Justia U.S. 5th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs, Luther Scott, Jr. and the Louisiana NAACP, filed suit to enjoin defendants to comply with the National Voter Registration Act, 42 U.S.C. 1973gg-1973gg-10. Scott alleged that he was not provided with a voter registration form when applying for food stamps, and the NAACP alleged that it had to divert resources to voter registration drives as a result of Louisiana's purported non-compliance. On appeal, the Secretary of State challenged the district court's injunction against it. The court was primarily concerned with the Secretary's challenge to the extent of its requirement that state welfare agencies provide benefits applicants with voter registration forms. The court dismissed Scott's claims on standing and notice grounds; on the merits of the NAACP's claim, the court concluded that the plain meaning of the declination form obliged the court to vacate in part the relief the district court granted to the NAACP; and affirming in part, the court held that the Act gives the Secretary enforcement authority, and that consequently he has an obligation to require the two state agencies to comply with the other miscellaneous portions of the Act. View "Scott, Jr., et al v. Schedler" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit against Deputy Arnold and Sheriff Graves, alleging violations of federal and state law after Arnold fatally shot their father while responding to a 911 call that the father was threatening to commit suicide. Plaintiffs also filed suit against ReliaStar to recover $179,000 they allege ReliaStar owes them under the father's accidental death policy. The district court granted Arnold and Grave's motions for summary judgment and granted ReliaStar's motion for summary judgment. The court held that Arnold did not violate the father's Fourth Amendment rights when he entered the father's home without a warrant because he had an objectively reasonable belief that the father would imminently seriously injure himself, and the district court did not err in granting Arnold's motion for summary judgment on the warrantless entry claim because Arnold is entitled to qualified immunity; Arnold is entitled to qualified immunity because he did not violate the father's constitutional right to be free from excessive force; the district court did not err in granting summary judgment for Arnold on the assault and battery claims, the false imprisonment claims, and the intentional infliction of emotional distress claim; the district court correctly granted Graves's motion for summary judgment; and the district court did not err in granting summary judgment for ReliaStar where the record was replete with factual evidence that ReliaStar relied on in determining that the father's death was not accidental, demonstrating that ReliaStar could have reached its determination without resorting to the conflict of interest at issue. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Rice, et al. v. Reliastar Life Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit seeking declaratory relief and permanent injunctions against the enforcement of two recent amendments to Texas's laws concerning the performing of abortions (H.B. 2). The district court enjoined the admitting privileges requirement and the ambulatory surgical center provision of H.B. 2 as to all abortion facilities. The district court also enjoined other specific applications of H.B. 2. The State appealed and filed an emergency motion to stay the district court's injunctions pending the resolution of their appeal. Because plaintiffs sought only as-applied relief from the admitting privileges requirement for two abortion clinics, the district court acted inappropriately by invalidating the admitting privileges requirement for all abortion clinics in Texas. The district court's facial invalidation of the admitting privileges requirement is directly contrary to this circuit's precedent. The court concluded that the State has shown a likelihood of success regarding whether the ambulatory surgical center provision is unconstitutional on its face where it satisfies rational basis review and plaintiffs failed to demonstrate that the provision will result in insufficient clinic capacity that will impose an undue burden on a large fraction of women. In regard to the district court's injunctions of both requirements as applied to clinics in McAllen and El Paso, the court concluded that the State has met its burden as to each, with the exception of the ambulatory provision as applied to El Paso. Accordingly, the court granted in part, denied in part, and stayed the district court's injunction orders until the final disposition of the appeal. View "Whole Woman's Health, et al. v. Lakey, et al." on Justia Law

After plaintiff was terminated from his position as Director of the University's art galleries after he told a member of U.S. Representative Louie Gohmert's staff that he believed Rep. Gohmert was a "fear monger," plaintiff filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 against the University and others, alleging that he was fired in retaliation for the exercise of protected speech in violation of his First Amendment rights. Defendants appealed the district court's denial of summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds. The court concluded that defendants should have known that plaintiff's speech was protected as the speech of a citizen and that their decision to terminate plaintiff on the basis of that citizen speech would violate plaintiff's First Amendment right. The court held that the law of this circuit clearly established what a reasonable investigation was such that a reasonable official would have known that defendants' investigation was unreasonable under the circumstances. Therefore, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court, concluding that every reasonable official in defendants' positions would have known based on precedent that an informal, hastily concluded investigation would be unreasonable. Accordingly, the district court did not err in finding that the law was "clearly established" at the time.View "Cutler v. Stephen F. Austin State Univ., et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against the City under 42 U.S.C. 1981 and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. 