Justia U.S. 5th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

A group of plaintiffs, who are voters in Travis County, Texas, filed a lawsuit against county officials alleging violations in the conduct of the November 2020 general election. Specifically, they claimed that the defendants used an uncertified electronic voting system for the election, thereby violating several state and federal laws. They sought injunctive and declaratory relief to prohibit electronic voting in Travis County, require paper ballots, and unseal various records related to the 2020 general election. The defendants removed the case to federal court and moved to dismiss the lawsuit, arguing that the plaintiffs lacked standing. The district court agreed and dismissed the case without prejudice. The decision was appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.In its decision, the Fifth Circuit agreed with the district court that the plaintiffs lacked standing to sue under Article III of the U.S. Constitution, which requires a plaintiff to establish that they have suffered a concrete and particularized injury that is likely caused by the defendant and would likely be redressed by judicial relief. The plaintiffs alleged two injuries: their votes were invalidated and not counted, and their personal information was unlawfully disclosed. The court found that neither injury was sufficient for Article III standing.However, the Fifth Circuit disagreed with the district court's dismissal of the case. Instead, it ruled that the proper course of action, when a federal court lacks subject matter jurisdiction due to a lack of standing, is to remand the case to state court rather than dismissing it. Accordingly, the Fifth Circuit vacated the district court's order and remanded the case with instructions to send it back to state court. View "Lutostanski v. Brown" on Justia Law

In this case brought before the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, the plaintiffs were appealing the wording of a district court's declaratory judgment which held certain voter-registration provisions in the Houston City Charter unconstitutional. The plaintiffs were up against the City of Houston and two officials, Anna Russell and Pat J. Daniel, who were acting in their official capacities as City Secretaries.The court, however, found that there was no case or controversy as both parties had agreed from the start that the voter registration provisions were unconstitutional, and the city confirmed that it could not and would not enforce these provisions. The court cited precedent confirming that where there is no adversity between the parties on a constitutional question, there is no Article III case or controversy.Therefore, the court vacated the district court's judgment and remanded the case with instructions to dismiss the suit without prejudice, stating that such faux disputes do not belong in federal court. This dismissal allows for the possibility of the case being refiled in a competent jurisdiction in the future if necessary. View "Pool v. City of Houston" on Justia Law

In a collision between two vessels on the Mississippi River, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit ruled that Louisiana law, not general maritime law, governs the burden of proof for the pilot's error.On January 3, 2019, the M/V STRANDJA, piloted by Captain Robert Johnson, drifted from its anchorage into the middle of the river, colliding with the M/V KIEFFER E. BAILEY, owned by Marquette Transportation Company Gulf-Inland LLC. The collision caused damage to both vessels. Marquette brought claims against STRANDJA's owner, Balkan Navigation Ltd, and manager, Navigation Maritime Bulgare JSC (collectively referred to as "Balkan"), alleging their negligence caused the collision.A jury found that Marquette was not negligent and that Balkan and Captain Johnson were each 50% at fault. The jury awarded Marquette $114,000 in damages and awarded Balkan $0 in damages. Both Balkan and Captain Johnson appealed the judgment.The Fifth Circuit affirmed the judgment that Marquette was not negligent, and therefore not liable for the accident. However, the court found that the district court erred in instructing the jury to apply general maritime law, which only requires a finding of ordinary negligence by a preponderance of the evidence, to the claim against Captain Johnson. Instead, the court held that Louisiana law, which requires clear and convincing evidence of gross negligence or willful misconduct, should have been applied.As a result, the court vacated the judgment against Balkan and Captain Johnson and remanded the case for a new trial, applying the correct standard of proof under Louisiana law. The court also ordered Marquette to amend its complaint within 14 days to allege admiralty jurisdiction as the jurisdictional basis for its claim against Balkan. View "Marquette Transportation Company Gulf-Inland, L.L.C. v. Navigation Maritime Bulgare" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed this action as unleased mineral owners whose interests are situated within forced drilling units formed by the Louisiana Office of Conservation and operated by Chesapeake. Plaintiffs have not made separate arrangements to dispose of their shares of production, so the unit operator can sell the shares but must pay the owners a pro rata share of the proceeds within one hundred eighty days of the sale. Chesapeake timely removed this action to the district court, based on diversity jurisdiction. The district court certified its ruling for interlocutory appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Section 1292(b).   The Fifth Circuit explained that this case concerns the interplay between Louisiana’s relatively new conservation laws and its deeply rooted negotiorum gestio doctrine. The court wrote that because it cannot make a reliable Erie guess as to the applicability of Louisiana’s negotiorum gestio doctrine. Accordingly, the court certified the following determinative question of law to the Louisiana Supreme Court: 1) Does La. Civ. Code art. 2292 applies to unit operators selling production in accordance with La. R.S. 30:10(A)(3)? View "Johnson v. Chesapeake Louisiana, L.P." on Justia Law

