Justia U.S. 5th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

In this employment discrimination case, the EEOC and Thomas D. Turner (collectively, plaintiffs), appealed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of defendant, dismissing all plaintiffs' claims that the decisions to discipline Turner and three other African American employees for putative work-rule violations were based on race in violation of federal and state law. The court affirmed with respect to the claims based on the decisions to discipline Jesse Frank and Clarence Cargo because the court concluded that the EEOC had failed to establish a prima facie case of discrimination with regard to those decisions. However, the court reversed with respect to the claims based on the decisions to discipline Turner and Lester Thomas because the court concluded that plaintiffs have established a prima facie case of discrimination; and that defendant failed to produce admissible evidence of legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for those decisions. Thus, a jury question existed as to whether the decisions to discipline Turner and Thomas were impermissibly based on race. View "Turner v. Kansas City Southern Railway Co." on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a Mississippi state prisoner, appealed from the judgment in favor of defendants in his 42 U.S.C. 1983 suit. Plaintiff alleged that his Fourth Amendment rights were violated (1) by delay in holding a probable cause determination after his arrest and (2) by his warrantless arrest. The court held that the reasons for delay could be seen as extraordinary where only a brief time passed beyond 48 hours when police resolved the uncertainties about jurisdiction and the subsequent overnight delay was the result of the magistrate's unavailability. The court also rejected plaintiff's illegal arrest claims and several other claims he raised on appeal. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Brown v. Sudduth, et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiff was dismissed from the East Baton Rouge police training program after falling asleep in class and purportedly making inappropriate sexual comments. Plaintiff subsequently demanded a name-clearing hearing from the East Baton Rouge Parish Sheriff but was denied. Plaintiff then brought federal and state law claims against the Sheriff for his failure to grant the hearing and for potentially defamatory statements made regarding plaintiff's dismissal. Because plaintiff had failed to present competent summary judgment evidence, the court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the Sheriff. View "Bellard v. Gautreaux, III" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed an action under, inter alia, 42 U.S.C. 1983, claiming that defendants violated his Fourteenth Amendment rights to keep and bear arms, as incorporated in the Second Amendment, and to due process. The district court dismissed the action under Rule 12. The court held that plaintiff had not stated a violation of his Second Amendment right to keep and bear arms because he had not alleged that defendants prevented his "retaining or acquiring other firearms." The right protected by the Second Amendment was not a property-like right to a specific firearm, but rather a right to keep and bear arms for self-defense. The court also held that plaintiff had not stated a due-process claim where his complaint did not allege that, under Louisiana law, he sought the proper remedy for seeking the return of seized property by filing a motion under La. Rev. Stat. 15:41. In the alternative, plaintiff did not allege that due process required defendants to notify him of the procedure. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment.

LULAC filed suit against the City alleging that the voting method adopted by the City Charter diluted minority voting strength, in violation of Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. 1973. The City and LULAC settled in December 1996, and the district court entered a consent decree in accordance with the parties' settlement. At issue on appeal was whether the district court properly granted a joint motion by the City and LULAC to modify temporarily the consent decree. Because the court concluded that the district court erred in approving the temporary modification without following the procedures mandated by an earlier panel, the court vacated the district court's order and remanded for further proceedings.

Plaintiffs filed this action against several defendants, under 42 U.S.C. 1983 for violations of their Fourth, Sixth, and Eighth Amendment rights that arose out of their incarceration in New Orleans at and around the time that Hurricane Katrina struck the city. The court concluded that there was no doubt that plaintiffs suffered terribly while held in custody after Hurricane Katrina struck New Orleans. However, the court held that Defendant Gusman's failure to release plaintiffs fell within the emergency exception to the rule that a probable cause determination must be made within 48 hours, and Defendant Hunter's failure to allow plaintiffs to use cell phones was not objectively unreasonable in light of any clearly established law. Therefore, the court reversed and vacated the judgment of the district court and remanded with instructions to enter judgment in favor of Defendants Gusman and Hunter on all claims asserted by plaintiffs.

Appellants appealed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Tony Arcuri and the City of San Antonio on their claim pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 1983, that SAPD officers, led by Arcuri, violated appellants' Fourth Amendment rights by failing to knock-and-announce their identity and purpose prior to forcibly entering appellants' home to execute a search warrant. Taken together, the deposition testimony of officers and the City's admission that the search of appellants' home was conducted in accordance with SAPD policies, were sufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact on the issue of municipal liability. Therefore, appellants made the requisite showing to survive summary judgment on the issue and the court reversed and remanded.

Plaintiff claimed and a jury found that he was constructively discharged from his UTSW faculty position because of racially motivated harassment by a superior. The jury also found that UTSW retaliated against plaintiff by preventing him from obtaining a position at Parkland Hospital after he resigned from UTSW. The court held that, although there was sufficient evidence to support the jury's verdict on the retaliation claim, there was insufficient evidence of constructive discharge. Therefore, the court vacated in part, affirmed in part, and remanded for reconsideration of plaintiff's monetary recovery and attorneys' fees.

Plaintiffs, individually and on behalf of Ruddy Elizondo, appealed from two separate district court orders granting summary judgment to Officer W.M. Green and the City of Garland, Texas, on their claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 1983 that Green used excessive force against Ruddy in violation of the Fourth Amendment. The court agreed with the district court's conclusion that Green's use of deadly force was not clearly unreasonable when Ruddy ignored repeated instructions to put down the knife he was holding and seemed intent on provoking Green; at the time Green discharged his weapon, Ruddy was hostile, armed with a knife, in close proximity to Green, and moving closer; and in considering the totality of the circumstances in which Green found himself, it was reasonable for him to conclude that Ruddy posed a threat of serious harm. Finally, in the absence of a constitutional violation, there was no municipal liability for the City. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court.

Plaintiff, who was incarcerated in the custody of TDCJ-CID, sought damages under 48 U.S.C. 1983, asserting that her constitutional rights were violated when her ovary and lymph nodes were removed without her consent during a radical hysterectomy. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the physicians who performed the surgery, holding that they were entitled to qualified immunity. In light of the circumstances, the court could not say that the law was, or was at the time of defendants' conduct, clearly established such that a reasonable official in the physicians' positions would understand that their conduct violated plaintiff's Fourteenth Amendment due process rights. Noting that the law governing claims involving unwanted medical treatment in the prison context was far from certain, the court held that plaintiff failed to rebut defendants' entitlement to qualified immunity on her Fourteenth Amendment claim and summary judgment was appropriate. The court disposed of plaintiff's other claims and affirmed the judgment of the district court.