Justia U.S. 5th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff, a convicted sexually violent predator, was held in the Lubbock County Detention Center as a pre-trial detainee for approximately one month from December 2017 to January 2018. Soon after his arrival, he was placed in administrative segregation away from the facility’s general population, where he was held for most of the remainder of his time there. He subsequently brought suit under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 against Lubbock County and several law enforcement officials, asserting a series of claims regarding his alleged mistreatment there. The district court entered an order dismissing the claims against the county and all but one of the officials, which he now appeals in the first of the consolidated cases. Plaintiff challenged the process by which he was placed and remained in administrative segregation. After the district court subsequently dismissed the remaining named official, Plaintiff moved to reconsider that dismissal and the dismissal of several of his other claims. The district court rejected both motions for lack of new evidence, which Plaintiff appealed in the second of the consolidated cases. The Fifth Circuit affirmed, finding no reversible errors. View "Welsh v. Lubbock County" on Justia Law

Plaintiff sued her employer Houston Independent School District (“HISD”), for retaliation and age discrimination. The district court dismissed Plaintiff’s complaint for failing to state a claim. Her amended complaint was also dismissed. Plaintiff appealed.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed. To begin, the court explained that by applying amended Rule 3(c), it concludes that it has jurisdiction to review the final judgment. Under the new rule, a notice of appeal “encompasses the final judgment” if it designates “an order described in Rule 4(a)(4)(A).” Further, the court found that the district court applied the correct standard when assessing whether Plaintiff adequately pled sufficient facts to establish all the elements of her claims. Moreover, Plaintiff’s amended complaint brings three categories of claims. The first is a retaliation claim pursuant to Title VII, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”), and Section 21.055 of the Texas Labor Code. To state a retaliation claim, a plaintiff must show: “(1) she was engaged in a protected activity; (2) she was subjected to an adverse employment action; and (3) there was a causal connection between the protected activity and adverse employment action.” Here, the court found that Plaintiff’s complaint is hard to understand, and parts of it fail even to establish the adverse action prong. For example, the complaint offers no specifics about the “forms of retaliation, harassment, taunting, and badgering” to which Plaintiff was allegedly subjected. It also provides little to nothing about what the positions actually were and what the ages and qualifications were of those who were given promotions. View "Norsworthy v. Houston Indep Sch Dist" on Justia Law

Governor Abbott filed suit on January 4, 2022. He alleged that the military vaccine mandate is arbitrary and capricious within the meaning of the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”). He also alleged that all but one of the Government’s planned enforcement measures violates the Constitution. For relief, Governor Abbott sought an order declaring the vaccination requirement and the challenged enforcement measures unlawful, Guardsmen. He also requested costs, attorneys’ fees, and any other relief the court deems proper. Governor Abbott then moved for an order preliminarily enjoining the defendants from enforcing the vaccine mandate against members of the Texas militia not in federal service. The district court denied the motion. The Governor appealed under 28 U.S.C. Section 1292(a)(1).   The Fifth Circuit vacated the district court’s order denying Governor Abbott’s motion for a preliminary injunction and remanded for further proceedings. The court explained that the Government conceded that its erstwhile vaccine mandate is unnecessary to military readiness by repealing it. The question, therefore, is whether the President can punish non-federalized Guardsmen in Texas who refused to get COVID injections before the President and Congress deemed such injections unnecessary. The court held that the Constitution’s text, history, and tradition foreclose the President’s efforts to impose such punishments. View "Abbott v. Biden" on Justia Law