Six small refineries1 (“petitioners”) challenge the EPA’s decision to deny their requested exemptions from their obligations under the Renewable Fuel Standard (“RFS”) program of the Clean Air Act (“CAA”). The EPA denied petitioners’ years-old petitions using a novel CAA interpretation and economic theory that the agency published in December 2021.The Fifth Circuit granted the petitions for review, vacated the challenged adjudications, denied a change of venue, and remanded. The court concluded that the denial was (1) impermissibly retroactive; (2) contrary to law; and (3) counter to the record evidence. The court noted that the agency supports its assertion by dreaming up a hypothetical contract—filled with unsubstantiated speculation about terms such RIN clip sale prices and broker service fees—that TSAR might be able to negotiate. But EPA never explains why it believes small refineries can get contract terms like those. Unsubstantiated agency speculation does not overcome petitioners’ proven inability to purchase market-rate RINs ratably. The court explained that as a general matter, courts cannot compel agencies to act. Petitioners do not allege that the CAA expressly requires EPA to issue such guidance. An agency’s control over its timetables is entitled to considerable deference.That EPA has yet to make good on its promise to provide further guidance does not render the agency’s current (lack of) guidance arbitrary and capricious. View "Placid Refining Company, L.L.C. v. EPA" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs are Constance Swanston (“Swanston”), Shannon Jones (“Jones”), and Women’s Elevated Sober Living, LLC (“WESL”) (collectively, “Plaintiffs”). Swanston is an individual in recovery from substance use disorders (“SUDs”) and the owner and operator of WESL. In November 2018, WESL opened a sober living home (the “Home”) on Stoney Point Drive in Plano, Texas. Jones is a caretaker and resident of the Home. Defendant-Appellant, the City of Plano (the “City”) appealed the district court’s judgment holding that it violated the Fair Housing Act (“FHA”) due to its failure to accommodate Plaintiffs as to the capacity limits in the applicable zoning ordinance. The district court enjoined the City from (1) restricting the Home’s occupancy to fewer than fifteen residents; (2) enforcing any other property restriction violative of the FHA or ADA; and (3) retaliating against Plaintiffs for pursuing housing discrimination complaints under the FHA and ADA. Following a hearing, awarded Plaintiffs nominal damages of one dollar.   The Fifth Circuit vacated the district court’s injunction and remanded it. The court held that the district court erred in determining that the evidence satisfied the applicable legal standard. The court explained that the Third Circuit concluded that, based on its strict reading of Section 3604(f)(3)(B) and the prior jurisprudence in its court and its sister circuits, the resident failed to prove that her requested accommodation was necessary considering the definition of the term, the purpose of the FHA, and the proffered alternatives. The court wrote that for the same reasons, it holds that Plaintiffs have failed to establish that their requested accommodation was therapeutically necessary. View "Women's Elevated v. City of Plano" on Justia Law

