Justia U.S. 5th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

N&W Marine Towing (N&W) filed in federal district court a verified complaint in limitation (the Limitation Action), pursuant to the Limitation of Liability Act of 1851 (Limitation Act) and Rule F of the Supplemental Rules for Certain Admiralty and Maritime Claims. The complaint filed in N&W’s Limitation Action alleged that on February 29, 2020, the M/V Nicholas, which is owned by N&W, was towing six barges up the Mississippi River when the wake of a cruise ship, the Majesty of the Seas, caused one of the Nicholas’s face wires to break. After dismissing N&W from the case, no claims remained in the State Court Petition because Wooley had settled his claims against the other defendants. Therefore, the district court severed Wooley’s State Court Petition from the Limitation Action and dismissed it. The district court retained jurisdiction over the Limitation Action but stayed and administratively closed it to allow Wooley to pursue any claims available to him against N&W in Louisiana state court pursuant to the saving to suitors clause. N&W and Wooley cross-appealed.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed. The court determines that a nondiverse defendant was improperly joined, the improperly joined defendant’s citizenship may not be considered for purposes of diversity jurisdiction, and that defendant must be dismissed without prejudice. After determining that N&W had been improperly joined, the district court correctly considered only the citizenship of the properly joined State Court Petition defendants. As they were diverse from Wooley, removal based on diversity jurisdiction was permitted. View "Wooley v. N&W Marine Towing" on Justia Law

These consolidated cases continue the Fifth Circuit’s saga of Deepwater Horizon. Plaintiffs argue the district court judge abused his discretion by failing to disqualify himself at their request. The Street Plaintiffs do not challenge Judge Ashe’s decision to exclude the expert’s testimony under Daubert, nor do they raise any argument on the merits as to why his granting of summary judgment to BP was erroneous. In the briefing before the Fifth Circuit, the two arguments raised were that Judge Ashe should have disqualified himself and, in the alternative, that he should have extended the case-management deadlines. The Street plaintiffs argued that Judge Ashe abused his discretion for not disqualifying himself under 28 U.S.C. Section 455(b)(2) because he was a partner at Stone Pigman when it represented Cameron in the Phase One liability trial.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that the Street Plaintiffs do not challenge the judge’s actual impartiality on appeal. Instead, they rely solely on the “matter in controversy” language found in Section 455(b)(2) and argue that recusal was mandatory. The court explained that even mandatory recusal under Section 455(b)(2) can be harmless. The court wrote that if Judge Ashe erred when he failed to recuse in these cases, that error was harmless. Nonetheless, as the arguments on this appeal support, potential conflicts of interest must be taken seriously by every member of the judiciary. The litigants and the public need to be confident in the impartiality of those who will decide legal disputes. View "Street v. BP Expl & Prod" on Justia Law

Defendant asserts that he is required by his religious faith to abstain from psychiatric medication. Defendant raised a religious objection to being involuntarily medicated without identifying a particular source of law. The district court denied the objection, concluding that: (1) the Government had a compelling interest in prosecuting Defendant’s crime, which was not outweighed by Defendant’s religious liberty interests; and (2) the Government satisfied the four Sell factors. Defendant appealed.   The Fifth Circuit vacated the district court’s order and remanded. The court explained that Defendant faces a pending civil-confinement hearing in North Carolina. Moreover, he asserts that his religious belief as a Jehovah’s Witness prevents him from taking medication. He further asserts that forcible medication would violate his “constitutionally protected liberty.” The Government does not dispute that Defendant’s religious faith can qualify as a “special factor” under Sell. See Red Br. at 13–15; cf. Ramirez v. Collier, 595 U.S. 411, 426 (2022). Defendant’s religious beliefs, combined with his lengthy detention and his potential civil confinement, thus lessen the Government’s interests under the first Sell factor. The court emphasized that it holds only that religious liberty can constitute a “special circumstance” under Sell and that Defendant properly raised a religious objection to forcible medication here. That well-taken special circumstance, combined with other factors identified above, necessitates the district court’s reevaluation of the Government’s efforts to forcibly medicate him. View "USA v. Harris" on Justia Law

