Justia U.S. 5th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Whirlpool filed a complaint against Shenzhen Sanlida Electrical Technology Co., Ltd. and Shenzhen Avoga Technology Co., Ltd. (collectively, “Shenzhen”) asserting federal and state law claims for trademark and trade dress infringement along with a motion for a preliminary injunction to stop the sale of the allegedly infringing mixers. The district court granted the injunction. In addition to its appeal, Shenzhen sought an emergency stay pending appeal. After granting an initial administrative stay, the Fifth Circuit denied that motion. Then, after the Federal Circuit heard the merits of the case, it affirmed the district court.The Fifth Circuit found the district court did not abuse its discretion in finding that the harms weighed in favor of Whirlpool. View "Whirlpool v. Shenzhen Sanlida" on Justia Law

Several collections of residents near Jefferson Parish Landfill sued the landfill’s owner (Jefferson Parish) and its operators (four companies). This mandamus action arises out of the Eastern District of Louisiana’s case management of two of those lawsuits: the Ictech-Bendeck class action and the Addison mass action. The Ictech-Bendeck class action plaintiffs seek damages on a state-law nuisance theory under Louisiana Civil Code articles 667, 668, and 669. The Addison mass action plaintiffs seek damages from the same defendants, although they plead claims for both nuisance and negligence. The district court granted in part and denied in part Petitioners’ motion for summary judgment against some of the Addison plaintiffs. Then on April 17 the district court adopted a new case management order drafted by the parties that scheduled a September 2023 trial for several of the Addison plaintiffs.   The Fifth Circuit denied Petitioners' petition for mandamus relief. The court explained that mandamus is an extraordinary form of relief saved for the rare case in which there has been a “usurpation of judicial power” or a “clear abuse of discretion.” The court explained that mandamus relief is not for testing novel legal theories. The court wrote that Petitioners’ theory is not merely new; it is also wrong. Rule 23 establishes a mechanism for plaintiffs to pursue their claims as a class. It does not cause the filing of a putative class action to universally estop all separate but related actions from proceeding to the merits until the class-certification process concludes in the putative class action, after years of motions practice. View "In Re Jefferson Parish" on Justia Law

The Jefferson Parish School Board (JPSB) separately suspended two students for individually having a BB gun visible during virtual school. Each student’s family sued the school board, in part seeking a declaration that the school board’s virtual learning disciplinary policy is unconstitutional. Louisiana intervened, agreeing with the families on the constitutionality of JPSB’s policy and separately challenging JPSB’s disciplinary actions as ultra vires. JPSB settled with the families, ending the private suits. Louisiana wants to continue the case, citing its broad interest in compliance with its laws. The question before us is whether Louisiana has standing to do so. This case lies outside the limits of Article III standing. States undoubtedly have an interest in enforcing their laws. But when it comes to federal courts, Louisiana must claim an injury to a traditional, sovereign interest to invoke Article III jurisdiction. The state similarly fails to establish an injury to an established quasi-sovereign interest sufficient to show parens patriae standing. Louisiana’s claim of injury to a proprietary interest also falls short.   The Fifth Circuit remanded to the district court. The court concluded that t Louisiana does not have Article III standing. The court explained that this case is the same “(non) controversy” that the Sixth and Seventh Circuits have held falls outside of our Article III power. The court explained that federal courts do not sit to resolve intramural disputes among state officials over the bounds of their authority under state law. Louisiana stands fully capable and ready to enforce its laws, and it can do so in its courts, which “are not bound to adhere” to Article III’s requirements. View "LA State v. Jefferson Parish Sch" on Justia Law

