Justia U.S. 5th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

After multiple appeals to the court and extensive trial and other proceedings, plaintiffs' Title VII class action for employment discrimination against Lufkin Industries, Inc. (Lufkin) culminated in a favorable multimillion dollar judgment and injunctive relief. Both parties subsequently challenged the district court's attorneys' fee award and Lufkin's complaint that back pay damages were erroneously authorized in an earlier appeal. The court affirmed as to the back pay damages but vacated and remanded as to the attorneys' fees. In particular, given the unrebutted evidence in the record that it was necessary for plaintiffs to retain counsel from outside the Eastern District of Texas, the district court abused its discretion in failing to use the rate counsel charged in their home district as the starting point in the lodestar calculation.

Plaintiffs sued, inter alia, the Covington County School District, its Board of Education, its president, and other persons, in their official and individual capacities (collectively, Education Defendants), as well as other known and unknown persons, under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and 1985, alleging violations of Jane Doe's Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process rights and various state law violations where the Education Defendants were deliberately indifferent to nine-year-old Jane's safety when they forced her into the sole custody of an unauthorized adult who took her off of the school's grounds. At issue was what were the circumstances under which a compulsory-attendance, elementary public school had a "special relationship" with its nine-year-old students such that it had a constitutional "duty to protect" their personal security. The court held that plaintiffs have pleaded a facially plausible claim that the school violated Jane's substantive due process rights by virtue of its special relationship with her and its deliberate indifference to known threats to her safety. Accordingly, the court reversed the district court's grant of the Education Defendants' Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) motion, affirmed that court's qualified immunity dismissal of plaintiffs' special relationship claims against those Education Defendants sued in their individual capacities, and remanded to the district court for further proceedings.

Plaintiff appealed summary judgment on her claims of sex discrimination and retaliation under 20 U.S.C. 1681(a) (Title IX) and 42 U.S.C. 1983. The court found that the case was nothing more than a dispute fueled by a disgruntled cheerleader mom, over whether her daughter should have made the cheerleading squad. The court affirmed summary judgment on the Title IX claim and held that the supposed harassment was not based on sex, it was not severe, pervasive or objectively unreasonable, and the district court was not deliberately indifferent to it. The court affirmed summary judgment on the Title IX retaliation claim and held that there was no support in the record for plaintiff's arguments. The court affirmed summary judgment on the section 1983 claim and held that any harassment was not based on sex, so there was no constitutional violation and there was no evidence that the district court was ever deliberately indifferent. The court affirmed summary judgment on the section 1983 retaliation claim and held that plaintiff failed to point to any evidence that the district court retaliated against her.

Plaintiff sued her former employer alleging various sex discrimination claims and a retaliatory termination claim under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. 2000e et seq., and the Texas Commission on Human Rights Act (TCHRA), Texas Lab. Code 21.001-21.556. A jury rendered a verdict in plaintiff's favor and awarded her $3,450,000 in back pay and compensatory and punitive damages. Applying Title VII's damages cap, the district court reduced the jury's award to a total of $500,000, representing $300,000 in backpay and $200,000 in compensatory and punitive damages. The employer appealed the judgment, arguing that there was insufficient evidence to support the jury's liability and punitive damages findings and plaintiff cross-appealed, arguing that the district court erred in its application of the damages cap. The court held that there was ample evidence by which the jury could conclude that the employer had a corporate culture hostile to women, that this discriminatory animus extended to its management, and that plaintiff's sex was a motivating factor in the employer's decision to terminate her. Consequently, the district court did not err in denying the employer's motion for judgment as a matter of law on plaintiff's discrimination termination claim and affirmed the compensatory damages award. The court also held that, although there was sufficient evidence to support the jury's verdict as to liability on plaintiff's quota claim, there was insufficient evidence to support its back pay reward. The court further held that the district court did not err in applying Title VII's compensatory and punitive damages cap. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded as to the jury's $150,000 back pay award for plaintiff's quota claim and affirmed the remainder of the district court's judgment.

Plaintiff filed suit alleging race discrimination when defendant terminated his contract. Plaintiff, who was white, served as the attorney for defendant for 24 years and was subsequently replaced by a black women as defendant's attorney. At issue was whether the district court properly granted judgment as a matter of law under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50. The court held that plaintiff did not meet his burden of presenting legally-sufficient evidence on which the jury could conclude that defendant intentionally discriminated against him on his race and therefore, the district court properly granted summary judgment to defendant under Rule 50(a)(1). The court also rejected plaintiff's claim that he had superior qualifications than the new attorney and plaintiff's argument that the district court erred by refusing to admit a certain article under Federal Rules of Evidence 801(c) and 802.

