Justia U.S. 5th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

In a dispute between Conti 11 Container Schiffarts-GMBH & Co. KG M.S. and MSC Mediterranean Shipping Company S.A., the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit found that the District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana lacked personal jurisdiction over the case and reversed the district court's decision. The dispute arose from an incident where three chemical tanks exploded onboard a cargo vessel chartered by Conti to MSC, causing extensive damage and three deaths. After Conti won a $200 million award from a London arbitration panel, Conti sought to confirm the award in the Eastern District of Louisiana. MSC argued that the court lacked personal jurisdiction. The Fifth Circuit agreed with the district court’s assessment that when confirming an award under the New York Convention, a court should consider contacts related to the underlying dispute, not just those related to the arbitration itself. However, the Fifth Circuit disagreed with the district court's ruling that MSC waived its personal jurisdiction defense through its insurer’s issuance of a letter of understanding. The court also disagreed with the district court's finding that the loading of the tanks in New Orleans conferred specific personal jurisdiction over MSC, as this contact resulted from the actions of other parties not attributable to MSC. Therefore, the Fifth Circuit reversed the lower court's decision and remanded the case with instructions to dismiss it for lack of personal jurisdiction. View "Conti 11. Container Schiffarts-GMBH & Co. KG M.S. v. MSC Mediterranean Shipping Co. S.A." on Justia Law

In this case before the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, the central issue was whether a contract for the inspection and repair of lifeboats on an oil platform, located on the Outer Continental Shelf, could be considered a maritime contract. The relevance of this classification was that it would determine whether indemnity might be owed by one corporate defendant, Palfinger Marine USA, Inc., to another, Shell Oil Company, for payments to third parties. The lower district court had ruled that the contract was not maritime. However, the Court of Appeals disagreed, finding that the contract was indeed a maritime one. The case was related to a tragic accident in 2019 when a lifeboat detached from an oil platform, resulting in the deaths of two workers and injury to another. The platform was owned and operated by Shell Oil Company and its affiliates. The lifeboats were serviced by Palfinger Marine USA, Inc. under a contract which included indemnity provisions. After the accident, lawsuits were filed against both companies by the injured worker and the families of the deceased workers. These claims were settled separately, but Palfinger's claim for indemnity from Shell under the contract was preserved for appeal. The decision of the district court to classify the contract as non-maritime was reversed and remanded for further proceedings. The court held that the contract was maritime, as it was related to the repair and maintenance of lifeboats facilitating offshore drilling and production of oil and gas, which constituted maritime commerce. The lifeboats were found to play a substantial role in the contract, making it a traditionally maritime contract. View "Palfinger Marine U S A v. Shell Oil" on Justia Law

In this case, Trey Wooley filed a state court action against N&W Marine Towing (N&W) and others based on injuries he suffered while serving as a deckhand on the Mississippi River. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that Wooley had improperly joined N&W in the state court action in violation of a district court's stay order and the Limitation of Liability Act of 1851, which effectively ceased all claims and proceedings against N&W outside of a federal limitation action that N&W had previously filed. Therefore, N&W was dismissed as a defendant in the state court action. The court further held that, after dismissing N&W, there were no live claims remaining in the state court action because Wooley had previously settled his claims against the other defendants. Consequently, the court severed Wooley's state court action from the limitation action and dismissed it without prejudice. The court retained jurisdiction over the limitation action but stayed it to allow Wooley to pursue any viable claims against N&W in state court. The court concluded that the district court properly denied Wooley's motion to remand, as it had diversity jurisdiction over the case once N&W was dismissed. View "Wooley v. N&W Marine Towing" on Justia Law

In a collision between two vessels on the Mississippi River, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit ruled that Louisiana law, not general maritime law, governs the burden of proof for the pilot's error.On January 3, 2019, the M/V STRANDJA, piloted by Captain Robert Johnson, drifted from its anchorage into the middle of the river, colliding with the M/V KIEFFER E. BAILEY, owned by Marquette Transportation Company Gulf-Inland LLC. The collision caused damage to both vessels. Marquette brought claims against STRANDJA's owner, Balkan Navigation Ltd, and manager, Navigation Maritime Bulgare JSC (collectively referred to as "Balkan"), alleging their negligence caused the collision.A jury found that Marquette was not negligent and that Balkan and Captain Johnson were each 50% at fault. The jury awarded Marquette $114,000 in damages and awarded Balkan $0 in damages. Both Balkan and Captain Johnson appealed the judgment.The Fifth Circuit affirmed the judgment that Marquette was not negligent, and therefore not liable for the accident. However, the court found that the district court erred in instructing the jury to apply general maritime law, which only requires a finding of ordinary negligence by a preponderance of the evidence, to the claim against Captain Johnson. Instead, the court held that Louisiana law, which requires clear and convincing evidence of gross negligence or willful misconduct, should have been applied.As a result, the court vacated the judgment against Balkan and Captain Johnson and remanded the case for a new trial, applying the correct standard of proof under Louisiana law. The court also ordered Marquette to amend its complaint within 14 days to allege admiralty jurisdiction as the jurisdictional basis for its claim against Balkan. View "Marquette Transportation Company Gulf-Inland, L.L.C. v. Navigation Maritime Bulgare" on Justia Law

