Justia U.S. 5th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff was injured while employed as a lead hand/operator in Express's plug and abandonment department, which specializes in decommissioned oil wells on various platforms off the coast of Louisiana. Plaintiff filed suit under the Jones Act, 46 U.S.C. 30104 et seq., against Express and others. The district court entered judgment against plaintiff, concluding that plaintiff is not a seaman and the district court dismissed plaintiff's claims against Express with prejudice. The court concluded that plaintiff failed to carry his burden of showing that he is a seaman where the undisputed evidence demonstrated that approximately 65% of plaintiff's job involved a fix platform only, without the help of an adjacent vessel. Even on the other jobs involving a vessel adjacent to plaintiff's platform, his work occurred mostly on the platform. Plaintiff failed to prove that he actually worked on a vessel at least 30% of the time. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Alexander v. Express Energy" on Justia Law

Rickmers Genoa Schiffahrtsgesellschaft mbH & Cie KG (Rickmers) sought to enforce a Philippine arbitral award given to Lito Martinez Asignacion for maritime injuries. Asignacion sued Rickmers in Louisiana state court to recover for his injuries. Rickmers filed an exception seeking to enforce the arbitration clause of Asignacion’s contract. The state court granted the exception, stayed litigation, and ordered arbitration in the Philippines. The district court refused to enforce the award pursuant to the public-policy defense found in the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, and the prospective-waiver doctrine. Rickmers appeals. Finding that the district court erred in reaching its conclusion, the Fifth Circuit reversed and remanded for the district court to enforce the award. View "Asignacion v. Rickmers Genoa Schiffahrtsgesellschaft mbH & Cie KG" on Justia Law

Appellee Palm Energy Offshore, L.L.C. owned the mineral rights in an area of the Gulf of Mexico called the West Delta 55 block (“WD55”). Palm also served as the court-appointed manager for appellee H.C. Resources, L.L.C. (“HCR”) and its mineral holdings at another Gulf location, the Chandeleur 37 block (“C37”). Acting as HCR’s manager, Palm asked CM to service one of HCR’s wells at C37. CM agreed and chartered a lift boat, the L/B Nicole Eymard from appellee Offshore Marine Contractors, Inc. to perform maintenance work. The ship worked at C37 from July 18 until July 27. On July 27, Palm, now acting on its own behalf, asked CM to send the Nicole Eymard to WD55. CM dispatched the ship to WD55. After completing the job at WD55, the crew of the Nicole Eymard attempted to retract the ship’s legs from the ocean floor. The crew discovered that one of the legs was stuck. The crew worked to free the leg until August 18, when Offshore ordered the crew to sever the leg and return to port ahead of an approaching storm. In port, Offshore completed repairs on the ship on October 10. Offshore then sued CM and Palm for charter fees that accrued from July 15 to August 18, for “downtime charter” from August 19 to October 10, and for the cost of repairs. CM and Palm then filed various counter- and cross-claims against each other and Offshore. CM and Offshore’s claims against each other are governed in part by the terms of an oral charter agreement. CM and Palm’s claims against each other are governed in part by the terms of a Master Service Agreement (“MSA”), and in part by a specific work order. The MSA contained an indemnity agreement (“Indemnity Agreement”). After a bench trial, the district court held that CM owed Offshore for charter fees that accrued from July 15 to July 27 while the Nicole Eymard was at C37, and for charter fees that accrued from July 28 to August 18 while the ship was at WD55. The court held that CM could recover the same fees from Palm. The court held that neither CM nor Palm owed Offshore for downtime charter fees from August 19 to October 10, or for repairs. CM, Offshore, and Palm filed motions to alter or amend the judgment under Fed. R. Civ. P. 59. The court granted these motions to the extent they sought clarification regarding the court’s order on prejudgment interest. The court determined that the Indemnity Agreement barred CM from seeking repayment for those fees. The court denied the parties’ motions in all other respects. CM appealed from the district court’s judgment and its post-trial order. Finding no reversible error in the district court’s judgment and post-trial order, the Fifth Circuit affirmed. View "Offshore Marine Contractors, et al v. Palm Energy" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, the captain of a crew boat, filed suit against his employer and his supervisor under the Jones Act, 46 U.S.C. 50101, and general maritime law, seeking maintenance and cure and damages. All parties cross-appealed the district court's judgment. The court concluded that the district court's finding that plaintiff merely strained his back while lifting a hatch cover is not clearly erroneous; the district court's findings regarding the weather and condition of the seas at the time and location of the incident are not clearly erroneous; the district court properly ruled against plaintiff on all of his unseaworthiness claims; the district court's finding that defendants were not negligent is fully supported by the record; the court vacated the maintenance and cure award against the supervisor where the maintenance and cure duty extends only to the seaman's employer; and the McCorpen v. Central Gulf Steamship Corp. rule precludes plaintiff from obtaining maintenance and cure from his employer in this case. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment to the extent the district court rejected plaintiff's Jones Act negligence and unseaworthiness claims; vacated the awards against the employer and supervisor in their entirety; and rendered judgment in favor of the employer and supervisor. View "Meche v. Key Energy Servs., LLC" on Justia Law