Plaintiff sued her former employer, University Healthcare System, L.C. (UHS), for sex discrimination, retaliation, breach of oral contract, violation of the Equal Pay Act (EPA), 29 U.S.C. 206(d), and violation of the Louisiana Wage Payment Statute (LWPS), La. Rev. Stat. Ann 23:631. Both parties raised challenges on appeal relating to either the admission or discoverability of evidence. The court reversed the district court's award in favor of plaintiff under the LWPS and vacated the judgment as to that claim where there was no evidence of any completed oral contract to pay plaintiff the bonus and the jury's conclusion that such an obligation existed could not be justified based on the record. The court also reversed the award of attorney's fees related to the LWPS claim to plaintiff and vacated the judgment as to the amount of fees rewarded. The court further held that, in all other respects, the judgment of the district court was affirmed. The court remanded to the district court for a determination of the amount of attorney's fees attributable to plaintiff's EPA claim. Plaintiff's trial counsel's motion for leave to assert privilege for attorneys' fees and costs on judgment was denied without prejudice to asserting the rights claimed therein by other means.

Appellant and his wife sued Halliburton Company ("KBR"), alleging claims of sexual harassment and retaliation under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e, assault and battery, intentional infliction of emotional distress, negligence, false imprisonment, and loss of consortium where the claims stemmed from the wife's work in Iraq as a civilian contractor for KBR. At issue was whether the district court erred by concluding that appellant could not, as a matter of law, maintain a loss of consortium claim because the claim arose from a civil rights violation against his wife. The court held that, under Texas law, a loss of consortium claim was derivative of the tortfeasor's liability to the physically injured person. Therefore, where appellant's loss of consortium claim derived solely from his wife's civil rights claim, his right to recover under Title VII could not be supported by his loss of consortium claim. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court.

The Elijah Group, Inc. ("Church") sued the City of Leon Valley ("City") alleging that the City's prohibition of the Church from performing religious services on certain properties violated Texas state law, the federal Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), 42 U.S.C. 2000cc(b)(1), and both the Texas and U.S. Constitutions. At issue was whether the district court properly dismissed the Church's claims under the Equal Terms Clause of the RLUIPA. The court held that the City's imposition of its land use regulation violated the Equal Terms Clause where the ordinance treated the Church on terms that were less than equal to the terms on which it treated similarly situated nonreligious institutions. Accordingly, the district court's order granting the City's motion for summary judgment was reversed and the case was remanded for further proceedings.

Appellant, proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, filed a lawsuit against appellees asserting claims under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 ("ADA"), 28 U.S.C. 1915(e)(2), based in part on the allegations that he suffered from certain conditions during his incarceration and appellees failed to provide him with adequate medical care and prevented him from using the community work centers, accessing the satellite and regional prison facilities, working in the kitchen, and attending school. At issue was whether appellees were entitled to sovereign immunity for claims that they violated Title II of the ADA. As a preliminary issue, the court held that appellant had not alleged facts from which the court could reasonably infer that he suffered from a qualifying disability under the ADA and remanded the case to the district court in order to allow appellant to amend his Title II allegations where he had not had an opportunity to amend his claim after being alerted of its deficiencies.

Plaintiff filed an original petition in Texas state court alleging violations of federal law under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and 1985, violations of Texas state law under the Texas whistleblower statute, and common law defamation. At issue was whether the district court abused its discretion by failing to remand the case to Texas state court after all federal claims had been deleted and only Texas state law claims remained. The court held that the district court abused its discretion when it denied plaintiff's motion to remand where the balance of the statutory and common law factors weighed heavily in favor of remanding the pendent Texas state law claims and where Carnegie Univ. v. Cohill did not permit the court to turn any allegation of improper forum manipulation into a trump card which could defeat the heavy balance of the other relevant considerations. Therefore, the court vacated the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of defendant on each Texas state law claim, reversed the district court's denial of plaintiff's motion to remand, and remanded the case with instructions to the district court to remand the Texas state law claims to the Texas state court from which the case was removed.