Justia U.S. 5th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

In Texas, individuals under the age of 25 cannot obtain driver’s licenses unless they submit a driver education certificate to the Department of Public Safety (DPS). Driver education certificates, in turn, are only available from private driver education schools licensed by the TEA. The named plaintiffs were all deaf individuals who contacted a variety of TEA-licensed private driver education schools, all of which informed the named plaintiffs that the schools would not accommodate them. Because they cannot obtain driver education certificates, the named plaintiffs cannot obtain driver’s licenses. Plaintiffs requested injunctive and declaratory relief requiring the TEA to bring driver education into compliance with the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and Rehabilitation Act. The district court denied the TEA's motion to dismiss but certified its order for immediate appeal.On appeal, plaintiffs essentially argued that the TEA’s pervasive regulation and supervision of driver education schools transforms these schools into agents of the state. The Fifth Circuit held, however, that the mere fact that the driver education schools are heavily regulated and supervised by the TEA does not make these schools a "service, program, or activity" of the TEA. "Admittedly, this case is further complicated by the fact that the benefit provided by driver education schools - a driver education certificate - is necessary for obtaining an important governmental benefit - a driver’s license. Given the broad remedial purposes of the ADA, it would be extremely troubling if deaf young adults were effectively deprived of driver’s licenses simply because they could not obtain the private education that the State of Texas has mandated as a prerequisite for this important government benefit. [. . .] the DPS may well be required to give exemptions to certain deaf individuals who cannot obtain driver education certificates, given that using these certificates as an eligibility criteria allegedly 'screen[s] out or tend[s] to screen out' deaf people and may not be 'necessary for the provision of the' driver’s license program. But the named plaintiffs have not sued the DPS, so we need not decide this issue." View "Ivy v. Williams" on Justia Law

Rebecca Breaux brought an age discrimination action against her employer ASC Industries on May 6, 2012. On May 24, 2013, Breaux’s attorney Lurlia Oglesby filed a statement in accordance with Rule 25(a)(3) noting that Breaux had died. The district court stayed the action pending the substitution of parties. After the ninety days allotted for the substitution of a party passed without any motion being filed, ASC Industries moved for the action to be dismissed. On the next business day, September 3, 2013, the district court granted ASC Industries’ motion to dismiss. On October 1, 2013, Oglesby filed a motion on behalf of Breaux’s estate to alter or amend the judgment of dismissal. The issue this case presented for the Fifth Circuit's centered on whether personal service of a suggestion of death on a deceased-plaintiff’s estate was required in order for the ninety-day time limit to run for the substitution of a party under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure ("Rule") 25. The Court held that personal service was required. View "Sampson v. ASC Industries" on Justia Law

This action began in 1993 when Plaintiffs, representatives of a class of over 1.5 million Texas children eligible for Medicaid’s Early and Periodic Screening, Diagnosis, and Treatment program ("EPSDT"), sued various Texas state officials under 42 U.S.C. 1983 for violations of federal Medicaid law in the state’s implementation of the Program. The parties concluded a consent decree in 1996 in which Defendants promised to implement a number of changes, among which was a training program for participating health care providers. A few years later, after little progress had been made, the district court found Defendants in violation of the Decree. The Fifth Circuit reversed solely on Defendants' challenge to the Decree's validity under the Eleventh Amendment. In 2007, the parties agreed on a corrective action order to resolve Plaintiffs’ concerns with one part of the Decree. Defendants, believing their obligations to be satisfied, moved to dissolve that order and the associated Decree provisions under Rule 60(b)(5). The district court granted their motion. Plaintiffs appealed the district court’s termination of several provisions of the Decree decree and the dissolution of a related corrective action order pursuant to the first clause of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(5), that the judgment has been “satisfied, released, or discharged.” Finding no reversible error, the Fifth Circuit affirmed. View "Frew v. Suehs" on Justia Law

