Justia U.S. 5th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs, members of the Trent family, filed suit against police officers under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging violations of their Fourth Amendment rights to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures. After Defendant Wade, a patrol officer, was involved in a high speed chase with a Trent family member, he entered and searched the Trents' home without knocking and announcing his presence, and then seized and impounded the Trents' ATV. Plaintiffs alleged that Defendant Walling, in his official capacity as Chief of Police, is a policymaker for the city and is liable under under Monell v. Department of Social Services of the City of New York. The court affirmed the district court's denial of the motion for summary judgment as to plaintiffs' claim against Wade for the no-knock entry where there was a genuine issue of material fact as to whether a reasonable officer would have taken into consideration that the other occupants at the home, at 2:00 a.m., were awake and aware of his authority and purpose; reversed as to plaintiffs' claim against Wade for the seizure of the ATV where Texas law allowed Wade to seize the ATV and where he was lawfully present on plaintiffs' property when he effected the seizure; and dismissed the appeal as to Walling for lack of jurisdiction because qualified immunity is not at issue in the claim against him. View "Trent v. Wade" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against his former employer under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), 29 U.S.C. 621-634. Plaintiff alleged discrimination and retaliation under the Act, but defendant never answered or defended the suit. After the district court entered a default judgment against defendant, defendant filed a motion to set aside the default judgment. The court concluded that evidence adduced at a default judgment "prove-up" hearing cannot cure a deficient complaint. In this case, plaintiff's complaint contained very few factual allegations, but his testimony at the damages hearing provided evidence on the elements of his claim that were absent from his pleadings. Accordingly, the court vacated the entry of default judgment and remanded. View "Wooten v. McDonald Transit Assoc, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against the TWC under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. 2000e-2(a), alleging that the TWC discriminated against him when it appointed another person to a management position over him. The court concluded that plaintiff failed to show that he was clearly better qualified for the position or that the TWC's bases for its decision were otherwise affected by his national origin. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment, concluding that the district court properly adopted the magistrate's Report and Recommendation granting summary judgment in favor of the TWC. View "Martinez v. Texas Workforce Comm'n" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against various prison officials, alleging a procedural due process claim arising out of his 39 years of continuous incarceration in solitary confinement. Prison officials appealed the district court's denial of their motion for summary judgment based on qualified immunity. The court concluded that, given the extraordinarily lengthy detention and the isolating, restrictive conditions that the district court considered in this instance, there is no basis for concluding that prison officials may avoid the established constitutional rights of prisoners by transferring them to a new facility and wiping the slate clean, while continuing all of the conditions that the prisoner has challenged; no reasonable prison official could conclude that continuing four decades in indefinite solitary confinement would not implicate a liberty interest protected by due process; and, having found a clearly established liberty interest, the court affirmed the denial of summary judgment based on qualified immunity. View "Wilkerson v. Stalder" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, a high school student and his mother, filed suit against defendants for violation of the student's freedom of speech under the First Amendment and the mother's substantive due process right to parental authority under the Fourteenth Amendment. Plaintiffs' complaint stemmed from the student's suspension and transfer to an alternative school for his posting of a rap song on his Facebook page and on YouTube that criticized and named two male athletic coaches at his school for sexually harassing female students. The court concluded that, even assuming arguendo the School Board could invoke Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District in this case, it would not afford the School Board a defense for its violation of the student's First Amendment rights because the evidence does not support a finding, as would be required by Tinker, that the student's song either substantially disrupted the school's work or discipline or that the school officials reasonably could have forecasted such a disruption. In the alternative, the court concluded that the student's song did not gravely and uniquely threaten violence to the school population such to justify discipline pursuant to the court's narrow holding in Ponce v. Socorro Independent School District that student speech that threatened a Columbine-style attack on a school was not protected by the First Amendment. In this case, the student's speech did not constitute a true threat as evidenced by, inter alia, its public broadcast as a rap song, its conditional nature, and the reactions of its listeners. The district court reversed in part and rendered in favor of the student against the School Board on the First Amendment claim; remanded and directed the district court to award the student nominal damages, court costs, appropriate attorneys' fees, and an injunction ordering the School Board to expunge all references to the incident at issue from the student's school records. The court affirmed in all other respects. View "Bell v. Itawamba Cty. Sch. Bd." on Justia Law

