Justia U.S. 5th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The trustee sought to avoid the pre-bankruptcy transfer of $18,529.64 to creditor as a preferential transfer made within 90 days prior to debtor's filing for bankruptcy. The bankruptcy court and the district court concluded that the transfer was indeed a preferential transfer avoidable by the trustee. Because the transfer of the bank account occurred less than 90 days before debtor filed for bankruptcy and because the transfer met all the other requirements of a preferential trade, the court agreed that the transfer was avoidable by the trustee. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court.View "Flooring Sys., Inc. v. Chow" on Justia Law

Drillers filed a mineral lien on Debtor's well after Drillers performed work on the well and were never paid. The bankruptcy court dismissed Drillers' constructive trust and equitable lien claims and granted summary judgment to Debtors on Drillers' mineral contractor's and subcontractor's lien claims. The district court affirmed. The court affirmed the dismissal of Drillers' constructive trust and equitable lien claims. However, the court reversed and remanded the grant of summary judgment on Drillers' mineral subcontractors' lien claims because Drillers submitted sufficient evidence to survive summary judgment. The court held that it is possible under Texas law for an owner to also be a contractor, and for a laborer to secure liens against both the contracting and non-contracting owners. Viewed in the light most favorable to Drillers, the facts demonstrate that Drillers were subcontractors with regard to Debtors.View "Endeavor Energy Resources, L.P, et al. v. Heritage Consolidated, L.L.C., et al." on Justia Law

McClendon was the president and sole shareholder of NIA Insurance, for which Springfield served as Chief Financial Officer. In 2007, McClendon accused Springfield of theft and fired him. NIA and McClendon sued Springfield in Texas state court, claiming theft and conversion. Springfield answered and counterclaimed, alleging defamation. The suit court jury determined that Springfield was entitled to $341,000 in actual damages for defamation. Later, McClendon filed a voluntary petition for Chapter 11 bankruptcy. Springfield filed a successful adversary proceeding, seeking to have the debt arising from the jury award declared non-dischargeable under 11 U.S.C. 523(a)(6). The bankruptcy court determined that McClendon inflicted a willful and malicious injury upon Springfield. The district court and Fifth Circuit affirmed, rejecting challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence and that the bankruptcy court impermissibly shifted the burden of proof to McClendon.View "McClendon v. Springfield" on Justia Law

Debtor Lisa Galaz filed an adversary proceeding in bankruptcy court against her ex-husband, appellant Raul Galaz, for fraudulently transferring the assets of Artist Rights Foundation, LLC ("ARF") to a Texas limited liability company managed by Raul's father. Raul, a former California attorney, founded ARF in 1998 with Julian, a music producer, in order to collect royalties for the music of the Ohio Players. Raul and Julian secured all rights to the Ohio Players' music catalogue and exploited those rights, but from 1998 until 2005 the rights did not generate any revenue. In 2002, Lisa and Raul divorced and executed a divorce decree under which Raul assigned half of his 50% interest in ARF to Lisa. Because Raul transferred half of his interest to Lisa without Julian's consent, in violation of ARF's written operating agreement, Lisa received an economic interest in ARF with no management or voting rights. In 2005, without obtaining prior consent from either Lisa or Julian, Raul assigned all of ARF's rights to the entity Segundo Suenos. Soon thereafter, the royalties for the Ohio Players' music began to generate a substantial amount of revenue. From the time of ARF's transfer in June 2005 until trial in February 2010, Segundo Suenos's gross revenue from the Ohio Players' royalties totaled nearly one million dollars. Neither Julian nor Lisa received any share of the profits despite their interests in ARF. In 2007, Lisa filed for Chapter 13 bankruptcy. In April 2008 she brought an adversary proceeding against Raul and Segundo Suenos, asserting claims under the Bankruptcy Code and the Texas Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act ("TUFTA"), and asserted that Raul, as a managing member of ARF, breached his fiduciary duties to Lisa when he transferred ARF's assets to Segundo Suenos. Defendants filed a third-party complaint against Julian, who in turn asserted seven counterclaims against Defendants, including breach of fiduciary duty and fraudulent conversion. After a bench trial, the bankruptcy court found that the transfer of assets from ARF to Segundo Suenos was invalid, that it constituted a fraudulent transfer under TUFTA, that Raul owed fiduciary duties to Julian and had breached those duties, and that Raul owed no fiduciary duties to Lisa. The court entered judgment for Lisa and Julian, awarding both actual and exemplary damages. Raul and Segundo Suenos unsuccessfully appealed the judgment to the district court. The district court vacated and remanded the damages awards, however, for further consideration of Segundo Suenos's alleged expenses and for redetermination of both the actual and exemplary damages. Appellants Raul and Segundo Suenos appealed the district court's decisions. "Because rapidly evolving case law has limited bankruptcy courts' jurisdiction," the Fifth Circuit vacated the district court's order and remanded the case with separate instructions for each judgment creditor. View "Galaz, et al v. Galaz, et al" on Justia Law

