Justia U.S. 5th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The Fifth Circuit denied Plaintiff’s motion for leave to proceed IFP and dismissed his appeal failure to pay filing fees pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Sections 1911–14. The court barred Plaintiff from proceeding IFP in any civil action or appeal filed while he is incarcerated or detained in any facility unless he is in imminent danger of serious physical injury as defined by Section 1915(g).   The Fifth Circuit denied Plaintiff’s motion to proceed IFP and dismissed his appeal for failure to pay the required filing fees. The court held that that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Plaintiff’s motion to proceed IFP. He has accumulated more than three strikes and has failed to demonstrate imminent danger in this case. The court barred him from proceeding IFP in any civil action or appeal filed while he is incarcerated or detained in any facility unless he is in imminent danger of serious physical injury as defined by Section 1915(g). Alternatively, he may pay the appropriate fees. He may resume any claims dismissed under Section 1915(g), if he decides to pursue them, under the fee provisions of 28 U.S.C. Sections 1911–14. View "Prescott v. UTMB" on Justia Law

Under Texas law, parties to municipal contracts must certify that they do not and will not boycott Israel for the duration of their contracts. The City of Houston offered A&R Engineering and Testing, Inc. a contract with an anti-boycott clause. A&R refused to sign and brought a Section 1983 suit against the City and the Texas Attorney General. The district court entered a preliminary injunction against the City and the Attorney General. The Attorney General appealed, arguing that A&R lacks standing.   The Fifth Circuit reversed and remanded with instructions to vacate the injunction and dismiss the suit against the Attorney General. The court explained that t, A&R has not shown that the Attorney General could interfere with the City’s contracts. Chapter Section 2271 merely provides a list of definitions and then a list of requirements. It doesn’t expressly provide a way for the Attorney General to enforce those requirements. The statute’s “textually unenforceable language” poses a traceability problem. Second, the Attorney General hasn’t taken any action to suggest he might enforce the provision even if he has such power. Plaintiffs must assert “an injury that is the result of a statute’s actual or threatened enforcement.” Finally, the City’s conduct severs any link between A&R’s economic injury and the Attorney General. View "A & R Engineering v. Scott" on Justia Law

Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin ordered all members of the Armed Forces to be vaccinated against COVID-19. Secretary of the Navy Carlos Del Toro followed suit soon after, mandating vaccination for all Navy servicemembers. Plaintiffs are thirty-five members of Naval Special Warfare Command units. Each sought an exemption due to a sincere religious objection to the Navy’s authorized vaccines. Plaintiffs sued Secretary Austin, Secretary Del Toro, and the Department of Defense (collectively, “the Navy”), alleging that the mandate violated the First Amendment and RFRA. They also sought a preliminary injunction to block enforcement of the policies described above. Specifically, they asked the court to enjoin “any adverse action” based on their vaccination status, such as job loss, ineligibility to deploy, and restrictions on promotion and training opportunities. The district court granted a preliminary injunction. The district court twice enjoined the Navy’s policies as likely illegal under RFRA. After the entry of those injunctions, however, Congress ordered the military branches to rescind their mandates. The Navy complied with that directive and then rescinded all the challenged policies and formally announced that COVID-19 vaccines would not be imposed on any servicemember.   The Fifth Circuit dismissed the appeal and remanded. The court explained that the interlocutory appeal is moot because the Navy’s vaccine policies challenged here have been rescinded and because no exception to mootness applies. That does not end the litigation, however, and Plaintiffs’ case remains before the district court, which will decide in the first instance whether any of Plaintiffs’ claims are justiciable. View "U.S. Navy SEALs 1-26 v. Joseph Biden, Jr." on Justia Law

Plaintiff sued Nueces County and Wellpath for “County/Municipal Liability” under Section 1983. Specifically, he alleged that the county was liable because it “sanctioned the custom, practice, and/or policy or procedure of failing to protect and/or ignoring the serious medical needs of those entrusted to [its] care.” The original claim was not specific about how Wellpath was supposedly liable. The county and Wellpath moved to dismiss. The district court granted both motions but permitted Martinez to file a “Motion for Leave to Amend his Complaint.” Plaintiff appealed the dismissal of his claim against Nueces County and the denial of leave to amend as to Wellpath.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed. The court held that because Plaintiff had not properly alleged a custom or policy that was the moving force of his injuries, the district court was correct to dismiss his claims against Nueces County. Further, the court found that from the face of Plaintiff’s pleadings, there is no reason to conclude that Wellpath, at an organization-wide level, had a policy of deliberate indifference that was the moving force of Plaintiff’s alleged constitutional violation at the Nueces County Jail. This is doubly so because of Plaintiff’s failure to allege, with sufficient detail, what happened to him at the jail. View "Martinez v. Nueces County" on Justia Law

