Justia U.S. 5th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The Plaintiffs—three doctors, a news website, a healthcare activist, and two states —had posts and stories removed or downgraded by the platforms. Their content touched on a host of divisive topics like the COVID-19 lab-leak theory. Plaintiffs maintain that although the platforms stifled their speech, the government officials were the ones pulling the strings. They sued the officials for First Amendment violations and asked the district court to enjoin the officials’ conduct. The officials argued that they only “sought to mitigate the hazards of online misinformation” by “calling attention to content” that violated the “platforms’ policies,” a form of permissible government speech. The district court agreed with the Plaintiffs and granted preliminary injunctive relief.   The Fifth Circuit granted the petition for panel rehearing and affirmed in part, reversed in part, vacated the injunction in part, and modified the injunction in part. The court affirmed with respect to the White House, the Surgeon General, the CDC, the FBI, and CISA and reversed as to all other officials. As to the NIAID officials, it is not apparent that they ever communicated with the social media platforms. Instead, the record shows, at most, that public statements by Director Anthony Fauci and other NIAID officials promoted the government’s scientific and policy views and attempted to discredit opposing ones—quintessential examples of government speech that do not run afoul of the First Amendment. Further, as for the State Department, while it did communicate directly with the platforms, so far, there is no evidence these communications went beyond educating the platforms on “tools and techniques” used by foreign actors. View "State of Missouri v. Biden" on Justia Law

On August 31, 2020, N&W Marine Towing (N&W) filed in federal district court a verified complaint in limitation, Case No. 2:20-cv-2390 (the Limitation Action), pursuant to the Limitation of Liability Act of 1851 (Limitation Act) and Rule F of the Supplemental Rules for Certain Admiralty and Maritime Claims. The Limitation Act provides that once a shipowner brings a limitation action “all claims and proceedings against the owner related to the matter in question shall cease.” The district court issued a Stay Order. Wooley, Turn Services (Wooley’s employer), and Royal Caribbean Cruises (RCC) (the owner of the Majesty of the Seas) all filed claims against N&W in the Limitation Action. N&W and Wooley cross-appeal. Seeking to remain in federal court. On cross-appeal, Wooley contends that the outcome of the case was correct, but if this court were to determine that N&W was properly joined, then Wooley contends the district court erred in denying his motion to remand. The main issue on appeal is whether the district court erred in dismissing an improperly joined, nondiverse defendant when the only independent jurisdictional basis for removal was admiralty jurisdiction.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that, like in Flagg, the Louisiana state court here would have had no choice but to dismiss Wooley’s claims against N&W because of the district court’s Stay Order. The district court could have retained jurisdiction over claims against RCC had RCC remained in the case. However the federal court could not retain jurisdiction over claims against a nondiverse defendant (N&W) without some other basis for federal jurisdiction over those claims. View "Trey Wooley v. N&W Marine Towing" on Justia Law

Louisiana’s Attorney General filed a request for mandamus relief seeking to vacate the district court’s hearing scheduled to begin on October 3 and require the district court to promptly convene trial on the merits of this congressional redistricting case.   The Fifth Circuit granted in part and ordered the district court to vacate the October Hearing. The court explained that redistricting based on section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, 52 U.S.C. Section 10301, is complex, historically evolving, and sometimes undertaken with looming electoral deadlines. The court explained that the district court did not follow the law of the Supreme Court or the Fifth Circuit court. Its action in rushing redistricting via a court-ordered map is a clear abuse of discretion for which there is no alternative means of appeal. Issuance of the writ is justified “under the circumstances” in light of multiple precedents contradicting the district court’s procedure here. The court held that the state has no other means of relief and is not seeking to use mandamus as a substitute for appeal. Further, the court noted that if this were ordinary litigation, the court would be most unlikely to intervene in a remedial proceeding for a preliminary injunction. Redistricting litigation, however, is not ordinary litigation. The court held that the district court here forsook its duty and placed the state at an intolerable disadvantage legally and tactically. View "In Re: Jeff Landry" on Justia Law

