Justia U.S. 5th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Jerrell Squyres sued his former employer, The Heico Companies and its subsidiaries, for violations of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”), and the Texas Commission on Human Rights Act (“TCHRA”). The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the companies. In July 2012, Squyres filed an employment-discrimination action against the employer. On September 18, 2012, in his response to the employer’s motion, Squyres raised the possibility of amending his complaint to “ple[a]d quantum meruit and/or fraudulent misrepresentation claims” instead. On October 31, 2012, the district court granted in part and denied in part Appellees’ motion to dismiss and entered a scheduling order that set a discovery deadline of June 21, 2013. At that point, the discovery deadline was nearly eight months away. After the district court entered the scheduling order, Squyres filed his second amended complaint, re-pleading the age-discrimination claims. The employer filed another motion to dismiss, but this time, the district court denied the motion. The employer answered the second amended complaint on January 8, 2013. When the answer was filed, five months still remained before the June discovery deadline. The employer contended Squyres was served interrogatories, document requests, and requests for admission on February 20, 2013. Squyres did not respond to these requests until April 30, 2013. Squyres also did not contact Appellees’ counsel about scheduling depositions until May 22, 2013. After a series of continuations, in late July 2013, the parties filed a joint motion to extend the scheduling order deadlines and to continue the trial, but the district court denied the motion based on the “long period of time in which the parties have had to arrange discovery.” The district court emphasized that “[t]he time has come for the parties and their counsel to be held accountable for the deadlines issued by this Court nine months ago.” The employer then filed a motion for summary judgment. Despite a warning from the court for no more extensions of time, Squyres requested leave to amend his complaint on August 22. Squyres sought to add a fraud claim and drop his breach-of-contract claim. Squyres filed his motion to amend unopposed, citing the earlier quid pro quo agreement. The employer, however, filed a response in opposition to Squyres’ motion, admitting the quid pro quo agreement, but arguing that Squyres had not sought amendment in a reasonable time after their June agreement and that “the circumstances ha[d] changed since that discussion in June.” The district court ultimately denied Squyres’ motion. Upon review of Squyers' arguments on appeal to the Fifth Circuit, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court, finding that that court acted within ints discretion when it denied Squyres' motions. View "Jerrell Squyres v. Heico Companies, L.L.C., et al" on Justia Law

At issue in this appeal was a contract dispute involving a Right-of-Way Easement Option (Agreement) between plaintiff-appellee Angus Chemical Company and defendant-appellant Glendora Plantation, Inc. This appeal stems from the district court’s grant of Angus’s motion for partial summary judgment, denial of Glendora’s motion for partial summary judgment, and denial of Glendora’s motion to compel discovery. Specifically, the issues presented were: (1) whether Angus had authority under the Agreement to abandon the original 12” pipeline in place when it constructed a new 16” pipeline; (2) whether Angus had authority under the Agreement to install fiber optic cables; and (3) whether it was improper for the district court to deny Glendora’s motion to compel discovery. Upon review, the Fifth Circuit concluded: (1) the there was still a material fact issue as to whether the Agreement required removal of the 12" pipeline; (2) the Agreement was sufficiently clear allowing Angus to install fiber optic cables; and (3) because the Fifth Circuit was remanding for consideration of other facts and issues, the Fifth Circuit remanded for the trial court to consider the motion to compel. View "Angus Chemical Company v. Glendora Plantation, Inc" on Justia Law

Rebecca Breaux brought an age discrimination action against her employer ASC Industries on May 6, 2012. On May 24, 2013, Breaux’s attorney Lurlia Oglesby filed a statement in accordance with Rule 25(a)(3) noting that Breaux had died. The district court stayed the action pending the substitution of parties. After the ninety days allotted for the substitution of a party passed without any motion being filed, ASC Industries moved for the action to be dismissed. On the next business day, September 3, 2013, the district court granted ASC Industries’ motion to dismiss. On October 1, 2013, Oglesby filed a motion on behalf of Breaux’s estate to alter or amend the judgment of dismissal. The issue this case presented for the Fifth Circuit's centered on whether personal service of a suggestion of death on a deceased-plaintiff’s estate was required in order for the ninety-day time limit to run for the substitution of a party under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure ("Rule") 25. The Court held that personal service was required. View "Sampson v. ASC Industries" on Justia Law

MRI, on behalf of itself and as successor-in-interest to P&L, filed suit against Alliance for, inter alia, tortious interference with business relations and tortious interference with contract. The district court dismissed Superior's tortious interference claims. The district court concluded that Superior failed to establish that it acquired contractual rights from P&L and that Superior lacked prudential standing to enforce P&L's rights. The court agreed, concluding that Superior submitted no evidence that the contracting hospitals at issue consented to any assignment. Even if P&L did attempt to assign its rights to Superior, the district court did not clearly err in finding that the purported assignment took place before Superior existed as a corporation. Accordingly, Superior failed to prove the existence of prudential standing by a preponderance of the evidence and, therefore, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Superior MRI Serv. v. Alliance Health Serv." on Justia Law

