Justia U.S. 5th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of defendant's motion to dismiss plaintiffs' action seeking to force payment on their state court judgment. In this case, plaintiffs succeeded in winning a money judgment against a state governmental entity in state court in Louisiana, but the Louisiana Constitution bars the seizure of public funds or property to satisfy a judgment against the state or its political subdivisions. The court agreed with the district court's application of long-standing precedent that there is no property right to timely payment on a judgment. Because plaintiffs' claims are foreclosed by Folsom v. City of New Orleans, 109 U.S. 285 (1883), the district court properly dismissed the case. Finally, the district court properly declined to hear plaintiffs' standalone claim to declaratory relief, and the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying to grant leave to amend as amendment would be futile. View "Ariyan, Inc. v. Sewerage and Water Board of New Orleans" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against Wedgewood in Texas state court after his mother, Emma Mitchell, died in a nursing home. Plaintiff alleged state-law causes of action for medical negligence, corporate negligence, and gross negligence. After removal to federal court, the district court granted plaintiff's motion to remand to state court.The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment, concluding that the Public Readiness and Emergency Preparedness (PREP) Act does not completely preempt plaintiff's state-law negligence claims. The court explained that, because the compensation fund created by the Act does not satisfy this Circuit's test for complete preemption, and because plaintiff could not have brought his claims under the willful-misconduct cause of action, those claims are not completely preempted. The court also rejected Wedgewood's claim that plaintiff's claims raise a significant federal issue that creates federal jurisdiction under the Grable doctrine. The court concluded that Wedgewood cannot avail itself of the federal officer removal statute because it failed to satisfy the third prong of the test where it was not acting pursuant to a federal officer's directions. Accordingly, the court remanded with directions to further remand to the appropriate state court. View "Mitchell v. Advanced HCS, LLC" on Justia Law

This case presents a coda to its companion appeal, No. 20-50671. The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's post-judgment order, as modified, charging defendant's membership interest in M. G. & Sons, a single-member LLC, and requiring both defendant and M. G. & Sons to obtain leave of court before transferring assets to third parties. The court stated that it is well established that courts have the power to enforce their judgments through injunctive relief. The court concluded that the district court properly exercised this power, in addition to charging defendant's interest in M. G. & Sons according to Texas law, by restricting Hughes from transferring assets to evade the district court's judgment. View "Thomas v. Hughes" on Justia Law

The Fifth Circuit slightly modified the district court's final judgment to prevent the possibility of double recovery and otherwise affirmed the district court's final judgment, attorney's fee award, and denial of post-judgment relief on various grounds. The court concluded that the district court did not err in limiting defendant's testimony as it did; the evidence was sufficient for the jury to conclude that defendant and Performance Probiotics misappropriated trade secrets; defendant breached her fiduciary duty to PPI; defendant fraudulently transferred assets in violation of the Texas Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act; and to support the jury's decision to pierce the corporate veils of PPI and Performance Probiotics.The court also concluded that the district court did not err by retaining jurisdiction over API or abuse its discretion either in denying defendant's motion for a new trial or in awarding attorney's fees and expenses. The court clarified that the district court's judgment could be read to allow for a duplicative recovery and thus modified the judgment affirmatively to state that plaintiffs may not recover the amount of the Comal County judgment twice. View "Thomas v. Hughes" on Justia Law

Continental, an auto-parts supplier, brought suit in the Northern District of California against several standard-essential patent holders and their licensing agent, claiming violations of federal antitrust law and attendant state law. The case was then transferred to federal district court where it was dismissed at the pleadings stage.The Fifth Circuit vacated the district court's judgment and remanded with instructions to dismiss for lack of standing. The court concluded that the two theories Continental alleges, based on indemnity obligations and a refusal to license, are inadequate to prove the supplier has Article III standing, let alone that it has antitrust standing or has suffered harm flowing from an antitrust violation. In this case, defendants' harm to Continental on account of Continental's indemnity obligations to original equipment manufacturers remains speculative. Furthermore, the court disagreed with the district court's conclusion that Continental's alleged unsuccessful attempts to obtain licenses on fair, reasonable, and nondiscriminatory terms from defendants comprise an injury in fact conferring Article III standing. View "Continental Automotive Systems v. Avanci, LLC" on Justia Law

