Justia U.S. 5th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Tejas Motel, L.L.C. (“Tejas”)—the repeat litigant in question—owns and operates a small motel of the same name in Mesquite, Texas. The City of Mesquite (“City”) enacted a series of strict zoning ordinances that turned the motel property into a nonconforming use. It then ordered Tejas to comply with the minimum zoning requirements or cease operations. Tejas sued in state court, claiming that the City violated both the state and federal constitutions by effecting a taking without just compensation. The state trial court dismissed. The Texas Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that Tejas’s state claim was procedurally barred and its federal claim was not “viable.” Tejas then brought the same federal takings claim in federal court, seeking a different result.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that while it understands that Tejas was forced into state court by Williamson County, and now cannot avoid the consequences of the adverse judgment it received. But nothing in Knick nullifies long-settled principles of res judicata. State courts are competent to adjudicate federal claims, and their judgments are entitled to full faith and credit in federal court. Because the Texas Court of Appeals issued a final judgment on the merits of Tejas’s constitutional claim, the motel does not get a second bite at the apple. View "Tejas Motel v. City of Mesquite" on Justia Law

Two years after an unfortunate single-boat accident, one of the boat’s two occupants died as a result of his injuries. The boat in which he was a passenger had struck a warning sign that was totally submerged at the time of the allision between the boat and sign. His estate and survivors sued the companies responsible for the sign in question. The district court granted summary judgment to the Defendants on the ground that the incident occurred on water governed by Louisiana law rather than federal. The parties agree that if Louisiana law governs, the claims are barred. At issue in this appeal is whether or not the allision occurred in “navigable” waters such that federal law governs.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed, holding that the allision occurred on non-navigable waters. The first ground on which the Plaintiffs claim that the allision took place on navigable water is that the “navigational servitude” for the Refuge is alleged to be 65 feet above the mean sea level (“MSL”). The court explained that the parties agree that the Corps has not in fact permanently flooded the refuge; the water may not be said to be navigable under this theory. Further, the unvegetated channel establishes the ordinary high-water mark of the Bayou; water outside of that channel is not navigable. Finally, the court held that Plaintiffs here fail to present even slight evidence concerning a commercial purpose for the channel in question. View "Newbold v. Kinder Morgan SNG Operator" on Justia Law

MLB and the MLBPA began an investigation into the sale and use of performance-enhancing drugs; Plaintiff and his company were among those investigated. Since then, Plaintiff has filed a series of lawsuits across the country against MLB, the MLBPA, their members and employees, and an increasing number of assorted defendants. This appeal involves the latest in a series of unsuccessful lawsuits by Plaintiff, proceeding pro se. Defendants moved to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) in five separate motions; MLB and the MLBPA also moved for sanctions. The district court dismissed Plaintiff’s claims, denied him leave to amend, and imposed sanctions.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed and granted Defendants’ motion for sanctions. The court ordered that no pleading or lawsuit in any federal court within the jurisdiction of the Fifth Circuit shall be filed by, or on behalf of, Plaintiff, his affiliates, or his related entities against any of the defendants in this suit without first obtaining the permission of the court in which he seeks to file. He must attach a copy of this opinion to any such request for permission. The court explained that aggravating the situation is Plaintiff’s patent bad faith. Plaintiff was not only on notice from the district court that he was a vexatious litigant and that his lawsuit was frivolous, but he was also on notice from two other courts that have imposed sanctions on him (a California federal court and a New York state court) that his claims have no merit. View "Nix v. Major League Baseball" on Justia Law

A disabled public-school student was sexually assaulted by another student with known violent tendencies. Despite knowing of this attack, the victim’s teachers let both her and her aggressor wander the school unsupervised, and she was again assaulted by the very same student. The victim’s mother sued various school officials under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983, alleging liability under the so-called “state-created danger” doctrine, an exception to the general rule that government has no duty under the Due Process Clause to protect people from privately inflicted harms. The school officials sought dismissal on qualified immunity grounds, arguing that the state-created danger doctrine was not clearly established in this circuit when the underlying events occurred. The district court denied their motion.   The Fifth Circuit reversed and remanded with instructions to dismiss the Section 1983 claim. The court explained that the circuit has never adopted a state-created danger exception to the sweeping “no duty to protect” rule. And a never-established right cannot be a clearly established one. The court further wrote that it does not think it is prudent to adopt a never-recognized theory of Section 1983 liability in the absence of rigorous briefing that grapples painstakingly with how such a cause of action, however widely accepted in other circuits, works in terms of its practical contours and application, details on which the court’s sister circuits disagree. Also, beyond the lack of thorough briefing, the court explained it is reluctant to expand substantive due process doctrine given the Supreme Court’s recent forceful pronouncements signaling unease with implied rights not deeply rooted in our Nation’s history and tradition. View "Fisher v. Moore" on Justia Law