Plaintiff worked for Defendant Huntington Ingalls (formerly “Avondale”) as a shipyard electrician from February 1969 to June 1977. In March 2020, Plaintiff was diagnosed with mesothelioma. Following his diagnosis, he filed a state-law tort suit in the Civil District Court for the Parish of Orleans, alleging that Avondale, among other defendants, caused Plaintiff to contract mesothelioma by exposing him to asbestos in a negligent manner. Because Plaintiff primarily worked on United States Navy ships when he was exposed, Avondale removed the case to the federal district court under the federal officer removal statute. Plaintiff never claimed benefits under the LHWCA, which provides a no-fault compensation remedy to injured workers. Avondale moved for summary judgment. The district court held that the claims are preempted.   The Fifth Circuit reversed and remanded. The court held express preemption does not apply. Despite the clear proclamation of exclusivity in the LHWCA’s text that prohibits any liability “at law or in admiralty” for injuries covered by the Act, there is no express preemption here. The court wrote that its conclusion that conflict preemption does not apply is supported by the existence of concurrent jurisdiction and the acceptable incongruity inherent therein, the Supreme Court’s consistent rejection of arguments resisting that regime, the LHWCA’s role of supplementing rather than supplanting state law, the limited category of claims at issue here, and the similarity between these claims and those the Supreme Court has already permitted in Hahn. View "Barrosse v. Huntington Ingalls" on Justia Law

The City of Balch Springs Police Department hired an officer who a jury later convicted of murdering a teenage boy while on duty. Plaintiff (the boy’s father) sued the City under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983. The district court granted the City’s motion for summary judgment, reasoning that the department’s use-of-force policy was constitutional and also that Plaintiff’s training, supervisory, and disciplinary theories of liability lacked factual support.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s ultimate judgment. Plaintiff argued that the City’s policy is facially unconstitutional because it contains “no immediacy requirement necessary to justify an officer’s use of deadly force” and because it calls “for an officer to use the officer’s own subjective beliefs in determining whether deadly force was justified.” The court explained that a local government’s official, written policy is itself unconstitutional only if it affirmatively allows or compels unconstitutional conduct. The City’s policy passes muster under that standard. It does not affirmatively allow officers to use deadly force absent an immediate threat, and it does not affirmatively allow officers to rely on subjective factors when evaluating whether to use deadly force. Likewise, the prior constitutional violations that Plaintiff relies on are too dissimilar and generalized to establish a pattern. For that reason, Plaintiff cannot show that the City’s training, supervisory, and disciplinary failures (if any) arose from deliberate indifference. In turn, he cannot satisfy Monell’s third element. View "Edwards v. Balch Springs, Texas" on Justia Law

This case involves a contract dispute between an automobile-product manufacturer and one of its distributors. The distributor, Plaintiff Wesden, LLC, appealed the district court’s Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal of its fraud claim and summary-judgment dismissal of its breach-of-contract claim against the manufacturer, Defendant Illinois Tool Works, Inc. d/b/a ITW Evercoat (“ITW”).   The Fifth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that the issue here reduces to the plausibility of Wesden’s fraud claim. Construing the complaint in Wesden’s favor, the claim is that, at the September 2018 meeting, ITW promised Wesden that it could sell Auto Magic products through online marketplaces like Amazon and that ITW would not stop Wesden from doing so or otherwise appropriate those online markets for itself. The court concluded that Wesden’s complaint does not permit a reasonable inference of fraud. Wesden’s alleged facts do not allow us to reasonably infer that, in September 2018, ITW had “no intention” of adhering to its promise to permit Wesden’s sales on Amazon and similar marketplaces.   Further, ITW has invoked the statute of frauds to assert that the parties’ agreement is unenforceable. The court explained that a requirements contract still must satisfy the statute of frauds, which demands a written quantity term. Wesden has identified no written term either specifying a quantity of goods or stating that Wesden will buy all of its requirements from ITW. The contract thus fails to satisfy the statute of frauds and is therefore unenforceable. View "Wesdem v. Illinois Tool Works" on Justia Law

On emerging from Chapter 11 reorganization effective February 9, 2021, Chesapeake Energy Corporation tested the limits of the bankruptcy court’s post-confirmation jurisdiction by asking it to settle two prebankruptcy purported class actions covering approximately 23,000 Pennsylvania oil and gas leases. The Fifth Circuit consolidated the Proof of Claim Lessors’ appeal from the preliminary approval order with the appeal from the final approval order. At issue is whether the bankruptcy and district courts had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. Section 1334 to hear and decide these “class” claims.   The Fifth Circuit vacated and remanded the bankruptcy and district court judgments with instructions to dismiss. The court explained that no proofs of claim were filed for class members, and every feature of the settlements conflicts with Chesapeake’s Plan and Disclosure Statement. Handling these forward-looking cases within the bankruptcy court, predicated on 28 U.S.C. Section 1334(a) or (b), rather than in the court where they originated, exceeds federal bankruptcy post-confirmation jurisdiction. View "Sarnosky v. Chesapeake" on Justia Law