BD LaPlace, LLC, doing business as Bayou Steel (Bayou Steel), operated a steel mill in LaPlace, Louisiana. Without giving The Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification Act (WARN) notice, Bayou Steel terminated Plaintiffs’ employment and closed the LaPlace mill where they worked. Seeking to recover under the WARN Act, Plaintiffs initially filed a putative class action complaint against Bayou Steel in Delaware bankruptcy court. Plaintiffs dismissed that action and filed the instant class action in federal district court. Rather than suing their employer Bayou Steel, Plaintiffs sued Bayou Steel BD Holdings II, LLC and Black Diamond Capital Management, LLC(a private equity firm that advised the fund that owned BD Holdings II). Plaintiffs demanded a jury trial, which the district court denied. Defendants sought summary judgment, which the district court granted. Plaintiffs appealed, challenging both the denial of their jury demand and the summary judgment for Defendants.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s conclusion that there is no right to a jury trial under the WARN Act. The court also affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment to BD Holdings II. But the district court erred in granting summary judgment to BDCM because there is a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether BDCM exercised de facto control over Bayou Steel’s decision to close its LaPlace steel mill and order Plaintiffs’ layoffs. The court explained that if BDCM “specifically directed” the closing of the mill without proper notice, the company may be liable for Bayou Steel’s WARN Act violation even absent the other factors. View "Fleming v. Bayou Steel" on Justia Law

In this case, the parties consented to have their commercial dispute tried before a United States magistrate judge. But, allegedly unbeknownst to Defendant, the judge was longtime family friends with the lead trial lawyer for the plaintiff. Specifically, the lawyer had been a groomsman in the judge’s own wedding, and the judge officiated the wedding of the lawyer’s daughter three months before this lawsuit was filed. None of this information was disclosed to Defendant. After a twenty-day bench trial, the magistrate judge rendered judgment for the Plaintiff, awarding $124.5 million, including over $100 million in trebled damages. After the issuance of the judgment and award, Defendant learned about the undisclosed longstanding friendship and sought to have the magistrate-judge referral vacated. The district judge denied the request and denied discovery on the issue. Defendant appealed.   The Fifth Circuit vacated. The court concluded that the facts asserted here, if true, raise serious doubts about the validity of Defendant’s constitutionally essential consent to have its case tried by this magistrate judge. Further, the court explained remand was necessary because the facts were not sufficiently developed for the court to decide whether Defendant’s consent was validly given or whether vacatur of the referral was otherwise warranted. Accordingly, the court remanded for an evidentiary inquiry. View "I F G Port Hold v. Lake Charles Harbor" on Justia Law

The Texas Department of Criminal Justice fired Plaintiff after he refused to cut his hair and beard in violation of his religious vow. Plaintiff exhausted his administrative remedies. He then filed a pro se lawsuit against TDCJ and various officers, which alleged claims of religious discrimination and failure to accommodate under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Defendants.   The Fifth Circuit, in accordance with the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Groff v. DeJoy, 143 S. Ct. 2279 (2023), reversed. The court explained that Title VII forbids religious discrimination in employment. The statute defines “religion” broadly to include “all aspects of religious observance and practice, as well as belief.” Further, the court explained that Title VII also requires employers to accommodate the religious observances or practices of applicants and employees. The court held that TDCJ breached both duties. TDCJ (A) failed to accommodate Hebrew’s religious practice and (B) discriminated against him on the basis of his religious practice   The court reasoned that the only issue is whether TDCJ has met its burden to show that granting Hebrew’s requested accommodation—to keep his hair and beard—would place an undue hardship on TDCJ. The court held that (1) TDCJ cannot meet the undue hardship standard and (2) the Department’s counterarguments are unavailing. The court noted that, in this case, TDCJ cannot hide behind its “otherwise-neutral policy.” This policy must “give way” to Plaintiff’s requested accommodation. View "Hebrew v. TDCJ" on Justia Law

The Verona Police Department twice arrested L.B. for his connection to violent shootings. Both times, however, he was released while his charges were pending. Just five months after his second arrest, L.B. drove to Annie Walton’s house and opened fire—killing Annie Walton and injuring her grandson, Aliven Walton. Annie Walton’s wrongful death beneficiaries (collectively, Plaintiffs ) believe the City of Verona and the Verona Chief of Police, J.B. Long, are responsible for the shooting at Annie Walton’s home, so they sued under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 and the Mississippi Tort Claims Act. At summary judgment, the district court initially dismissed all claims. But Plaintiffs filed a motion for reconsideration, and the district court reversed course—finding the City of Verona was not entitled to sovereign immunity under the Mississippi Tort Claims Act. Plaintiffs and the City of Verona subsequently filed interlocutory appeals.   The Fifth Circuit dismissed Plaintiffs appeal for lack of jurisdiction and reversed the district court’s finding against the City regarding sovereign immunity. The court explained that Long had no special duty to protect Plaintiffs besides his general duty to keep the public safe as the City’s Chief of Police. The court explained that the only evidence that demonstrates Long had knowledge of any connection between L.B. and Plaintiffs comes from Long’s investigative file, where there is a copy of a trespassing complaint that Annie filed against L.B. in 2016. Accordingly, the court held Long did not owe a duty to protect Plaintiffs from L.B.’s drive-by shooting. Thus, Plaintiffs cannot sustain their negligence claims or their MTCA claims against the City. View "Walton v. City of Verona" on Justia Law

