Justia U.S. 5th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Using a blocked number, an anonymous individual twice called 9-1-1 in Abilene, Texas, relaying a serious threat of gun violence against officers and an alleged hostage while providing his location. Abilene Police responded, only to find the apartment occupied by Plaintiff and his dog, with no hostage or lethal firearm in sight. Plaintiff was detained, taken to the police station, and ultimately released when an investigation proved inconclusive. Weeks later, Plaintiff was charged with making a false report, though the charges were eventually dropped. Plaintiff subsequently sued three individuals involved in his arrest and prosecution as well as Taylor County, Texas. Each defendant moved for summary judgment, with the individuals asserting qualified immunity. The district court granted the Defendants’ motions.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part. The court affirmed the district court’s order regarding the exclusion of the affidavits, the dismissal of Plaintiff’s First Amendment claims against the officer and detective, and the dismissal of Plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment claims against all Defendants. The court reversed the district court’s order regarding Plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment claim against the officer. The court explained that the investigator is the only Taylor County employee involved in this suit, serving in the Taylor County District Attorney’s Office. Plaintiff’s suit against Taylor County is, therefore, wholly premised on the investigator’s alleged wrongdoing. Affirming the district court’s grant of summary judgment on Plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment claim against the investigator vitiates Plaintiff’s Monell claim. View "Reitz v. Woods" on Justia Law

In July 2021, Texas Governor Greg Abbott issued an executive order that prohibited private individuals from providing ground transportation to migrants who were previously detained or subject to expulsion. The United States brought a lawsuit against Governor Abbott and the State of Texas, arguing that the executive order was preempted by federal law. Three nonprofit organizations and a retired lawyer also brought a Section 1983 suit against the Governor and the Director of the Texas Department of Public Safety (“DPS”). The defendants moved to dismiss the suit brought by the private plaintiffs, arguing in part that the plaintiffs lacked standing and the suit against the Governor was barred by sovereign immunity. The district court rejected these arguments, and Governor Abbott appealed.   The Fifth Circuit agreed with the Governor that sovereign immunity bars the lawsuit brought by the private plaintiffs. The court explained Section 411.012 does not imbue the Governor with the “particular duty to enforce” the Executive Order. Second, even if the Governor had a particular duty to enforce GA-37 by commandeering DPS, he has not “demonstrated [a] willingness to exercise that duty.” Third, the Governor’s enforcement directive to DPS should have been sufficient to remove the Governor from this suit. Fourth, the court explained that if Plaintiffs want to show that the Governor silently invoked Section 411.012 and implicitly commandeered a state agency, they must plead facts to support that inference. Thus, the court held that sovereign immunity bars the private Plaintiffs’ suit against the Governor. View "USA v. Abbott" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a Louisiana prisoner, sued the Louisiana Board of Pardons and Parole (“Parole Board”), seeking to have his parole reinstated on the grounds that its rescission just prior to its effective date violated his due process rights. The district court agreed with Plaintiff and ordered his release on parole within 30 days. On appeal, the Parole Board’s arguments include that there is no constitutionally protected liberty interest in parole.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed. The court explained the State bases its argument on the premise that the Parole Board has unfettered discretion in all aspects of parole and release decisions. In support of its position, the State relied on an unpublished opinion, Burton v. Bd. of Parole. The court wrote that the opinion relies on Sinclair for its analysis, which the court has already rejected as inapplicable in this case. The court concluded the same now with regard to Burton because, there, the Louisiana First Circuit was considering an appeal from a prisoner’s denial of parole. The opinion discusses “expectancy of release,” while the question here is whether there are limits on the Parole Board to rescind parole after its formal grant but before the effective date of release. The court agreed and explained that Plaintiff’s parole was ostensibly rescinded because of an alleged problem with notice to a victim. He was notified of this reason on May 1, 2017, 10 days after his parole was rescinded. At the time, that was not a permissible reason to rescind his grant of parole. Therefore, Plaintiff’s parole was improperly rescinded. View "Galbraith v. Hooper" on Justia Law

