Justia U.S. 5th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Defendant appealed the terms of his supervised release, arguing that they exceed the statutory minimum under 18 U.S.C. 3583(h). Defendant argued that the district court's failure to aggregate across counts fails to serve the purposes of the supervised-release statute, asserting that supervised release aims to rehabilitate rather than punish. The court concluded that defendant's argument about the purposes of supervised release is unavailing because it conflicts with the clear meaning of section 3583(h); the statute requires the sentencing judge to consider factors unrelated to rehabilitation; and the district court must consider whether the term of supervised release would "afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct" and "protect the public from further crimes of the defendant." Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "United States v. Oswalt" on Justia Law

This case stemmed from an indirect gift made by J. Howard Marshall to various family members. After J. Howard's Estate failed to pay gift taxes pursuant to I.R.C. 6324(b), the IRS tried to collect the unpaid gift tax from the donees. The Government subsequently filed suit against the donees, seeking to recover the unpaid gift taxes and to collect interest from the beneficiaries. The Government also sought to recover from two individuals (E. Pierce Jr. and Hilliard), who, as representatives of various estates and trusts, allegedly paid other debts before paying those owed to the Government. The court rejected appellants' argument that the district court erred in finding that the donees incurred an independent interest liability as a result of the donor's unpaid gift tax and held that interest accrues on donee's liability for the unpaid gift taxes and that interest is not limited to the extent of the value of the gift. The court concluded that res judicata barred Eleanor Pierce (Marshall) Stevens from arguing that J. Howard did not make a gift to her because the court determined that Stevens was a donee. Finally, the court held that Hilliard and E. Pierce Jr. knew of the potential liability to the Government and the Federal Priority Statute applies; Hilliard and E. Pierce Jr. are liable under the Federal Priority Statue for the amount of the charitable set-aside; E. Pierce Jr. is individually liable for the value of the personal property he distributed from Stevens's Estate; Hilliard is personally liable for the amount he caused the Living Trust to pay for accounting and legal services on behalf of other charitable organizations; and E. Pierce Jr. did not breach his state law fiduciary duties because E. Pierce Jr. did not owe Stevens's Estate's creditors a fiduciary duty under Texas law. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part and reversed in part. View "United States v. Marshall, et al." on Justia Law

Appellant, a federal prisoner, appealed the district court's order civilly committing her under 18 U.S.C. 4245, contending that section 4245's statutory preponderance-of-the-evidence standard violates the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause. The court concluded that section 4245's preponderance-of-the-evidence standard does not violate due process in light of the other significant procedural protections afforded to prisoners subject to civil-commitment proceedings. The different contexts for civil commitment - prisoners as distinguished from citizens - reflected distinct liberty interests that justified different evidentiary standards. View "Sealed Appellee v. Sealed Appellant" on Justia Law

LPSC sought review of FERC's orders relating to the allocation of production costs among Entergy's six operating companies. LPSC argued that certain revenues and expenses should be removed from the bandwidth calculation for 2008 because they were not incurred in that test year and that the production cost formula should account for the mid-year acquisition of generation facilities by Entergy Gulf States Louisiana and Entergy Arkansas on a partial-year basis. The court concluded that FERC reasonably excluded challenges to the "justness and reasonableness" of formula inputs from annual bandwidth implementation proceedings where FERC reasonably interpreted the System Agreement and correctly applied the filed rate doctrine, and FERC's reversal of its initial interpretation of the scope of bandwidth implementation proceedings was not arbitrary. The court also concluded that FERC reasonably required Entergy to include casualty loss Net Accumulated Deferred Income Taxes (ADIT) in its third bandwidth calculation where LPSC had notice of the casualty loss ADIT issue, and FERC's decision to include casualty loss ADIT in the bandwidth formula was rational. Accordingly, the court denied LPSC's petition for review. View "Louisiana Public Svc. Cmsn. v. FERC" on Justia Law

This case involves a challenge to Mississippi's disclosure requirements for ballot initiatives proposing amendments to the state constitution. Plaintiffs, Mississippi citizens, contend that the disclosure requirements impermissibly burden their First Amendment rights. The district court agreed and enjoined Mississippi from enforcing the requirements against small groups and individuals expending "just in excess of" Mississippi's $200 disclosure threshold. The court concluded that plaintiffs have standing where they have shown that they have a legitimate fear of criminal penalties for failure to comply with Chapter 17 of the Mississippi Code's disclosure requirements; plaintiffs' as-applied challenge, asserted both as a collective group and by each plaintiff individually, failed because the record is bereft of facts that would allow the court to assume that plaintiffs intend to raise "just in excess of" $200 as a group or as individuals; the requirements that Mississippi has enacted under Chapter 17 survive plaintiffs' facial challenge under the exacting scrutiny standard where the government has identified a sufficiently important government interest in its disclosure scheme to have an interest in knowing who is lobbying for Mississippians' vote, and is substantially related to this informational interest; and, therefore, the court reversed the district court's order and rendered judgment in favor of defendants were plaintiffs' as-applied and facial constitutional challenges failed. View "Justice, Jr., et al. v. Hosemann, et al." on Justia Law

