Justia U.S. 5th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff, a group representing taxicab companies that hold only one to three permits for cabs, asserted that the city's plan to distribute new taxicab permits violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The district court granted summary judgment to the city and plaintiff appealed. The court held that plaintiff had not demonstrated that the ordinance violated the Equal Protection Clause by treating taxi companies differently based on size and therefore, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court.

Plaintiff brought suit against various officials arising from his name not being placed on the 2010 primary election ballot in Houston. Plaintiff appealed the dismissal of his complaint for failure to state a claim. The court held that plaintiff's procedural due process claim was properly rejected where plaintiff had no property right to be a candidate. The court also held that plaintiff's substantive due process claim failed because there were no disputed facts regarding plaintiff's application containing an incorrect residential address where plaintiff made an oral admission that he did not live at the listed address. The court further held that plaintiff's Equal Protection claim was properly denied where the actions of the official at issue did not constitute intentional or purposeful discrimination. The court finally held that plaintiff failed to establish that Section 141.032(e) of the Texas Election Code was unconstitutional. Accordingly, because plaintiff filed his application for candidacy in the last hour of the last possible day, which limited his opportunity to refile a correct application, the court affirmed the judgment.

This case involved a claim brought under 42 U.S.C. 1981 by a terminated employee against his former union, which represented him in a grievance hearing in connection with his termination. Plaintiff alleged that defendants discriminated against him on account of his race by failing to argue during the grievance hearing that he was being terminated for a racially discriminatory reason. The court held that plaintiff failed to state a prima facie claim for racial discrimination by the union under section 1981, and therefore the district court was correct to grant defendants' motion for summary judgment.

Defendant, the Commissioner of the Mississippi Department of Corrections (MDOC), was found liable under 42 U.S.C. 1983 for violating plaintiff's constitutional rights by unlawfully incarcerating him for fifteen months beyond the expiration of his sentence. Defendant appealed the district court's denial of his motion for judgment as a matter of law, or in the alternative, motion for a new trial. The court held that because defendant was entitled to qualified immunity where no reasonable jury could have found that defendant's conduct was objectively unreasonable. Accordingly, the court reversed the judgment of the district court.

Plaintiffs, four former elementary-school students, sued the school district because school officials have, at various times and in various ways, prevented them from evangelizing while at school. At issue was whether the school principals violated clearly established law when they restricted plaintiffs from distributing written religious materials while at school. The court held that the principals were entitled to qualified immunity because clearly established law did not put the constitutionality of their actions beyond debate. Accordingly, the court reversed the judgment of the district court and remanded with an instruction to dismiss plaintiffs' claims as to the principals in their individual capacities.

Plaintiff brought an age discrimination suit against her former employer and at issue, on appeal, was whether plaintiff's claim was time barred. The district court held that plaintiff did not experience an adverse employment action until she was finally terminated on January 2, 2008. In the alternative, the district court found that the 180-day limitations period should be equitably tolled because the employer's actions induced plaintiff not to file suit until after the limitations period had expired. The court held, however, that the limitations period began to run upon the unequivocal notification that her employment would ultimately be terminated, absent any later equivocation which did not occur here. Based upon this record, plaintiff's suit was time-barred. The court also held that plaintiff failed to present evidence that the employer's actions prevented or discouraged her from filing a claim of age discrimination. Accordingly, the district court abused its discretion in holding that plaintiff's wrongful termination claim should be equitably tolled.

Plaintiffs, five individuals with disabilities, alleged that defendant recently built and altered sidewalks that were not readily accessible to them and requested injunctive relief under Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. 12132, and section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. 794(e). At issue was whether Title II and section 504 extended to newly built and altered public sidewalks. Also at issue was whether that private right of action accrued at the time the city built or altered its inaccessible sidewalks, or alternatively at the time plaintiffs first knew or should have known they were being denied the benefits of those sidewalks. The court held that plaintiffs have a private right of action to enforce Title II and section 504 with respect to newly built and altered public sidewalks, and that the right accrued at the time plaintiffs first knew or should have known they were being denied the benefits of those sidewalks.

Plaintiff appealed the district court's grant of summary judgment for his former employer on his claims of hostile work environment and for constructive discharge. The court held that summary judgment was granted in error on plaintiff's claim of hostile work environment based on age where the allegations at issue were for the trier of fact to resolve. As to the claim of hostile work environment based on religion, the court held that plaintiff had pointed to certain instances of acrimony based on religion that, based on the standard of review, supported the court's conclusion that the district court's grant of summary judgment on this issue was reversible error. The court further held that plaintiff's allegations regarding the claim of constructive discharge survived summary judgment where there was a genuine issue of material fact. Accordingly, the court reversed the judgment and remanded for further proceedings.

This case stemmed from a dispute regarding the individualized education program (IEP) of C.C., a child with a disability. At issue was whether a school district, after being declared in compliance with the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), 20 U.S.C. 1400-1490, in respect to a disabled child's entitlements, by an administrative hearing officer, could bring a civil action in court for attorneys' fees as a prevailing party against the child's parents on the grounds that their IDEA administrative complaint was brought for an "improper purpose, such as to harass, to cause unnecessary delay, or to needlessly increase the cost of litigation," although the parents had voluntarily dismissed their administrative complaint without prejudice. The court held that, under the plain meaning of the IDEA and its implementing regulations, the administrative proceeding through which the school district sought a declaratory ruling was a proceeding under section 1415. The court also held that the declaratory ruling favorably altered the school district's legal relationship with the parents. Therefore, the court reversed the district court's legal relationship dismissing the school district's civil action and remanded the case for determination of whether the parents' administrative complaint "was delay or to needlessly increase the cost of litigation," and if so, whether the district court should, within its discretion, award attorneys' fees to the school district.

Plaintiffs brought this action for damages under 42 U.S.C. 1983 on behalf of their minor daughter, who allegedly was deprived of her constitutional rights when she was expelled from public school and refused alternative education benefits during the 2005-2006 academic school year by defendants. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of defendants dismissing all of plaintiffs' claims. The court affirmed the district court's summary judgment in principal part, but reversed summary judgment with respect to plaintiffs' claims that their daughter was deprived of her constitutional right to procedural due process when defendants denied her right under state law to continued public educational benefits through an alternative education program without some kind of notice and some kind of hearing. Accordingly, the court remanded the case to the district court for further proceedings.