Justia U.S. 5th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff and other Texas residents filed a putative class action against a life insurance company that sells annuities, alleging that the company overcharged them by miscalculating early-withdrawal fees in breach of the annuities contracts.The Fifth Circuit vacated the class certification order and remanded for further proceedings. The court held that the company did not waive its personal jurisdiction as to any non-Texas class members. The court also held that the district court erred in its predominance analysis by failing to assess how state-law variations may impact adjudication of the breach question and also by failing to consider the individualized evidence relevant to the company's affirmative defenses of waiver and ratification. Finally, the court held that plaintiffs failed to offer a damages model adequate to support class treatment, an issue they virtually conceded at oral argument. View "Cruson v. Jackson National Life Insurance, Co." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a putative class action alleging that Medicredit's collection letter made a false threat of legal action against her, in violation of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA). The Fifth Circuit reversed the district court's class certification order, holding that the putative class failed to satisfy Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23's commonality, typicality, and predominance requirements. In this case, plaintiff failed to carry her burden to affirmatively demonstrate that her claim that Medicredit threatened to take legal action against class members was capable of classwide resolution. Furthermore, the putative class presented substantial questions of Article III standing. Accordingly, the court remanded for further proceedings. View "Flecha v. Medicredit, Inc." on Justia Law

Florida law does not recognize putative class actions in Fla. Stat. 95.051's exclusive list of tolling exceptions. In these consolidated cases arising from the Stanford Ponzi scheme, investors alleged that Pershing breached its fiduciary duty and committed indirect fraud under Florida law.The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's holding that investors' claims were time-barred. The court held that the Florida Legislature has laid out an exclusive list of tolling exceptions, and class actions are not on the list. Furthermore, the federal policy of tolling for putative class members could not override the governing statute. Therefore, investors' claims were time-barred by Florida's statute of limitations and the court did not reach the merits of those claims. View "Weatherly v. Pershing, LLC" on Justia Law

BP sought discretionary review of an Appeal Panel's calculation of lost profits owed to appellee under the Deepwater Horizon Economic and Property Damages Class Action Settlement Agreement. The Fifth Circuit vacated the district court's denial of the request, holding that the Appeal Panels were split and this Appeal Panel misapplied the distinction between fixed and variable costs under the Business Economic Loss Formula. Therefore, the district court abused its discretion in failing to correct the significant error. The court remanded for further proceedings. View "BP Exploration & Production, Inc. v. Claimant ID 100094497" on Justia Law

Mobil Oil removed the underlying suits as a mass action under the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 (CAFA). On interlocutory appeal, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of Plaintiffs Bottley and Lester's respective motions to remand. The Fifth Circuit held that Mobil Oil was permitted to remove both plaintiffs' cases to federal court as a mass action under CAFA. In this case, the Bottley consolidation motion proposed a joint trial of 100 or more plaintiffs' claims, a mass action under CAFA. The court held that CAFA applied to Bottley and Lester even though Lester commenced prior to CAFA's effective date. Finally, the district court was permitted to order consolidation under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 42(a) sua sponte. View "Lester v. Exxon Mobil Corp." on Justia Law

This appeal arose out of the district court's approval of a zero-dollar class action settlement and award of attorneys' fees in a consolidated lawsuit stemming from a merger between Midstream and Equity. The Fifth Circuit dismissed a class member's objection to the settlement based on lack of appellate jurisdiction. In this case, the class member was a nonparty, non-intervenor, who waived his right to appeal by filing an untimely, procedurally deficient objection. Furthermore, he failed to qualify for an exception pursuant to Devlin v. Scardelletti, 536 U.S. 1, 3–4, 6–7 (2002). View "Aron v. Crestwood Midstream Partners" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit alleging that defendants violated the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), 29 U.S.C. 201 et seq., by improperly classifying them as exempt employees and failing to pay appropriate overtime. Plaintiffs were also class members of a previously settled opt out class action in California that released FLSA claims (the Lofton settlement). The district court granted summary judgment to defendants. The court concluded that the FLSA does not create an exception to how California preclusion law would treat the enforcement of an opt out class action settlement, and the Lofton settlement was a final judgment for preclusion purposes. The court concluded, pursuant to Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Epstein, that plaintiffs’ FLSA claims in the instant appeal would be precluded by the Lofton settlement under California law; the FLSA does not create an implied exception to the Full Faith and Credit Act, 28 U.S.C. 1738; and the fact that FLSA claims can be released, and therefore precluded, by the settlement of an opt out class action in state court does not conflict with section 216(b)’s requirement that such claims only be asserted on an opt in basis. The court concluded that there was insufficient evidence to find a due process violation and rejected plaintiffs' claims that there was inadequate representation because of the improprieties committed by ILG and class counsel’s response, and the notice sent to class members was inadequate. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Richardson v. Wells Fargo Bank" on Justia Law