Kristy Sones worked as a nurse for LHC, a home-health company, until she was terminated shortly after she had an epileptic seizure. The EEOC brought an enforcement action on her behalf against LHC under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. 12101 et seq. The district court subsequently granted summary judgment for LHC on all claims. The court affirmed summary judgment on the EEOC's failure-to-accommodate claim; affirmed partial summary judgment to the extent Sones was a Field Nurse because she was not qualified for that position; but concluded that there were genuine disputes of material fact remaining as to (1) whether Sones was promoted to Team Leader, (2) if so, whether LHC could reasonably accommodate her disability, (3) whether LHC engaged in the required interactive process to seek accommodation, and (4) whether Sones was terminated on account of her disability. The court reversed and remanded for further proceedings as to these issues. View "EEOC v. LHC Group, Inc." on Justia Law

Burnside, a sergeant for the Nueces County Sheriff’s Department, was assigned to the patrol division. Burnside also served as chairman of a law enforcement political action committee (PAC). In 2012, Sheriff Kaelin, up for re-election in a contested race, approached Burnside while Burnside was on duty and told him that the PAC should support Kaelin’s re-election bid. Burnside said that he would not treat Kaelin differently from any other candidate and that PAC members would vote on the endorsement. Kaelin told Burnside that Kaelin would move him to jail duty if the PAC did not support Kaelin’s candidacy. Kaelin knew that Burnside personally supported Kaelin’s opponent. That the PAC did not support Kaelin, was common knowledge. Three weeks after the PAC failed to endorse Kaelin, Kaelin transferred Burnside to the “extremely less desirable position” of jail duty. Burnside continued to work at the jail for a year. In 2013, his employment was terminated because of the dissemination of a recording containing Kaelin’s threat against another officer. Burnside sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983. Kaelin was denied the defense of qualified immunity. The Fifth Circuit reversed as to the termination claim and affirmed denial of qualified immunity as to the transfer claim. View "Burnside v. Nueces Cnty." on Justia Law

By statute and constitutional provision, Mississippi prohibits same-sex couples from marrying and does not recognize those marriages entered into by same-sex couples which have been validly performed and are recognized elsewhere, Miss. Const. art XIV, 263A; Miss. Code. 93-1-1(2). In October 2014, two same sex couples and the Campaign for Southern Equality, a non-profit advocacy group, challenged the bans as violating the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses. The district court entered a preliminary injunction, prohibiting Mississippi from enforcing the marriage bans, but stayed the effect of its own order for 14 days to permit the state to seek a further stay of the injunction pending an appeal. The Fifth Circuit granted Mississippi’s emergency motion to stay the injunction pending appeal, noting considerations of intra-circuit uniformity and the avoidance of confusion; that it will hear arguments on bans in Texas and Louisiana within one month; and that the Supreme Court granted a similar stay while the issue of Utah’s marriage ban was pending before the Tenth Circuit. View "Campaign for So. Equal. v. Bryant" on Justia Law

Appellant, a federal prisoner, appealed the district court's order civilly committing her under 18 U.S.C. 4245, contending that section 4245's statutory preponderance-of-the-evidence standard violates the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause. The court concluded that section 4245's preponderance-of-the-evidence standard does not violate due process in light of the other significant procedural protections afforded to prisoners subject to civil-commitment proceedings. The different contexts for civil commitment - prisoners as distinguished from citizens - reflected distinct liberty interests that justified different evidentiary standards. View "Sealed Appellee v. Sealed Appellant" on Justia Law

This case involves a challenge to Mississippi's disclosure requirements for ballot initiatives proposing amendments to the state constitution. Plaintiffs, Mississippi citizens, contend that the disclosure requirements impermissibly burden their First Amendment rights. The district court agreed and enjoined Mississippi from enforcing the requirements against small groups and individuals expending "just in excess of" Mississippi's $200 disclosure threshold. The court concluded that plaintiffs have standing where they have shown that they have a legitimate fear of criminal penalties for failure to comply with Chapter 17 of the Mississippi Code's disclosure requirements; plaintiffs' as-applied challenge, asserted both as a collective group and by each plaintiff individually, failed because the record is bereft of facts that would allow the court to assume that plaintiffs intend to raise "just in excess of" $200 as a group or as individuals; the requirements that Mississippi has enacted under Chapter 17 survive plaintiffs' facial challenge under the exacting scrutiny standard where the government has identified a sufficiently important government interest in its disclosure scheme to have an interest in knowing who is lobbying for Mississippians' vote, and is substantially related to this informational interest; and, therefore, the court reversed the district court's order and rendered judgment in favor of defendants were plaintiffs' as-applied and facial constitutional challenges failed. View "Justice, Jr., et al. v. Hosemann, et al." on Justia Law