Justia U.S. 5th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Several Louisiana coastal parishes, joined by the Louisiana Attorney General and the Louisiana Secretary of Natural Resources, filed lawsuits against various oil and gas companies, alleging violations of Louisiana’s State and Local Coastal Resources Management Act of 1978. The companies removed these cases to federal court, asserting that they satisfy the requirements of the federal officer removal statute due to their refining contracts with the government during World War II. The district courts granted the parishes’ motions to remand these cases to state court, concluding that the oil companies did not meet their burden of establishing federal jurisdiction.The oil companies appealed the district courts' decisions. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district courts’ orders remanding these cases to state court. The court concluded that the oil companies failed to satisfy the “acting under” requirement of the federal officer removal statute, as their compliance with federal regulations or cooperation with federal agencies was insufficient to bring a private action within the statute. The court also found that the oil companies failed to establish that the conduct challenged in the parishes’ lawsuits was “connected or associated with” acts the companies had taken under color of federal office. View "Plaquemines Parish v. BP America Production Co." on Justia Law

The case involves Tammy O’Connor and Michael Stewart (the Sellers) who sold their company, Red River Solutions, LLC, to Atherio, Inc., a company led by Jason Cory, Greg Furst, and Thomas Farb (the Executives). The agreement stipulated that the Sellers would receive nearly half of their compensation upfront, with the rest—around $3.5 million—coming in the form of ownership units and future payments. However, Atherio went bankrupt and the Sellers received none of the promised $3.5 million. The Sellers sued the Executives, alleging fraud under federal securities law, Delaware common law, and the Texas Securities Act.The district court granted summary judgment to the Executives on all claims. The Sellers appealed the decision, arguing that the district court erred in applying the summary-judgment standard to the federal securities law and Delaware common law claims.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision on the extracontractual and Texas Securities Act fraud claims, but reversed the summary judgment grants on the federal securities law and Delaware common law claims. The court found that there was a genuine dispute as to whether the Executives' misrepresentation of Farb's role as CFO was a substantial factor in the Sellers' loss. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Cory v. Stewart" on Justia Law

The case involves a dispute over the ownership of a painting by Bernardo Bellotto, which was sold under duress by Max Emden during the Nazi persecution of Jews prior to World War II. The painting was later found in a salt mine in Austria by the Monuments Men, a group of U.S. military officers tasked with facilitating the restitution of art stolen by the Nazis. The painting was mistakenly sent to the Netherlands to fulfill a claim by a gallery in Amsterdam, but the painting was actually a replica painted by Bellotto himself, not the gallery's version. The painting was eventually sent to the United States and is currently housed in the Museum of Fine Arts in Houston. The heirs of Max Emden, the original owner, are seeking to recover the painting.The case was initially heard in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas, which dismissed the claim due to the act of state doctrine. This doctrine prohibits U.S. courts from questioning the actions of a foreign government, in this case, the Dutch government's decision to send the painting to the United States.The case was then appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. The court affirmed the lower court's decision, agreeing that the act of state doctrine applies in this case. The court held that any evaluation of the painting's ownership would require questioning the Dutch government's actions, which is prohibited by the act of state doctrine. The court also rejected the plaintiffs' arguments that the doctrine should not apply because the Dutch government's actions were not official, there would be no negative impact on foreign relations, and the act was not solely within the Netherlands. The court concluded that the act of state doctrine bars U.S. courts from questioning the validity of the Dutch government's actions. View "Emden v. Museum of Fine Arts" on Justia Law

In 2021, Grant and Sarah Palmquist, on behalf of their minor son, sued baby-food manufacturer Hain Celestial Group, Inc. and grocery retailer Whole Foods Market, Inc. in Texas state court. They sought damages for their son Ethan’s physical and mental decline, which they allege began when he was about thirty months old and had been consuming Hain’s Earth’s Best Organic Products, purchased from Whole Foods. The Palmquists attributed Ethan's health issues to heavy metal toxicity caused by the baby food. The case was removed to federal court, where Whole Foods was dismissed as improperly joined and judgment was granted in favor of Hain during trial.The district court dismissed Whole Foods on the grounds of improper joinder and denied the Palmquists’ motion to remand the case to state court. The court also granted Hain’s motion for judgment as a matter of law, concluding that the Palmquists had presented no evidence of general causation. The Palmquists appealed these decisions.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed the district court’s judgment denying the Palmquists’ motion to remand, vacated the final judgment of the district court, and remanded with instructions for the district court to remand the case to the state court. The court held that the Palmquists were entitled to a remand to state court because the allegations in their state-court complaint stated plausible claims against Whole Foods. The court did not address whether the district court erred in granting judgment as a matter of law in favor of Hain. View "Palmquist v. Hain Celestial Group" on Justia Law