After plaintiff was terminated, she filed suit against the City and Chief Freddie Cannon under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that the termination was a result of engaging in protected speech under the First Amendment. The court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment to defendants where plaintiff, a sergeant with the police department, made critical statements against the Chief on her Facebook page and such statements were not within the ordinary scope of her duties as a police officer. Therefore, the statements on Facebook were speech made as a citizen. Further, considering the content, form, and context of plaintiff's speech, the court held that the speech is not entitled to First Amendment protection where plaintiff's speech was primarily motivated by and primarily addressed her displeasure with the Chief and not a matter of public concern. Even assuming that plaintiff spoke as a citizen on a matter of public concern, she failed to demonstrated that her interests outweigh those of defendants to maintain discipline and close working relationships, while preventing insubordination within the police department. View "Graziosi v. City of Greenville" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, members of the Trent family, filed suit against police officers under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging violations of their Fourth Amendment rights to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures. After Defendant Wade, a patrol officer, was involved in a high speed chase with a Trent family member, he entered and searched the Trents' home without knocking and announcing his presence, and then seized and impounded the Trents' ATV. Plaintiffs alleged that Defendant Walling, in his official capacity as Chief of Police, is a policymaker for the city and is liable under under Monell v. Department of Social Services of the City of New York. The court affirmed the district court's denial of the motion for summary judgment as to plaintiffs' claim against Wade for the no-knock entry where there was a genuine issue of material fact as to whether a reasonable officer would have taken into consideration that the other occupants at the home, at 2:00 a.m., were awake and aware of his authority and purpose; reversed as to plaintiffs' claim against Wade for the seizure of the ATV where Texas law allowed Wade to seize the ATV and where he was lawfully present on plaintiffs' property when he effected the seizure; and dismissed the appeal as to Walling for lack of jurisdiction because qualified immunity is not at issue in the claim against him. View "Trent v. Wade" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against his former employer under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), 29 U.S.C. 621-634. Plaintiff alleged discrimination and retaliation under the Act, but defendant never answered or defended the suit. After the district court entered a default judgment against defendant, defendant filed a motion to set aside the default judgment. The court concluded that evidence adduced at a default judgment "prove-up" hearing cannot cure a deficient complaint. In this case, plaintiff's complaint contained very few factual allegations, but his testimony at the damages hearing provided evidence on the elements of his claim that were absent from his pleadings. Accordingly, the court vacated the entry of default judgment and remanded. View "Wooten v. McDonald Transit Assoc, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against the TWC under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. 2000e-2(a), alleging that the TWC discriminated against him when it appointed another person to a management position over him. The court concluded that plaintiff failed to show that he was clearly better qualified for the position or that the TWC's bases for its decision were otherwise affected by his national origin. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment, concluding that the district court properly adopted the magistrate's Report and Recommendation granting summary judgment in favor of the TWC. View "Martinez v. Texas Workforce Comm'n" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against various prison officials, alleging a procedural due process claim arising out of his 39 years of continuous incarceration in solitary confinement. Prison officials appealed the district court's denial of their motion for summary judgment based on qualified immunity. The court concluded that, given the extraordinarily lengthy detention and the isolating, restrictive conditions that the district court considered in this instance, there is no basis for concluding that prison officials may avoid the established constitutional rights of prisoners by transferring them to a new facility and wiping the slate clean, while continuing all of the conditions that the prisoner has challenged; no reasonable prison official could conclude that continuing four decades in indefinite solitary confinement would not implicate a liberty interest protected by due process; and, having found a clearly established liberty interest, the court affirmed the denial of summary judgment based on qualified immunity. View "Wilkerson v. Stalder" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, a high school student and his mother, filed suit against defendants for violation of the student's freedom of speech under the First Amendment and the mother's substantive due process right to parental authority under the Fourteenth Amendment. Plaintiffs' complaint stemmed from the student's suspension and transfer to an alternative school for his posting of a rap song on his Facebook page and on YouTube that criticized and named two male athletic coaches at his school for sexually harassing female students. The court concluded that, even assuming arguendo the School Board could invoke Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District in this case, it would not afford the School Board a defense for its violation of the student's First Amendment rights because the evidence does not support a finding, as would be required by Tinker, that the student's song either substantially disrupted the school's work or discipline or that the school officials reasonably could have forecasted such a disruption. In the alternative, the court concluded that the student's song did not gravely and uniquely threaten violence to the school population such to justify discipline pursuant to the court's narrow holding in Ponce v. Socorro Independent School District that student speech that threatened a Columbine-style attack on a school was not protected by the First Amendment. In this case, the student's speech did not constitute a true threat as evidenced by, inter alia, its public broadcast as a rap song, its conditional nature, and the reactions of its listeners. The district court reversed in part and rendered in favor of the student against the School Board on the First Amendment claim; remanded and directed the district court to award the student nominal damages, court costs, appropriate attorneys' fees, and an injunction ordering the School Board to expunge all references to the incident at issue from the student's school records. The court affirmed in all other respects. View "Bell v. Itawamba Cty. Sch. Bd." on Justia Law

Kristy Sones worked as a nurse for LHC, a home-health company, until she was terminated shortly after she had an epileptic seizure. The EEOC brought an enforcement action on her behalf against LHC under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. 12101 et seq. The district court subsequently granted summary judgment for LHC on all claims. The court affirmed summary judgment on the EEOC's failure-to-accommodate claim; affirmed partial summary judgment to the extent Sones was a Field Nurse because she was not qualified for that position; but concluded that there were genuine disputes of material fact remaining as to (1) whether Sones was promoted to Team Leader, (2) if so, whether LHC could reasonably accommodate her disability, (3) whether LHC engaged in the required interactive process to seek accommodation, and (4) whether Sones was terminated on account of her disability. The court reversed and remanded for further proceedings as to these issues. View "EEOC v. LHC Group, Inc." on Justia Law