Justia U.S. 5th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff sued the Louisiana State Board of Practical Nurse Examiners, claiming its status requirement violated the Constitution when the Board denied her a license solely on account of her immigration status. Plaintiff was an alien who had applied for permanent residence. The district court granted the Board summary judgment on all grounds. The court held that because applicants for permanent resident status did not constitute a suspect class under the Equal Protection Clause, and a rational basis supported the immigration-status requirement, the judgment was affirmed.

Plaintiffs filed a civil action against St. Tammany Parish Sheriff Rodney Strain and Deputies Bryan Steinert, Julie Boynton, and Wayne Wicker, each in their individual and official capacities. Plaintiffs brought claims for negligence under Louisiana state law and for deliberate indifference based on the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The only three issues to survive summary judgment were the state-law negligence claims and the section 1983 claims against Steinert in his personal capacity and Strain in his official capacity. At issue were the two section 1983 claims. The court dismissed Steinert's appeal for lack of jurisdiction because he challenged the district court's factual conclusions on interlocutory appeal. The court dismissed Strain's appeal for lack of jurisdiction because Strain was being sued in his official capacity, the suit against him was "in essence" a suit against a municipality, and municipal governments could not raise immunity defenses on interlocutory appeal.

In this equal protection case, plaintiff appealed from a grant of summary judgment in favor of the School Board. The district court rejected plaintiff's claim that the School Board's student assignment plan, formulated to address school population changes while "maintaining the district's unitary status," was impermissibly race-based and discriminatory against minority elementary, middle, and high school students zoned for East Ascension High School. At issue on appeal was whether child A had standing; prescription of plaintiff's claims based upon the 2002 feeder plan modification; and whether Option 2f violated the Fourteenth Amendment's equal protection clause. The court held that because it remanded on other grounds, the court vacated the district court's ruling on whether plaintiff had standing to pursue claims on behalf of child A and remanded for reconsideration by the district court in the first instance as to whether to permit plaintiff to cure his defective allegations of capacity. The court also held that the district court correctly held that the 2002 feeder plan modifications claims were time-barred. The court finally held that because factual questions existed as to whether Option 2f had both a racially discriminatory motive and a disparate impact, and the district court misapprehended the significance of the evidence before it, that court erred in awarding summary judgment under a rational basis test. Accordingly, further factual development was required.

Plaintiff sued Hudspeth County and Sheriff West under 42 U.S.C. 1983 for violation of his rights under the Fourth Amendment. The district court granted summary judgment for Hudspeth County but not for West, finding that genuine disputes of material fact precluded a determination of the application of qualified immunity. In particular, the district court found genuine disputes existed as to West's knowledge of plaintiff's status as an El Paso Police Department (EPPD) officer and plaintiff's authority to operate in Hudspeth County as part of the 34th Judicial District task force. The court affirmed the judgment of the district court where West failed to show legal error in the district court's analysis.

Plaintiff brought suit under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. 12102, against defendant for failing to provide a reasonable employment accommodation in consideration of his diabetes. The district court entered summary judgment in favor of defendant. The court held that because plaintiff's diabetes treatment regiment required only modest dietary and lifestyle changes, no genuine issue existed as to whether his impairment substantially limited his eating. Therefore, the district court properly concluded that plaintiff was not disabled within the meaning of the ADA. The court also held that, based upon the record evidence, no reasonable juror could conclude that defendant was unwilling to, in good faith, participate in an interactive process to reasonably accommodate plaintiff's needs. Accordingly, the judgment was affirmed.

Plaintiffs, Mr. and Ms. Jimenez, sued the County under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging constitutional violations stemming from their arrests. Ms. Jimenez claimed that, because she was arrested for a minor offense, she could be strip-searched only upon reasonable suspicion that she was concealing weapons or contraband. The jury ultimately returned a verdict for Ms. Jimenez, the court entered a final judgment against the County, awarding Ms. Jimenez for past and future mental anguish, as well as punitive damages. The County appealed and a panel of the court affirmed. The court granted rehearing en banc and vacated the panel opinion. Because the County had not demonstrated reversible error in the jury instructions in this case, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. The court reinstated Parts III, IV, and V of the panel opinion, which rejected other arguments that the County had not urged on rehearing.

Plaintiff, a group representing taxicab companies that hold only one to three permits for cabs, asserted that the city's plan to distribute new taxicab permits violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The district court granted summary judgment to the city and plaintiff appealed. The court held that plaintiff had not demonstrated that the ordinance violated the Equal Protection Clause by treating taxi companies differently based on size and therefore, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court.

Plaintiff brought suit against various officials arising from his name not being placed on the 2010 primary election ballot in Houston. Plaintiff appealed the dismissal of his complaint for failure to state a claim. The court held that plaintiff's procedural due process claim was properly rejected where plaintiff had no property right to be a candidate. The court also held that plaintiff's substantive due process claim failed because there were no disputed facts regarding plaintiff's application containing an incorrect residential address where plaintiff made an oral admission that he did not live at the listed address. The court further held that plaintiff's Equal Protection claim was properly denied where the actions of the official at issue did not constitute intentional or purposeful discrimination. The court finally held that plaintiff failed to establish that Section 141.032(e) of the Texas Election Code was unconstitutional. Accordingly, because plaintiff filed his application for candidacy in the last hour of the last possible day, which limited his opportunity to refile a correct application, the court affirmed the judgment.

This case involved a claim brought under 42 U.S.C. 1981 by a terminated employee against his former union, which represented him in a grievance hearing in connection with his termination. Plaintiff alleged that defendants discriminated against him on account of his race by failing to argue during the grievance hearing that he was being terminated for a racially discriminatory reason. The court held that plaintiff failed to state a prima facie claim for racial discrimination by the union under section 1981, and therefore the district court was correct to grant defendants' motion for summary judgment.

Defendant, the Commissioner of the Mississippi Department of Corrections (MDOC), was found liable under 42 U.S.C. 1983 for violating plaintiff's constitutional rights by unlawfully incarcerating him for fifteen months beyond the expiration of his sentence. Defendant appealed the district court's denial of his motion for judgment as a matter of law, or in the alternative, motion for a new trial. The court held that because defendant was entitled to qualified immunity where no reasonable jury could have found that defendant's conduct was objectively unreasonable. Accordingly, the court reversed the judgment of the district court.