The property owners (doing business as Re-Mart Investment), and St. Maron Properties— brought Section 1983 claims against the City under the Takings Clause, the Due Process Clause, and the Equal Protection Clause, as well as state law tort and statutory claims. The district court dismissed the state law claims as barred by sovereign immunity. It also dismissed the Section 1983 claims under Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to satisfy the requirements for municipal liability under Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978).   The Fifth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the state law claims. But reversed the dismissal of the Section 1983 claims. The court explained that under Monell, a Section 1983 plaintiff may not proceed against a municipality unless the injury was caused by an official policy of the municipality. But here, the property owners allege that city officials violated their rights at the specific direction of the Mayor and the City Council. That is enough to establish liability under Monell. Accordingly, the court held that the property owners are entitled to proceed against the City on their federal claims. View "St. Maron v. City of Houston" on Justia Law

Defendants, game wardens with the Texas Parks and Wildlife Department, appealed the district court’s denial of qualified immunity as to Plaintiff’s Section 1983 claims against them.   The Fifth Circuit reversed and rendered judgment for Defendants. The court concluded that Plaintiff has not plausibly alleged that Defendant violated his constitutional rights. The court explained that because Plaintiff does not allege that Defendants knowingly withheld relevant, material information from the grand jury, he has not shown that the independent intermediary’s deliberations or decisions were tainted. Accordingly, the independent-intermediary doctrine defeats Plaintiff’s allegations that there was no probable cause to prosecute him and insulates Defendants from liability. The court wrote that this conclusion applies with equal force to Plaintiff’s claims for both retaliatory prosecution and prosecution without probable cause. View "Trevino v. Iden" on Justia Law

This False Claims Act case involves Medicare reimbursements to Stone County Hospital (SCH), a critical access hospital in Wiggins, Mississippi. At trial, the Government proved that Appellants (a corporate management company, company owner, corporate executives, and SCH) defrauded Medicare out of millions over the span of twelve years by overbilling for the owner’s and his wife’s compensation despite little or no reimbursable work. The district court’s judgment in favor of the Government included an order barring Appellants from dissipating their assets. Almost two years later, the district court issued a temporary enforcement order that specifically barred Appellants from selling a piece of real property. Appellants separately appealed the enforcement of this post-judgment injunction.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. The court explained that Appellants’ arguments on appeal fail to undercut the jury’s verdict. But the Government’s dilatory conduct over the protracted procedural history of this case gives pause, even if the Government largely prevails today. When Appellants interposed the statute of limitations because of the Government’s dawdling, the Government maintained its claims were timely. It does the same on appeal. But the Government’s own sealed extension request memoranda, which remains sealed to this day, demonstrate otherwise. Further, the court explained that contrary to Appellants’ frequent reference to “nonparties” in their briefing, Defendants in fact own, or control the property in question, albeit through indirect corporate entities. At the end of the day, the only ownership interests beyond Defendants in any of the relevant entities are held by trusts for Defendants’ children. View "Aldridge v. Corporate Management" on Justia Law

The Satanic Temple and one of its members sued the Texas Health and Human Services Commission (“THHSC”), its Executive Commissioner, and the Planned Parenthood Center for Choice, Inc., seeking injunctive and declaratory relief against several Texas abortion laws.Plaintiffs moved for a temporary restraining order (“TRO”) and a preliminary injunction against the Commissioner; the district court denied the motion. The Satanic Temple appealed.While the appeal was pending, the litigation continued in district court. Defendants moved to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction and for failure to state a claim. The district court granted the motion and dismissed the suit without prejudice but without leave to replead.On appeal, the Fifth Circuit affirmed, finding that the district court had jurisdiction to proceed on the merits of the case. An appeal from a grant or denial of a preliminary injunction does not divest the district court of jurisdiction or restrain it from taking other steps in the litigation. The district court, therefore, had jurisdiction to dismiss Plaintiffs’ claims despite the pending appeal. Thus, the Fifth Circuit dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. View "Satanic Temple v. TX Hlth and Human" on Justia Law

