Justia U.S. 5th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff sued Forensic Laboratory, Inc., KHS, the KISD Police Department, the KISD Board of Trustees (“KISD Board”), and a number of KHS, KISD, and KISD Police Department employees in their individual and official capacities. That suit was filed in the state district court in Fort Bend County, Texas. McClelland alleged (1) violations of 42 U.S.C. Section 1983; (2) violations of his procedural and substantive due process rights; and (3) various state law claims, including defamation, spoliation, and civil conspiracy. The district court granted Defendants motion to dismiss and denied several other pending motions.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that the district court correctly analyzed Plaintiff’s void-for-vagueness claim and did not err in dismissing it. It is well settled, in the educational context, that a plaintiff must allege a protected property interest. Plaintiff’s second amended complaint is devoid of any such allegations. And, even if he had alleged lack of participation on the football team or team captainship in connection with vagueness, he still would not prevail. Further, the court wrote that the district court did not err in dismissing Plaintiff’s substantive and procedural due process claims because Plaintiff did not allege the deprivation of his property or liberty interests. View "McClelland v. Katy Indep Sch Dist" on Justia Law

After the EEOC closed its investigation into Plaintiff’s charge of discrimination, the agency issued Plaintiff a right-to-sue notice. This notice, however, only reached Plaintiff’s attorney and not Plaintiff himself. The EEOC then sent a subsequent notice acknowledging that the first had not reached Plaintiff and advising him that his 90-day window in which to file suit began to run upon its—the second notice’s—receipt. Plaintiff filed his complaint 141 days after his attorney is presumed to have received the first notice and 89 days after Plaintiff and his attorney received the second. The district court dismissed Plaintiff’s suit as untimely and held that equitable tolling was unavailable.   The Fifth Circuit vacated the district court’s order dismissing Plaintiff’s complaint. The court explained that Plaintiff’s case did not present the kind of exceptional circumstances that may warrant equitable tolling; the district court failed to consider controlling precedent from this court that tolling may be available when the EEOC affirmatively misleads a claimant about the time in which he must file his federal complaint. The court wrote that this was an abuse of discretion. Further, the court found that the district court did not proceed beyond this first prong of the tolling analysis the record at this motion to dismiss stage does not disclose whether Plaintiff diligently pursued his rights. View "Bernstein v. Maximus Federal Services" on Justia Law

The Fifth Circuit granted Petitioner’s petition for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) dismissal of Petitioner’s appeal from the immigration judge’s (IJ) denial of his application for relief from removal. Because the IJ’s adverse credibility determination was not supported by evidence in the record, the court determined that the BIA erred in affirming it and remanded the case to the BIA. Petitioner filed a timely application for attorneys’ fees under the Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA).   The Fifth Circuit found that Petitioner is entitled to attorneys’ fees under the EAJA and awarded $56,169.79. The court found that the government’s position was not substantially justified at each stage of this litigation. Accordingly, Petitioner is entitled to attorneys’ fees and costs under the EAJA. The court found that the EAJA statutory rate, adjusted for regional cost of living increases, adequately compensates counsel for the work performed. Petitioner also sought fees for work performed by a paralegal. The court wrote that a review of district court cases analyzing the prevailing rate for paralegals in Louisiana under the EAJA reveals a range of $75/hr to $100/hr. In light of the paralegal’s experience,the court found that a rate of $100/hr appears appropriate. View "Nkenglefac v. Garland" on Justia Law

In 2017, KP Engineering entered into a contract with Appellee to engineer and build a natural gas processing plant. KP Engineering hired Appellant as a subcontractor. Midway through the project, KP Engineering stopped paying its subcontractors, including Appellant, resulting in $2,329,830.86 in outstanding invoices. Appellee then ended its contract with KP Engineering but asked Appellant to stay on and complete the project. In exchange, Appellee promised that it would pay Appellant any unpaid invoices. Appellee paid nine of eleven outstanding invoices. Several weeks later, and after Appellant had substantially completed work on the project, Appellee informed Appellant that it would not pay the final two invoices.KP Engineering then filed for bankruptcy in 2019. Appellant filed an adversary proceeding against Appellee in KP Engineering’s bankruptcy proceeding, seeking to recover amounts for the unpaid invoices. The bankruptcy court dismissed Appellant's claim.On appeal, the Fifth Circuit affirmed, rejecting Appellant's quantum meruit claim, finding that it was barred by the existence of an express contract that covered the services at issue. The Fifth Circuit also rejected Appelant's unjust enrichment and breach of contract claims. View "Credos Industrial v. Targa Pipeline" on Justia Law

