Justia U.S. 5th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Planned Parenthood filed suit against the State for declaratory judgment and to enjoin provisions of 2013 Texas House Bill No. 2 (H.B. 2). H.B. 2 pertains to the regulation of surgical abortions and abortion-inducing drugs. Two provisions of H.B.2 were at issue: first, the requirement that a physician performing or inducing an abortion have admitting privileges at a hospital no more than thirty miles from the location where the abortion is provided; and second, the limitations on the use of abortion-inducing drugs to a protocol authorized by the FDA. The district court held that parts of both provisions were unconstitutional and granted, in substantial part, the requested injunctive relief. A motions panel of this court granted a stay pending appeal, and the Supreme Court upheld the stay. As a preliminary matter, the court concluded that the physician-plaintiffs had standing on behalf of their patients, as well as standing to assert their own rights. The court concluded that the district court applied the wrong legal standards under rational basis review and erred in finding that the admitting-privileges requirement amounts to an undue burden for a large fraction of women that it affects. The court also concluded that the district court erred in holding that H.B. 2's rejection of the off-label protocol from fifty to sixty-three days LMP (last menstrual period) facially imposes an undue burden on the abortion rights of certain women. Accordingly, the court reversed and rendered judgment for the State, except that the admitting privileges requirement may not be enforced against abortion providers who timely applied for admitting privileges under the statute but are awaiting a response from the hospital. View "Planned Parenthood, et al. v. Abbott, et al." on Justia Law

The district court held that ICP had proven that defendants' allocation of Low Income Housing Tax Credits (LIHTC) in Dallas resulted in disparate impact on African-American residents under the Fair Housing Act (FHA), 42 U.S.C. 3604(a) and 3605(a). At issue was the correct legal standard to be applied to disparate impact claims under the FHA. The court adopted the HUD burden-shifting approach found in 24 C.F.R. 100.500 for claims of disparate impact under the FHA and remanded to the district court for application of this standard in the first instance. View "Inclusive Communities Project v. TX Dept. of Housing, et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiff appealed from the district court's sua sponte dismissal of his 42 U.S.C. 1983 suit as frivolous, for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted, and for want of prosecution. Plaintiff filed suit claiming that the shower floor of the "C Dorm" was slippery and unsafe, and that he received inadequate medical care. Plaintiff had fallen three times and sustained a fractured hip as a result. The court held that plaintiff did not state a claim under the Eighth Amendment with the contention that a slippery shower condition may inflict cruel and unusual punishment. The court affirmed the dismissal of plaintiff's claims against Defendants Sweetin, Oliver, Cowan, and Brown where prisoner slip-and-fall claims almost never serve as the predicate for constitutional violations as a matter of law. The court also concluded that Defendants Erwin and Fisher ignored plaintiff's complaints and pleas for help. Therefore, the court reversed the dismissal of these defendants and remanded for further proceedings. With regard to Defendant Lamb, however, the mere allegation that plaintiff complained of his pain and lack of official response during a disciplinary proceeding Lamb conducted on an entirely different matter did not suffice for Eighth Amendment purposes. Plaintiff's allegations were sufficient to raise the possibility of Defendant Hough's deliberate indifference to plaintiff and the court reversed the dismissal of Hough and remanded. Because the record was devoid of material delay or contumacious conduct, the court reversed the dismissal of Defendant McManus and remanded. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded in part. View "Coleman v. Sweetin, et al." on Justia Law

Brain Harris's surviving children filed suit against the city and police officers for excessive force after the officers shot and killed Harris. Officers arrived at Harris's home after his former wife called 911 when she feared that he was attempting suicide. After breaching the barricaded door to Harris's bedroom, officers saw that Harris was holding a knife in a stabbing position and fatally shot him. The court concluded that the district court properly held that under the circumstances, the officers reasonably feared for their safety at the moment of the fatal shooting; the court need not reach plaintiffs' alternate argument regarding whether Harris's possible suicide attempt constituted exigent circumstances justifying a warrantless entry into his bedroom because officers had consent to enter; and since plaintiffs failed to show that there was a constitutional violation in this case, the district court properly dismissed the Monell claims against the city. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment for the officers based on qualified immunity and affirmed the dismissal of the Monell claim against the city. View "Harris, et al. v. New Orleans Police Dept., et al." on Justia Law