Plaintiff worked at Huntington Ingalls Incorporated as a sheet-metal mechanic. After leaving the company, Plaintiff complained of hearing loss. Plaintiff selected and met with an audiologist. An administrative law judge denied Plaintiff’s Longshore and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act (LHWCA). Plaintiff appealed this decision to the Department of Labor’s Benefits Review Board. The Board reversed its initial decision on whether Plaintiff could choose his own audiologist. The Company timely petitioned for review. The question is whether audiologists are “physicians” under Section 907(b) of LHWCA.   The Fifth Circuit denied the Company’s petition for review. The court reasoned that based on the education they receive and the role that they play in identifying and treating hearing disorders, audiologists can fairly be described as “skilled in the art of healing.” However, audiologists are not themselves medical doctors. Their work complements that of a medical doctor. But, the court wrote, Optometrists, despite lacking a medical degree, are able to administer and interpret vision tests. And based on the results of those tests, optometrists can prescribe the appropriate corrective lenses that someone with impaired vision can use to bolster his or her ability to see. Audiologists are similarly able to administer hearing tests, evaluate the resulting audiograms, and then use that information to fit a patient with hearing aids that are appropriately calibrated to the individual’s level of auditory impairment. Because the plain meaning of the regulation includes audiologists, and because that regulation is entitled to Chevron deference, audiologists are included in Section 907(b) of the LHWCA’s use of the word “physician.” View "Huntington Ingalls v. DOWCP" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a native and citizen of Ecuador, entered the United States without inspection on or about July 17, 1999. He was 25 years old. Soon after his entry, he was apprehended with others who had entered the country near Brownsville, Texas. On July 23, 1999, he was given a Notice to Appear (“NTA”), charging him as subject to removal because he was present in the United States without having been admitted or paroled. The NTA did not provide a hearing date or time. Petitioner’s then-current address was correctly listed on the NTA as the address of the processing center in Los Fresnos, Texas, where he was then detained. Petitioner challenged the BIA’s denial of his motion to reopen removal proceedings and rescind his in-absentia removal order.   The Fifth Circuit denied his petition. The court held: (1) Rodriguez does not apply here; (2) Spagnol Bastos, Gudiel, and Platero-Rosales govern this case; (3) the applicable rule from those cases is that an alien who fails to provide a viable mailing address/to correct an erroneous address forfeits his right to notice under Section 1229a(b)(5)(B); and (4) Petitioner forfeited his right to notice by failing to correct the erroneous address listed in his “Notification Requirement for Change of Address” and Form I-830. View "Nivelo Cardenas v. Garland" on Justia Law

In 2009, Stanford International Bank was exposed as a Ponzi scheme and placed into receivership. Since then, the Receiver has been recovering Stanford’s assets and distributing them to victims of the scheme. To that end, the Receiver sued Defendant, a Stanford investor, to recover funds for the Receivership estate. The district court entered judgment against Defendant. Defendant sought to exercise setoff rights against that judgment. Because Defendant did not timely raise those setoff rights, they have been forfeited.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that here, Defendant initially raised a setoff defense in his answer to the Receiver’s complaint. The Receiver moved in limine to exclude any setoff defenses before trial, arguing that any reference to setoff would be “unfairly prejudicial” and “an attempt to sidestep the claims process.” In May 2021, when Defendant moved for a stay of the district court’s final judgment, he represented that, should the Supreme Court deny certiorari, he would “not oppose a motion by the Receiver to release” funds. Yet, when the Supreme Court denied certiorari, Defendant changed course and registered his opposition. Defendant later again changed course, pursuing this appeal to assert setoff rights and thereby reduce his obligations. Because Defendant failed to raise his setoff defense before the district court’s entry of final judgment, he has forfeited that defense. View "GMAG v. Janvey" on Justia Law