Justia U.S. 5th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff filed suit in Texas state court seeking relief under general maritime law, the Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, 33 U.S.C. 901-950, and Texas tort law. Plaintiff claimed that he suffered severe emotional distress from witnessing his friend's death as a result of an accident on a jack-up rig attached to the Outer Continental Shelf. The district court denied plaintiff's motion for remand and granted summary judgment to defendants. The court concluded that the suit was properly removed to federal court under the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act's, 43 U.S.C. 1331-1356, grant of original federal question jurisdiction, regardless of whether maritime law provided the substantive rule of decision, and regardless of the citizenship of the parties. Because plaintiff could not show a genuine issue of material fact with respect to his claims under either Texas or maritime law, the court affirmed the district court's orders denying remand and granting summary judgment to defendants. View "Barker, Jr. v. Hercules Offshore, Inc., et al" on Justia Law

Plaintiff appealed the district court's entry of an order declaring enforceable under general maritime law a liquidated damages provision (LD Provision) in a contract between defendant and plaintiff. The parties entered into a Vessel Sales Agreement (VSA), which included the LD Provision, that provided for a $250,000 payment for each violation of the non-competition clause. The court followed Farmers Exp. Co. v. M/V Georgis Prois in finding persuasive the district court's careful factual findings as to whether the LD Provision was a reasonable forecast of damages. The court held that looking at the contract at the time it was made, ex ante breach, the court could not bicker with the $250,000 per occurrence forecast. Plaintiff had not met its burden to prove that the LD Provision was a penalty. Therefore, the court concluded that the district court properly held that the LD Provision was enforceable and affirmed the judgment. View "International Marine, L.L.C., et al v. Delta Towing, L.L.C." on Justia Law

This case arose from the 2010 Deepwater Horizon accident in the Gulf of Mexico where an explosion killed 11 workers, caused the drilling platform to sink, and resulted in a major uncontrolled release of oil. At Presidential direction, those events prompted the Department of the Interior to prohibit all new and existing oil and gas drilling operations on the Outer Continental Shelf for six months. The district court preliminarily enjoined enforcement of the moratorium. At issue on appeal was whether the Interior's subsequent actions violated a specific provision of the court's injunction, justifying a finding of civil contempt. The court held that even though the Interior immediately took steps to avoid the effect of the injunction, the court concluded that none of those actions violated the court's order. Accordingly, the court reversed the judgment. View "Hornbeck Offshore Services, et al v. Salazar, et al" on Justia Law

This dispute concerned the MSA's indemnification provision and the insurance agreements supporting M-I's indemnification obligations. At issue was whether, pursuant to the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act (OCSLA), 43 U.S.C. 1333(a), Louisiana law governed the indemnity provisions. The court affirmed the district court's grant of partial summary judgment, finding that the OCSLA applied to the parties' contractual dispute, and thus, pursuant to the OCSLA choice of law provision, Louisiana law applied, under which the Louisiana Oilfield Indemnity Act (LOIA), La. Rev. Stat. 9:2780(B), invalidated the indemnity provisions. View "Ace American Ins. Co. v. M-I, L.L.C." on Justia Law

This case required the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals to decide whether vicarious liability principles under the Jones Act allowed a seaman's wife to recover from her husband's employer for the events that led to his death. Keith Beech died after his co-worker, Michael Cosenza, accidentally shot him aboard a Hercules Drilling Company-owned vessel. The district court determined that Cosenza was acting in the course and scope of his employment at the time of the accident, and therefore, Hercules was liable for Mr. Beech's wrongful death. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, holding that Cosenza was not acting in the course of his employment when he accidentally shot Beech, and therefore, the district court's judgment in favor of Mrs. Beech must be reversed. View "Beech v. Hercules Drilling Co., LLC" on Justia Law