When authorities booked Randall as a pretrial detainee, he was medicated and intoxicated and had a history of mental health treatment. Though Randall was supposed to “be followed for alcohol withdrawal syndrome and possible delirium tremens,” he was allegedly placed in a cell without an operable source of water, not monitored, nor provided any medication or liquids. The next day, officials found him hanging from his bedsheets. He eventually died there from his injuries.A complaint filed by Randall’s mother, Karen, under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleged that Randall was survived by his wife, Kelsey and his biological parents. Karen later amended her complaint to “substitute Plaintiff with individual heirs,” adding Kelsey, and M.A., Randall’s minor child, and to allow M.A. to appear through Morrow, her mother. The district court dismissed, holding that Karen lacked standing and adding Kelsey and M.A. could not cure the initial jurisdictional defect.The Fifth Circuit reversed. The district court was “less than meticulous” in analyzing “standing.” While Karen lacked prudential standing because Louisiana law does not authorize her to bring this particular cause of action, she has Article III standing. She has a constitutionally cognizable interest in the life of her son, which does not depend on whether Louisiana law allows her to sue. View "Abraugh v. Altimus" on Justia Law

Earnest sued Sanofi as part of the multidistrict litigation over several pharmaceutical companies’ alleged failure to warn users of Taxotere (generically docetaxel), a chemotherapy drug, of the risk of permanent alopecia or hair loss. At trial, Sanofi elicited testimony from two medical doctors: Dr. Glaspy was accepted as an expert witness under Federal Rule of Evidence 702; Dr. Kopreski was offered as Sanofi’s designated corporate representative under FRCP 30(b)(6). As a general matter, both testified that little medical evidence linked Taxotere to permanent hair loss. On appeal Earnest challenged the admission of Dr. Kopreski’s testimony, arguing it was actually expert testimony admitted in contravention of Rule 702 and “Daubert” and that because Dr. Glaspy’s testimony relied in relevant parts on Dr. Kopreski’s testimony, it also should not have been admitted.The Fifth Circuit reversed and remanded for a new trial. Sanofi’s maneuvers in cloaking Dr. Kopreski’s quasi-expert testimony as “lay witness” opinion testimony under Rule 701, and then using Dr. Glaspy to repeat it as expert analysis, effected a concerning end-run around Rule 702. Because this strategy allowed Sanofi to shoehorn inadmissible opinion testimony into evidence and then emphasize those “expert” conclusions in closing arguments to the jury it significantly prejudiced Earnest’s case. View "Earnest v. Sanofi US Services, Inc." on Justia Law

The Fifth Circuit dismissed plaintiff's appeal of the district court's order denying her motion to re-open the case, sever the cost-splitting provision of the parties' arbitration agreement, and impose the full costs of arbitration on Tonti Management. The court agreed with Tonti that it lacked jurisdiction over this appeal because the latter order is not final within the meaning of Section 16 of the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA). In this case, the district court's order declining to re-open the case and sever the cost splitting provision of the parties' arbitration agreement is an unappealable interlocutory order. Furthermore, the court lacked jurisdiction under the collateral order doctrine and exercising mandamus jurisdiction would be inappropriate. The court denied as moot plaintiff's motion requesting reassignment. View "Doe v. Tonti Management Co., LLC" on Justia Law

The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal with prejudice of Gordon Plaza's complaint, filed under the citizen suit provision of the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) against the City. Plaintiffs allege that a former landfill site remains contaminated with hazardous chemicals causing residents to suffer from cancer and other health conditions.Because the court found that the City raised its defense under 42 U.S.C. 6972(b)(2)(B)(iv) in both the 2018 Litigation and in its motion to dismiss in the instant suit, the court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion by considering it. The court also held that neither Chevron nor Skidmore deference is warranted; the City's maintenance obligations under the Decree are "removal" actions under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 (CERCLA); and Gordon Plaza has failed to plausibly plead that the City was not "diligently" conducting a removal action. Finally, based on Gordon Plaza's repeated failure to cure its pleadings and lack of diligence to present any indication of the factual allegations with which it seeks to amend its complaint, the court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying leave to amend. View "Residents of Gordon Plaza, Inc. v. Cantrell" on Justia Law

The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment to Atlantic, concluding that the action is precluded on res judicata grounds. The court clarified some doctrinal confusion in its law about Louisiana principles of res judicata that one of its sister circuits has observed. The court concluded that this action arises out of the same nucleus of facts as plaintiff's initial suit, the issue of Atlantic's alleged bad faith misrepresentation of underinsured motorist coverage could have been raised in that initial suit, and plaintiff did not specifically reserve the right to bring this second suit as part of his settlement agreement with Atlantic. While plaintiff is correct that Louisiana's bad faith statutes impose duties on Atlantic that are separate and distinct from its duties under the insurance contract, this action remains barred by res judicata. Finally, this case does not present an exceptional circumstance exception to res judicata. View "Dotson v. Atlantic Specialty Insurance Co." on Justia Law