In 2023, the State of Texas, under the direction of Governor Greg Abbott, installed a floating barrier in the Rio Grande near Eagle Pass, Texas. The United States government filed a civil enforcement action against Texas, alleging that the installation of the barrier violated the Rivers and Harbors Appropriation Act of 1899 (“RHA”). The United States sought a preliminary injunction, which was granted by the district court, ordering Texas to cease work on the barrier and to relocate it to the Texas riverbank. Texas appealed this decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The Court of Appeals found that the United States demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits of its RHA claims. The court determined that the part of the Rio Grande where the barrier was installed was a navigable waterway and that the barrier constituted an obstruction to this waterway. The court also found that the barrier was a structure as defined by the RHA and that it had been constructed without necessary authorization.In addition, the court found that the United States had demonstrated that it was likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief. The court noted that the barrier strained diplomatic relations with Mexico, interfered with the ability of the International Boundary and Water Commission to implement the provisions of a treaty concerning the allocation of waters in the Rio Grande, and posed a risk to human life.The court also held that the balance of equities favored the United States and that the issuance of a preliminary injunction was in the public interest. Specifically, the court noted that the barrier threatened navigation and federal government operations on the Rio Grande, and also posed a potential threat to human life.Taking all of these factors into account, the court ruled that the district court did not abuse its discretion in granting a preliminary injunction ordering Texas to cease work on the barrier and to relocate it. View "USA v. Abbott, No. 23-50632 (5th Cir. 2023)" on Justia Law

N&W Marine Towing (N&W) filed in federal district court a verified complaint in limitation (the Limitation Action), pursuant to the Limitation of Liability Act of 1851 (Limitation Act) and Rule F of the Supplemental Rules for Certain Admiralty and Maritime Claims. The complaint filed in N&W’s Limitation Action alleged that on February 29, 2020, the M/V Nicholas, which is owned by N&W, was towing six barges up the Mississippi River when the wake of a cruise ship, the Majesty of the Seas, caused one of the Nicholas’s face wires to break. After dismissing N&W from the case, no claims remained in the State Court Petition because Wooley had settled his claims against the other defendants. Therefore, the district court severed Wooley’s State Court Petition from the Limitation Action and dismissed it. The district court retained jurisdiction over the Limitation Action but stayed and administratively closed it to allow Wooley to pursue any claims available to him against N&W in Louisiana state court pursuant to the saving to suitors clause. N&W and Wooley cross-appealed.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed. The court determines that a nondiverse defendant was improperly joined, the improperly joined defendant’s citizenship may not be considered for purposes of diversity jurisdiction, and that defendant must be dismissed without prejudice. After determining that N&W had been improperly joined, the district court correctly considered only the citizenship of the properly joined State Court Petition defendants. As they were diverse from Wooley, removal based on diversity jurisdiction was permitted. View "Wooley v. N&W Marine Towing" on Justia Law

On August 31, 2020, N&W Marine Towing (N&W) filed in federal district court a verified complaint in limitation, Case No. 2:20-cv-2390 (the Limitation Action), pursuant to the Limitation of Liability Act of 1851 (Limitation Act) and Rule F of the Supplemental Rules for Certain Admiralty and Maritime Claims. The Limitation Act provides that once a shipowner brings a limitation action “all claims and proceedings against the owner related to the matter in question shall cease.” The district court issued a Stay Order. Wooley, Turn Services (Wooley’s employer), and Royal Caribbean Cruises (RCC) (the owner of the Majesty of the Seas) all filed claims against N&W in the Limitation Action. N&W and Wooley cross-appeal. Seeking to remain in federal court. On cross-appeal, Wooley contends that the outcome of the case was correct, but if this court were to determine that N&W was properly joined, then Wooley contends the district court erred in denying his motion to remand. The main issue on appeal is whether the district court erred in dismissing an improperly joined, nondiverse defendant when the only independent jurisdictional basis for removal was admiralty jurisdiction.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that, like in Flagg, the Louisiana state court here would have had no choice but to dismiss Wooley’s claims against N&W because of the district court’s Stay Order. The district court could have retained jurisdiction over claims against RCC had RCC remained in the case. However the federal court could not retain jurisdiction over claims against a nondiverse defendant (N&W) without some other basis for federal jurisdiction over those claims. View "Trey Wooley v. N&W Marine Towing" on Justia Law