In 2008, Intervenors-Appellees Caterpillar Financial Services Asia Pte Ltd (“Caterpillar”) and Eksportfinans ASA (“Eksportfinans”) provided a loan to Marfield Limited Incorporated (“Marfield”) for the construction of an offshore construction vessel. To secure payment of this loan, Marfield executed and delivered a First Preferred Naval Mortgage to Eksportfinans and a Second Preferred Naval Mortgage to Caterpillar on December 19, 2008. As further security for outstanding sums owed to Caterpillar, Marfield executed a Third Preferred Naval Mortgage on April 17, 2014, encumbering the vessel. The vessel was flagged in Panama, so all three of those mortgages were submitted to the Panama government.In 2012, Caterpillar and Intervenor-Appellee the Norwegian Government (“Norway”) provided a loan to Shanara Maritime International S.A. (“Shanara”) for the construction of another offshore construction vessel. Once both vessels were complete, there were chartered until early 2014, when the Mexican government seized them. On February 28, 2014, Marfield and Shanara terminated their bareboat charters of the vessels, and the vessels remained in the Mexican government’s custody. Shanara and Marfield could not generate revenue on the vessels and began to fall behind on their loan payments to IntervenorsAppellees Caterpillar, Norway, KFW, and Eksportfinans (collectively, the “Lenders”). Shortly after that, the Mexican government separately seized the vessels in connection with the bankruptcy.Subsequently, the district court entered findings, including that (1) Marfield and Shanara are in default under the loan agreements; and (2) the Lenders’ preferred ship mortgages related to said default outrank Plaintiff's state-created liens arising from PLaintiff's attachment of the vessells under Texas state law. The Fifth Circuit affirmed, finding no clear error. View "Corporativo Grupo v. Marfield Ltd" on Justia Law

Congress enacted Sec. 254 of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, which established the Universal Service Fund (USF) and entrusted its administration to the Federal Communications Commission (FCC). The FCC relies on a private entity, the Universal Service Administrative Company (“USAC”), to aid it in its administration of the USF. USAC proposals are approved by the FCC either expressly or after fourteen days of agency inaction.USAC submitted its 2022 first quarter projections to the FCC on November 2, 2021. The FCC published these projections for notice andcomment in accordance with the Administrative Procedure Act. On November 19, 2021, Petitioners submitted comments challenging the constitutionality of the USF and the FCC’s reliance on USAC. The FCC approved USAC’s proposal on December 27, 2021. In response, Petitioners filed this petition on January 5, 2022.On appeal, Petitioners assert that: (1) the Hobbs Act is not a jurisdictional bar to their constitutional claims; (2) Section 254 violates the nondelegation doctrine because Congress failed to supply the FCC with an intelligible principle; and (3) the FCC’s relationship with USAC violates the private nondelegation doctrine because the FCC does not adequately subordinate USAC in its administration of the USF.Finding that the Hobbs Act did not bar Petitioners' claims, the Fifth Circuit reached and rejected the claims on their merits. The Fifth Circuit held that Sec. 254 does not violate the non-delegation doctrine or the private non-delegation doctrine. View "Consumers' Research v. FCC" on Justia Law

President Biden issued Executive Order 14043, which generally required all federal employees to be vaccinated. Employees who didn’t comply would face termination. He also issued Executive Order 14042, imposing the same requirements and punishments for federal contractors. Plaintiffs, Feds for Medical Freedom, raised several constitutional and statutory claims. First, they asserted constitutional objections. They claimed both mandates were arbitrary, capricious, and otherwise not in accordance with law under the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”). And the contractor mandate violated the APA because it was not in accordance with law. Finally, they sought relief under the Declaratory Judgment Act (“DJA”). Plaintiffs sought preliminary injunctions against both mandates. The district court declined to enjoin the contractor mandate because it was already the subject of a nationwide injunction. But it enjoined the employee mandate on January 21, 2022. On an expedited appeal, the Fifth Circuit majority held that the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978 (“CSRA”) precluded the district court’s jurisdiction. The Government timely appealed that injunction. The Government’s contention is that the CSRA implicitly repeals Section1331 jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ claims.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision and held that it has jurisdiction over pre-enforcement challenges to President Biden’s vaccine mandate for federal employees. The court explained that the text and structure of the CSRA create a decades-old, well-established, bright-line rule: Federal employees must bring challenges to CSRA-covered personnel actions through the CSRA, but they remain free to bring other, non-CSRA challenges under the district courts’ general Section 1331 jurisdiction. View "Feds for Medical Freedom v. Biden" on Justia Law

