Justia U.S. 5th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The State challenged the district court's determination that Mississippi's Stop Notice statute, Miss. Code Ann. 85-7-181, was facially unconstitutional. In a separate appeal, Noatex challenged the district court's denial of its motion for further relief and stay of an appeal bond determination. In Case No. 12-60385, the court affirmed the district court's determination that the Stop Notice statute was a facially unconstitutional deprivation of property without due process, and denied King's motion to withdraw its appeal where King and the State both presented the same arguments concerning the constitutionality of the statute. In Case No. 12-60586, the court affirmed the district court's denial of Noatex's motion for further relief because the fees requested were for another lawsuit that continued to be contested even after the declaratory judgment, and affirmed the district court's stay of Noatex's appeal bond because there was no abuse of discretion in the district court's implicit denial of Noatex's Rule 7 motion. View "Noatex Corp. v. King Construction of Houston, et al." on Justia Law

Defendant appealed his conviction of conspiracy and drug offenses, as well as unlawful use of communications facilities. Defendant argued that the district court plainly erred by allowing two alternative jurors to take part in the jury deliberations. The court dismissed the appeal because defendant waived his right to appeal in a sentencing agreement. View "United States v. Walter" on Justia Law

Under a Power Sales Agreement, the Authorities granted Entergy the right to oversee the generation of power and to purchase the generated power. Plaintiffs filed suit against Entergy after their properties were flooded and eroded after the Authorities and Entergy opened spillway gates during certain times. Because the state law property damages claims at issue here infringed on FERC's operational control, the court held that they were conflict preempted. Accordingly, the court held that the district court properly concluded that the Federal Power Act, 16 U.S.C. 791-828c, preempted plaintiffs' claim for negligence. The court affirmed the district court's judgment in its entirety. View "Simmons, et al. v. Sabine River Authority, et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs appealed the district court's denial of their motion for a preliminary injunction restraining state officials from conducting executions with pentobarbital procured from compounding pharmacies. The court concluded that there was no evidence in the record that the drug was very likely to cause needless suffering. Because plaintiffs have not shown a likelihood of success on the merits, the court affirmed the denial of injunctive relief without examining the other prongs. View "Whitaker, et al. v. Livingston, et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against PPG, alleging that he was "seriously and permanently injured" by a piece of falling equipment. On appeal, plaintiff challenged the district court's denial of his motion for leave to amend his complaint. The court agreed with the district court that plaintiff's proffered amendment relied on the proposed parties' general responsibilities to oversee safety rather than on evidence of personal fault, as required to trigger individual liability under Louisiana law. Further, the court concurred with the district court's conclusion that the amendment only served to defeat diversity jurisdiction. Although the district court did not expressly examine the other Hensgens v. Deere & Co. factors, the court could not conclude that any of those factors tipped the scales in favor of plaintiff. Accordingly, the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion and the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Moore v. Smith, et al." on Justia Law

The Benefits Review Board ordered Sherwin to pay respondent benefits under the Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act (LHWCA), 33 U.S.C. 901-950, when respondent, a dockworker, was injured in one of Sherwin's waterside ore processing facilities. The court concluded that respondent's injury did not occur on a LHWCA-covered situs because the underground transport tunnel where respondent was injured was not used in the vessel-unloading process under section 903(a). Accordingly, the court granted Sherwin's petition for review and remanded to the Board to dismiss respondent's claim. View "BPU Mgmt., Inc., et al. v. DOWCP, et al." on Justia Law

