Justia U.S. 5th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

When a state prisoner is implicitly granted extra time to seek supervisory writs from the denial of his state post-conviction application—and he does so within that time—his initial application therefore remains "pending" under the tolling provision in 28 U.S.C. 2244(d)(2). The Fifth Circuit relied on its own precedents and by the Supreme Court's teaching that a state post-conviction application remains pending for statutory tolling purposes as long as the ordinary state collateral review process is in continuance. The court vacated the district court's dismissal of a 28 U.S.C. 2254 petition as time-barred and held that petitioner was entitled to statutory tolling and thus his petition was not time-barred. View "Leonard v. Deville" on Justia Law

Emotional distress damages are not available under the Rehabilitation Act (RA) and the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA). In this case, plaintiff filed suit against Premier, a federal funding recipient, for disability discrimination.The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of Premier's motion to dismiss, holding that because punitive damages are unavailable for a funding recipient's "breach" of its Spending Clause "contract," despite the existence of exceptions to the general prohibition against such damages, emotional distress damages are unavailable for a funding recipient's "breach" of the RA or the ACA, despite the existence of exceptions. The court did not believe that it was within its power to expand the Spending Clause contract-law analogy, which would expose federal funding recipients to greater liability. The court found that the Bell rule was not a vehicle for importing remedies that have already been rejected. View "Cummings v. Premier Rehab Keller, PLLC" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, Second Amendment advocates, filed suit seeking to prevent the State Department from blocking their efforts to publish plans for how to assemble a firearm using a 3D printer. Plaintiffs settled with the State Department and then voluntarily dismissed the suit. Now plaintiffs seek to revive their Texas suit under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e) in response to a nationwide injunction against enforcement of the settlement issued by the Western District of Washington.The Fifth Circuit declined plaintiffs request to revive the lawsuit, holding that Rule 59(e) authorizes motions to alter or amend judgments, not to revive lawsuits. The court explained that the initiation and prosecution of the Washington suit did not render any action by the district court in Texas erroneous, let alone manifestly erroneous. View "Defense Distributed v. United States" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit challenging the county's 2011 redistricting plan for electing county commissioners, alleging a violation of their rights under section 2 of the Voting Rights Act and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment by providing only one Anglo-majority district.Determining that plaintiffs had standing, the Fifth Circuit held that the district court did not clearly err in finding that plaintiffs failed to meet the threshold conditions in Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 79 (1986), and in finding that plaintiffs failed to make a claim for voter dilution. In this case, the district court concluded that plaintiffs did not prove that Anglos, a minority in Dallas County, have the potential to elect their preferred candidate, a Republican, in a second commissioner district. The court rejected plaintiffs' claims that the district court applied the wrong standard, and that they need only provide an alternative map with two Anglo-majority districts. The court explained that an alternative map containing an additional majority-minority district does not necessarily establish an increased opportunity for the Anglo-preferred candidate. Furthermore, there was no case in which the ability to create an influence district was considered sufficient to establish a section 2 vote dilution claim.The court also held that plaintiffs failed to plead a racial gerrymandering claim, because the complaint did not allege a Shaw claim. Rather, the complaint only once alleged that race predominated, and it made this allegation five pages before stating the claim for relief. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's refusal to entertain a claim of racial gerrymandering and its denial of the vote dilution claim after trial. View "Harding v. County of Dallas" on Justia Law

White Glove appealed the district court's dismissal of its 42 U.S.C. 1981 racial discrimination claim and grant of summary judgment on its 42 U.S.C. 1981 retaliation claim.The Fifth Circuit reversed the district court's dismissal of White Glove's racial discrimination claim, holding that White Glove did not need a racial identity to have standing to assert a 42 U.S.C. 1981 racial discrimination claim and White Glove has statutory standing to assert a section 1981 racial discrimination claim. However, the court held that no genuine factual dispute existed regarding whether White Glove engaged in protected activities, and thus the court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment on the section 1981 retaliation claim. The court remanded for further proceedings. View "White Glove Staffing, Inc. v. Methodist Hospitals of Dallas" on Justia Law

