Justia U.S. 5th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The Texas Department of Criminal Justice (“TDCJ”) has denied prisoner requests to hold religious gatherings for the Nation of Gods and Earths (“the Nation”).   In response, Plaintiff, brought this suit against the TDCJ’s Deputy Director of Volunteer Services and Special Populations, in the hope of vindicating the rights of the Nation’s adherents to congregate. The suit was initially filed pro se over half a decade ago. But Tucker began receiving the aid of pro bono legal counsel a few years later. The State now says that it has promulgated a new policy to govern congregation requests on behalf of the Nation’s adherents. As a result, the State contends that this suit is now moot.   On appeal, the Fifth Circuit vacated the judgment to the congregation claim, holding that there were genuine disputes of material fact as to “whether the state’s ban: (1) advances a compelling interest (2) through the least restrictive means.” Tucker v. Collier (Tucker I), 906 F.3d 295, 302 (5th Cir. 2018). After adopting the changes, TDCJ sought summary judgment on the grounds that Tucker’s case was. The district court dismissed Plaintiff’s claim as moot.   The Fifth Circuit reversed the district court’s ruling and found that the case is not moot. The court explained that TDCJ’s policy change gives Plaintiff nothing more than the right to apply for a congregation—to date TDCJ has never approved the Nation for congregation. And it is the latter that this suit seeks to obtain. View "Tucker v. Gaddis" on Justia Law

After a man was found incompetent to stand trial, and his civil commitment proceeding was dismissed, he stayed in jail for six more years. Plaintiff, the man’s guardian, filed suit against the District Attorney, Sheriffs, and Clay County under Section 1983, challenging the man’s years-long detention.   The district court first dismissed the District Attorney from the case. However, the court determined that the Sheriffs were not entitled to qualified immunity on the detention claim because their constitutional violations were obvious. It denied summary judgment to Clay County too, finding that there was strong evidence that the Sheriffs were final policymakers for the county.   The Fifth Circuit dismissed Clay County’s appeal for lack of jurisdiction and affirmed the district court’s denial of summary judgment as to the Sheriffs.  The court first held that it lacked jurisdiction over the ruling keeping Clay County in the case. The Court explained that, unlike the Sheriffs, municipalities do not enjoy immunity. Further, the court wrote it did not have pendent party jurisdiction over Clay County. Defendants assume that if Clay County’s liability is “inextricably intertwined” with that of the individual officers, that provides “support [for] pendent appellate jurisdiction.” But the court has never permitted pendent party (as opposed to pendent claim) interlocutory jurisdiction.   Further, taking the evidence in Plaintiff’s favor, the Sheriffs violated the man’s due process right by detaining him for six years in violation of the commit-or-release rule and the circuit court’s order enforcing that rule. The court explained that it was clearly established that the Sheriffs could be liable for a violation of the man’s clearly established due process right. View "Harris v. Clay County, MS" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs sued a nursing home and its insurer in state court after their mother contracted COVID-19 at the facility and died. The home, Woodlawn Manor, removed the action to federal court. After dismissing Plaintiffs’ federal claims, the district court remanded to state court, declining supplemental jurisdiction over the state-law claims that remained.Woodlawn contested that remand arguing that the state-law claims pose federal questions that the district court could and should have heard. Further, Woodlawn argued that even if those claims did not pose federal questions the court should have exercised supplemental jurisdiction over them despite having dismissed all federal claims.The Fifth Circuit affirmed holding the Public Readiness and Emergency Preparedness Act (“PREP” or “Act”) does not preempt state-law negligence claims. Second, Plaintiffs did not plead willful-misconduct claims. But even if they had, they could not have brought them under the Act. Further, Plaintiffs asserted state-law claims for negligence. Under Mitchell, the PREP Act does not preempt those claims, so they cannot support original federal jurisdiction. Thus, because Plaintiffs’ factual allegations, taken as true, do not state and could not support a willful-misconduct claim under the Act, there is no federal question here. View "Manyweather v. Woodlawn Manor" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs alleged that they contracted COVID-19 while working at two Tyson Foods, Inc (“Tyson”) facilities in Texas during the first few months of 2020. Some of them died as a result. They alleged that Tyson failed to follow applicable COVID-19 guidance by directing employees to work in close quarters without proper protective equipment. They also alleged that Tyson knew some of its employees were coming to work sick with COVID-19 but ignored the problem and that Tyson implemented a “work while sick” policy to keep the plant open.   Tyson argued that it was “acting under” direction from the federal government when it chose to keep its poultry processing plants open during the early months of the COVID-19 pandemic and that the district courts erred in remanding these cases back to state court.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's orders. The court explained that Tyson received, at most, strong encouragement from the federal government. But Tyson was never told that it must keep its facilities open. The court wrote that from the earliest days of the pandemic all the way through the issuance of Executive Order 13917, the federal government’s actions followed the same playbook: encouragement to meat and poultry processors to continue operating, careful monitoring of the food supply, and support for state and local governments. Tyson was exhorted, but it was not directed. Thus, Tyson has not shown that it was “acting under” a federal officer’s directions” and so the court need not consider whether it meets the remaining elements of the federal officer removal statute. View "Glenn v. Tyson Foods" on Justia Law