Appellant sued the Northside Independent School District, arguing that the District failed to properly accommodate her hearing impairment as required by the Americans with Disabilities Act. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the District, holding that Appellant’s ADA claim was barred by 20 U.S.C. Section 1415(l), the “exhaustion requirement” of the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act.   The Fifth Circuit vacated the summary judgment order; the court held that the district court erred in its interpretation of Section 1415(l). The court explained that the district court erred when it held that Appellant did not have a standalone claim under the ADA because the gravamen of her complaint was the denial of a FAPE. Under the plain text of Section 1415(l), “nothing in [the IDEA]” “restricts or limits” Appellant’s ability to assert her claim “under . . . the Americans with Disabilities Act.” The court noted that as Fry explained, “the IDEA does not prevent a plaintiff from asserting claims under [other federal] laws”—including “the ADA”—“even if . . . those claims allege the denial of an appropriate public education (much as an IDEA claim would). Further, the court wrote that it cannot affirm the district court’s grant of summary judgment, as it would return the Circuit to the Smith era—an erroneous decision that would have “consequences . . . for a great many children with disabilities and their parents,” and one which Congress directly abandoned by enacting Section 1415(l). View "Lartigue v. Northside Indep" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs are people who claim to suffer from chronic Lyme disease. A person contracts Lyme disease from ticks carrying the bacterium Borrelia burgdorferi. In 2006, IDSA published The Clinical Assessment, Treatment, and Prevention of Lyme Disease, Human Granulocytic Anaplasmosis, and Babesiosis: Clinical Practice Guidelines by the Infectious Diseases Society of America (“the Guidelines”). The Guidelines extensively discuss how to diagnose and treat Lyme disease. Throughout, they express doubt about the causes, frequency, and even the existence of chronic Lyme disease. Moreover, the Guidelines do not recommend long-term antibiotic therapy for persons with persistent Lyme symptoms who have already received recommended treatments.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s ruling dismissing Plaintiffs’ claims. Plaintiffs took issue with IDSA’s positions that (1) “there is no convincing biological evidence for the existence of symptomatic chronic B. burgdorferi infection among patients after receipt of recommended treatment regimens for Lyme disease,” and (2) “antibiotic therapy has not proven to be useful and is not recommended for patients with chronic (>6 months) subjective symptoms after recommended treatment regimens for Lyme disease.” On their face, however, these statements are medical opinions. In this context (a scientific debate over treatment options for persistent Lyme symptoms), to say that evidence is not “convincing” or that some treatment is “not recommended” is plainly to express a medical opinion. Just because Plaintiffs disagree with those opinions does not mean that IDSA is somehow liable because their doctors or insurance providers found the opinions persuasive. View "Torrey v. Infectious Diseases Socty" on Justia Law

The original leaseholder transferred its interest to Martin Marietta Materials, Inc. (“Martin Marietta”), in 2014, and Elmen Holdings, L.L.C. (“Elmen”), acquired title to the underlying land in 2018. Elmen contends that Martin Marietta did not make required royalty payments to it or prior lessors; Elmen sought a declaration that the lease had terminated. Both parties moved for summary judgment, and a magistrate judge recommended that the district court grant Elmen’s motion and deny Martin Marietta’s. The district court adopted that recommendation.   The Fifth Circuit disagreed with the magistrate judge’s and district court’s reasoning, but affirmed the summary judgment for Elmen and affirmed the denial of summary judgment for Martin Marietta. The court explained that a payment or tender—such as Martin Marietta’s April 12 check— made to someone other than the lessor is not made “in the manner provided” by the Gravel Lease. The sentence in paragraph six that Martin Marietta relies on does not apply. Further, the court wrote that the undisputed facts show that Martin Marietta failed to pay royalties in 2017, received adequate notice of this failure, and did not cure within ten days of that notice. Therefore, the Gravel Lease terminated ten days after Martin Marietta received the relevant email, and summary judgment in favor of Elmen is warranted. View "Elmen Holdings v. Martin Marietta" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs challenge the Louisiana Legislature’s 2022 redistricting map for electing the state’s six members of the United States House of Representatives. The district court preliminarily enjoined use of that map for the 2022 congressional elections. The United States Supreme Court stayed that injunction, pending resolution of a case involving Alabama’s congressional redistricting plan. About a year later, the Supreme Court resolved the Alabama case.In review of the Louisiana Legislature's 2022 redistricting plan, the Fifth Circuit held that district court did not clearly err in its necessary fact-findings nor commit legal error in its conclusions that the Plaintiffs were likely to succeed in proving a violation of Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act. However, the court found the injunction is no longer necessary. View "Robinson v. Ardoin" on Justia Law