Justia U.S. 5th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff sued her school district under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, alleging racial discrimination by other students. After a bench trial, the district court ruled for the school district. Plaintiff argued the district court committed three reversible legal errors in finding the District was not deliberately indifferent.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that the magistrate judge recommended granting the District summary judgment “so far as Plaintiff attempts to couch her Title VI claim on [the District’s] alleged failure to comply with its own policies and regulations[.]” Plaintiff did not object to this recommendation, which the district court adopted. Accordingly, the most Plaintiff could argue on appeal is that the district court committed plain error in adopting this conclusion. But, the court wrote, that Plaintiff does not even raise the possibility of plain error. Nowhere in her briefing, much less the portion devoted to the District’s policies, does she argue that the district court committed plain error. This argument is therefore forfeited in its entirety.   Further, the court explained that a Title VI defendant is not deliberately indifferent where it actively responds to harassment, provided that its response is not pretextual or knowingly ineffective. Here, Plaintiff failed to explain why any of the District’s particular responses were deficient. Thus, the court found no error much less clear error, in the court’s findings that the District was not deliberately indifferent with respect to any of these incidents, whether considered singularly or collectively. View "Sneed v. Austin Indep School Dist" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a Texas prisoner, appealed the summary judgment dismissal of his 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 claim that a correctional officer at the Allred Unit of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice (TDCJ), confiscated Plaintiff’s religious materials in violation of the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment.   The primary issue on appeal is whether confiscation of Plaintiff’s materials violated Plaintiff’s constitutional rights under the Free Exercise Clause. The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s ruling. The court explained that Plaintiff conceded that he did not store his religious materials as required by AD-03.72. And the Fifth Circuit Court has previously indicated that TDCJ policies regarding the storage of personal property do not infringe on a prisoner’s right to free exercise of religion. Evaluating AD-03.72 in view of the relevant considerations, the confiscation of Plaintiff’s religious materials was reasonably related to a legitimate penological objective.   The impact of accommodating Plaintiff’s constitutional rights on other prisoners, guards, and prison resources could be great, given the management and safety concerns underlying the policy. Moreover, even if the confiscation had violated Plaintiff’s constitutional rights, the district court correctly found that the correctional officer was entitled to qualified immunity because his actions were objectively reasonable. View "DeMarco v. Bynum" on Justia Law

Tavis Crane’s estate and the passengers of Crane’s car sued Arlington Police Officer (Officer) and the City of Arlington for the use of excessive force during a traffic stop in violation of the Fourth Amendment. The district court dismissed the passengers’ claims, finding that they could not bring claims as bystanders, and granted summary judgment to the Officer and the City after determining that the Officer was entitled to qualified immunity.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the passengers’ claims and vacate the grant of summary judgment as to Crane’s claims and dismiss the appeals of those claims for want of jurisdiction. The court explained that there is no express requirement for a physical injury in an excessive force claim,80 but even if the passengers stated a plausible claim for psychological injuries, the officer is entitled to qualified immunity. “Fourth Amendment jurisprudence has long recognized that the right to make an arrest or investigatory stop necessarily carries with it the right to use some degree of physical coercion or threat thereof to effect it.” Here, there was no unreasonable use of force against the passengers, so no constitutional injury occurred. View "Crane v. City of Arlington" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, including the American Civil Liberties Union, sought an injunction compelling the Texas Attorney General to release the names of certain individuals who were suspected of being non-citizens but were registered to vote. The case arose when the Texas Attorney General began matching Department of Public Safety data against voter registration rolls on a weekly basis and intended to notify county election officials of voters identified as potential non-citizens. Through their claim under the National Voter Registration Act of 1993, Plaintiffs obtained an injunction from the district court requiring the State of Texas to provide the names and voter identification numbers of persons suspected of being noncitizens though registered to vote.The Fifth Circuit reversed, finding that Plaintiffs lacked standing to bring a case under the National Voter Registration Act of 1993, finding that they did not suffer injury in fact because "an injury in law is not an injury in fact." View "Campaign Legal Center v. Scott" on Justia Law

Defendant, a Texas Justice of the Peace, opened his courtroom with a prayer every morning. The plaintiffs, a group of litigants appearing before the judge, sought an injunction preventing Defendant from doing so. The district court granted Plaintiff's request for an injunction, which the Fifth Circuit stayed pending resolution on the merits.In resolving the merits, the Fifth Circuit reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment and entered judgment for Defendant. The court concluded that as long as Defendant 1.) has a policy of denominational nondiscrimination and that (2) anyone may choose not to participate and suffer no consequences, Defendant's practice is non-coercive. Defendant allowed anyone to participate in the prayer and would select attendees to lead the prayer without regard to their beliefs. View "Freedom From Religion v. Mack" on Justia Law