A Texas citizen brought state-law claims in federal court against “Dining Alliance Inc.” Prior to the suit, however, Dining Alliance Inc. had converted into Dining Alliance LLC (“Dining Alliance”), whose citizenship may include both Texas and Delaware. This potential jurisdictional defect was not recognized because Dining Alliance originally answered under the name Dining Alliance Inc. and represented itself as a Massachusetts citizen. Dining Alliance unacceptably hid the ball with respect to the elementary jurisdictional facts during the entire course of litigation, including on appeal. The district court dismissed its third-party claims with prejudice as a sanction for that willful abuse of the judicial process.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that a district court may invoke its inherent power to dismiss claims with prejudice in order to protect “the integrity of the judicial process.” It must find that the litigant acted in bad faith or willfully abused the judicial process. It must also find that “lesser sanctions would not serve the best interests of justice.” The court wrote that contrary to Dining Alliance’s assertion, the district court found that Dining Alliance itself willfully abused the judicial process based on the totality of its litigation misconduct, which culminated in its refusal to obey the court’s order. That misstatement was reckless because the company’s transformation into Dining Alliance LLC should have been and apparently was known at the time. Accordingly, the court held that the district court neither lacked jurisdiction nor abused its discretion in dismissing Dining Alliance LLC’s third-party claims with prejudice as a sanction for its willful abuse of the judicial process. View "Dining Alliance v. Foodbuy" on Justia Law

Louisiana oil and gas law authorizes the state Commissioner of Conservation to combine separate tracts of land and appoint a unit operator to extract the minerals. Plaintiffs own unleased mineral interests in Louisiana that are part of a forced drilling unit. BPX is the operator. Plaintiffs alleged on behalf of themselves and a named class that BPX has been improperly deducting post-production costs from their pro rata share of production and that this practice is improper per se. The district court granted BPX’s motion to dismiss Plaintiffs’ per se claims, holding that the quasi-contractual doctrine of negotiorum gestio provides a mechanism for BPX to properly deduct postproduction costs. Plaintiffs filed this action as purported representatives of a named class of unleased mineral owners whose interests are situated within forced drilling units formed by the Louisiana Office of Conservation and operated by BPX. BPX removed this action to the district court based on both diversity and federal question jurisdiction. BPX sought dismissal of the Plaintiffs’ primary claim. The district court granted BPX’s motion to dismiss. The district court certified its ruling for interlocutory appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Section 1292(b).The Fifth Circuit wrote that no controlling Louisiana case resolves the parties’ issue. Accordingly, the court certified the following determinative question of law to the Louisiana Supreme Court: 1) Does La. Civ. Code art. 2292 applies to unit operators selling production in accordance with La. R.S. 30:10(A)(3)? View "Self v. B P X Operating" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, formerly a patrol sergeant in the Alamo, Texas police department, brought a Section 1983 action against the City of Alamo (the “City”), former chief of police, and several other officers in connection with an alleged scheme to have Plaintiff fired and arrested on bogus charges. The district court dismissed the City and the other officers under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), then dismissed the chief of police under 12(c). Plaintiff appealed the dismissals of the chief of police and the City.   The Fifth Circuit reversed the dismissal of Plaintiff's false arrest complaint against the chief of police and affirmed the dismissal of the City. The court explained that Plaintiff’s complaint presents Defendant as the sole moving force behind a deliberate, long-term conspiracy to create and file affidavits Defendant knew to be false, with the purpose of exploiting the criminal justice system to arrest, detain, and torment Plaintiff for crimes Defendant knew he did not commit. Defendant, moreover, ordered the sham investigations that served as the basis for the false affidavits and pushed the investigations forward despite knowing Plaintiff was innocent. The court wrote that Terwilliger v. Reyna controls here. As such, the court held that Defendant’s alleged actions are relevant, like Reyna’s, for purposes of evaluating his potential Franks liability at the Rule 12 stage. Defendant was the “driving force” behind the conspiracy, and he was “continuously updated” as to the status of the investigations he had ordered, including the fact the investigations revealed no criminality or impropriety. Therefore, the court reversed the district court’s dismissal of Plaintiff’s false arrest claim against Defendant. View "Guerra v. Castillo" on Justia Law