This case arose when claimant served plaintiff with a complaint, alleging that his injuries were caused by the unseaworthiness of the M/V St. Andrew and by the negligence of plaintiff and its employees. Claimant became entangled in a line and was pulled into a mooring bit, seriously injuring his left leg. Following a state court trial, claimant won a judgment in excess of $750,000 and plaintiff subsequently appealed. On appeal, plaintiff challenged the district court's dismissal of its limitation act as untimely. Because a challenge to the timeliness of a limitation action was a challenge to the district court's subject matter jurisdiction and because plaintiff had notice claimant was mounting such a challenge in his motion to dismiss, the district court did not err by construing plaintiff's motion as a Rule 12(b)(1) jurisdictional attack. The court held that the district court did not err in concluding that the six-month deadline was triggered when claimant delivered his complaint to plaintiff on April 28, 2009, and that plaintiff's January 18, 2010 petition was untimely filed. Finally, the court concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion when it opted not to hold an evidentiary hearing on claimant's motion to dismiss. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court.

Plaintiff, an engineer aboard defendant's dive vessel, challenged the denial of his claims under the Jones Act, 46 U.S.C. 30104, et seq., and general maritime law and of his costs. Defendant challenged the amount plaintiff was awarded for cure and his being awarded attorney's fees, including the amount. Based on the court's review of the record, the court held that the denial of plaintiff's Jones Act and general maritime law claims were not clearly erroneous. In regard to plaintiff's challenge of the district court's application of the collateral-source rule in determining the amount of cure awarded him, the court held that, regardless of what plaintiff's medical providers charged, those charges were satisfied by the much lower amount paid by his insurer. Consequently, the district court erred by awarding the higher, charged amount. The court also held that the district court clearly erred in finding defendant arbitrary and capricious in denying maintenance and cure to plaintiff. The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying plaintiff's Rule 54(d) motion for costs.

This case arose when an ocean-going tanker collided with a barge that was being towed on the Mississippi River, which resulted in the barge splitting in half and spilling its cargo of oil into the river. Following the filing of numerous lawsuits, including personal injury claims by the crew members and class actions by fishermen, the primary insurer filed an interpleader action, depositing its policy limits with the court. At issue was the allocations of the interpleader funds as well as the district court's finding that the maritime insurance policy's liability limit included defense costs. The court affirmed the district court's decision that defense costs eroded policy limits but was persuaded that its orders allocating court-held funds among claimants were tentative and produced no appealable order.

This case arose from an oil spill in the Mississippi River when an ocean-going tanker struck a barge that was being towed. Appellants (Excess Insurers) appealed the district court's decision requiring them to pay prejudgment interest on the funds deposited into the court's registry in an interpleader action. The Excess Insurers argued that the district court erred by: (1) finding that coverage under the excess policy was triggered by the primary insurer's filing of an interpleader complaint; (2) holding that a marine insurer that filed an interpleader action and deposited the policy limits with the court was obligated to pay legal interest in excess of the policy limits; and (3) applying the incorrect interest rate and awarding interest from the incorrect date. The court held that because the Excess Insurers' liability had not been triggered at the time the Excess Insurers filed their interpleader complaint, the district court erred in finding that they unreasonably delayed in depositing the policy limit into the court's registry and holding them liable for prejudgment interest. Therefore, the court reversed the judgment and did not reach the remaining issues.

This suit arose out of a dispute between a ship repair contractor, barge owner, and insurance company over the terms of a ship repair service contract and a maritime insurance policy. The contractor appealed from the district court's ruling that that the contractor breached its contractual obligation to procure insurance coverage for the barge owner and that it was contractually obligated to defend and indemnify the barge owner against damages ensuing from a workplace injury that occurred while the barge was being repaired. The barge owner cross-appealed from the district court's ruling that it was not entitled to additional insured coverage under the contractor's insurance policy. The court affirmed the district court's holding that there was a written agreement between the contractor and the barge owner which obligated the contractor to defend, indemnify, and procure insurance for the barge owner. The court also affirmed the district court's holding that the barge owner, which was not named in the policy, was not an additional insured under the policy. The court held, however, that the district court made no ruling regarding attorney's fees and therefore, the court remanded to the district court for a determination of the barge owner's entitlement, if any, to attorney's fees.