After plaintiff was shot five times during an armed confrontation with two sheriff's deputies, he filed a 42 U.S.C. 1983 action alleging that the deputies used unreasonable and excessive force in violation of the Fourth Amendment.The Fifth Circuit held that there was no error in the district court's conclusion that plaintiff failed to produce sufficient pleadings to state a Monell claim against the county. In this case, plaintiff failed to establish an official custom or policy of excessive force because the only facts he alleged with any specificity related to his shooting. The court also held that, even if the district court erred by excluding testimony from plaintiff's criminal trial, such error was harmless and the testimony's exclusion was not a basis for reversal. Finally, the court held that the deputies were entitled to qualified immunity where plaintiff failed to meet his burden of establishing a Fourth Amendment violation in the form of unreasonable and excessive force, much less a violation that every reasonable officer in Deputy Scudder's position would appreciate. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's judgment in all respects. View "Ratliff v. Aransas County" on Justia Law

The Fifth Circuit denied defendant's motion to change the name of his judgment of confinement to "Kathrine Nicole Jett." Plaintiff had previously come out as a transgender woman. The district court denied the motion as meritless.The court held that defendant's request to change the name on his judgment of commitment was an unauthorized motion which the district court was without jurisdiction to entertain. Therefore, the court vacated the district court's judgment. In this case, defendant's request did not fall into any of the recognized categories of postconviction motions. Furthermore, defendant's request was not authorized under 18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(2) because it was not based upon an amendment to the Sentencing Guidelines.The court also denied defendant's motion to refer to him with female instead of male pronouns. The court held that no authority supported the proposition that the court could require litigants, judges, court personnel, or anyone else to refer to gender-dysphoric litigants with pronouns matching their subjective gender identity; if a court were to compel the use of particular pronouns at the invitation of litigants, it could raise delicate questions about judicial impartiality; and ordering use of a litigant's preferred pronouns may well turn out to be more complex than at first it might appear. View "United States v. Varner" on Justia Law

The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of Champion's motion for summary judgment on workplace-discrimination claims brought by plaintiff, an employee, who alleged that he was fired because of a diabetes-related condition. Champion claimed that plaintiff was sleeping at his desk during work hours, an immediately terminable offense.The court held that the district court did not err in finding no direct evidence of discrimination on the basis of disability. The court also agreed with the district court that the evidence suggested that plaintiff could not perform the essential functions of the job with or without an accommodation.The court also held that plaintiff's disability-based claim failed because any harassment plaintiff alleged was not severe or pervasive and did not create an abusive working environment. Furthermore, plaintiff failed to show that the harassment was based on his disability. The court held that the district court did not err in finding no failure to accommodate plaintiff's disability and no failure to engage in an interactive process. Even if plaintiff was a qualified individual, his failure-to-accommodate claim failed because he failed to carry his burden to show that he requested reasonable accommodations. The court further held that plaintiff failed to show a prima facie case of retaliation. Finally, the district court did not err by denying plaintiff's claims for damages. View "Clark v. Champion National Security, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against the fire chief and the city after he was terminated from his position as a driver/pump operator at the fire department because he objected to having TDAP vaccinations based on religious grounds. Plaintiff was given a choice between two accommodations: transfer to a code enforcement job that did not require a vaccination, or wear a respirator mask during his shifts, keep a log of his temperature, and submit to additional medical testing. When plaintiff did not accept either accommodation, he was fired by the fire chief for insubordination.The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment to defendants on all of plaintiff's claims. In regard to plaintiff's claim of retaliation in violation of Title VII and the Texas Commission on Human Rights Act (TCHRA), the court held that the city provided a reasonable accommodation by offering to transfer plaintiff to the code enforcement position in the department. In regard to plaintiff's Title VII and TCHRA retaliation claims, the court held that the city had a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for plaintiff's termination: plaintiff's defiance of a direct order by failing to select an accommodation to the TDAP vaccine policy. In regard to plaintiff's 42 U.S.C. 1983 claims that defendants violated his First Amendment Free Exercise rights, the court held that plaintiff's right to freely exercise his religious beliefs was not burdened by the respirator requirement. View "Horvath v. City of Leander" on Justia Law

Plaintiff sought review of the district court's dismissal of her claim against the county under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and 42 U.S.C. 1983. Plaintiff's claims stemmed from the conditions of her arrest after she had undergone surgery on her right leg 24 hours beforehand.The Fifth Circuit reversed the district court's summary judgment dismissal of the ADA claim and held that a reasonable jury could find that the county intentionally denied her reasonable accommodations. In this case, the county provided plaintiff with crutches, but it denied her other accommodations, such as a wheelchair, a modified food delivery procedure, and various forms of medical care. However, the court affirmed the district court's summary judgment dismissal of plaintiff's section 1983 claim and held that she failed to show that she was subjected to an unconstitutional condition of confinement, or that the medical treatment that she received was so deficient that it amounted to deliberate indifference to a serious medical need. View "Cadena v. El Paso County" on Justia Law