The case involves four plaintiffs who took docetaxel, a chemotherapy drug, as part of their treatment for early-stage breast cancer and subsequently suffered permanent chemotherapy-induced alopecia (PCIA). The plaintiffs allege that the manufacturers of the drug, Hospira, Inc., Hospira Worldwide, LLC, and Accord Healthcare, Inc., violated state law by failing to warn them that docetaxel could cause PCIA.The case was initially heard in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana, where the defendants moved for summary judgment on the basis that the plaintiffs' state law failure-to-warn claims were preempted by federal law. The district court denied the motion, and the defendants appealed.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit was tasked with determining whether federal law preempts the plaintiffs' state law failure-to-warn claims against the defendant drug manufacturers. The court found that the district court had erred in its interpretation of what constitutes "newly acquired information" under the changes-being-effected (CBE) regulation, which allows manufacturers to file a supplemental application with the FDA and simultaneously implement a labeling change before obtaining FDA approval. The court held that the district court failed to enforce the requirement that newly acquired information must "reveal risks of a different type or greater severity or frequency than previously included in submissions to FDA."The court vacated the district court's judgment on the plaintiffs' failure-to-warn claims and remanded the case for further consideration of one outstanding issue: whether the Bertrand Abstract, a scientific study, constituted "newly acquired information" that revealed a greater risk of PCIA than previously known. If the Bertrand Abstract does not meet this standard, the court held that the defendants would not be liable to the plaintiffs on their state law failure-to-warn claims. View "Hickey v. Hospira" on Justia Law

The case revolves around a data privacy dispute involving Pebbles Martin and LCMC Health Holdings and Louisiana Children’s Medical Center (collectively, “LCMC”). Martin filed a class action suit alleging that LCMC violated Louisiana law by embedding tracking pixels onto its website that shared her private health information with third-party websites. The question before the court was not to determine the merits of Martin’s claims, but instead to determine which forum—state or federal—is proper to hear this dispute. LCMC argued that the suit should proceed in federal court because it acted under the direction of a federal officer when it allegedly violated Louisiana law. Martin, however, argued that the suit should remain in state court because LCMC fails to show a basis for federal jurisdiction.LCMC had removed the case to federal court, invoking the federal officer removal statute as the basis for jurisdiction. Martin moved to remand to state court, and the district court granted Martin’s motion, holding that LCMC did not act under the direction of a federal officer when it disclosed private health information to third-party websites. LCMC appealed the remand order.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The court concluded that LCMC did not act under the direction of a federal officer when it embedded tracking pixels onto its website. The court noted that a hospital does not act under the direction of the federal government when it maintains an online patient portal that utilizes tracking pixels. Therefore, the federal officer removal statute does not provide jurisdiction for this case to be heard in federal court. The court affirmed the district court’s order remanding this case to state court. View "Martin v. LCMC Health Holdings" on Justia Law

This case involves a dispute between Sentry Insurance and James J. Morgan, who operates a business. Morgan's properties, insured by Sentry, suffered wind and hail damage from a storm. Sentry estimated the damages at $190,768.33 and paid Morgan $61,026.93 after deductions. However, Morgan estimated his loss at $540,426.05 and demanded Sentry pay an additional $349,657.22. When the parties couldn't agree on the loss amount, they turned to an appraisal process outlined in their insurance policy. Both parties appointed an appraiser, but the appraisers couldn't agree on an umpire. Consequently, Sentry filed a petition for the district court to appoint an umpire.The district court dismissed Sentry's petition, ruling that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction because the petition didn't meet the amount-in-controversy requirement for diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332. The court reasoned that it couldn't assess the value of the parties' contractual right to have an umpire examine the difference between two appraisers' estimates and determine the loss amount because the appraisers hadn't yet made their estimates.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed the district court's decision. The appellate court disagreed with the district court's narrow interpretation of the right to be protected. It held that in an action seeking the appointment of an umpire for appraisal, the right to be protected is the right to continue with the appraisal process, and the value of this right is the disputed amount set to be resolved through appraisal. The court found that Sentry's petition established an amount in controversy over $75,000, as Morgan had demanded an additional $349,657.22 under the policy. The case was remanded to the district court to consider Morgan's additional jurisdictional arguments. View "Sentry Insurance v. Morgan" on Justia Law