Defendant asserts that he is required by his religious faith to abstain from psychiatric medication. Defendant raised a religious objection to being involuntarily medicated without identifying a particular source of law. The district court denied the objection, concluding that: (1) the Government had a compelling interest in prosecuting Defendant’s crime, which was not outweighed by Defendant’s religious liberty interests; and (2) the Government satisfied the four Sell factors. Defendant appealed.   The Fifth Circuit vacated the district court’s order and remanded. The court explained that Defendant faces a pending civil-confinement hearing in North Carolina. Moreover, he asserts that his religious belief as a Jehovah’s Witness prevents him from taking medication. He further asserts that forcible medication would violate his “constitutionally protected liberty.” The Government does not dispute that Defendant’s religious faith can qualify as a “special factor” under Sell. See Red Br. at 13–15; cf. Ramirez v. Collier, 595 U.S. 411, 426 (2022). Defendant’s religious beliefs, combined with his lengthy detention and his potential civil confinement, thus lessen the Government’s interests under the first Sell factor. The court emphasized that it holds only that religious liberty can constitute a “special circumstance” under Sell and that Defendant properly raised a religious objection to forcible medication here. That well-taken special circumstance, combined with other factors identified above, necessitates the district court’s reevaluation of the Government’s efforts to forcibly medicate him. View "USA v. Harris" on Justia Law

On a Mesa Airlines flight, a flight attendant grew concerned about two passengers. She alerted the pilot, who, despite the reassurance of security officers, delayed takeoff until the flight was canceled. The passengers were told the delay was for maintenance issues, and all passengers, including the two in question, were rebooked onto a new flight. After learning the real reason behind the cancellation, Passenger Plaintiffs sued Mesa under 42 U.S.C. Section 1981. The airline countered that it had immunity under 49 U.S.C. Section 44902(b). The district court granted Mesa’s motion for summary judgment. At issue is whether such conduct constitutes disparate treatment under Section 1981, whether a Section 1981 claim can exist without a “breach” of contract, and whether Section 44902(b) grants immunity to airlines for allegedly discriminatory decisions.   The Fifth Circuit reversed. The court explained that the right to be free from discrimination in “the enjoyment of all benefits, privileges, terms and conditions” means that one has the right to be free from discrimination in the discretionary “benefits, privileges, terms and conditions” of a contract, too. Defendants cannot claim that flying at the originally scheduled time is not a “benefit” of the contract at all. Further, the court explained that a hand wave, refusing to leave one’s assigned seat, boarding late, sleeping, and using the restroom are far from occurrences so obviously suspicious that no one could conclude that race was not a but-for factor for the airline’s actions. The court wrote that because “a reasonable jury could return a verdict for” Plaintiffs, the dispute is genuine. View "Abdallah v. Mesa Air Group" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, then an Assistant Athletic Director at Louisiana State University (“LSU”)— internally reported Head Football Coach Les Miles for sexually harassing students. LSU retained outside counsel—Taylor, Porter, Brooks & Phillips LLP (“Taylor Porter”)—to investigate the matter, culminating in a formal report dated May 15, 2013 (the “Taylor Porter Report”). Matters were privately settled, and Miles stayed on as head coach until 2016. Lewis alleges that Defendants, members of LSU’s Board of Supervisors (the “Board”), leadership, and athletics department, along with lawyers at Taylor Porter (“Taylor Porter Defendants” and, collectively, “Defendants”), engaged in a concerted effort to illegally conceal the Taylor Porter Report and Miles’s wrong-doings. Plaintiff also alleged workplace retaliation for having reported Miles. She brings both employment and civil RICO claims. The district court dismissed Plaintiff’s RICO-related allegations as time-barred and inadequately pleaded as to causation.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed. The court considered when Plaintiff was first made aware of her injuries. It matters not when she discovered Defendants’ “enterprise racketeering scheme”—she alleges that this happened in March 2021 with the release of the Husch Blackwell Report. Plaintiff’s allegations make clear that she was made aware of her injuries much earlier. She was subject to overt retaliation after “Miles was cleared of any wrongdoing” by the Taylor Porter Report in 2013. Plaintiff alleged numerous harmful workplace interactions from that point forward. Given that Plaintiff filed her original complaint on April 8, 2021, her claims for injuries that were discovered—or that should have been discovered—before April 8, 2017, are time-barred. View "Lewis v. Danos" on Justia Law