Pearl Seas filed suit against LRNA under various tort theories regarding LRNA's allegedly inadequate performance in certifying a ship and its alleged misdeeds during arbitration. The district court denied LRNA's motion to dismiss on the ground of forum non conveniens (FNC) without written or oral explanation. LRNA petitions for a writ of mandamus to order the district court to vacate its denial and dismiss for FNC. The court granted the petition because the district court clearly abused its discretion and reached a patently erroneous result where it failed to enforce a valid forum-selection clause, and because LRNA has no effective way to vindicate its rights without a writ of mandamus. View "In Re: Lloyd's Register N.A., Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit alleging that the City misreported charges under the Texas Driver Responsibility Program to plaintiffs and that the State overcharged plaintiffs as a result. On appeal, defendant, the Director of the Texas Department of Public Safety, challenged the district court's partial denial of his motion to dismiss the case against him for want of jurisdiction. The court concluded that plaintiff Fontenot lacks standing to sue; plaintiffs Miller and Zamarron have no live controversy with the State for correction of driving records, and therefore the class action claim for similar relief is moot and nonjusticiable; the refund claims to recover surcharges are barred by the Eleventh Amendment and sovereign immunity; and the court found it unnecessary to discuss the State's jurisdictional defense. Accordingly, the court vacated the district court's order denying state sovereign immunity and remanded with instructions to dismiss for lack of federal jurisdiction. View "Fontenot v. McCraw" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against his former employer under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), 29 U.S.C. 621-634. Plaintiff alleged discrimination and retaliation under the Act, but defendant never answered or defended the suit. After the district court entered a default judgment against defendant, defendant filed a motion to set aside the default judgment. The court concluded that evidence adduced at a default judgment "prove-up" hearing cannot cure a deficient complaint. In this case, plaintiff's complaint contained very few factual allegations, but his testimony at the damages hearing provided evidence on the elements of his claim that were absent from his pleadings. Accordingly, the court vacated the entry of default judgment and remanded. View "Wooten v. McDonald Transit Assoc, Inc." on Justia Law

Rolls Royce petitioned the court for mandamus relief following the denial of its severance-and-transfer motion. The underlying litigation concerns the liability stemming from a helicopter crash in the Gulf of Mexico. The court concluded that the district court erred in not considering Rolls Royce's forum-selection clause when conducting its severance-and-transfer analysis; there is no evidence indicating special administrative difficulties with severance, or that the interests of defendants not privy to the clause would be significantly threatened; such interests can be secured by the hand of an experienced federal trial judge with such devices as common discovery among separated cases and sequencing of any dispositive motions or trials; and, therefore, the court granted the mandamus petition, reversing and remanding with instructions to sever and transfer the claims against Rolls Royce. View "In Re: Rolls Royce Corp." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit in Texas state court against Deutsche Bank, challenging the adequacy of a loan that they obtained. The state court granted plaintiffs a default judgment even though Deutsche was never properly served. Deutsche removed the case after learning of the suit and moved to set aside the state court default judgment, and then moved for dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6). Plaintiffs moved for remand to state court and the district court dismissed plaintiffs' claims as barred by the statute of limitations. The court held that Deutsche could remove this case to federal court and the district court committed no error in denying plaintiffs' motion to remand; the district court properly vacated the default judgment in favor of Deutsche and properly granted Deutsche's motion to dismiss plaintiffs' petition under Rule 12(b)(6); and, therefore, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Thompson v. Deutsche Bank Nat'l Trust Co." on Justia Law

Symetra appealed the district court's refusal to award attorneys' fees under the Texas and Washington State Structured Settlement Protection Acts (SSPAs). Rapid cross appealed the district court's award of attorneys' fees as damages for tortious interference and the district court's permanent injunction, arguing that the injunction relies on an erroneous interpretation of the SSPAs. The court concluded that the district court erroneously held that Symetra could not recover any fees under the SSPAs where specific transfers were challenged throughout this litigation and Symetra can recover some portion of its fees related to some of those transfers. Therefore, remand is appropriate, but Symetra bears the burden of segregating fees and the district court retains discretion to deny Symetra's attorneys' fees request for failure to segregate. The court also concluded that the district court's award of fees incurred in state court with respect to one annuitant as damages for tortious interference under Texas law was proper where the natural and proximate cause of Rapid's conduct toward the annuitant was to drag Symetra into Indiana state court litigation. The district court's requirement that state court transfer orders also list first-refusal rights contravenes the SSPAs. However, the court found no error in the district court's analysis of first refusal rights under the SSPAs. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Symetra Life Ins. Co. v. Rapid Settlements, Ltd." on Justia Law