion in approving the settlement's claims-making process; the district court did not abuse its discretion in approving the elimination of the de minimus provision in the original plan of allocation; the district court's decision not to reissue notice or reopen the filing period was not an abuse of discretion; objectors presented no reason to conclude that the judgment was an abuse of discretion; and there was no basis for concluding that the district court abused its discretion in setting the amount of attorney's fees and in awarding interest in the fee award. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court.

In 2005, during plaintiff's employment, defendant issued an employee handbook, including a provision that all employment-related disputes, whether initiated by an employee or by defendant, would be "resolved only by an arbitrator through final and binding arbitration," that disputes under the Fair Labor Standards Act were among those subject to the arbitration policy, that disputes cannot be brought as class actions or in representative capacities, and that the Federal Arbitration Act was its governing authority. Plaintiff signed a receipt that reiterated the arbitration policy. After his employment ended, plaintiff filed a class action, alleging violation of the FLSA by failing to adequately compensate him and other similarly-situated employees for overtime work. The district court denied a motion to stay proceedings and compel arbitration, finding that the provision was illusory because the employer retained the right to terminate or modify the provision at any time. The Fifth Circuit affirmed, noting that under the provision the company could make amendments almost instantaneously.

This appeal involved a putative class action brought against several oil and gas companies and several companies that provide labor for offshore oil and gas projects. Plaintiffs alleged that defendants maintained a hiring scheme to employ foreign workers on the Outer Continental Shelf in violation of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 18 U.S.C. 1961-1968, and the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act (OCSLA), 43 U.S.C. 1331 et seq. The district court disposed of all plaintiffs' claims and then entered final judgment dismissing all claims. The court held that the Service Defendants did not violate RICO because the law that would make their conduct racketeering activity did not apply in the place where that conduct occurred, namely vessels floating on the waters of the Outer Continental Shelf. The court rejected plaintiffs' contention that the exemptions the Service Defendants possessed to the OCSLA manning requirements did not shield them from RICO liability because those exemptions were fraudulently obtained. The court also held that plaintiffs could not state a claim for a private right of action for damages under the OCSLA and the district court's dismissal was proper. The court further held that the district court did not err in disposing plaintiffs' OCSLA enforcement claim. Accordingly, the judgment of the district court was affirmed.

This appeal arose from the settlement of a class action where defendant paid substantial sums for res judicata protection from the claims of persons assertedly injured by the toxic emissions of an industrial plant. The monies were allocated among three subclasses, one of which was to receive medical monitoring. Upon the monitoring program's completion, substantial sums remained unused. The district court denied the settlement administrator's request to distribute the unused medical-monitoring funds to another subclass of persons suffering serious injuries. Instead, the district court repaired to the doctrine of cy pres and ordered that the money be given to three charities suggested by defendant and one selected by the district court. The court held that the district court abused its discretion by ordering a cy pres distribution in the teeth of the bargained-for-terms of the settlement agreement, which required residual funds to be distributed within the class. The court reversed the district court's order distributing the unused medical-monitoring funds to third-party charities and remanded with instructions that the district court order that the funds be distributed to the subclass comprising the most seriously injured class members.

Plaintiff brought a class action in Louisiana state court on behalf of a class of Louisiana medical providers against three Louisiana defendants, alleging that defendants failed to comply with the preferred provider organization (PPO) notice provisions of Louisiana law. Homeland Insurance Company subsequently appealed the district court's class action to Louisiana state court. Because it concluded that the local controversy exception to the Class Action Fairness Act applied, 28 U.S.C. 1332(d)(4), the court affirmed the judgment of the district court.

Plaintiff sued three defendants in Louisiana state court, alleging that there was an enterprise between all three defendants to misappropriate funds using a Texas bill review company's under-calculation of recommended payments to hospitals. Defendants subsequently appealed the judgment of the district court holding that the local controversy exception to federal court jurisdiction under the Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA), 28 U.S.C. 1332(d), applied to this class action suit filed by plaintiffs and remanding this case to Louisiana state court. The court held that, based on its conclusion that plaintiff failed in its burden to establish that the sole local defendant formed a significant basis of the claims of the potential class, the court vacated the remand order and directed that the case be reinstated on the district court's docket.

Plaintiffs (Insured) filed a class action claiming violations of the Texas Insurance Code, alleging insurance discrimination in the non-standard insurance market, which served lower income individuals and those drivers with less than ideal driving records. Defendants (Insurance Companies) each moved to dismiss the case based on the "local controversy" and "home state" mandatory abstention provisions of the Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA), 28 U.S.C. 1332(d). The court concluded that the underlying case presented questions of Texas state law regarding insurance policies issued for automobiles in the state of Texas by Texas County Mutuals to Texas citizens. The Insured's case did not appear to be national litigation, so the spirit and intent of CAFA were not fulfilled. Therefore, the court held that the district court properly applied the "local controversy" and "home state" mandatory abstention provisions of CAFA diversity jurisdiction.

This case arose when an ocean-going tanker collided with a barge that was being towed on the Mississippi River, which resulted in the barge splitting in half and spilling its cargo of oil into the river. Following the filing of numerous lawsuits, including personal injury claims by the crew members and class actions by fishermen, the primary insurer filed an interpleader action, depositing its policy limits with the court. At issue was the allocations of the interpleader funds as well as the district court's finding that the maritime insurance policy's liability limit included defense costs. The court affirmed the district court's decision that defense costs eroded policy limits but was persuaded that its orders allocating court-held funds among claimants were tentative and produced no appealable order.