Defendant entered a guilty plea to conspiracy to interfere with commerce by robbery under 18 U.S.C. Section 1951(a) and brandishing a firearm during a crime of violence under 18 U.S.C. Section 924(c). The conspiracy conviction served as the predicate crime of violence for the firearm offense.Under the terms of the plea agreement, Defendant waived the right to challenge his conviction and sentence on direct appeal or through a collateral attack. However, following United States v. Davis, 139 S. Ct. 2319 (2019), Defendant brought a collateral attack on his firearm conviction under 28 U.S.C. Section 2255, claiming that notwithstanding his waiver, his conviction must be vacated because it was predicated on the residual clause held unconstitutional in Davis.The Fifth Circuit held that Defendant's plea waiver was valid, and precluded collateral attack, citing Grzegorczyk v. United States, _ U.S. _ (2022) (Kavanaugh, J., respecting the denial of certiorari). View "USA v. Caldwell" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Jennifer Leonard alleged Tyler Martin rear-ended her when she stopped in traffic. She sued Martin and his insurer, Wadena Insurance Company, in Louisiana state court seeking damages for injuries she allegedly sustained during the accident. Martin removed the lawsuit to federal court based on the existence of diversity jurisdiction. This appeal related to a Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 45 subpoena issued to third party Dr. Joseph Turnipseed requiring him to perform patient record audits and generate data about how frequently he recommends a particular course of treatment. Turnipseed, an anesthesiologist and pain management specialist, treated Leonard for neck and back pain allegedly caused by the accident. Among other treatments, Turnipseed performed a cervical radiofrequency neurotomy on Leonard. According to Turnipseed, Leonard responded favorably to the cervical neurotomy and he recommended that she undergo the procedure annually for the next five to six years. These future treatments make up a large percentage of Leonard’s life care plan and alleged damages. Defendants disputed the medical necessity of those expensive, future treatments. Turnipseed moved to quash the subpoena on undue burden grounds. The district court denied his motion to quash. He appealed. In the alternative, he sought a writ of mandamus ordering the district court to quash the subpoena. "With misgivings about the district court’s substantive ruling," the Fifth Circuit dismissed Turnipseed’s appeal for lack of jurisdiction under the collateral order doctrine, and denied his alternative petition for a writ of mandamus for not having demonstrated a clear and indisputable right to the writ. View "Martin v. Turnipseed" on Justia Law