Certain Underwriters at Lloyds, London (“Lloyds”) brought an intervenor complaint against Cox Operating LLC (“Cox”) seeking to recover maintenance and cure benefits Lloyds paid to an injured seaman. Cox filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that Lloyds bears responsibility for the payments under a protection and indemnity (“P & I”) policy under which Cox is an assured. The district court agreed and granted the motion. Lloyds timely appealed.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that even if there were ambiguity as to the term “intended operations,” as included in the limitation on the waiver of subrogation, any such ambiguity is to be resolved “in favor of coverage.” Because the M/V SELECT 102 was engaged in its “intended operations” at the time of the seaman’s injury and the limitation on the waiver of subrogation does not apply, Lloyds waived its subrogation rights as to Cox. Thus, the court affirmed the he district court’s dismissal of Lloyds’s intervenor complaint. View "Certain Underwriters v. Cox Operating" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs are private shareholders of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac—government-sponsored home mortgage companies. Defendants include the Federal Housing Finance Agency (“FHFA”), the Treasury, the Secretary of the Treasury and the Director of the FHFA in their official capacities. The district court concluded that Plaintiffs had not plausibly alleged that the removal restriction caused them harm and dismissed their claims. It also dismissed their claims—raised for the first time on remand—that the FHFA’s funding mechanism is inconsistent with the Appropriations Clause, concluding that the claims were outside the scope of the Collins remand order in violation of the mandate rule. Plaintiffs raise two issues on appeal. The first is whether the district court erred in dismissing their claims that the unconstitutional removal restriction caused them harm. The second is whether the court erred in dismissing their Appropriations Clause claims.   The Fifth Circuit rejected Plaintiffs’ contentions and affirmed the dismissal of the removal and Appropriations Clause claims. The court explained that the anti-injunction clause applies and prevents courts from taking “any action to restrain or affect the exercise of powers or functions of the [FHFA] as a conservator or a receiver.” Because Plaintiffs seek injunctive relief that would require the FHFA to take specific actions as conservator to restore Plaintiffs to the position they would have been in if not for the unconstitutional removal restriction, they asked the district court to “affect” the “function of the [FHFA] as a conservator[.]” So, Plaintiffs’ APA claims are barred. View "Collins v. Treasury" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, then an Assistant Athletic Director at Louisiana State University (“LSU”)— internally reported Head Football Coach Les Miles for sexually harassing students. LSU retained outside counsel—Taylor, Porter, Brooks & Phillips LLP (“Taylor Porter”)—to investigate the matter, culminating in a formal report dated May 15, 2013 (the “Taylor Porter Report”). Matters were privately settled, and Miles stayed on as head coach until 2016. Lewis alleges that Defendants, members of LSU’s Board of Supervisors (the “Board”), leadership, and athletics department, along with lawyers at Taylor Porter (“Taylor Porter Defendants” and, collectively, “Defendants”), engaged in a concerted effort to illegally conceal the Taylor Porter Report and Miles’s wrong-doings. Plaintiff also alleged workplace retaliation for having reported Miles. She brings both employment and civil RICO claims. The district court dismissed Plaintiff’s RICO-related allegations as time-barred and inadequately pleaded as to causation.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed. The court considered when Plaintiff was first made aware of her injuries. It matters not when she discovered Defendants’ “enterprise racketeering scheme”—she alleges that this happened in March 2021 with the release of the Husch Blackwell Report. Plaintiff’s allegations make clear that she was made aware of her injuries much earlier. She was subject to overt retaliation after “Miles was cleared of any wrongdoing” by the Taylor Porter Report in 2013. Plaintiff alleged numerous harmful workplace interactions from that point forward. Given that Plaintiff filed her original complaint on April 8, 2021, her claims for injuries that were discovered—or that should have been discovered—before April 8, 2017, are time-barred. View "Lewis v. Danos" on Justia Law

Seven years ago, A.D. was hired to create a PVT (“pressure volume temperature”) simulation software program. Sah was hired by A.D. to develop a PVT software program in exchange for a stake in one of A.D.’s companies, IPSS. Eight months later, a product called InPVT hit the market. Plaintiff Calsep started looking into InPVT. In Calsep’s assessment, A.D. didn’t have the technical skills or resources to develop a PVT product. Calsep filed another motion to compel, alleging that A.D. still hadn’t adequately disclosed his source code control system. Although A.D. had “produced [a] purported source code system” in April and July, Calsep claimed that these productions were “undoubtedly incomplete” and “had been manipulated.” Believing the deletions to be intentional, Calsep filed a motion for sanctions. Afterward, A.D. filed a motion for reconsideration based on newly discovered forensic images that “vindicated” him. The magistrate judge recommended denying the motion, and the district court agreed, denying the motion for reconsideration of the sanctions order. A.D. appealed.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision on A.D.'s motion for reconsideration. The court explained that A.D. cannot offer any reason—other than mere forgetfulness—why he couldn’t acquire the images sooner. Further, A.D. hasn’t shown that he acted with diligence during the case to locate these images. Moreover, the court explained that although A.D. argues that the images change the game, Calsep’s expert insists that too much data is still missing from the source code control system, rendering a proper review impossible. The court noted that there was no reason to question the district court’s judgment crediting Calsep’s expert testimony. View "Calsep v. Dabral" on Justia Law

