Justia U.S. 5th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Zastrow appealed the district court's grant of summary judgment on their claims under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”), 18 U.S.C. 961–1968, and 42 U.S.C. 1981 and 1982. The court concluded that plaintiff has not shown that defendants’ alleged predicate acts amount to or constitute a threat of continuing racketeering activity; even if plaintiff had produced evidence of a pattern of racketeering activity, he has not demonstrated the existence of an enterprise; and therefore, the district court properly granted summary judgment on plaintiff's breach of contract claim dressed in civil RICO garb. The court also concluded that because plaintiff has alleged that Mercedes Greenway refused to sell him parts after he testified in support of some clients' discrimination claims, he has stated a claim for retaliation under section 1981. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment on plaintiff's RICO claim and his section 1982 claim, but vacated as to the section 1981 claim, remanding for further proceedings. View "Zastrow v. Houston Auto Imports Greenway" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a Texas prisoner, filed suit alleging that prison officials were deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs, causing him injury and violating his constitutional rights. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of defendants. The court concluded that plaintiff's appeal is not frivolous and his motion to proceed in forma pauperis is granted. The court also concluded that further briefing is unnecessary and therefore turned to the merits. In this case, defendants failed to establish that there was an available procedure plaintiff did not exhaust. Without knowing what the applicable grievance procedures is, it is impossible to determine whether plaintiff exhausted them. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "Cantwell v. Sterling" on Justia Law

Texas abortion providers filed suit against the State seeking declaratory and injunctive relief against the enforcement of amendments to Texas's law regulating abortions. At issue is H.B. 2’s physician admitting privileges requirement as applied to a McAllen and an El Paso abortion facility, as well as H.B. 2’s requirement that abortion facilities satisfy the standards set for ambulatory surgical centers (ASC) facially and as applied to the McAllen and El Paso abortion facilities. In regards to the facial challenge to the admitting privileges requirement, the district court erred by granting unrequested relief. In doing so, the district court also ran afoul of the holding and mandate in Abbott II, and the principles of res judicata. In regards to the facial challenge of the ASC requirement and the ASC requirement in the context of medication abortions, res judicata bars these claims. On the merits, the ASC requirements are rationally related to a legitimate state interest and have not been shown to have an improper purpose or impose an undue burden.The court affirmed in part and modified in part the district court’s injunction of the admitting privileges and ASC requirements as applied to McAllen, as follows: (1) The State is enjoined from enforcing section 135.51 - .56 and 135.41 of the ASC regulations against the abortion facility in McAllen when that facility is used to provide abortions to women residing in the Rio Grande Valley, until such time as another licensed abortion facility becomes available to provide abortions at a location nearer to the Rio Grande Valley than San Antonio; (2) The State is enjoined from enforcing the admitting privileges requirement against Dr. Lynn when he provides abortions at the abortion facility located in McAllen to women residing in the Rio Grande Valley. The remainder of the injunction as to the McAllen facility is vacated. Because H.B. 2 does not place a substantial obstacle in the path of those women seeking an abortion in the El Paso area, the court held that the district court erred in sustaining plaintiffs’ as applied challenge in El Paso. The court affirmed the district court’s dismissal of plaintiffs’ equal-protection and unlawful-delegation claims. View "Whole Woman's Health v. Lakey" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a probationary Border Patrol agent, filed suit against the Department, alleging that he had been unlawfully terminated because of his race and color. The court concluded that, even assuming that plaintiff established a prima facie case of discrimination, the government has asserted a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for plaintiff's termination, lack of candor. Plaintiff failed to show that the Department's decision was made in bad faith and there is no evidence of disparate treatment. Finally, the court rejected plaintiff's claim that he was similarly situated to permanent Border Patrol agents who were present at the Checkpoint at issue. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the Department. View "Thomas v. Johnson" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, former Chief Deputy in the Sheriff's office, filed suit against the Sheriff, raising claims under 42 U.S.C. 1983, the Louisiana Constitution, and the Louisiana whistleblower statutes. The district court dismissed plaintiff's claims and granted summary judgment in favor of the Sheriff. The court concluded that plaintiff's First Amendment retaliation claim failed because plaintiff's complaints about the recordings at issue were made within the scope of his employment and, therefore, his speech was not protected by the First Amendment. The court agreed with the district court that it would have been a waste of judicial resources to decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction where plaintiff's state law claims were neither novel nor complex; the court concluded that plaintiff has not shown that the Sheriff’s Office committed an actual violation of Louisiana law and, therefore, the district court was correct to dismiss his claim under the Louisiana Whistleblower Statute, La. Rev. Stat. 23:967; and La. Rev. Stat. 42: 1169 does not provide a private right of action for plaintiff to sue in either state or federal court. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Wilson v. Tregre" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit against CBP agents, alleging Fourth Amendment violations. At issue was whether illegal aliens can pursue Bivens claims against CBP agents for illegally stopping and arresting them. In Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, the Supreme Court created a damage remedy against individual federal law enforcement officers who allegedly conducted a warrantless search of a suspect’s home and arrested him without probable cause. The court joined its sister circuits and concluded that Bivens actions are not available for claims that can be addressed in civil immigration removal proceedings. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded. View "De La Paz v. Coy" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, who is white, filed suit alleging state and federal claims of workplace retaliation and discrimination. On appeal, plaintiff challenged the district court's grant of the government's motion to exclude certain testimony offered by plaintiff and a police department captain and dismissal of plaintiff's federal claims. The court agreed with the district court that the statements at issue lacked foundation and plaintiff cannot show that all reasonable persons would reject the district court's decision to strike the testimony. The court also affirmed the district court's dismissal of plaintiff's Title VII race discrimination claim, 42 U.S.C. 2000e-2(a)(1), where plaintiff failed to present evidence sufficient to raise a genuine issue of material fact that he was treated less favorably because of his race than were other similarly situated employees who were not white, under nearly identical circumstances. Assuming that the district court dismissed plaintiff's race retaliation claim, 42 U.S.C. 2000e-3(a), sua sponte and without notice, the court held that the dismissal was harmless and affirmed the judgment. View "Paske, Jr. v. Fitzgerald" on Justia Law

