Justia U.S. 5th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff, former Chief Deputy in the Sheriff's office, filed suit against the Sheriff, raising claims under 42 U.S.C. 1983, the Louisiana Constitution, and the Louisiana whistleblower statutes. The district court dismissed plaintiff's claims and granted summary judgment in favor of the Sheriff. The court concluded that plaintiff's First Amendment retaliation claim failed because plaintiff's complaints about the recordings at issue were made within the scope of his employment and, therefore, his speech was not protected by the First Amendment. The court agreed with the district court that it would have been a waste of judicial resources to decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction where plaintiff's state law claims were neither novel nor complex; the court concluded that plaintiff has not shown that the Sheriff’s Office committed an actual violation of Louisiana law and, therefore, the district court was correct to dismiss his claim under the Louisiana Whistleblower Statute, La. Rev. Stat. 23:967; and La. Rev. Stat. 42: 1169 does not provide a private right of action for plaintiff to sue in either state or federal court. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Wilson v. Tregre" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit against CBP agents, alleging Fourth Amendment violations. At issue was whether illegal aliens can pursue Bivens claims against CBP agents for illegally stopping and arresting them. In Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, the Supreme Court created a damage remedy against individual federal law enforcement officers who allegedly conducted a warrantless search of a suspect’s home and arrested him without probable cause. The court joined its sister circuits and concluded that Bivens actions are not available for claims that can be addressed in civil immigration removal proceedings. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded. View "De La Paz v. Coy" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, who is white, filed suit alleging state and federal claims of workplace retaliation and discrimination. On appeal, plaintiff challenged the district court's grant of the government's motion to exclude certain testimony offered by plaintiff and a police department captain and dismissal of plaintiff's federal claims. The court agreed with the district court that the statements at issue lacked foundation and plaintiff cannot show that all reasonable persons would reject the district court's decision to strike the testimony. The court also affirmed the district court's dismissal of plaintiff's Title VII race discrimination claim, 42 U.S.C. 2000e-2(a)(1), where plaintiff failed to present evidence sufficient to raise a genuine issue of material fact that he was treated less favorably because of his race than were other similarly situated employees who were not white, under nearly identical circumstances. Assuming that the district court dismissed plaintiff's race retaliation claim, 42 U.S.C. 2000e-3(a), sua sponte and without notice, the court held that the dismissal was harmless and affirmed the judgment. View "Paske, Jr. v. Fitzgerald" on Justia Law

Randy Jenkins, a 51-year-old African-American man, served in the San Antonio Fire Department since 1986. The Fire Department was headed by the Fire Chief, Charles Hood, who managed a deputy chief, assistant chiefs, district chiefs, captains, lieutenants, engineers, and firefighters. In 2008, Jenkins was appointed as one of two district chiefs of Fire Prevention, reporting directly to Assistant Chief Earl Crayton. In this capacity, Jenkins was responsible for oversight of Community Safety & Education ("CS&E"). When the other district chief in the Fire Prevention Division left, Jenkins temporarily assumed his responsibilities. Eventually, a new district chief was assigned to the Fire Prevention Division and given responsibility for CS&E while Jenkins retained oversight of Special Events, Inspections, and Administration. After the recently appointed district chief left in 2009, Captain Christopher Monestier was hired as his replacement and assigned oversight of CS&E and Special Events. In 2011, Assistant Chief Crayton "realigned" Jenkins and Monestier’s duties. Jenkins did not suffer a reduction in rank or benefits but perceived the realignment as discrimination based on his race, color, or age as well as retaliation for giving a statement supporting an EEOC charge against Crayton. Jenkins filed an EEOC charge to this effect, and the EEOC issued a right-to-sue letter on May 16, 2012. Several other actions would lead Jenkins to amend his EEOC complaint to include several other "realignments." He ultimately sued, taking his right-to-sue letter to district court. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the Fire Department. It held that Jenkins’s discrimination and retaliation claims stemming from the 2011 reassignment of duties were not timely filed. Even assuming his suit was timely, the district court found that Jenkins’s discrimination and retaliation claims stemming from both the 2011 reassignment and Jenkins’s non-selection as District Chief of Inspections in 2012 failed because he was unable to establish a prima facie case. Jenkins timely appealed. But finding no reversible error, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. View "Jenkins v. City of San Antonio Fire Dept" on Justia Law

In this appeal of the grant of summary judgment dismissing a complaint in a Title VII race-discrimination case, plaintiff Lieutenant Gayle McMullin, presented evidence, which, if believed by a jury, would have shown "a fumbling, bumbling case of determined efforts" to deny a promotion to McMullin. Lieutenant McMullin alleged that the Mississippi Department of Public Safety failed to promote her to the position of Training Director and instead promoted a less-qualified officer of lower rank to fill the position, based on race. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the Department, finding that Lieutenant McMullin failed to establish a prima facie case of race-based discrimination. Because the district court erred in granting summary judgment, the Fifth Circuit vacated the judgment, and remanded the case for trial or other proceedings. View "McMullin v. MS Dept of Public Safety" on Justia Law