Appellant worked as a barge cleaner for T.T. Barge Services, which provides barge cleaning services to Ingram Barge Company. Appellant asserted negligence claims against Ingram after Appellant was injured by caustic soda that he was cleaning up on Ingram Barge 976, which was moored to one of T.T.’s work barges at the time of his injury. After Ingram filed a district court complaint to limit liability, Appellant counterclaimed and asserted claims of negligence against Ingram. T.T. also filed a claim for contribution and indemnity against Ingram. The district court granted summary judgment (1) as to Appellant’s lack of seaman status under the Jones Act and (2) as to all of Appellant’s negligence claims against Ingram. The district court then dismissed the case with prejudice. Appellant challenged the district court’s orders.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that T.T.’s Cleaning Barge is semi-permanently and indefinitely attached to land by steel cables, except for rare moves during repairs or to accommodate nearby dredging operations. Therefore, the district court did not err in finding that T.T.’s Cleaning Barge lacked vessel status at summary judgment.   Further, the court explained that to qualify as a Jones Act seaman, a plaintiff must satisfy two requirements. First, an employee’s duties must ‘contribute to the function of the vessel or to the accomplishment of its mission. Second, that employee must have a connection to a vessel in navigation that is substantial in terms of both its duration and its nature. Here, Ratcliff lacks a substantial connection to Ingram’s barges. View "Ingram Barge v. Ratcliff" on Justia Law

Plaintiff worked as a longshoreman as early as 1998 and worked regularly for Cooper from 2008 through the date of his injury on June 22, 2018, never going more than a week and a half without working. He performed various jobs including operating a front-end loader and track hoe, flagging cranes, and loading barges. Employer classified Plaintiff as a non-assigned employee, meaning he was not assigned to a specific vessel. Employer has other employees who are assigned to vessels.Plaintiff was hurt when he fell to the deck of a ship he was working on. He filed suit against Employer in federal district court in November 2020, alleging that he was a seaman and a member of the crew, and bringing claims of Jones Act negligence, failure to pay maintenance and cure, and unseaworthiness. In the alternative, Plaintiff alleged that if he was not a seaman and was covered by the LHWCA.The District Court found Plaintiff failed to cite evidence that showed a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether he was a seaman and, alternatively, as to vessel negligence.The Fifth Circuit affirmed, finding that Plaintiff did not have a connection to the ship he was working on at the time he was injured, and that he could not establish vessel negligence. View "Johnson v. Cooper T. Smith Stevedoring" on Justia Law

In 2008, Intervenors-Appellees Caterpillar Financial Services Asia Pte Ltd (“Caterpillar”) and Eksportfinans ASA (“Eksportfinans”) provided a loan to Marfield Limited Incorporated (“Marfield”) for the construction of an offshore construction vessel. To secure payment of this loan, Marfield executed and delivered a First Preferred Naval Mortgage to Eksportfinans and a Second Preferred Naval Mortgage to Caterpillar on December 19, 2008. As further security for outstanding sums owed to Caterpillar, Marfield executed a Third Preferred Naval Mortgage on April 17, 2014, encumbering the vessel. The vessel was flagged in Panama, so all three of those mortgages were submitted to the Panama government.In 2012, Caterpillar and Intervenor-Appellee the Norwegian Government (“Norway”) provided a loan to Shanara Maritime International S.A. (“Shanara”) for the construction of another offshore construction vessel. Once both vessels were complete, there were chartered until early 2014, when the Mexican government seized them. On February 28, 2014, Marfield and Shanara terminated their bareboat charters of the vessels, and the vessels remained in the Mexican government’s custody. Shanara and Marfield could not generate revenue on the vessels and began to fall behind on their loan payments to IntervenorsAppellees Caterpillar, Norway, KFW, and Eksportfinans (collectively, the “Lenders”). Shortly after that, the Mexican government separately seized the vessels in connection with the bankruptcy.Subsequently, the district court entered findings, including that (1) Marfield and Shanara are in default under the loan agreements; and (2) the Lenders’ preferred ship mortgages related to said default outrank Plaintiff's state-created liens arising from PLaintiff's attachment of the vessells under Texas state law. The Fifth Circuit affirmed, finding no clear error. View "Corporativo Grupo v. Marfield Ltd" on Justia Law