Plaintiff was arrested and charged with interfering with the duties of a public servant. Eight hundred fifty-six days later, she brought suit under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 against Harris County and a number of law enforcement officials, asserting a series of alleged constitutional rights violations. The district court found the applicable statute of limitations barred all claims and granted all Defendants’ respective motions to dismiss. On appeal, Plaintiff challenged the dismissal of her claims of false arrest, false imprisonment, and failure to train, supervise, and discipline. She also asserted the district court erred in denying leave to amend her complaint. Finally, Plaintiff requested reassignment to a different district judge.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that a false arrest claim accrues when charges are filed. Similarly, because a Section 1983 claim for false imprisonment is “based upon ‘detention without legal process,’” limitations run once “legal process [is] initiated.” Limitations had long lapsed by the time Plaintiff sued. The false arrest and false imprisonment claims are time-barred, and she concedes that no basis for tolling applies. Further, the court explained that Plaintiff’s proposed amendment includes twenty-three examples of arrests conducted by Precinct Seven officers that resulted in criminal charges later dismissed for lack of probable cause. They are of no use. All twenty-three lack critical factual detail. That, in turn, precludes Plaintiff from showing that the pattern of examples is sufficiently similar to her incident. Consequently, Plaintiff’s complaint—even as amended—would not survive a motion to dismiss. View "Johnson v. Harris County" on Justia Law

Communities can therefore regulate the so-called “secondary effects” of sexually oriented businesses (or “SOBs”), like crime and blight, without running afoul of the First Amendment. The City of Dallas passed Ordinance No. 32125 in 2022. The Ordinance requires licensed SOBs, such as cabarets, escort agencies, and adult video stores, to close between 2:00 a.m. and 6:00 a.m.. Plaintiffs, a group of SOBs and their trade association, challenged the Ordinance under the First Amendment. After a hearing, the district court found that the City lacked reliable evidence to justify the Ordinance and that the Ordinance overly restricted Plaintiffs’ speech. It therefore preliminarily enjoined the Ordinance.   The Fifth Circuit vacated the preliminary injunction and remanded. The court explained that under longstanding Supreme Court precedent, the Ordinance is likely constitutional. The City’s evidence reasonably showed a link between SOBs’ late-night operations and an increase in “noxious side effects,” such as crime. The court explained that it cannot say that the Ordinance substantially or disproportionately restricts speech. It leaves SOBs free to open for twenty hours a day, seven days a week, while also, in the City’s reasonable view, curtailing the violent crime and 911 calls with which the City was concerned. View "Assoc of Club Exct v. City of Dallas" on Justia Law

When an armed fugitive held a 15-year-old girl hostage inside Plaintiff, City of McKinney (the “City”), police officers employed armored vehicles, explosives, and toxic-gas grenades to resolve the situation. The parties agree the officers only did what was necessary in an active emergency. However, Plaintiff’s home suffered severe damage, much of her personal property was destroyed, and the City refused to provide compensation. Plaintiff brought suit in federal court alleging a violation of the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution, which states that private property shall not “be taken for public use, without just compensation.” The district court held that, as a matter of law, the City violated the Takings Clause when it refused to compensate Baker for the damage and destruction of her property. The City timely appealed.   The Fifth Circuit reversed and remanded. The court explained that as a matter of history and precedent, the Takings Clause does not require compensation for damaged or destroyed property when it was objectively necessary for officers to damage or destroy that property in an active emergency to prevent imminent harm to persons. Plaintiff has maintained that the officers’ actions were precisely that: necessary, in light of an active emergency, to prevent imminent harm to the hostage child, to the officers who responded on the scene, and to others in her residential community. View "Baker v. City of McKinney" on Justia Law

Appellant suffers from various mental health conditions. Appellant’s delusions led her to believe that the federal government— specifically, former President Barack Obama—was conspiring with hip-hop mogul Jay-Z and other members of the music industry to harm Appellant and her family. To send a message to these government conspirators, Appellant threw a Molotov cocktail into the lobby of the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services field office in Oakland Park, Florida. Appellant was indicted and the parties jointly requested an evaluation of whether she was competent to stand trial. The court determined, based on medical evaluation, that Appellant was “presently not competent to stand trial” and therefore ordered her committed to the custody of the Attorney General for hospitalization and treatment pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 4241(d). Appellant contends that the district court lacked statutory authority to order her indefinite civil commitment pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 4246.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed.  The court explained that Section 4241(d) sets forth two time periods during which a criminal defendant is committed to the custody of the Attorney General. The court explained that Appellant was never rendered competent to stand trial. Second, the court noted that Appellant’s criminal charges were still pending when the dangerousness certificate was filed on December 17, 2020. Third, Appellant does not argue that her three months of additional confinement between September and December 2020 was of unreasonable duration. Accordingly, Appellant remained in the custody of the Attorney General pursuant to  4241(d) on December 17, 2020, and was therefore properly subject to indefinite-civil-commitment proceedings under 4246. View "Sealed Appellee v. Sealed Appellant" on Justia Law