Plaintiff sued the Austin Independent School District (“AISD”) on behalf of her minor son, A.H., alleging that AISD violated Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), and 42 U.S.C. Section 1983by employing an individual assigned to help A.H. accommodate his disabilities, but who instead verbally harassed him and threw a trash can at him, hitting him and causing injury. After the incident, the parties settled all of A.H.’s Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (“IDEA”) claims outside of court but agreed that Plaintiff still had the right to file a separate action containing A.H.’s claims arising under Section 504, the ADA, and Section 1983. Heston then brought these claims in a suit filed in 2018. The district court dismissed the suit without prejudice for Plaintiff’s failure to exhaust the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act’s (“IDEA”) administrative remedies.   The Fifth Circuit vacated the district court’s judgment and remanded it to the district court for further consideration in light of Luna Perez v. Sturgis Pub. Schs., 143 S. Ct. 859 (2023). Since Plaintiff appealed and the Parties’ briefed the case, the Supreme Court decided Luna Perez, concluding that the IDEA does not require administrative exhaustion “where a plaintiff brings a suit under another federal law for compensatory damages.” This constitutes a “modification in controlling legal principles . . . rendering a previous determination inconsistent with the prevailing doctrine.” View "Heston v. Austin Indep" on Justia Law

Plaintiff brought a Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”) suit against Rehab Synergies alleging violations of the federal overtime law. The district court, over Rehab Synergies’ objection, allowed the case to proceed as a collective action and a jury found Rehab Synergies liable. On appeal, Rehab Synergies contends that the district court abused its discretion by allowing the case to proceed as a collective action.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed. The court concluded that the district court applied the correct legal standards and that its factual findings were not clearly erroneous. The court explained that Plaintiffs’ adverse-inference argument does not suggest a “disparity” as a result of the case proceeding as a collective action; rather, the record shows that any “disparity” had other causes. Because the Plaintiffs were similarly situated, it would have been inconsistent with the FLSA to require 22 separate trials absent countervailing due process concerns that are simply not present here. View "Loy v. Rehab Synergies" on Justia Law

This litigation challenges the bail practices of one Louisiana parish. The claim is that money bail is required for pretrial detainees without consideration of alternatives, violating the rights of indigents to substantive due process and equal protection. The district court denied all relief.   The Fifth Circuit held that abstention is mandated and remanded in order that the district court may dismiss the suit. The court explained that Texas courts are neither unable nor unwilling to reconsider bail determinations under the proper circumstances, thus providing state court detainees the chance to raise federal claims without the need to come to federal court. Here, Plaintiffs have failed to show that Louisiana is unable or unwilling to reconsider bail determinations. How quickly those can be reconsidered is irrelevant because “arguments about delay and timeliness pertain not to the adequacy of a state proceeding, but rather to ‘conventional claims of bad faith.’” View "Little v. Doguet" on Justia Law

Two Texas employers: Braidwood Management, Inc. (“Braidwood”) and Bear Creek Bible Church (“Bear Creek”), filed suit, as per their closely held religious beliefs, asserting that Title VII, as interpreted in the EEOC’s guidance and Bostock, prevents them from operating their places of employment in a way compatible with their Christian beliefs. Plaintiffs have implicitly asserted that they will not alter or discontinue their employment practices. all parties admitted in district court that numerous policies promulgated by plaintiffs (such as those about dress codes and segregating bathroom usage by solely biological sex) already clearly violate EEOC guidance. Both plaintiffs also contend that they are focused on individuals’ behavior, not their asserted identity.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s conclusion that plaintiffs’ claims are justiciable; reversed the class certifications; affirmed the judgment against Bear Creek; affirmed the ruling that Braidwood is statutorily entitled to a Title VII exemption; vacated the judgment that Braidwood is constitutionally entitled to a Title VII exemption; and vacated the judgment regarding the scope-of-Title-VII claims as a matter of law. The court reasoned that under the facts presented, it cannot determine a more appropriate, limited class definition for any of the classes presented here. Accordingly, the court held that both Braidwood and Bear Creek have standing and bring individual claims. Further, the court explained that the EEOC failed to show a compelling interest in denying Braidwood, individually, an exemption. The agency does not even attempt to argue the point outside of gesturing to a generalized interest in prohibiting all forms of sex discrimination in every potential case. View "Braidwood Management v. EEOC" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a Baton Rouge police officer, sued Defendant, the organizer of a protest after Plaintiff was seriously injured by a protestor at a protest Defendant arranged. After a lengthy procedural history, the case came back to the Fifth Circuit after the Supreme Court of Louisiana affirmed that state law recognizes a negligence cause of action in the circumstances alleged in Plaintiff's complaint.In turn, the Fifth Circuit reversed the district court's order dismissing Plaintiff's negligence claim. Additionally, due to these developments, the district court also erred in failing to grant Plaintiff leave to amend his complaint. Otherwise, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of Plaintiff's other claims. View "Doe v. Mckesson, et al" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a convicted sexually violent predator, was held in the Lubbock County Detention Center as a pre-trial detainee for approximately one month from December 2017 to January 2018. Soon after his arrival, he was placed in administrative segregation away from the facility’s general population, where he was held for most of the remainder of his time there. He subsequently brought suit under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 against Lubbock County and several law enforcement officials, asserting a series of claims regarding his alleged mistreatment there. The district court entered an order dismissing the claims against the county and all but one of the officials, which he now appeals in the first of the consolidated cases. Plaintiff challenged the process by which he was placed and remained in administrative segregation. After the district court subsequently dismissed the remaining named official, Plaintiff moved to reconsider that dismissal and the dismissal of several of his other claims. The district court rejected both motions for lack of new evidence, which Plaintiff appealed in the second of the consolidated cases. The Fifth Circuit affirmed, finding no reversible errors. View "Welsh v. Lubbock County" on Justia Law