Two years after an unfortunate single-boat accident, one of the boat’s two occupants died as a result of his injuries. The boat in which he was a passenger had struck a warning sign that was totally submerged at the time of the allision between the boat and sign. His estate and survivors sued the companies responsible for the sign in question. The district court granted summary judgment to the Defendants on the ground that the incident occurred on water governed by Louisiana law rather than federal. The parties agreed that if Louisiana law governs, the claims are barred. At issue in this appeal is whether or not the allision occurred in “navigable” waters such that federal law governs   The Fifth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that navigational servitude relates to actualities – “the waters below the ordinary high-water mark,” “the line of the shore,” and so forth, id. – rather than potentialities. Should the Corps permanently flood the Refuge, the water there would likely be navigable. But as the parties agree that the Corps has not, in fact, permanently flooded the refuge, the water may not be said to be navigable under this theory. Further, the unvegetated channel establishes the ordinary high-water mark of the Bayou; water outside of that channel is not navigable. Moreover, Plaintiffs here failed to present even slight evidence concerning a commercial purpose for the channel in question. Accordingly, the court found that the water in which the allision occurred was not navigable and summary judgment was proper. View "Newbold v. Kinder Morgan SNG Operator" on Justia Law

Plaintiff is a former federal employee and participant in a health-insurance plan (“Plan”) that is governed by the Federal Employees Health Benefits Act (“FEHBA”). The Plan stems from a contract between the federal Office of Personnel Management (“OPM”) and Blue Cross Blue Shield Association and certain of its affiliates (together, “Blue Cross”). Blue Cross administers the Plan under OPM’s supervision. Plaintiff suffered from cancer, and she asked Blue Cross whether the Plan would cover the proton therapy that her physicians recommended. Blue Cross told her the Plan did not cover that treatment. So Plaintiff chose to receive a different type of radiation treatment, one that the Plan did cover. The second-choice treatment eliminated cancer, but it also caused devastating side effects. Plaintiff then sued OPM and Blue Cross, claiming that the Plan actually does cover proton therapy. As against OPM, she seeks the “benefits” that she wanted but did not receive, as well as an injunction directing OPM to compel Blue Cross to reform its internal processes by, among other things, covering proton therapy in the Plan going forward. As against Blue Cross, she seeks monetary damages under Texas common law. The district court dismissed Plaintiff’s suit.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed. The court held that neither the advance process nor the proton-therapy guideline poses an immediate threat of injury, so injunctive relief is therefore unavailable. Further, the court found that FEHBA preempts Plaintiff’s common-law claims against Blue Cross. Accordingly, the court held that no relief is available under the relevant statutory and regulatory regime. View "Gonzalez v. Blue Cross Blue Shield" on Justia Law

