Justia U.S. 5th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs, individually and on behalf of Ruddy Elizondo, appealed from two separate district court orders granting summary judgment to Officer W.M. Green and the City of Garland, Texas, on their claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 1983 that Green used excessive force against Ruddy in violation of the Fourth Amendment. The court agreed with the district court's conclusion that Green's use of deadly force was not clearly unreasonable when Ruddy ignored repeated instructions to put down the knife he was holding and seemed intent on provoking Green; at the time Green discharged his weapon, Ruddy was hostile, armed with a knife, in close proximity to Green, and moving closer; and in considering the totality of the circumstances in which Green found himself, it was reasonable for him to conclude that Ruddy posed a threat of serious harm. Finally, in the absence of a constitutional violation, there was no municipal liability for the City. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court.

Plaintiff, who was incarcerated in the custody of TDCJ-CID, sought damages under 48 U.S.C. 1983, asserting that her constitutional rights were violated when her ovary and lymph nodes were removed without her consent during a radical hysterectomy. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the physicians who performed the surgery, holding that they were entitled to qualified immunity. In light of the circumstances, the court could not say that the law was, or was at the time of defendants' conduct, clearly established such that a reasonable official in the physicians' positions would understand that their conduct violated plaintiff's Fourteenth Amendment due process rights. Noting that the law governing claims involving unwanted medical treatment in the prison context was far from certain, the court held that plaintiff failed to rebut defendants' entitlement to qualified immunity on her Fourteenth Amendment claim and summary judgment was appropriate. The court disposed of plaintiff's other claims and affirmed the judgment of the district court.

Plaintiff appealed the district court's entry of judgment as a matter of law as to his claims of sexual harassment, retaliation, loss of overtime, and for punitive damages. The court concluded that the district court correctly found that plaintiff did not present sufficient evidence to support his claims for retaliation, loss of overtime and punitive damages, but that the evidence presented did support the jury's conclusion that plaintiff was sexually harassed and that his employer failed to promptly respond to the harassment. Therefore, the court vacated the district court's grant of summary judgment as a matter of law and remanded to the district court with directions to enter judgment on those claims.

Plaintiff brought suit against various officials arising from his name not being placed on the 2010 primary election ballot in Houston, Texas. Plaintiff's complaint was dismissed for failure to state a claim. The court held that no equitable relief was appropriate either because the relief was moot or because the court determined when examining the claims for damages that no constitutional violation occurred that would support such relief. The court also held that plaintiff lacked an interest protected by procedural due process and affirmed the district court's dismissal of that cause; plaintiff's interpretation of Anderson v. Celebrezze was not applicable; plaintiff's claims were rooted in procedural due process and his substantive due process claim failed; the dismissal of the equal protection claim was reversed and remanded where further proceedings were needed to determine whether plaintiff in fact submitted a proper application and, if he did, whether the Harris County Democratic Party Chairman purposefully discriminated or simply made an error or mistake of judgment; and the challenged election statute was constitutional.

Plaintiffs, physicians and abortion providers, sued the State under 42 U.S.C. 1983 for declaratory and injunctive relief against alleged constitutional violations resulting from Texas House Bill 15, an act "relating to informed consent to an abortion." Plaintiffs contended that H.B. 15 abridged their First Amendment rights by compelling the physician to take and display to the woman sonogram images of her fetus, make audible its heartbeat, and explain to her the results of both exams, as well as have her sign a consent form. The court held that the enumerated provisions of H.B. 15 requiring disclosures and written consent were sustainable under Planned Parenthood v. Casey, were within the State's power to regulate the practice of medicine, and did not violate the First Amendment. The court also held that the phrase "the physician who is to perform the abortion," the conflict between section 171.012(a)(4) and section 171.0122, and the provision in section 171.0123 regarding the failure to provide printed materials were not unconstitutionally vague. Therefore, plaintiffs failed to establish a substantial likelihood of success on any of the claims on which the injunction was granted and the court vacated the preliminary injunction.

Plaintiffs, Matthew Cantrell's family, filed suit against the City of Murphy and several of its officers after 21-month-old Matthew died of accidental hanging when he was found tangled up in a soccer net in the back yard of his home. This was an interlocutory appeal from the denial of qualified immunity. The court rejected plaintiffs' argument that the officers deprived Matthew of his due process rights under DeShaney v. Winnebago County Department of Social Services, where plaintiffs failed to establish that the officers had a special relationship with Matthew when they separated him from his mother. The court also held that because the officers had probable cause to detain Matthew's mother, the district court did not err in granting the officers summary judgment on this portion of plaintiffs' Fourth Amendment claim. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded for further proceedings.

Plaintiff brought suit against her former employer, claiming racial discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the employer and plaintiff appealed. The court held that because plaintiff had presented a genuine issue of material fact concerning the employer's proffered reason for firing her, the district court's grant of summary judgment was reversed and the case was remanded for a trial on the merits.

Plaintiff appealed the district court's grant of summary judgment on his claims against defendants, under 42 U.S.C. 1983, for wrongful termination. The court held that UTMB was entitled to immunity from suit where plaintiff conceded that UTMB was a state agency and failed to argue that Texas had consented to suit, nor had Congress expressly waived sovereign immunity from section 1983 suits. The court also held that, putting aside plaintiff's purported property interest in his employment, plaintiff failed to identify a genuine dispute that his termination was arbitrary or capricious, or that the decision was made without professional judgment. Accordingly, the judgment of the district court was affirmed.

Plaintiffs sued law enforcement officers for excess use of force, assault and battery, and unlawful entry after the officers breached the locked door to the private bedroom of plaintiffs' 27-year-old son, Scott, to arrest him for threatening his mother. Scott attacked the officers with two knives, and in the ensuing melee, the officers shot and killed him. The court held that the officers' use of deadly force was objectively reasonable. Because the court held that Scott's Fourth Amendment right to be free from the use of excessive force was not violated, the court need not consider the issue of whether that right was clearly established. The court also affirmed the district court's grant of official immunity to the officers on plaintiffs' assault-and-battery claims; unlawful-entry claims; and warrantless arrest claims. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment on all claims.

Plaintiff sued defendants under Title VII, alleging claims of racial harassment and constructive discharge. Plaintiff subsequently appealed the district court's dismissal of his complaint based on a finding that plaintiff committed perjury and the district court's grant of defendants' motion for sanctions. Plaintiff argued that a less severe sanction was more appropriate and that the district court should have held an evidentiary hearing to allow plaintiff to explain his conflicting testimony. Plaintiff's counsel, who was separately sanctioned, also appealed the denial of his motion for recusal of the magistrate judge. The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in deciding to dismiss plaintiff's complaint with prejudice where plaintiff plainly committed perjury; plaintiff's argument that the district court failed to hold a hearing was meritless where he made no effort to explain why he and his attorney failed to show at the hearing held by the district court to address objections to the magistrate judge's report; and the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying counsel's motion for recusal where a reasonable person would not question the magistrate judge's impartiality in this case. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment.