Justia U.S. 5th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Defendant was found not guilty of second degree murder by reason of insanity and was committed to the Attorney General's custody under 18 U.S.C. 4243(e). Defendant was subsequently found to no longer be a substantial risk to others if he followed a strict treatment regimen and was conditionally released. The district court then later found that defendant failed to comply with the conditions of his release and that he posed a substantial risk of bodily injury to others. Consequently, the district court revoked the release and placed him back into the custody of the Attorney General. The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in not calling for a competency hearing; defendant failed to raise a valid Sixth Amendment complaint and the district court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to replace counsel; and the district court committed no error in its finding underlying the conclusion to revoke the conditional release. Accordingly, the court affirmed the order. View "United States v. Mitchell" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to conspiracy to distribute and possess with the intent to distribute cocaine and methamphetamine. After the district court denied defendant's motion for relief from judgment under Rule 60(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, defendant filed a notice of appeal and the district court denied him a certificate of appealability (COA). The court then granted a COA, in relevant part on the issue of whether defendant's Rule 60(b) motion presented a successive habeas petition within the meaning of Gonzalez v. Crosby. The court concluded that it did, and thus the district court was not permitted to consider the motion. Accordingly, the court dismissed the appeal. View "United States v. Hernandes" on Justia Law

Defendant conditionally pleaded guilty to possession with intent to distribute a controlled substance. On appeal, defendant challenged the district court's partial denial of his motion to suppress. The district court found that defendant voluntarily consented to the search of the house containing marijuana. His consent was not automatically involuntary merely because his Miranda rights were violated. And even if government agents violated Edwards v. Arizona when they sought his consent, the Edwards violation would not suffice to justify suppression of the marijuana. Therefore, the court affirmed the judgment. View "United States v. Gonzalez-Garcia" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs sued for a declaratory judgment that the lien on their homestead was void and that the mortgage holder was required to forfeit all principal and interest. Plaintiffs also sought damages for defamation. The court concluded that plaintiffs' claims were time-barred under Tex. Const. Art. XVI 50(a)(6); because there was no evidence or allegation of defendants' attempting to conceal information, and because the facts that gave rise to any claims were obvious and not hidden, the doctrine of fraudulent concealment did not apply in this instance to estop the lenders' assertion of the limitations defense; because the loan was valid, and plaintiffs were delinquent, the statements at issue were true and no defamation occurred; the court rejected plaintiffs' claim that the statute of limitations barred only remedies; and the district court did not abuse its discretion in striking the amended complaints. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Priester, Jr., et al v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A., et al" on Justia Law

This case stemmed from Chevron's involvement in litigation over the alleged environmental contamination of oil fields in Ecuador. Ecuador sought discovery from John Connor and GSI Environmental, his company, for use in a foreign arbitration against Chevron. During the course of extended litigation with Ecuador, Chevron, an intervenor in the district court, benefited repeatedly by arguing against Ecuador and others that the arbitration was a "foreign or international tribunal." Because Chevron's previous positions were inconsistent with its current argument, judicial estoppel was appropriate to make discovery under 28 U.S.C. 1782 available for Ecuador. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded for determination of the scope of discovery. View "Republic of Ecuador, et al v. Connor, et al" on Justia Law

This appeal arose out of a contract dispute between Verint and Tekelec where Tekelec sought a right to payment stemming from a patent dispute between two corporate entities not directly involved in this appeal. The district court awarded summary judgment to Tekelec and denied Verint's cross-motion for summary judgment. The court rejected Verint's claims that Tekelc lacked constitutional standing to enforce its right to the payments at issue. Because the court concluded that Verint's fixed, contractual payment obligations under the Blue Pumpkin/IEX Agreement unambiguously fell outside of the scope of the subsequent Verint/NICE Settlement's boilerplate Non-Accrual Clause, the court need not consider Tekelec's alternative argument that the disputed payments accrued prior to the effective date of the Verint/NICE Settlement. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Tekelec, Inc. v. Verint Systems, Inc." on Justia Law

Defendants Mathew Dean Moore and Melvin Williams, former New Orleans Police Officers (NOPD), appealed their convictions and sentences arising from an incident that resulted in the death of an individual. The court concluded that a jury could reasonably conclude from the evidence that the individual's death was proximately caused by and the foreseeable result of being kicked in the chest by Williams; the district court did not err by basing Williams' sentence on the base offense of voluntary manslaughter; the evidence was sufficient to sustain Moore's conviction for aiding and abetting the submission of a false incident report and by obstructing a federal investigation through the submission of a false NOPD incident report and aiding and abetting each other; the evidence was sufficient to sustain Moore's conviction for making false, material statements to the FBI; and the district court did not err in determining Moore's sentence. Accordingly, the court affirmed the convictions and sentences. View "United States v. Moore, et al" on Justia Law

Petitioner sought federal habeas relief raising Batson v. Kentucky claims. The court subsequently granted petitioner a Certificate of Appealability (COA) on the limited issue of comparative juror analysis required by Miller-El v. Dretke. After the COA was granted, the Supreme Court decided Cullen v. Pinholster, which called in question whether the district court could properly grant petitioner an evidentiary hearing on his Batson claim. The court held that Pinholster's restriction did not bar the federal evidentiary hearing conducted in this case because the district court first concluded, solely on the basis of the state court record, that the state courts committed legal error, as required under 28 U.S.C. 2254(d)(1), through the state courts' "unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law." After reviewing the record, the court held that petitioner failed to carry his burden of proving that the prosecutor's race-neutral explanations for striking the two black panelists at issue were a pretext for purposeful discrimination and affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Smith v. Cain" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a former TDCJ employee, appealed the district court's grant of summary judgment for TDCJ on her Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. 12112(a), and Family Medical Leave Act (FMLA), 29 U.S.C. 2612(a)(1)(D), claims. Plaintiff's allergic reaction to the use of scented candles and wall plug-ins around her work area was the basis of her ADA claim. The court held that plaintiff did not suffer from a disability within the meaning and coverage of the ADA. Further, there was no dispute that TDCJ did not receive plaintiff's FMLA certification before the deadline. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Milton v. Texas Dept. of Criminal Justice" on Justia Law

Christopher Sepulvado appealed an order transferring his second-in-time petition for writ of habeas corpus, amended motion to appoint counsel, and a motion to stay his execution. He also requested a certificate of appealability (COA). In 1993, Sepulvado was convicted and sentenced to death for the first-degree murder of his six-year-old stepson. On appeal, the court concluded that it had jurisdiction over both the district court's order and the motions it transferred thereby; Sepulvado's second-in-time habeas petition was an abuse of the writ and was therefore successive; because the petition was successive, the district court did not have jurisdiction to consider it in light of the fact that Sepulvado did not obtain the court's prior authorization pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 2244(b)(3)(A); because the court lacked jurisdiction, there was no basis for a stay of execution; and Sepulvado did not request a COA from the district court and therefore, the court was without jurisdiction to consider the appeal. Accordingly, the court affirmed the order of transfer; dismissed the petition for writ of habeas corpus for want of jurisdiction; dismissed the amended motion to appoint counsel for want of jurisdiction; denied the motion for stay of execution; and dismissed the COA. View "In re: Christopher Sepulvado" on Justia Law