Justia U.S. 5th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Defendant appealed his sentence after pleading guilty to conspiracy to commit wire fraud. The court found that the Government initially breached the express terms of the plea agreement by objecting to the original PSR on the basis that U.S.S.G. 2B1.1(b)(2)(C) should have applied. However, this breach was sufficiently cured by the withdrawal and the actions of the district court. Further, the court found that the Government did not implicitly breach the plea agreement by advocating for the U.S.S.G. 3B1.1(a) adjustment. Accordingly, the court found that the appeal waiver was still applicable and barred plaintiff's appeal. View "United States v. Purser" on Justia Law

OAK made a request for attorney's fees in an underlying bankruptcy case for legal services it provided when representing debtors in Chapter 11 proceedings. OAK sought review of the district court's order vacating in part and remanding in part the bankruptcy court's decision to award only a portion of OAK's overall attorney's fees request. The court dismissed for lack of appellate jurisdiction under the court's well-established principle that a district court order was not final within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. 158(d) when that order reverses an order of the bankruptcy court and remands the case for significant further proceedings on the very issue the parties sought to address on appeal. View "Okin Adams & Kilmer, L.L.P. v. Hill" on Justia Law

The district court held that ICP had proven that defendants' allocation of Low Income Housing Tax Credits (LIHTC) in Dallas resulted in disparate impact on African-American residents under the Fair Housing Act (FHA), 42 U.S.C. 3604(a) and 3605(a). At issue was the correct legal standard to be applied to disparate impact claims under the FHA. The court adopted the HUD burden-shifting approach found in 24 C.F.R. 100.500 for claims of disparate impact under the FHA and remanded to the district court for application of this standard in the first instance. View "Inclusive Communities Project v. TX Dept. of Housing, et al." on Justia Law

Flex Frac petitioned for review of an order by the NLRB holding that Flex Frac's employee confidentiality policy is an unfair labor practice in violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. 158. The NLRB cross-petitioned for enforcement. The ALJ found that although there was no reference to wages or other specific terms and conditions of employment in the confidentiality clause, the clause nonetheless violated Section 8(a)(1) because it was overly broad and contained language employees could reasonably interpret as restricting the exercise of their Section 7 rights. The NLRB affirmed. As an initial matter, the court declined to address the merits of Flex Frac's constitutional argument regarding the NLRB's authority to render the decision currently before the court and instead held that Flex Frac waived its constitutional challenge by failing to raise it in its initial brief. The court concluded that Flex Frac's contention that the NLRB's interpretation of the confidentiality clause was unreasonable was without merit and rejected Flex Frac's remaining arguments. Accordingly, the court rejected Flex Frac's petition for review and enforced the NLRB's order. View "Flex Frac Logistics, L.L.C., et al. v. NLRB" on Justia Law

El Paso appealed the district court's grant of summary judgment to the IRS, denying El Paso's tax refund claim. El Paso contended that the IRS, in settling a tax dispute with El Paso involving a refund and set-off, failed to adhere to the assessment and collection procedures provided by the Internal Revenue Code when setting off El Paso's deficiency against its refunds. El Paso contended that this failure barred the IRS from collecting unpaid taxes from El Paso. The court concluded that it had jurisdiction over the suit where it was unwilling to apply the variance doctrine to deprive the taxpayer from asserting federal court jurisdiction over the suit for refund. On the merits, the court held that, where the IRS and a taxpayer enter into a closing agreement, which sets out the liabilities and overpayments of the taxpayer, the IRS could comply with the mitigation provisions of the Code by "assessing and collecting" any net deficiency from the years covered by the closing agreement, or by "refunding or crediting" any net overpayment for those years. This case involved "refunding" an overpayment and the Government refunded El Paso's net overpayment within one year of the execution of the Closing Agreement. The "refunding" thus occurred within the applicable statutory period of limitations as per the mitigation provisions. The IRS acted within its authority in applying El Paso's deficiencies to offset its overpayment. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "El Paso CGP Co., et al. v. United States" on Justia Law