Appellants purchased tickets to Super Bowl XLV and were either displaced from their seats, relocated, or had an obstructed view of the field. The majority of the affected ticketholders settled with the NFL. However, appellants in this instance elected to file suit, alleging various claims relating to breach of contract and fraud. Most of appellants’ claims were dismissed before trial, and class certification was denied. Seven individual appellants went to trial against the NFL and prevailed on breach of contract, but not on fraudulent inducement claims. The court concluded that, because appellants have presented no authority supporting that a third-party vendor with limited responsibility is also responsible for the performance of the express ticket terms, appellants’ argument that the Cowboys are liable for their tort claims fails; an inference of fraudulent inducement is untenable; and the economic loss rule bars appellants' claims. The court also concluded that the contract claims failed where the unambiguous term of the contract entitling ticketholders to “a spectator seat for the game” was not breached by an obstructed view of the video board. Furthermore, the fraudulent inducement claims failed because appellants were not fraudulently induced to buy Super Bowl tickets thinking they would see the game on the video board. As to class certification, the court concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to certify the Displaced Class, the Relocated Class, and the Obstructed-View Class. Finally, the court concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in declining to give appellants' proposed jury instruction. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Ibe v. Jones" on Justia Law

The Southeast Louisiana Urban Flood Control Project aimed to reduce flooding by improving draining canals, increasing capacity for pump stations, and constructing new pump stations. Its efforts at constructing a new canal in New Orleans’s Ninth Ward resulted in complaints of property damage to surrounding homes. Plaintiffs filed suit seeking to represent a class of property owners and residents who owned immovable property or resided within 1,000 feet to the north or south of the Project. The district court denied plaintiffs’ motion, concluding that they failed to satisfy the requirements of commonality under Rule 23(a) and predominance and superiority under Rule 23(b)(3). The court agreed with the district court that jurisdiction exists under the federal officer removal statute. The court concluded that this suit seeks to recover different damages caused by different acts committed by different defendants at different times over a five year period. Therefore, the district court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that individualized issues of causation and damages would predominate. The court affirmed the denial of certification and remanded to allow the district court to consider how the case of the named plaintiffs should proceed. View "Crutchfield v. Sewerage & Water Bd." on Justia Law

Duwayne Mason appealed the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of Seacor, as well as the denial of Mason's motion to be recognized as a plaintiff who opted out of the class action settlement at issue in this case. Seacor owned and operated a vessel that assisted in putting out the fire after the Deepwater Horizon oil spill explosion in the Gulf of Mexico and that subsequently took part in the cleanup efforts. In response to a class action filed against it relating to damages stemming from the Deepwater Horizon incident, Seacor filed a limitation of liability action under 46 U.S.C. 30505. Mason, an employee of Seacor and a member of the crew aboard the vessel, alleged injuries sustained from his firefighting efforts. The court concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in failing to determine that Mason had opted out of the class action settlement through informal means. Even assuming arguendo that a reasonable indication of a desire to opt out would suffice, the court concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in determining that Mason’s conduct did not reasonably indicate a desire to opt out of the Medical Benefits Settlement Class. Further, the court rejected Mason's argument that the notice of the Agreement was constitutionally deficient in both delivery and content where Mason had actual notice through his counsel, which satisfies due process. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "In Re: Deepwater Horizon" on Justia Law