Defendants United Services Automobile Association and USAA General Indemnity Company (“USAA”) contract with insureds to pay “Actual Cash Value” (“ACV”) for totaled vehicles. USAA calculates ACV using the CCC One Market Valuation Report (“CCC”) rather than, e.g., the National Automobile Dealers Association guidebook (“NADA”) or Kelley Blue Book (“KBB”). Plaintiffs are USAA-insureds whose vehicles were totaled and who received ACV as determined by CCC. Plaintiffs alleged that CCC violates Louisiana statutory law, that they would have been paid more if USAA used NADA, and that they are owed the difference. Plaintiffs sought certification for a class of USAA-insureds who were paid less under CCC, and the district court granted it. USAA appealed class certification. On appeal, the parties dispute, among other things, whether common questions across the class involving damages and liability predominate over individual differences between class members, as required for class certification under Rule 23(b)(3).   The Fifth Circuit vacated and remanded. The court held that Plaintiffs failed to show injury and therefore failed to establish USAA’s liability on a class-wide basis because they failed to demonstrate entitlement to the NADA values for their totaled vehicles. The court held that with respect to Plaintiffs’ breach of contract claim, the district court’s choice of NADA is not simply an arbitrary choice among imperfect damages models. It is an arbitrary choice of a liability model, and a district court’s wide discretion to choose an imperfect estimative-damages model at the certification stage does not carry over from the context of damages to the context of liability. View "United Svcs Automobile v. Sampson" on Justia Law

This litigation stems from the bankruptcy of Imperial Petroleum Recovery Corporation (“IPRC”). IPRC once marketed microwave separation technology (“MST”) machines, which purported to recover usable oil from various emulsions. The Carmichael parties held security interests in IPRC’s assets—including its MST units. The Carmichaels filed an involuntary Chapter 7 liquidation proceeding against IPRC. After various proceedings, the amended judgment cut the actual damages owed to the Carmichaels to $4,000, cut the fee and cost award to around $92,000, and made no provision for post-judgment interest. All told, the sum due to the Carmichael parties declined roughly 96%, from over $2.3 million to approximately $96,000. The Carmichaels appealed to the district court. The district court affirmed.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded. The court wrote that the bankruptcy court’s factual findings related to the assigned assets were not clearly erroneous. The court wrote that the district court’s damages award nevertheless rested on clearly erroneous factual findings. The court explained that the Carmichaels are entitled to post-judgment interest pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Section 1961. Finally, the court disposed of the Carmichaels’ contention that the bankruptcy court’s judgment did not provide adequate declaratory relief. The court wrote that applying a preponderance standard and viewing the record holistically, it is persuaded that the Carmichaels’ damages for reassembly exceed $4,000. But the court wrote that it does not attempt to specify the Carmichaels’ reassembly damages here. Instead, the court remanded so that the bankruptcy court may consider the Carmichaels’ asserted damages under the correct standard of proof. View "Carmichael v. Balke" on Justia Law

Appellant suffers from various mental health conditions. Appellant’s delusions led her to believe that the federal government— specifically, former President Barack Obama—was conspiring with hip-hop mogul Jay-Z and other members of the music industry to harm Appellant and her family. To send a message to these government conspirators, Appellant threw a Molotov cocktail into the lobby of the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services field office in Oakland Park, Florida. Appellant was indicted and the parties jointly requested an evaluation of whether she was competent to stand trial. The court determined, based on medical evaluation, that Appellant was “presently not competent to stand trial” and therefore ordered her committed to the custody of the Attorney General for hospitalization and treatment pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 4241(d). Appellant contends that the district court lacked statutory authority to order her indefinite civil commitment pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 4246.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed.  The court explained that Section 4241(d) sets forth two time periods during which a criminal defendant is committed to the custody of the Attorney General. The court explained that Appellant was never rendered competent to stand trial. Second, the court noted that Appellant’s criminal charges were still pending when the dangerousness certificate was filed on December 17, 2020. Third, Appellant does not argue that her three months of additional confinement between September and December 2020 was of unreasonable duration. Accordingly, Appellant remained in the custody of the Attorney General pursuant to  4241(d) on December 17, 2020, and was therefore properly subject to indefinite-civil-commitment proceedings under 4246. View "Sealed Appellee v. Sealed Appellant" on Justia Law