Randy Jenkins, a 51-year-old African-American man, served in the San Antonio Fire Department since 1986. The Fire Department was headed by the Fire Chief, Charles Hood, who managed a deputy chief, assistant chiefs, district chiefs, captains, lieutenants, engineers, and firefighters. In 2008, Jenkins was appointed as one of two district chiefs of Fire Prevention, reporting directly to Assistant Chief Earl Crayton. In this capacity, Jenkins was responsible for oversight of Community Safety & Education ("CS&E"). When the other district chief in the Fire Prevention Division left, Jenkins temporarily assumed his responsibilities. Eventually, a new district chief was assigned to the Fire Prevention Division and given responsibility for CS&E while Jenkins retained oversight of Special Events, Inspections, and Administration. After the recently appointed district chief left in 2009, Captain Christopher Monestier was hired as his replacement and assigned oversight of CS&E and Special Events. In 2011, Assistant Chief Crayton "realigned" Jenkins and Monestier’s duties. Jenkins did not suffer a reduction in rank or benefits but perceived the realignment as discrimination based on his race, color, or age as well as retaliation for giving a statement supporting an EEOC charge against Crayton. Jenkins filed an EEOC charge to this effect, and the EEOC issued a right-to-sue letter on May 16, 2012. Several other actions would lead Jenkins to amend his EEOC complaint to include several other "realignments." He ultimately sued, taking his right-to-sue letter to district court. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the Fire Department. It held that Jenkins’s discrimination and retaliation claims stemming from the 2011 reassignment of duties were not timely filed. Even assuming his suit was timely, the district court found that Jenkins’s discrimination and retaliation claims stemming from both the 2011 reassignment and Jenkins’s non-selection as District Chief of Inspections in 2012 failed because he was unable to establish a prima facie case. Jenkins timely appealed. But finding no reversible error, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. View "Jenkins v. City of San Antonio Fire Dept" on Justia Law

In this appeal of the grant of summary judgment dismissing a complaint in a Title VII race-discrimination case, plaintiff Lieutenant Gayle McMullin, presented evidence, which, if believed by a jury, would have shown "a fumbling, bumbling case of determined efforts" to deny a promotion to McMullin. Lieutenant McMullin alleged that the Mississippi Department of Public Safety failed to promote her to the position of Training Director and instead promoted a less-qualified officer of lower rank to fill the position, based on race. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the Department, finding that Lieutenant McMullin failed to establish a prima facie case of race-based discrimination. Because the district court erred in granting summary judgment, the Fifth Circuit vacated the judgment, and remanded the case for trial or other proceedings. View "McMullin v. MS Dept of Public Safety" on Justia Law

Plaintiff-appellee Tammy Bryant filed suit against her employer, the Texas Department of Aging and Disability Services, and supervisor, Kim Littleton, in her individual capacity, claiming violations of the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA). Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment on the bases of sovereign and qualified immunity. The district court denied the motion in full. After review of the trial court record, the Fifth Circuit concluded the Department was entitled to sovereign immunity on Bryant’s self-care claims and that Littleton was entitled to qualified immunity on Bryant’s interference claims. View "Bryant v. Texas Dept of Aging & Disab." on Justia Law