Justia U.S. 5th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff ACTGC brought federal antitrust and various state law claims in a suit concerning tours of two New Orleans cemeteries, Defendant New Orleans Archdiocesan Cemeteries d.b.a. New Orleans Catholic Cemeteries (“NOAC”)  and Defendant Cemetery Tours NOLA LLC (“CTN”). ACTGC also requested injunctive relief, which the district court denied, and ACTGC first appealed. The district court then dismissed ACTGC’s federal antitrust and state law claims, which ACTGC also appealed. Defendant NOAC then moved to dismiss the first appeal as moot.   The Fifth Circuit granted NOAC’s motion, dismissed the first appeal, and affirmed the judgment of the district court on all issues in the second appeal. The court agreed with NOAC and found that the first amended complaint is a legal nullity because it was not incorporated by the subsequent second amended complaint. Thus, because the first amended complaint is nullified, the court cannot consider—and thus must dismiss—an appeal of a denial of injunctive relief stemming from the complaint. Further, the court explained that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying ACTGC leave to amend its complaint to add affidavits that do not add additional evidence of irreparable harm and do not address the pleading deficiencies of its federal law claims.   Moreover, the court held that ACTGC has not pleaded a legally sufficient product market under either of its proffered definitions. If the relevant product market is cemetery tours, it has not identified or included reasonably interchangeable substitutes. And if the product market is cemetery tours of Nos. 1 and 2, such a market is unduly narrow. View "New Orleans Assoc v. New Orleans Arch" on Justia Law

Ultra Petroleum Corp. (HoldCo) and its affiliates, including its subsidiary Ultra Resources, Inc. (OpCo), entered Chapter 11 bankruptcy deep in the hole. But during the bankruptcy process, these debtors (collectively, Ultra) hit it big—as natural gas prices soared, they became supremely solvent. Ultra proposed a $2.5 billion bankruptcy plan. It provided that OpCo’s creditors would be paid—in full and in cash—their outstanding principal and all interest that had accrued before bankruptcy, plus interest on both at the Federal Judgment Rate for the duration of the bankruptcy proceeding. Two groups of creditors complain that the plan falls some $387 million short.   The issue on appeal is whether the Bankruptcy Code precludes the creditors’ claims for the Make-Whole Amount; second, even if it does, whether the traditional solvent-debtor exception applies; and third, whether post-judgment interest is to be calculated at the contractual or Federal Judgment rate.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed the bankruptcy court’s judgment. The court held the Bankruptcy Code disallows the Make-Whole Amount as the economic equivalent of unmatured interest. But because Congress has not clearly abrogated the solvent-debtor exception, the court held that it applies to this case. And the solvent-debtor exception demands that Ultra pay what it promised now that it is financially capable. The court further held, given Ultra’s solvency, post-petition interest is to be calculated according to the agreed-upon contractual rate. View "Ultra Petro Corp v. Ad Hoc Com" on Justia Law

The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s order denying Klairmont Korners, L.L.C. (“Klairmont”) claim that a debtor’s decision to reject a commercial lease pursuant to 11 U.S.C. Section 365 should not receive deference under the business judgment rul Klairmont Korners, L.L.C. (“Klairmont”) appeals a district court order denying its claim that a debtor’s decision to reject a commercial lease pursuant to 11 U.S.C. Section 365 should not receive deference under the business judgment rule because of “bad faith, whim, or caprice” inherent in a third party’s negotiations with Klairmont.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that Klairmont’s contentions fail under this court’s own standard for overcoming the business judgment rule, as well as the “bad faith” test Klairmont encourages us to adopt. The court explained that Klairmont’s position is untenable, even under the test it proposes the court adopt from another circuit, under which courts should not defer to a debtor’s decision under Section 365 that is “the product of bad faith, or whim, or caprice.” Klairmont misunderstands this standard, urging the court to hold that any bad faith involved in the bankruptcy proceedings should prompt a bankruptcy court to decline a debtor’s decision regarding an executory contract. That is not the test these other courts have adopted. Klairmont will not find relief in asserting that the debtor’s decision deserves no deference under the business judgment rule.     . View "Klairmont Korners, L.L.C." on Justia Law

In a dispute over the applicability of a forum selection clause contained in a franchise agreement, the Fifth Circuit held that non-signatories to a franchise agreement may be bound to the contract’s choice of forum provision under the equitable doctrine that binds non-signatories who are “closely related” to the contract. View "Franlink v. BACE Services" on Justia Law

BRFHH Shreveport sued Willis-Knighton Medical Center for antitrust violations. The district court dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim. The Fifth Circuit affirmed. The court held (A) BRF’s Section 1 claim fails because BRF hasn’t plausibly alleged an agreement between Willis-Knighton and LSU. Then the court held (B) BRF’s Section 2 claim fails because BRF hasn’t plausibly alleged market foreclosure.   The court explained that BRF’s complaint fails because the complaint alleges that Willis-Knighton’s exclusive dealing arrangement affected the upstream market for physician services. Then the complaint alleges foreclosure in the downstream medical services market. But BRF doesn’t adequately connect the two. First, the complaint already chose which market to allege. And it chose to focus on downstream markets for healthcare services—not the upstream market for physicians. BRF can’t change horses midstream. Second, though the complaint asserts that BRF had no choice but to get physicians from LSU, it admits this was a pre-existing “provision in the hospital by-laws.” So even if the restriction threatened substantial foreclosure— which BRF hasn’t alleged—BRF still would’ve failed to plead causation. View "BRFHH Shreveport v. Willis-Knighton" on Justia Law