BNSF filed suit seeking refunds of certain taxes that it, and its predecessor companies, paid under the Railroad Retirement Tax Act (RRTA), 26 U.S.C. 3201 et seq. The court concluded that, at least as applied to Non-Qualified Stock Options (NQSOs), the term "compensation", as used and defined by the RRTA, was inherently ambiguous; the IRS's definition was reasonable as applied to the NQSOs; although RRTA "compensation" may exclude certain in-kind benefits such as free rail passes that would otherwise be compensation under section 3121, the court concluded that NQSOs were properly included as "compensation" under the RRTA as interpreted by Treasury Regulation 31.3231(e)-1; the court's conclusion found firm support in the purpose, structure, and legislative history of the RRTA; and therefore, NQSOs were properly taxed as compensation under the RRTA. The court also concluded that, although the informal claims that BNSF filed for the employee tax paid on moving-expense benefits in 1996 and 1997 may satisfy the informal clams doctrine, it was undisputed that BNSF failed to perfect those claims prior to filing the present suit. Accordingly, BNSF's refund claims for those years must be dismissed. The court further concluded that a more reasonable interpretation of section 3231(e)(1)(iii) permitted exclusion of payments to employees for traveling expenses and bona fide and reasonable expenses related to travel, an interpretation harmonizing section 3231(e)(1)(iii) and section 3231(e)(5) as required by the specific-general canon and the rule against superfluities. Therefore, the court reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "BNSF Railway Co. v. United States" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed his sentence for unlawfully reentering the United States. Defendant argued that the district court erred in applying a 12-level sentencing enhancement under U.S.S.G. 2L1.2. The court affirmed the sentence, concluding that defendant's prior New Mexico conviction for aggravated assault with a deadly weapon was a crime of violence within the meaning of U.S.S.G. 2L1.2. View "United States v. Carrasco-Tercero" on Justia Law

Plaintiff appealed from the district court's sua sponte dismissal of his 42 U.S.C. 1983 suit as frivolous, for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted, and for want of prosecution. Plaintiff filed suit claiming that the shower floor of the "C Dorm" was slippery and unsafe, and that he received inadequate medical care. Plaintiff had fallen three times and sustained a fractured hip as a result. The court held that plaintiff did not state a claim under the Eighth Amendment with the contention that a slippery shower condition may inflict cruel and unusual punishment. The court affirmed the dismissal of plaintiff's claims against Defendants Sweetin, Oliver, Cowan, and Brown where prisoner slip-and-fall claims almost never serve as the predicate for constitutional violations as a matter of law. The court also concluded that Defendants Erwin and Fisher ignored plaintiff's complaints and pleas for help. Therefore, the court reversed the dismissal of these defendants and remanded for further proceedings. With regard to Defendant Lamb, however, the mere allegation that plaintiff complained of his pain and lack of official response during a disciplinary proceeding Lamb conducted on an entirely different matter did not suffice for Eighth Amendment purposes. Plaintiff's allegations were sufficient to raise the possibility of Defendant Hough's deliberate indifference to plaintiff and the court reversed the dismissal of Hough and remanded. Because the record was devoid of material delay or contumacious conduct, the court reversed the dismissal of Defendant McManus and remanded. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded in part. View "Coleman v. Sweetin, et al." on Justia Law

Brain Harris's surviving children filed suit against the city and police officers for excessive force after the officers shot and killed Harris. Officers arrived at Harris's home after his former wife called 911 when she feared that he was attempting suicide. After breaching the barricaded door to Harris's bedroom, officers saw that Harris was holding a knife in a stabbing position and fatally shot him. The court concluded that the district court properly held that under the circumstances, the officers reasonably feared for their safety at the moment of the fatal shooting; the court need not reach plaintiffs' alternate argument regarding whether Harris's possible suicide attempt constituted exigent circumstances justifying a warrantless entry into his bedroom because officers had consent to enter; and since plaintiffs failed to show that there was a constitutional violation in this case, the district court properly dismissed the Monell claims against the city. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment for the officers based on qualified immunity and affirmed the dismissal of the Monell claim against the city. View "Harris, et al. v. New Orleans Police Dept., et al." on Justia Law

Defendant appealed his sentence after pleading guilty to drug offenses. The court concluded that the district court did not err by imposing a two-level enhancement to defendant's sentence under U.S.S.G. 2D1.1(b)(5) for the importation of methamphetamine. The court affirmed the judgment of the district court because the methamphetamine defendant possessed was imported from Mexico and the enhancement was properly applied. View "United States v. Foulks" on Justia Law