Plaintiff-appellee Tammy Bryant filed suit against her employer, the Texas Department of Aging and Disability Services, and supervisor, Kim Littleton, in her individual capacity, claiming violations of the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA). Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment on the bases of sovereign and qualified immunity. The district court denied the motion in full. After review of the trial court record, the Fifth Circuit concluded the Department was entitled to sovereign immunity on Bryant’s self-care claims and that Littleton was entitled to qualified immunity on Bryant’s interference claims. View "Bryant v. Texas Dept of Aging & Disab." on Justia Law

In Texas, individuals under the age of 25 cannot obtain driver’s licenses unless they submit a driver education certificate to the Department of Public Safety (DPS). Driver education certificates, in turn, are only available from private driver education schools licensed by the TEA. The named plaintiffs were all deaf individuals who contacted a variety of TEA-licensed private driver education schools, all of which informed the named plaintiffs that the schools would not accommodate them. Because they cannot obtain driver education certificates, the named plaintiffs cannot obtain driver’s licenses. Plaintiffs requested injunctive and declaratory relief requiring the TEA to bring driver education into compliance with the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and Rehabilitation Act. The district court denied the TEA's motion to dismiss but certified its order for immediate appeal.On appeal, plaintiffs essentially argued that the TEA’s pervasive regulation and supervision of driver education schools transforms these schools into agents of the state. The Fifth Circuit held, however, that the mere fact that the driver education schools are heavily regulated and supervised by the TEA does not make these schools a "service, program, or activity" of the TEA. "Admittedly, this case is further complicated by the fact that the benefit provided by driver education schools - a driver education certificate - is necessary for obtaining an important governmental benefit - a driver’s license. Given the broad remedial purposes of the ADA, it would be extremely troubling if deaf young adults were effectively deprived of driver’s licenses simply because they could not obtain the private education that the State of Texas has mandated as a prerequisite for this important government benefit. [. . .] the DPS may well be required to give exemptions to certain deaf individuals who cannot obtain driver education certificates, given that using these certificates as an eligibility criteria allegedly 'screen[s] out or tend[s] to screen out' deaf people and may not be 'necessary for the provision of the' driver’s license program. But the named plaintiffs have not sued the DPS, so we need not decide this issue." View "Ivy v. Williams" on Justia Law

Rebecca Breaux brought an age discrimination action against her employer ASC Industries on May 6, 2012. On May 24, 2013, Breaux’s attorney Lurlia Oglesby filed a statement in accordance with Rule 25(a)(3) noting that Breaux had died. The district court stayed the action pending the substitution of parties. After the ninety days allotted for the substitution of a party passed without any motion being filed, ASC Industries moved for the action to be dismissed. On the next business day, September 3, 2013, the district court granted ASC Industries’ motion to dismiss. On October 1, 2013, Oglesby filed a motion on behalf of Breaux’s estate to alter or amend the judgment of dismissal. The issue this case presented for the Fifth Circuit's centered on whether personal service of a suggestion of death on a deceased-plaintiff’s estate was required in order for the ninety-day time limit to run for the substitution of a party under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure ("Rule") 25. The Court held that personal service was required. View "Sampson v. ASC Industries" on Justia Law

This action began in 1993 when Plaintiffs, representatives of a class of over 1.5 million Texas children eligible for Medicaid’s Early and Periodic Screening, Diagnosis, and Treatment program ("EPSDT"), sued various Texas state officials under 42 U.S.C. 1983 for violations of federal Medicaid law in the state’s implementation of the Program. The parties concluded a consent decree in 1996 in which Defendants promised to implement a number of changes, among which was a training program for participating health care providers. A few years later, after little progress had been made, the district court found Defendants in violation of the Decree. The Fifth Circuit reversed solely on Defendants' challenge to the Decree's validity under the Eleventh Amendment. In 2007, the parties agreed on a corrective action order to resolve Plaintiffs’ concerns with one part of the Decree. Defendants, believing their obligations to be satisfied, moved to dissolve that order and the associated Decree provisions under Rule 60(b)(5). The district court granted their motion. Plaintiffs appealed the district court’s termination of several provisions of the Decree decree and the dissolution of a related corrective action order pursuant to the first clause of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(5), that the judgment has been “satisfied, released, or discharged.” Finding no reversible error, the Fifth Circuit affirmed. View "Frew v. Suehs" on Justia Law

After plaintiff was terminated, she filed suit against the City and Chief Freddie Cannon under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that the termination was a result of engaging in protected speech under the First Amendment. The court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment to defendants where plaintiff, a sergeant with the police department, made critical statements against the Chief on her Facebook page and such statements were not within the ordinary scope of her duties as a police officer. Therefore, the statements on Facebook were speech made as a citizen. Further, considering the content, form, and context of plaintiff's speech, the court held that the speech is not entitled to First Amendment protection where plaintiff's speech was primarily motivated by and primarily addressed her displeasure with the Chief and not a matter of public concern. Even assuming that plaintiff spoke as a citizen on a matter of public concern, she failed to demonstrated that her interests outweigh those of defendants to maintain discipline and close working relationships, while preventing insubordination within the police department. View "Graziosi v. City of Greenville" on Justia Law