This case concerns the denial of qualified immunity to a police officer. Plaintiff and four of her children sued the officer asserting claims for unlawful arrest, bystander injury, and excessive use of force. The district court denied Defendant’s motion for summary judgment on the excessive force claims on qualified immunity grounds. This interlocutory appeal followed.   The Fifth Circuit reversed the district court’s denial of qualified immunity on the excessive force claims and render judgment in Defendant’s favor as to those claims. The court explained that Defendant's conduct, in this case, was not objectively unreasonable and did not violate any of the Plaintiffs’ Fourth Amendment rights. On this basis alone, Defendant is entitled to qualified immunity.   Further, the court wrote, that even assuming Plaintiffs could show that Defendant committed a constitutional violation, Defendant is nonetheless entitled to qualified immunity under the second prong of the qualified immunity analysis. Defendant’s use of force, in this case, is also far less severe than the use of force in any of the cases Plaintiffs have identified. Although Plaintiffs need not point to a factually identical case to demonstrate that the law is clearly established, they nonetheless must provide some controlling precedent that “squarely governs the specific facts at issue. Here, Plaintiffs have not provided such precedent here and thus have failed to show that the law clearly established that Defendant’s particular conduct was unlawful at the time of the incident. View "Craig v. Martin" on Justia Law

Texas City’s “permit officer” handles applications for ambulance permits for the City. One day, he spotted an ambulance without a permit. He knew he was powerless to issue citations to the drivers himself, so he summoned someone who could (the Fire Marshal). While waiting for the Fire Marshal to show up, the officer repeatedly told the ambulance drivers that they were detained, that they could not leave, and that they must stay. He did not have that power, but he did it anyway. The Fire Marshal showed up about thirty minutes later and issued them citations. The ambulance drivers sued, claiming this violated their Fourth Amendment rights.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed in part finding that because the officer acted beyond the scope of his discretionary duties as “permit officer,” he is not entitled to qualified immunity. But the claim against the City fails because the officer did not have final policymaking authority. The court explained that the officer was not acting within the scope of his discretionary authority because state law does not give a permit officer the authority to conduct stops of any kind.   However, the court wrote, that the City cannot be held liable under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 because Wylie does not have any final policymaking authority. Section 1983 allows suits against persons for violating federal rights. That term includes municipalities like Texas City. But a city cannot be held liable under Section 1983 on a respondeat superior theory of liability. Rather, a city can be liable only if one of its policies or customs caused the injury. View "Sweetin v. City of Texas City" on Justia Law

This dispute is about whether Texas must provide around-the-clock nursing services to a disabled individuals even though the expense of doing so exceeds the cost cap in the state’s Medicaid program. Plaintiff contends that the Americans with Disabilities Act and Rehabilitation Act require this service because the alternative of institutionalization would amount to discrimination. The district court issued a preliminary injunction requiring Texas to provide the nursing services.   The Fifth Circuit vacated the injunction. The court explained that with the scorecard lopsided in favor of exercising jurisdiction, it is unlikely the district court abused its discretion in declining to abstain. Further, although Plaintiff has shown that the district court should hear her claims, we conclude she is unlikely to succeed on one of them: her due process claim. The court found that because it is unlikely that Plaintiff has a property interest in the treatment she is seeking, a preliminary injunction was not warranted on her due process claim. Finally, on the current record, Plaintiff has not shown that she can prevail on an Olmstead claim seeking services that exceed the cost cap in Texas’s Medicaid waiver program. View "Harrison v. Young" on Justia Law

While violently resisting several prison guards, Plaintiff’s arm was broken by one guard’s baton strikes. Plaintiff sued for excessive force. The district court granted the guard summary judgment based on qualified immunity.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed. The court considered the Hudson factors in determining when force was applied in good faith. Here, all agree Plaintiff suffered more than a de minimis injury. The first factor weighs in Plaintiff’s favor. But force was obviously needed. The officers faced a violent inmate who had previously told the guard that he “will kill before [he] get[s] killed.” The third factor asks whether striking Plaintiff’s arm was needed to subdue him. Nonetheless, the guard’s strikes came at the culmination of a violent encounter with a prisoner determined to fight through the chemical spray and riot shields. The Supreme Court has told judges not to micro-manage the force necessary to quell such volatile situations. Next, there is no dispute that the guard faced, as he puts it, a “hostile, combative, utterly non-compliant” prisoner who was committed to violent resistance.  In sum, the court saw no error in the district court’s application of the Hudson factors to the undisputed facts here. View "Byrd v. Harrell, et al" on Justia Law

Plaintiff was a local delivery driver for Cintas Corporation. That means he picked up items from a Houston warehouse (items shipped from out of state) and delivered them to local customers. Lopez does not want to arbitrate his claims against Cintas. He says that he is exempt from doing so because he belongs to a “class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce” under Section 1 of the Federal Arbitration Act.   The Fifth Circuit partially affirmed the district court’s ruling finding that Plaintiff is not a “transportation worker” under Section 1 of the FAA. However, because Plaintiff's unconscionability challenge to his employment agreement must be decided in arbitration, the court vacated and remanded for that claim to be dismissed without prejudice to be considered in arbitration in the first instance.   The court explained that unlike either seamen or railroad employees, the local delivery drivers here have a more customer-facing role, which further underscores that this class does not fall within Section 1’s ambit. As a result, the transportation-worker exemption does not apply to this class of local delivery drivers. Further, because unconscionability under Texas law is a challenge to the validity, not the existence, of a contract, that challenge must be resolved by an arbitrator. Thus, the court held that the district court erred in resolving the merits of Plaintiff’s unconscionability claim. View "Lopez v. Cintas" on Justia Law