The district court declined to decide as a matter of law whether nine individual plaintiffs, former vessel-based tankermen on Blessey barges, were exempt from the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), 28 U.S.C. 1292(b), as seamen. Blessey filed this interlocutory appeal challenging the district court's denial of its motion for summary judgment. The court concluded that the district court erred when it determined that Owens v. SeaRiver Maritime, Inc. required it to hold that loading and unloading duties performed by vessel-based tankermen were nonseaman duties as a matter of law; instead, the court's review of the relevant law and undisputed facts lead it to conclude that loading and unloading was seaman work when done by these vessel-based plaintiffs; and, consequently, the district court erred when it denied Blessey's motion for summary judgment on this issue. In this case, the tankermen performed duties crucial to the mission and purpose for the unit tow and were at all times engaged in work regarding the safe and efficient operation of a "vessel as a means of transportation" under 29 C.F.R. 783.31. Accordingly, the court vacated and remanded. View "Coffin, et al. v. Blessey Marine Services, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff appealed the denial of her application for disability insurance benefits (DIB) and supplemental security income (SSI) benefits. The court vacated the district court's dismissal of plaintiff's complaint and remanded, holding that a rebuttable presumption against substantial gainful activity arises where a disability claimant's earnings are below the threshold set by the relevant statutory regulations. In this case, the Commissioner's failure to address plaintiff's earnings and apply the presumption is grounds for reversal. View "Copeland v. Colvin" on Justia Law

The Trustee of the Vallecito bankruptcy estate appealed the district court's affirmance of the bankruptcy court's judgment in favor of various owners of overriding royalty interests (appellees) to a lease that the trustee seeks to sell on behalf of the bankruptcy estate. The court concluded that the bankruptcy court did not abuse its discretion in excluding a letter submitted by an attorney in the Navajo Nation Department of Justice, stating that any "purported overriding royalty interest is invalid under the applicable provisions of the Navajo Nation Code and is completely void." The court agreed with the district court that the letter was untrustworthy, in large part because it was drafted by the trustee's counsel and was prepared after the trustee's counsel provided the Navajo Nation official with only one side of the story; the court concluded that the bankruptcy court properly held that the trustee could not raise the lack of approval by the Navajo Nation to void the contracts between Appellees and Briggs-Cockerham; and the court found no error in the district court's disposition of the trustee's additional arguments in a lis pendens filing. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Morton v. Yonkers, et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against PNC, alleging federal and state claims related to PNC's sale of her property at foreclose. PNC moved to dismiss the complaint in its entirety. The district court granted PNC's motion with respect to the federal claims; concluded that the Substitute Trustees were properly joined and thus there was not complete diversity as to the state law claims; and declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state law claims and remanded to state court. The court concluded that PNC satisfied its burden of proving improper joinder of the Substitute Trustees and Mr. Vaillancourt, the remaining parties to the suit are diverse. Therefore, the district court had diversity jurisdiction over the state law claims at the time of remand and the exercise of that jurisdiction is mandatory. Consequently, the district court erred its decision to remand. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "Vaillancourt v. PNC Bank, N.A." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, Luther Scott, Jr. and the Louisiana NAACP, filed suit to enjoin defendants to comply with the National Voter Registration Act, 42 U.S.C. 1973gg-1973gg-10. Scott alleged that he was not provided with a voter registration form when applying for food stamps, and the NAACP alleged that it had to divert resources to voter registration drives as a result of Louisiana's purported non-compliance. On appeal, the Secretary of State challenged the district court's injunction against it. The court was primarily concerned with the Secretary's challenge to the extent of its requirement that state welfare agencies provide benefits applicants with voter registration forms. The court dismissed Scott's claims on standing and notice grounds; on the merits of the NAACP's claim, the court concluded that the plain meaning of the declination form obliged the court to vacate in part the relief the district court granted to the NAACP; and affirming in part, the court held that the Act gives the Secretary enforcement authority, and that consequently he has an obligation to require the two state agencies to comply with the other miscellaneous portions of the Act. View "Scott, Jr., et al v. Schedler" on Justia Law