Justia U.S. 5th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Defendant is a Texas law firm engaged in an advertising campaign to solicit former dental patients from Kool Smiles dental clinics as potential clients. On appeal, defendant challenged the district court's denial of its Texas anti-SLAPP motion brought under the Texas Citizen's Participation Act (TCPA), Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. 27.001-27.011, to dismiss a claim brought by Kool Smiles. The court held that it had jurisdiction to interlocutorily consider the denial of a TCPA anti-SLAPP motion to dismiss; because Kool Smiles waived its argument that the TCPA was a procedural law that conflicted with the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure, the court assumed that it did not; and the Supreme Court of Texas would most likely hold that defendant's ads and other client solicitations were exempted from the TCPA's protection because defendant's speech arose from the sale of services where the intended audience was an actual or potential customer. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's denial of defendant's anti-SLAPP motion. View "NCDR, L.L.C., et al. v. Mauze & Bagby, P.L.L.C., et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against Bailey in Texas state court, alleging racial discrimination and retaliation claims under state law. Plaintiff then filed an amended petition in state court, adding claims for racial discrimination and retaliation under federal laws. Plaintiff then removed the case to federal court based on the newly asserted federal-law claims. The district court granted Bailey's motion to dismiss. The court held that the Texas statute applied here to determine whether plaintiff's amended petition filed in state court related back to the date of his original petition. In this case, the amended petition did not relate back under the Texas statute because the claims set forth in plaintiff's original petition were barred when filed. Accordingly, the district court did not err in concluding that the claims asserted therein were barred by the applicable statutes of limitations. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Taylor v. Bailey Tool & Manufacturing Co." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a Jones Act suit alleging that EBI was negligent in the construction and/or maintenance of the LC-400 shipyard crane. A jury concluded that plaintiff was a Jones Act, 33 U.S.C. 902(3), seaman and that EBI's negligence caused his injury from the crane, awarding him past and future physical pain and suffering, past and future mental pain and suffering, and future lost wages. EBI appealed. The court concluded that the evidence supported the jury's finding that plaintiff was a seaman under the Jones Act; because the district court's seaman status instruction was clear and consistent with the usual articulation, the court concluded that the district court did not err in its instruction on the issue of seaman status; the evidence was sufficient to support the jury's finding of negligence; and because the court could not discern to what extent plaintiff's award for emotional suffering was based upon the non-compensable harm caused by a relative's death, his awards were tainted. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court as it related to liability but vacated the judgment as it related to damages, remanding for further proceedings. View "Naquin, Sr. v. Elevating Boats, L.L.C." on Justia Law

Plaintiff, injured while employed by GC, filed suit against GC alleging that he was working as a seamen at the time of his accident and sought damages under the Jones Act, 46 U.S.C. 30104, for GC's negligence. Travelers, which provided coverage to GC at the time of plaintiff's accident, moved to intervene. In this appeal, the court held that an insurer who makes voluntary Longshore Harbor Workers' Compensation Act (LHWCA), 33 U.S.C. 901-950, payments to an injured employee on behalf of the employer acquires a subrogation lien on any recovery by the employee in a Jones Act suit against the employer based on the injuries for which the insurer has already compensated him. Therefore, Travelers was entitled to the disputed funds in the district court's registry, and Travelers could intervene for the purpose of collecting these funds. Accordingly, the court reversed the district court's denial of the motion to intervene filed by Travelers and remanded with instructions. View "Chenevert v. Travelers Indemnity Co." on Justia Law

Petitioner, a native and citizen of Mexico, sought review from the BIA's dismissal of his appeal from a removal order. At issue was whether petitioner's conviction for aiding or abetting improper entry under 8 U.S.C. 1325(a) rendered him removable under 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(1)(E)(i). The court concluded that the BIA's finding that the conviction documents associated with petitioner's section 1325(a) conviction established his removability under section 1227(a)(1)(E) was supported by substantial evidence. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court and denied the petition for review. View "Santos-Sanchez v. Holder, Jr." on Justia Law

Debtor challenged the district court's determination that proceeds from the post-certification sale of an exempted homestead revert to the estate if not reinvested within six months. The "snapshot rule" of bankruptcy law holds that all exemptions are determined at the time the bankruptcy petition is filed, and that they do not change due to subsequent events. In re Zibman held that proceeds from the pre-petition of a sale of a Texas homestead are not permanently immune from bankruptcy creditors. Under the court's precedent, the sale of the homestead voided the homestead exemption and the failure to reinvest the proceeds within six months voided the proceeds exemption, regardless of whether the sale occurred pre- or post- petition. This interpretation of 11 U.S.C. 522(c) is in accordance with Texas law and the decisions of the court. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's judgment. View "Viegelahn v. Frost" on Justia Law

Defendant pled guilty to possession with intent to distribute 100 kilograms or more of marijuana. On appeal, defendant challenged the district court's denial of her motion to withdraw her guilty plea. The court affirmed, concluding that defendant's statements before the magistrate judge provided a sufficient basis for the district court to find that close assistance of counsel was available to defendant. The court held, however, that when a Padilla claim was sufficiently presented during a motion to withdraw plea, both legally and factually, a district court erred in failing to address the claim. In this case, because the district court did not make factual findings on the Padilla claim specifically, the court vacated and remanded for the district court to address the merits of that claim. View "United States v. Urias-Marrufo" on Justia Law

This appeal arose from a contracting dispute between MetroplexCore and Parsons, which contracted with the county to design, build, and operate a transit system. The court agreed that the summary judgment evidence did not present any genuine issue of material fact as to MetroplexCore's joint venture and quantum meruit claims, and MetroplexCore did not challenge the dismissal of its fraudulent misrepresentation claim on appeal. However, because the district court impermissibly resolved certain disputed questions of fact at the summary judgment stage, and because those facts, taken in a light most favorable to MetroplexCore would give rise to a claim to relief for promissory estoppel, the court affirmed in part and reversed in part. View "Metroplexcore, L.L.C. v. Perrin" on Justia Law

Montana Lance locked himself inside the school nurse's bathroom when he was in the fourth grade and took his own life. Montana's parents filed suit against the school district alleging, among other claims, that the school district violated Montana's constitutional rights under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and discriminated against him because of his disabilities under section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. 794. The court concluded that plaintiffs failed to allege genuine issues of fact regarding their discrimination claims under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), 20 U.S.C. 1400 et seq., the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. 12101 et seq., and section 504. The court also concluded that plaintiffs failed to allege genuine issues of fact under three theories of section 1983 liability: a "special relationship" theory; a "state-created danger" theory; and a "caused-to-be subjected" theory. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment for the school district. View "Estate of Montana Lance, et al. v. Lewisville Indep. Sch. Dist." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit alleging violations of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. 1001 et seq. Plaintiffs claimed that the bonds that they invested in were an unsuitable investment for the Plans' funds and that defendant made multiple oral misrepresentations to plaintiffs in violation of his fiduciary duties. The district court ruled that there was a disputed issue of material fact as to whether defendant was an ERISA fiduciary, but nonetheless granted summary judgment because defendant provided plaintiffs with written disclosures. The court concluded that defendant did not qualify as a fiduciary under ERISA subsection 1002(21)(A)(i) because he did not exercise discretionary authority or control over the investment at issue; subsection 1002(21)(A)(ii) because he did not receive a fee from the Plans in connection with the investment; and section 1002(21)(A)(iii) because it was inapplicable in this instance. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Tiblier, et al. v. Dlabal, et al." on Justia Law