The Food and Drug Administration denied Petitioner R.J. Reynolds Vapor Company’s (“RJRV”) application to market menthol-flavored e-cigarettes. Petitioners so ughta stay pending review of the denial order on the merits. RJRV petitioned the FDA for a stay, which was denied. RJRV and three other companies then petitioned the Fifth Circuit for review and moved to stay the Denial Order.   The Fifth Circuit entered a full stay pending resolution of RJRV’s petition on the merits. The court explained that the FDA’s disregard for the principles of fair notice and consideration of reliance interests is exacerbated by its failure to consider alternatives to denial. When an agency changes course, as the FDA did here, it must take into account “alternatives that are within the ambit of the existing policy.” Here, the court wrote, the FDA gave RJRV no such opportunity for its menthol PMTA. Further, the court explained that the FDA did not adequately address RJRV’s evidence that substantial health benefits would accrue to adult and youth cigarette smokers alike who switched to menthol Vuse, while popularity among youth would remain low overall. Moreover, the court found that RJRV has adduced evidence that the FDA has effectively banned all non-tobacco-flavored e-cigarettes, pursuant to its new and secret heightened evidentiary standard, without affording affected persons any notice or the opportunity for public comment. The court also held that given RJRV’s uncontested allegations and legal arguments, RJRV has met its burden of showing irreparable harm if denied a stay pending appeal. View "R.J. Reynolds v. FDA" on Justia Law

Tejas Motel, L.L.C. (“Tejas”)—the repeat litigant in question—owns and operates a small motel of the same name in Mesquite, Texas. The City of Mesquite (“City”) enacted a series of strict zoning ordinances that turned the motel property into a nonconforming use. It then ordered Tejas to comply with the minimum zoning requirements or cease operations. Tejas sued in state court, claiming that the City violated both the state and federal constitutions by effecting a taking without just compensation. The state trial court dismissed. The Texas Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that Tejas’s state claim was procedurally barred and its federal claim was not “viable.” Tejas then brought the same federal takings claim in federal court, seeking a different result.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that while it understands that Tejas was forced into state court by Williamson County, and now cannot avoid the consequences of the adverse judgment it received. But nothing in Knick nullifies long-settled principles of res judicata. State courts are competent to adjudicate federal claims, and their judgments are entitled to full faith and credit in federal court. Because the Texas Court of Appeals issued a final judgment on the merits of Tejas’s constitutional claim, the motel does not get a second bite at the apple. View "Tejas Motel v. City of Mesquite" on Justia Law

Two years after an unfortunate single-boat accident, one of the boat’s two occupants died as a result of his injuries. The boat in which he was a passenger had struck a warning sign that was totally submerged at the time of the allision between the boat and sign. His estate and survivors sued the companies responsible for the sign in question. The district court granted summary judgment to the Defendants on the ground that the incident occurred on water governed by Louisiana law rather than federal. The parties agree that if Louisiana law governs, the claims are barred. At issue in this appeal is whether or not the allision occurred in “navigable” waters such that federal law governs.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed, holding that the allision occurred on non-navigable waters. The first ground on which the Plaintiffs claim that the allision took place on navigable water is that the “navigational servitude” for the Refuge is alleged to be 65 feet above the mean sea level (“MSL”). The court explained that the parties agree that the Corps has not in fact permanently flooded the refuge; the water may not be said to be navigable under this theory. Further, the unvegetated channel establishes the ordinary high-water mark of the Bayou; water outside of that channel is not navigable. Finally, the court held that Plaintiffs here fail to present even slight evidence concerning a commercial purpose for the channel in question. View "Newbold v. Kinder Morgan SNG Operator" on Justia Law