Four police officers unlawfully arrested Plaintiff. Plaintiff sued under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983. The officers appeal the district court’s denial of their summary judgment motion as to (1) excessive force (Officer W.), (2) false arrest (all officers), and (3) fabrication of evidence (Officer L.).   The Fifth Circuit dismissed the appeal and held that it lacked jurisdiction. The court explained that Officer W. argued that Plaintiff took a defensive and threatening posture, resisted being pulled from the vehicle, struggled after being removed, and willfully and aggressively refused to follow commands while resisting the officer’s detainment. Contrary to Officer W.’s argument, those facts are of a genuine dispute. Officer W. failed to take the facts in a light most favorable to Plaintiff, instead relying on facts different from those assumed by the district court. Accordingly, the court wrote that it lacked jurisdiction to consider Officer W.’s appeal of the genuineness of the district court’s factual determinations.   Further, the court addressed the basis of our jurisdiction over Officer L.’s appeal, which does not invoke qualified immunity. Federal courts of appeal have jurisdiction over “appeals from all final decisions of the district courts.” Denial of summary judgment is not a final decision. Thus, the court explained that it lacked jurisdiction over Officer L.’s appeal of this claim. View "Ducksworth v. Landrum" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a lawsuit against Lewisville Independent School District (“LISD”) and seven school board members, alleging that the district’s at-large election system violated Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act (“VRA”) and seeking injunctive relief. The district court determined that Plaintiff lacked standing to bring his Section 2 claim because he is white. The district court then granted Defendants’ motion for sanctions against Plaintiff, his attorneys, and their law firm based on the findings that Plaintiff’s lawsuit was frivolous under 52 U.S.C. Section 10310(e) and his attorneys multiplied proceedings unreasonably and vexatiously under 28 U.S.C. Section 1927.   
The Fifth Circuit vacated the district court’s sanctions order and remanded to determine the extent to which the order is footed upon specific contemptuous conduct in the attorneys’ prosecution of the case. The court held that Plaintiff’s lawsuit did not merit sanctions. The court concluded that sanctions against Plaintiff were unwarranted because precedent in the circuit did not squarely foreclose his legal argument and because he sought to extend existing law. Critically, LISD points to no precedent in the circuit considering whether a voter in his position has standing under the VRA, let alone “squarely controlling precedent.” Further, as Plaintiff’s s lawsuit was not frivolous and relied on an “unsettled legal theory,”  his attorneys cannot be sanctioned under Section 1927 simply for filing the action. View "Vaughan v. Lewisville Indep Sch Dist" on Justia Law

Springboards for Education (“Springboards”) brought trademark infringement claims against McAllen Independent School District (“MISD”), a public school district in Texas, and IDEA Public Schools (“IDEA”), a nonprofit organization operating charter schools in Texas. The district court dismissed the suit against IDEA, concluding it was an arm of the state and therefore shared Texas’s sovereign immunity. As for MISD, the court found that it did not have sovereign immunity but ultimately granted summary judgment in MISD’s favor.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment for MISD. The court explained that while it disagrees with the district court’s conclusion that IDEA has sovereign immunity, the court affirmed the judgment for IDEA on alternate grounds. The court reasoned that in determining whether an entity is an arm of the state, the court balances the so-called “Clark factors,” which our court first articulated decades ago in Clark v. Tarrant County. Those factors are: (1) whether state statutes and case law view the entity as an arm of the state; (2) the source of the entity’s funding; (3) the entity’s degree of local autonomy; (4) whether the entity is concerned primarily with local, as opposed to statewide, problems; (5) whether the entity has the authority to sue and be sued in its own name; and (6) whether it has the right to hold and use property. The court held that factors one and three favor sovereign immunity while factors two, four, five, and six do not. The court concluded that IDEA is not an arm of the state and does not share in Texas’s sovereign immunity. View "Springboards v. IDEA Public Schools" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a citizen of Mexico, entered the United States without authorization in 2000. In 2017, Petitioner accidentally hit a pedestrian with her car and then fled the scene. She entered a guilty plea to Texas Transportation Code Sec. 550.021 and was sentenced to five years’ deferred adjudication.While on deferred adjudication, the Department of Homeland Security arrested Petitioner and charged her with being present without admission or parole under section 212(a)(6)(A)(i) of the Immigration and Nationality Act. In 2020, Petitioner filed an application for cancellation of removal with the immigration court; she also requested voluntary departure. The Immigration Judge denied her application, finding her 2017 conviction was for a crime of moral turpitude, rendering her ineligible for cancellation. The Board of Immigration Appeals ("BIA") affirmed and denied Petitioner's motion to reconsider.In reviewing Petitioner's claim, the BIA applied outdated precedent. Under controlling precedent, outlined in Mathis v. United States, 579 U.S. 500 (2016), the proper focus is on the minimum conduct prohibited by the statute, not on the Petitioner's particular actions. Here, The minimum conduct that can trigger liability is the failure to remain at the scene of the accident and provide one’s name and other information. However, this question was not addressed by the BIA. Thus, the court vacated the BIA's order and remanded to determine whether the failure to share information under Sec. 550.021(a)(4) is a CIMT. View "Zamaro-Silvero v. Garland" on Justia Law