Harrison Co., L.L.C. executed a credit agreement with A-Z Wholesalers, Inc. to supply A-Z with tobacco products and other goods. Barkat Ali personally guaranteed A-Z’s payment. A-Z fell behind $2.6 million on payments for the goods it received, so Harrison sued for breach of contract and breach of guaranty actions against A-Z and Ali. The district court granted summary judgment for Harrison.A-Z and Ali argue there is a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether the sales that Harrison is seeking payment for were, in reality, sales from Imperial following the merger of the two companies. The Fifth Circuit affirmed. The court wrote that Imperial and Harrison are—and always have been—separate entities with their own employees, customers, and warehouses. As the district court explained, A-Z and Ali do not allege, let alone present evidence, “that A-Z experienced any changes in ordering procedures, pricing, delivery schedules, type or brand of goods, inventory availability, or any other indicia that . . . [shows] it was no longer doing business with Harrison.” Therefore, the district court did not err in granting summary judgment. View "Harrison Company v. A-Z Whsle" on Justia Law

CAE Integrated L.L.C. and Capital Asset Exchange and Trading, L.L.C. (collectively CAE) sued its former employee and his current employer, Moov, for misappropriation of trade secrets and then moved for a preliminary injunction. The district court denied the preliminary injunction and CAE appealed.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed the denial finding that CAE failed to establish a likelihood of success on the merits of its claims. The court considered that trade secret information derives independent economic value from being not generally known or readily ascertainable through proper means. What CAE refers to as the “transactional documents” are files from Google Drive with purchase orders, invoices, customer equipment needs, and pricing history. The former employee has not had access to his MacBook since 2016 and he testified that Google Drive contained none of the transactional documents when he started at Moov. The district court found the employee’s testimony credible and the forensic analysis confirmed that before the employee began at Moov, he deleted any remaining transactional documents from his Google Drive. Therefore, the district court did not clearly err in finding that neither the employee nor Moov misappropriated trade secrets. Further, even if CAE had established that the employee or Moov misappropriated trade secrets, it failed to show the use or potential use of trade secrets. View "CAE Integrated v. Moov Technologies" on Justia Law

This appeal arises from an enforcement action brought by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) against Appellants World Tree Financial, L.L.C. (World Tree) and its principals. After a bench trial, the district court found that the principal and World Tree engaged in a fraudulent “cherry-picking” scheme, in which they allocated favorable trades to themselves and favored clients and unfavorable trades to disfavored clients. It also found that all three Appellants made false and misleading statements about the firm’s allocation and trading practices. The court entered permanent injunctions against the principal and World Tree, ordered them to disgorge ill-gotten gains, and imposed civil penalties on each Appellant.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed, holding that Liu v. SEC, 140 S. Ct. 1936, 1940 (2020) does not require the district court to conduct its own search for business deductions that Appellants have not identified. Accordingly, the court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in ordering disgorgement.   The court explained that unlike in Liu, in this case, Appellants did not challenge the SEC’s proposed disgorgement amount in their pretrial or posttrial submissions—instead, they argued only that there was no “basis for disgorgement.” Nor did the principal and World Tree propose specific deduction amounts, either before the district court or to this court. View "SEC v. World Tree" on Justia Law

Triller Inc., a social media company was being sold to a group of owners, including Carnegie Technologies, Inc. Prior to the sale, Triller executed a promissory note in favor of Carnegie and then immediately assigned the note to a group of “legacy” owners—including Carnegie—as part of the deal’s closing. After the note was defaulted, Carnegie sued Triller to collect the amounts due. Triller claimed that it had no obligations under the note because it had been assigned, resulting in novation. The district court rejected Triller's novation defense and Triller appealed.The Fifth Circuit affirmed, finding that the plain meaning of the agreement was silent on the extinction of any obligation between Triller and Carnegie. The laws of both California and Texas require clear evidence illustrating the parties' intent to replace an earlier agreement, and the agreement's merger clause precludes evidence of a contemporaneous or earlier agreement. Thus, the court held that Triller failed to raise an issue of material fact regarding whether its obligations under the note were extinguished. View "Carnegie Technologies. v. Triller" on Justia Law

In this case involving a dispute related to Texas liquor laws, the court previously certified the following two questions to the Supreme Court of Texas:1.) Does Texas Alcoholic Beverage Code Section 22.16(f) “continue[] to exempt a public corporation if that corporation sells some or all its shares to a non-exempt corporation, and, if so,2.) Whether the exempt corporation can acquire additional package store permits.The Supreme Court of Texas affirmatively answered both questions, resolving the appeal. Thus, the court reversed the district court's judgment and remanded for further proceedings. View "Gabriel Invst v. Texas Alcoholic" on Justia Law