Defendant is a Texas law firm engaged in an advertising campaign to solicit former dental patients from Kool Smiles dental clinics as potential clients. On appeal, defendant challenged the district court's denial of its Texas anti-SLAPP motion brought under the Texas Citizen's Participation Act (TCPA), Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. 27.001-27.011, to dismiss a claim brought by Kool Smiles. The court held that it had jurisdiction to interlocutorily consider the denial of a TCPA anti-SLAPP motion to dismiss; because Kool Smiles waived its argument that the TCPA was a procedural law that conflicted with the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure, the court assumed that it did not; and the Supreme Court of Texas would most likely hold that defendant's ads and other client solicitations were exempted from the TCPA's protection because defendant's speech arose from the sale of services where the intended audience was an actual or potential customer. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's denial of defendant's anti-SLAPP motion. View "NCDR, L.L.C., et al. v. Mauze & Bagby, P.L.L.C., et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against Bailey in Texas state court, alleging racial discrimination and retaliation claims under state law. Plaintiff then filed an amended petition in state court, adding claims for racial discrimination and retaliation under federal laws. Plaintiff then removed the case to federal court based on the newly asserted federal-law claims. The district court granted Bailey's motion to dismiss. The court held that the Texas statute applied here to determine whether plaintiff's amended petition filed in state court related back to the date of his original petition. In this case, the amended petition did not relate back under the Texas statute because the claims set forth in plaintiff's original petition were barred when filed. Accordingly, the district court did not err in concluding that the claims asserted therein were barred by the applicable statutes of limitations. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Taylor v. Bailey Tool & Manufacturing Co." on Justia Law

Montana Lance locked himself inside the school nurse's bathroom when he was in the fourth grade and took his own life. Montana's parents filed suit against the school district alleging, among other claims, that the school district violated Montana's constitutional rights under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and discriminated against him because of his disabilities under section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. 794. The court concluded that plaintiffs failed to allege genuine issues of fact regarding their discrimination claims under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), 20 U.S.C. 1400 et seq., the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. 12101 et seq., and section 504. The court also concluded that plaintiffs failed to allege genuine issues of fact under three theories of section 1983 liability: a "special relationship" theory; a "state-created danger" theory; and a "caused-to-be subjected" theory. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment for the school district. View "Estate of Montana Lance, et al. v. Lewisville Indep. Sch. Dist." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit alleging, inter alia, that she was subjected to a hostile work environment based on her race. The court concluded that the evidence did not support a hostile work environment claim and Denton County was entitled to judgment as a matter of law; because plaintiff failed to plead facts sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss on her failure to promote claim, the district court did not err by denying discovery and dismissing the suit against the Individual Defendants; and, therefore, the court reversed in part and affirmed in part. View "Williams-Boldware v. Denton County Texas" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, detainees, filed Bivens claims against defendant, a border officer, for violations of their Fourth Amendment right to be free of unreasonable searches and seizures. The district court granted defendant's motion to dismiss based on qualified immunity and plaintiffs appealed. The court concluded that plaintiffs were detained as excluded aliens for varying amounts of time and neither of the claims involved physical abuse. Therefore, the claims fell within the confines of entry fiction, and the Fourth Amendment was inapplicable; the detention did not violate constitutional rights; and the district court properly dismissed these claims under Rule 12(b)(6). Even if plaintiffs were in fact U.S. citizens, dismissal was proper because defendant enjoyed qualified immunity where plaintiffs pointed to no authority clearly establishing that defendant's actions in detaining, even for as long as ten hours, individuals who presented facially valid documentation, plus the use of unspecified threats and insults during interrogation, violated the Constitution. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Castro, et al. v. Cabrera" on Justia Law

Petitioner appealed the denial of his petition for writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. 2241. Petitioner challenged the constitutionality of the Inmate Financial Responsibility Program (IFRP), a program administered by the Bureau of Prisons (BOP), that grants inmates certain privileges if they participate in the program by paying off court-ordered financial obligations. Petitioner argued that his placement into IFRP "refuse" status violated his First Amendment rights because he could not make the minimum payment under the IFRP and pursue his various claims and appeals in the judicial system. The court concluded that this argument failed because petitioner could not demonstrate an actual injury. Because the IFRP was reasonably related to legitimate penological interests, it does not violate petitioner's equal protection rights. Finally, the court found that the imposition of the "refuse" conditions in 28 C.F.R. 545.11(d) did not violate an inmate's liberty interests under the Due Process Clause. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's denial of the petition. View "Driggers v. Cruz, et al." on Justia Law