In 2012, then-sheriff Gusman of the Orleans Parish Sheriff’s Office claimed constitutional violations at the Orleans Parish Prison, including inadequate housing for detainees with mental-health needs. The United States intervened that September, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1997c. That same month, the sheriff brought in the city as a third-party defendant. At issue here was whether the district court abused its discretion in denying the city’s motion for relief from January and March 2019 orders, pursuant to Rule 60(b)(5). The Fifth Circuit held that '[a] Rule 60(b) motion, of course, is not a substitute for a timely appeal from the judgment or order from which relief is requested." The Court determined it had jurisdiction to review the denial of the Rule 60(b) motion, but not the underlying January and March 2019 orders. The denial of the city's Rule 60(b) motion was affirmed. View "Anderson v. City of New Orleans" on Justia Law

Fountain of praise, a church, leased space to Central Care Integrated Health Services. Shortly after the execution of the lease, the relationship soured when the parties disagreed on the frequency and amount of rent payments. Eventually, Fountain of Praise terminated the lease and successfully evicted Central Care from the premises.Subsequently, Central Care filed for Chapter 11 reorganization. Central Care then sued Fountain of Praise in state court, claiming breach of contract and unjust enrichment. Fountain of Praise then removed the case to bankruptcy court as an adversary proceeding. The bankruptcy court entered judgment in favor of Fountain of Praise, finding that any breach was excusable due to Central Care's failure to make timely rent payments and that Central Care lacked the requisite interest in the property for an unjust enrichment claim.Central Care appealed, and the district court judge assigned to the case reassigned the case to a magistrate judge who affirmed the bankruptcy court's judgment.On appeal, the Fifth Circuit vacated the magistrate judge's order, finding that the district court improperly authorized referral of the appeal from a bankruptcy court decision to a magistrate judge. Under 28 U.S.C. Section 158, appeals from a bankruptcy court must be heard either by the district court or a panel of bankruptcy court judges. View "South Central v. Oak Baptist" on Justia Law

Petitioners overstayed their permission to visit the United States 20 years ago, and they’ve been here ever since. For the second time after they were ordered removed, they asked the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) to reopen their removal proceedings. For the second time, the Board refused.On appeal, Petitioners focused on the BIA’s failure to consider certain evidence of changed country conditions. They argue that amounted to an abuse of discretion. (They also argue the BIA committed various other errors.)The Fifth Circuit denied their petition, holding that (A) Petitioners’ claims are number-barred. Then the court wrote that it (B) rejected Petitioners’ resort to federal regulations and instead apply the statute as written. Finally, the court (C) denied the petition without remanding it to the BIA. The court explained that the number bar is a separate impediment to relief. The INA first lays out the number bar: Petitioners generally get one and only one motion to reopen. Section 1229a(c)(7)(A). Then the statute creates one and only one exception. In the same sentence as the number bar itself, Congress said: “[T]his limitation shall not apply so as to prevent the filing of one motion to reopen described in subparagraph (C)(iv).” And everyone agrees that petitioners do not qualify for the single statutory exception to the number bar in (C)(iv). Thus, Petitioners'’ motion to reopen is number-barred. View "Djie v. Garland" on Justia Law

Plaintiff was an engineer for the City of Pharr, Texas. When his supervisors asked him to sign a document he did not believe was true, Plaintiff refused. Ultimately, he was terminated and filed this case against the city and two of Plaintiff's supervisors.Defendant filed a motion for summary judgment, claiming he was entitled to qualified immunity. The district court held a hearing and denied Defendant's motion. Two days later, the court entered a minute order; however, no written order was attached. Exactly 412 days later, Defendant appealed the denial of his motion for summary judgment, claiming that the court's oral ruling was not appealable and that he is technically appealing the court's refusal to rile on his motion.The Fifth Circuit rejected Defendant's reasoning. A bench ruling can be effective without a written order and triggers appeal deadlines if it is final. Here, the court's order was final. While the district court's ruling did not comply with Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 58, an alternate interpretation would give Defendant infinite time to appeal. View "Ueckert v. Guerra" on Justia Law