RLB filed suit seeking to limit its liability to the value of the dredge vessel, "Jonathan King Boyd," after a fatal allision between a fishing boat and the Vessel's dredge pipe. Claimants had previously filed suit against RLB in state court for personal injuries and property damage, and for the wrongful death of one occupant. Claimants argue that RLB missed the Limitation of Liability Act's, 46 U.S.C. 30501 et seq., six-month jurisdictional deadline for invoking the protections of the Act. The court concluded that claimants established that the pre-suit writing from their counsel to RLB's counsel conveyed the reasonable possibility that RLB faced a claim exceeding the value of the Vessel. Therefore, RLB had written notice under the Act earlier than six months before it filed its limitation action. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's dismissal of RLB's complaint as time-bared. View "RLB Contracting, Inc. v. Butler" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit against oil and gas companies and their insurers, alleging that aspects of the companies' pipeline activities impeded water flows and commercial navigation, causing economic damages. On appeal, plaintiffs challenged the district court's dismissal of their complaint for failure to state a claim in favor of two defendants, DIGC and Willbros. The court affirmed, concluding that plaintiffs failed to state a claim for a maritime tort against DIGC and Willbros. Further, the court adopted the Golden State rule where a defendant is alleged to be a corporate successor to a maritime tortfeasor but is not accused of having engaged in tortious conduct. In this case, plaintiffs' allegations that Dow is the "predecessor" to DIGC and that DIGC operated under an Army Corps permit originally issued to Dow do not show that an exception to Golden State's default rule of nonliability plausibly applies. Without more, plaintiffs have failed to state a claim for successor liability against DIGC. View "In re: Louisiana Crawfish Producers" on Justia Law

The district court declined to decide as a matter of law whether nine individual plaintiffs, former vessel-based tankermen on Blessey barges, were exempt from the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), 28 U.S.C. 1292(b), as seamen. Blessey filed this interlocutory appeal challenging the district court's denial of its motion for summary judgment. The court concluded that the district court erred when it determined that Owens v. SeaRiver Maritime, Inc. required it to hold that loading and unloading duties performed by vessel-based tankermen were nonseaman duties as a matter of law; instead, the court's review of the relevant law and undisputed facts lead it to conclude that loading and unloading was seaman work when done by these vessel-based plaintiffs; and, consequently, the district court erred when it denied Blessey's motion for summary judgment on this issue. In this case, the tankermen performed duties crucial to the mission and purpose for the unit tow and were at all times engaged in work regarding the safe and efficient operation of a "vessel as a means of transportation" under 29 C.F.R. 783.31. Accordingly, the court vacated and remanded. View "Coffin, et al. v. Blessey Marine Services, Inc." on Justia Law

Celtic Marine filed suit against Justice in this maritime dispute for breach of contract. After the parties reached two settlements and both were not fulfilled, Celtic Marine moved for summary judgment to enforce an acceleration clause contained in the second agreement for all payments due under the first settlement agreement. Celtic Marine also moved to reopen the case under Rule 60(b)(6). The district court granted both motions, granting leave for Celtic Marine to amend its complaint and then denied Justice's motion to reconsider. The court concluded that 28 U.S.C. 1292(a)(3) does not grant the court jurisdiction over the district court's Rule 60(b) order and, therefore, the court dismissed Justice's appeal for want of jurisdiction. In regards to summary judgment, the court concluded that there was no genuine dispute that the email exchange did not amend the October Settlement Agreement and Celtic Marine did not waive its right to exercise the acceleration clause. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment.View "Celtic Marine Corp. v. James C. Justice Co., Inc." on Justia Law

This case arose out of the sinking of a vessel owned by Hornbeck while at R&R's shipyard for repairs. R&R's liability insurer, National, filed suit to disclaim liability under its policy. Hornbeck counterclaimed. The district court found that R&R was negligent and that National was liable for the ensuing damages. The court concluded that the district court did not clearly err in finding that R&R was negligent under bailment law where the vessel was delivered to R&R afloat, R&R had full custody of the vessel, and the vessel sank while under R&R's care; even if the salvage company had been negligent, R&R would remain fully liable because this negligence was a foreseeable consequence of R&R's own negligence; under Rule 13(a), Hornbeck had standing to bring its counterclaim and the district court properly ruled on that claim after deciding R&R's liability; and the district court erred in the amount of damages it awarded and in applying an 18% interest rate. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for the entry of judgment and the appropriate assessment of interest on that judgment. View "National Liability & Fire Ins. Co. v. R & R Marine, Inc., et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a Jones Act suit alleging that EBI was negligent in the construction and/or maintenance of the LC-400 shipyard crane. A jury concluded that plaintiff was a Jones Act, 33 U.S.C. 902(3), seaman and that EBI's negligence caused his injury from the crane, awarding him past and future physical pain and suffering, past and future mental pain and suffering, and future lost wages. EBI appealed. The court concluded that the evidence supported the jury's finding that plaintiff was a seaman under the Jones Act; because the district court's seaman status instruction was clear and consistent with the usual articulation, the court concluded that the district court did not err in its instruction on the issue of seaman status; the evidence was sufficient to support the jury's finding of negligence; and because the court could not discern to what extent plaintiff's award for emotional suffering was based upon the non-compensable harm caused by a relative's death, his awards were tainted. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court as it related to liability but vacated the judgment as it related to damages, remanding for further proceedings. View "Naquin, Sr. v. Elevating Boats, L.L.C." on Justia Law