In this case, Austin Thompson Hughes, a former police officer and Uber driver, reported a drunk driver swerving across a highway in Houston. After the drunk driver crashed, Hughes, still on the phone with 911, performed a citizen's arrest in accordance with Texas law. However, when police officers arrived at the scene, they released the drunk driver and arrested Hughes, charging him with a felony for impersonating a peace officer. Hughes spent thousands of dollars defending against these charges before they were dropped by the City of Houston. Hughes then filed a § 1983 suit against the two officers who arrested him.The case was initially heard in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas, where the officers moved to dismiss Hughes's complaint, asserting qualified immunity. The district court denied the officers' motions, leading to an appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision, denying the officers' qualified immunity. The court found that Hughes had sufficiently pleaded that the officers violated his Fourth Amendment rights by arresting and prosecuting him without probable cause because they included material misstatements and omissions in their warrant affidavit and materials. The court also found that a corrected warrant affidavit could not have established probable cause to arrest and prosecute Hughes. The court concluded that no reasonable officer could have suspected Hughes committed a felony, given the inconsistencies in the drunk driver's statement, the driver's obvious intoxication, and the evidence supporting Hughes's account. View "Hughes v. Garcia" on Justia Law

Levi Rudder, a non-lawyer, was sanctioned by the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas for engaging in unauthorized practice of law. Rudder had contacted a detainee facing federal firearm charges and attempted to involve himself in the case, despite being told not to by the defense counsel. He held an unprivileged, monitored video meeting with the detainee, offered legal advice, and encouraged the detainee to sign a form appointing him as additional counsel. The district court found Rudder guilty of unauthorized practice of law and imposed a monetary sanction of $500. He was also barred from filing documents in the Northern District of Texas without the court's permission.Rudder appealed the decision, arguing that the district court lacked the authority to impose these sanctions. He contended that the Constitution does not afford federal courts inherent powers to sanction individuals for engaging in unauthorized practice of law.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit disagreed with Rudder's argument. The court cited previous cases that established federal courts' inherent power to police the conduct of litigants and attorneys who appear before them. The court also noted that a party cannot be represented by a non-lawyer and that a minimum level of competence is required to protect the client, their adversaries, and the court from poorly drafted, inarticulate, or vexatious claims. Therefore, the court concluded that a federal court's power to regulate and discipline attorneys extends to conduct by non-lawyers amounting to practicing law without a license. The court found that the district court did not abuse its discretion in imposing the sanctions on Rudder and affirmed the lower court's decision. View "In re: Rudder" on Justia Law

The case involves a challenge by the Sierra Club to the pre-construction permits issued by the Louisiana Department of Environmental Quality (LDEQ) to Commonwealth LNG, LLC for its planned liquefied natural gas (LNG) export facility. The Sierra Club argued that the facility’s emissions would exceed National Ambient Air Quality Standards (NAAQS) and that LDEQ failed to require Commonwealth to use the best available control technology (BACT) to limit those emissions.Before the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, LDEQ argued that the court lacked jurisdiction to hear the case, asserting that the claim arose under state law, not federal law. However, the court found that it had jurisdiction to review the petition because when LDEQ issued the permit, it was acting pursuant to federal law, not merely state law.On the merits, the court found that LDEQ did not act arbitrarily in its use of significant impact levels (SILs) to calculate which pollutants will have an insignificant effect on the NAAQS. The court also found that LDEQ did not act arbitrarily in its use of AP-42 emission factors to determine potential emissions from an LNG facility that has not yet been built. Furthermore, the court held that LDEQ did not violate its public trustee duty under Louisiana law, which requires LDEQ to evaluate and avoid adverse environmental impacts to the maximum extent possible.The court denied Sierra Club’s petition for review and affirmed LDEQ’s permitting decision. View "Sierra Club v. Louisiana Department of Environmental Quality" on Justia Law