2000e-1, for racial discrimination. The district court dismissed the complaint for failure to allege an adverse employment action under Rule 12(b)(6). The court concluded that, viewing the factual allegations in the light most favorable to plaintiff, plaintiff plausibly alleged that he was subject to the equivalent of a demotion. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded for further proceedings.View "Thompson v. City of Waco, TX" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging excessive use of force from the shooting and death of Israel Leija, Jr. by a DPS trooper. The district court denied the trooper's motion for summary judgment based on qualified immunity because multiple genuine disputes of material fact existed as to the qualified immunity analysis. The court concluded that whether Leija was posing a substantial and immediate risk of danger to other officers or bystanders, sufficient to justify the use of deadly force at the time of the shooting, is a disputed fact. Because on this record, the immediacy of the risk posed by Leija cannot be resolved as a matter of law at the summary judgment stage, the court affirmed the district court's judgment. View "Luna, et al. v. Texas Dept. of Public Safety" on Justia Law

Fort Bend hired Davis in 2007 as a Desktop Support Supervisor for 15 information technology technicians. Cook was the IT Director, and in 2009, hired his friend and fellow church member, Ford, as Davis’s supervisor. In 2010, Davis complained to human resources that Cook subjected her to constant sexual harassment and assaults. Fort Bend placed Davis on Family Medical Leave Act leave during its investigation, which substantiated the allegations and led to Cook’s resignation. According to Davis, Ford immediately began retaliating when she returned to work. She alleged that Ford “effectively” demoted her by reducing the number of her direct reports to four; removed her from projects she had previously managed; superseded her authority; removed her administrative rights from the computer server; and assigned her tasks that similarly situated employees were not required to perform. When a special installation was scheduled for the weekend of July 4, 2011, all employees were required to be present. On June 28, Davis informed Ford that she would not be available on the morning of Sunday July 3, “due to a previous religious commitment.” Davis claimed that she had arranged for a replacement. After Davis attended her church event and did not report to work, Fort Bend terminated her employment. Davis filed suit, alleging retaliation and religious discrimination under Title VII, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. The district court dismissed. The Fifth Circuit affirmed in part. Summary judgment was proper as to the retaliation claim, but not as to the religious discrimination claim.View "Davis v. Fort Bend Cnty." on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a corrections officer, filed suit against the County, acting through its Sheriff, alleging that plaintiff was terminated from his employment in violation of his First Amendment right to free speech. The court held that plaintiff's statements to the news reporter was ordinarily within the scope of plaintiff's duties and did not merely concern those duties. Therefore, plaintiff was not speaking as a citizen for First Amendment purposes and his communications were not constitutionally insulated from employer discipline. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court in favor of the County.View "Hurst v. Lee County" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit against the Department seeking a declaration of rights that the Department's enforcement of the Migratory Bird Treaty Act (MBTA), 16 U.S.C. 703, and the Bald and Golden Eagle Protection Act (Eagle Protection Act), 76 Pub. L. No 567, 54 Stat. 250, violates the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment and the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA), 42 U.S.C. 2000bb, because it prohibits American Indians who are not members of federally recognized tribes from possessing bald and golden eagle feathers. The district court found that the Department's implementation of the Eagle Protection Act was narrowly tailored to a compelling governmental interest. The court reversed the district court's grant of the Department's motion for summary judgment because the Department did not provide sufficient evidence that the policy limiting permits for the possession of eagle feathers to members of federally recognized tribes survives the scrutiny required by RFRA. The court remanded for further proceedings.View "Mc Allen Grace Brethren Church, et al. v. U.S. Attorney General" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, owner of a bar and nightclub, filed suit challenging the noise ordinance of Ocean Springs, arguing that the ordinance is unconstitutionally vague. The court focused on the language of the ordinance that prohibits noise that "annoys... a reasonable person of ordinary sensibilities." The court concluded that this language imposed an admittedly objective standard of conduct in its enforcement. Therefore, the court held that the ordinance sets an explicitly objective standard in accordance with Supreme Court precedent, and therefore it is not unconstitutionally vague. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court.View "Munn v. City of Ocean Springs, MS" on Justia Law