Idearc, a corporation spun-off from its parent corporation, Verizon, filed for bankruptcy protection and the confirmed plan of reorganization created a litigation trust. In this case, the trustee filed suit against Verizon and others, alleging various federal and state law claims in connection with the spin-off. The court concluded that the trustee was not entitled to a jury trial where the trustee's fraudulent transfer claims against Verizon are integral to the restructuring of the debtor-creditor relationship through the bankruptcy court's equity jurisdiction; resolution of Verizon's proof of claim in the bankruptcy court would necessarily resolve the fraudulent transfer issue; and, therefore, the court affirmed the district court's order granting the motion to strike the jury. The court affirmed the district court's denial of reconsideration of its holding that Idearc was a wholly-owned subsidiary of Verizon because the request to reconsider was untimely, based entirely on evidence that was available at the summary judgment stage, and lacked merit. Finally, the court rejected the trustee's challenges to the district court's evidentiary rulings; affirmed the district court's finding that Idearc was worth at least $12 billion on the date of the spin-off; and affirmed the district court's conclusions of law.View "U.S. Bank Nat'l Assoc. v. Verizon Communications, Inc., et al." on Justia Law

B&N, a law firm, represented debtor in his Chapter 11 bankruptcy. The bankruptcy court converted the case to Chapter 7 and B&N's services were terminated. B&N then filed an application for fees in excess of $130,000. The bankruptcy court allowed approximately $20,000 and disallowed the remainder. The district court affirmed. Based on the court's review of the statutory framework and the court's decision in In re Pro-Snax Distribs., Inc., the court concluded that the bankruptcy court did not apply the wrong standard in making its ruling on the fee application and thus did not abuse its discretion. The bankruptcy court did not err in finding that B&N was entitled to only a small subset of the fees requested. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court.View "Barron & Newburger, P.C. v. Texas Skyline, Ltd., et al." on Justia Law

Debtor filed a bankruptcy petition under Chapter 13, made regular payments from his wages to the trustee under a confirmed Chapter 13 plan, and eventually converted his case to Chapter 7. At issue was whether the undistributed payments held by the Chapter 13 trustee at the time of conversion should be returned to the debtor or distributed to creditors under the Chapter 13 plan. The court concluded that the creditors' claim to the undistributed funds is superior to that of the debtor. Accordingly, the payments must be distributed to creditors in this case. The court reversed and remanded.View "Viegelahn v. Harris, III" on Justia Law

The principal issue in this case was whether, after an automatic stay in bankruptcy has been lifted and a creditor was permitted to foreclose on real property, federal or state law governed an oversecured creditor's recovery of attorneys' and other fees from the sale proceeds. A corollary issue was whether the bankruptcy court has jurisdiction over the sale proceedings for purposes of determining the creditor's right to recover attorneys' fees and the Deed of Trust trustee's right to recover a contractually specified commission for conducting the non-judicial foreclosure sale. The bankruptcy court held that it had jurisdiction but the district court reversed. The court reversed, concluding that federal law governs what is to be distributed to a secured claimant that is oversecured. The court discerned no intent from 11 U.S.C. 506(b) that oversecured creditors who are permitted to foreclose are to be treated differently from oversecured creditors whose claims are satisfied within the bankruptcy proceeding. In this instance, the bankruptcy court's order lifting the stay allowed Wells Fargo to foreclose on the property in accordance with state law foreclosure procedures. It did not give the Deed of Trust any further authority and did not have the effect of insulating the debtor or any of the creditors from the reach of section 506(b). Lifting the automatic stay to allow Wells Fargo to foreclose was not tantamount to an abandonment of the property. The court concluded that the bankruptcy court was within its discretion in finding that there was no documentation of the time that was spent and no testimony as to what was a reasonable fee. Based on this record, the court could not say that the bankruptcy court erred in finding under section 506(b) that the amount of attorneys' fees Wells Fargo sought was not substantiated and therefore was not shown to be reasonable. Even under Texas law, Wells Fargo would bear the burden of demonstrating that the fees it requested were reasonable. The court remanded for further proceedings. View "Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., et al. v. 804 Congress, L.L.C." on Justia Law

Appellant and his children brought tort claims against Placid in connection with the allegedly asbestos-related illness and death of his wife. On appeal, appellants challenged the district court's affirmance of the bankruptcy court's grant of Placid's motion for summary judgment. The court affirmed, concluding that appellants were unknown creditors whose pre-petition claims were discharged by Placid's constructive notice and that Placid's notice was not substantively deficient. The court has never required bar date notices to contain information about specific potential claims and neither the Bankruptcy Court nor Rules require bar date notices to apprise creditors of potential claims. The court held that because a bar date notice need not inform unknown claimants of the nature of their potential claims, Placid's notices were substantively sufficient to satisfy due process. View "Williams, Sr., et al. v. Placid Oil Co." on Justia Law

These appeals concerned a suit filed under the False Claims Act (FCA), 31 U.S.C. 3729 et seq., and two bankruptcy proceedings. The district court concluded that the bankruptcy trustee had exclusive standing to assert the FCA claims at issue because those claims belonged to the bankruptcy estate. The court agreed with the district court that only the trustee had standing to prosecute the FCA lawsuit; affirmed the district court's dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6); and concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion for reconsideration. View "Westbrook Navigator L.L.C., et al v. Navistar, Inc., et al." on Justia Law