Flugence filed for Chapter 13 bankruptcy protection in 2004 and a plan was confirmed. In 2007, she was injured in a car accident and hired an attorney. Weeks later an amended Chapter 13 plan was confirmed. In 2008 Flugence sued for personal injury. Months later, Flugence was discharged. She never disclosed to the bankruptcy court that she might prosecute a personal-injury claim. The personal-injury defendants discovered the non-disclosure and had the bankruptcy case reopened. The bankruptcy court declared that although Flugence was estopped from pursuing the claim on her own behalf, her bankruptcy trustee was not estopped and could pursue the claim for the benefit of creditors. The district court reversed with respect to estopping Flugence, stating that Flugence did not have a potential cause of action prior to her initial application for bankruptcy protection, and relied on her attorney’s advice concerning disclosure. The Fifth Circuit reinstated the bankruptcy court holding. There is a continuing duty to disclose in a Chapter 13 proceeding and Flugence met all elements of estoppel. Nothing requires that recovery be limited strictly to the amount owed creditors; after a claim is prosecuted and creditors and fees have been paid, any remaining recovery must be returned to the personal-injury defendants. View "Flugence v. Axis Surplus Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Muse, Nelson, and Weiss, and two others formed DGP. The five individuals were DGP’s limited partners; its general partner was MNW LLC, consisting of Muse, Nelson, and Weiss. DGP contracted to buy Gas Solutions and Prospect agreed to lend DGP 95% of the purchase price, subject to due diligence. The agreement prevented DGP from negotiating with other lenders. Prospect’s investigation raised concerns and it informed DGP that it would not make the loan. After DGP threatened to sue, Prospect agreed to pay DGP $3.295 million as reimbursement for DGP’s expenses and DGP agreed to assign Prospect its right to buy Gas Solutions. DGP assigned the purchase contract to DGP’s general partner, MNW, owned by Muse, Nelson and Weiss, who then sold Prospect their individual membership interests, transferring the contract to Prospect. Despite a mutual release, DGP sued Prospect alleging fraud, breach of fiduciary duty, and tortious interference with contract. Prospect counterclaimed alleging breach of the covenant not to sue. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Prospect and awarded attorneys’ fees in its award. The Fifth Circuit affirmed, rejecting an argument that the covenants did not bind the individuals. Under an interpretation of the agreement giving effect to all its terms, Nelson and Muse breached the agreement by funding DGP’s lawsuits and violated the release and covenant not to sue.View "Dallas Gas Partners, L.P. v. Prospect Energy Corp" on Justia Law

Serna defaulted on a loan he obtained through the Internet that was subsequently purchased by Samara. Attorney Onwuteaka, who owns Samara, obtained a default judgment and attempted to collect. Serna then filed suit in federal court, alleging that because he neither resided nor entered the loan agreement in Harris County where the judgment entered, the suit violated the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. 1692, venue requirement. A magistrate found Serna’s suit was untimely under the FDCPA’s one-year limitations period because he filed his complaint more than one year after Onwuteaka filed his petition in the underlying debt-collection action. The Fifth Circuit reversed, that the alleged FDCPA violation arose only after Serna received notice of the underlying debt collection action. The FDCPA provides that a debtor may bring an action “within one year from the date on which the violation occurs.” A violation of does not occur until the debt-collection suit is filed and the alleged debtor is notified of the suit.View "Serna v. Law Office of Joseph Onwuteaka" on Justia Law

Abilene police were investigating Alcantar for cocaine dealing. During a traffic stop, officers found cocaine. A subsequent search of his residence revealed drug paraphernalia, drug-manufacturing materials, and a dismantled 12-gauge shotgun in Alcantar’s bedroom. He was charged by the state with possession of cocaine with intent to deliver. Alcantar had a previous conviction for felony aggravated assault of a police officer. Alcantar was indicted as a felon in possession of a firearm, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1) and 924(a)(2) and for possession of an unregistered firearm, 26 U.S.C. 5861(d) and 5871. He challenged section 922(g)(1) as unconstitutional under the Commerce Clause and pleaded guilty to the firearms charge. The pre-sentence report recommended a four-level enhancement under U.S.S.G. 2K2.1(b)(6)(B) for use or possession of a firearm in connection with another felony: the state charge of possession of cocaine with the intent to deliver. Alcantar argued that despite the proximity of the firearm to the drug paraphernalia, its dissembled state, his lack of knowledge regarding assembly, and the absence of ammunition rendered the firearm useless in facilitating another offense. An ATF agent estimated it could take 10 to 30 seconds to assemble the three pieces even without instructions. The district court overruled Alcantar’s objection and imposed a sentence of 63 months. The Fifth Circuit affirmed both the refusal to dismiss the indictment and the sentence. View "United States v. Alcantar" on Justia Law