After slipping on a puddle of water in a Wal-Mart store, Plaintiff sued Defendant Wal-Mart Inc. and Wal-Mart Louisiana, L.L.C. in federal district court. The district court granted summary judgment for the Defendants, and Plaintiff appealed.   The court reversed and remanded because Plaintiff has raised genuine issues of material fact precluding summary judgment. The court explained that at least two Wal-Mart employees were in the area who reasonably could have seen the puddle. Another shopper notified one Walmart employee in the area, who was bringing a wet floor sign. After the shopper returned to the area of the puddle and before Plaintiff slipped, the video surveillance shows another Wal-Mart employee walk past the puddle, looking in its direction. The shopper testified the puddle was visible, glimmering and reflecting light. Moreover, it was raining, and this area—known as “action alley”—was high-traffic, which, like in Courville, reduced the amount of time necessary to put Wal-Mart on notice. The court explained that Plaintiff has provided direct evidence that the puddle existed for “some period of time.” Under these circumstances and on summary judgment, Plaintiff has presented enough evidence to create a genuine issue of material fact that the period of time the puddle existed was sufficient to place the Defendants on notice of its existence. View "Flowers v. Wal-Mart" on Justia Law

Plaintiff is the former Chief Financial Officer of the Cypress Bayou Casino. The Casino is owned by the Chitimacha Tribe of Louisiana. The Chitimacha Tribe is one of four federally recognized Indian tribes in Louisiana. According to the allegations in Plaintiff’s complaint, the Chitimacha tribal council authorized Spivey (as CFO of the Casino) to make a $3,900 bonus payment to the then-newly elected chairman of the tribal council. Plaintiff claimed that several members of the tribal council turned around and reported the bonus payment to federal and state law enforcement. Plaintiff initially sued the Tribe, the Casino, and four tribal council members in federal court under 42 U.S.C. Sections 1983 and 1985 and Louisiana tort law. The district court, over Plaintiff’s objections, again adopted the magistrate judge’s recommendations, denied Plaintiff’s remand motion, and dismissed all Plaintiff’s claims with prejudice.   The Fifth Circuit reversed and remanded to state court. The court first wrote that when a district court determines that it lacks subject matter jurisdiction over a removed case, it must remand. The court held, in accordance with the statute’s plain text and the great weight of authority from across the country, that Section 1447(c) means what it says, admits of no exceptions, and requires remand even when the district court thinks it futile. Moreover, the court held that such a dismissal should be made without prejudice. View "Spivey v. Chitimacha Tribe" on Justia Law

On a  Mesa Airlines flight from Birmingham to Dallas Fort Worth International Airport, a flight attendant grew concerned about two passengers, Plaintiffs.  She alerted the pilot, who, despite the reassurance of security officers, delayed takeoff until the flight was canceled. The passengers were told the delay was for maintenance issues, and all passengers, including the two in question (Plaintiffs), were rebooked onto a new flight that reached DFW. After learning the real reason behind the cancellation, Plaintiffs sued Mesa under 42 U.S.C. Section 1981. The airline countered that it had immunity under 49 U.S.C. Section 44902(b) and 49 U.S.C. Section 44941(a).     Given the unusual facts that all passengers had their flight canceled, the primary issue on appeal whether such conduct constitutes disparate treatment under Section 1981, whether a Section 1981 claim can exist without a “breach” of contract, and whether Section 44902(b) grants immunity to airlines for allegedly discriminatory decisions, thereby negating Section 1981’s application against airlines in this context.   The Fifth Circuit reversed the district court’s judgment. The court held that Section 1981 prohibits discrimination in contracting. Section 44902(b) provides immunity to airlines in their decision to remove passengers they feel are “inimical to safety.” There is a straightforward way to reconcile these two statutes: If a passenger’s protected status is the but-for cause of the airline’s decision to remove them (such that the passenger has made out a Section 1981 claim), then Section 44902(b) does not grant immunity to the airline because the decision is not based on a fear that the passenger was inimical to safety. View "Abdallah v. Mesa Air Group" on Justia Law