Justia U.S. 5th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff, an employee of the Railroad for nearly 40 years, filed suit under the Federal Employers Liability Act (FELA), 45 U.S.C. 51 et seq., claiming that the injuries to his knees, diagnosed after his retirement, were partly the result of the Railroad's negligence. A jury found such a connection and awarded damages. The court held that the evidence was insufficient on causation where no evidence was introduced to connect the worker's specific condition to the work that he performed. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded for entry of judgment.

Defendant pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession of stolen firearms and body armor. Defendant's plea was subject to an appeal of the denial of his motion to suppress evidence, namely, the guns and armor discovered during a search of his house. Defendant alleged that the police unlawfully entered the curtilage while attempting to conduct a "knock and talk" in violation of the Fourth Amendment and that his mother's consent to enter the premises was vitiated by his prior express refusal under Georgia v. Randolph. The court held that the mother's consent attenuated any alleged Fourth Amendment violation in entering through the outside doors such that the causal chain between the alleged violation and the discovery of the evidence was broken. The court agreed with the Seventh and Eight Circuits that the objection of an absent co-tenant did not vitiate the consent of a physically present co-tenant under Randolph. Accordingly, Randolph applied only to searches conducted in the face of a present and objecting co-tenant. Therefore, the district court did not err in denying defendant's motion to suppress. The conviction and sentence were affirmed.

This case arose when debtors inherited an IRA worth $170,000. When debtors filed for bankruptcy, they sought to exempt the inherited IRA from the bankruptcy estate pursuant to 11 U.S.C. 522(d)(12). The Chapter 7 trustee objected to the exemption, arguing that inherited IRAs did not qualify for exemption under section 522(d)(12). After the bankruptcy court ruled for the trustee, the district court reversed the bankruptcy court. Because the court held that inherited IRAs were exempt from the bankruptcy estate, upon de novo review, pursuant to section 522(d)(12), the court affirmed the district court's judgment.

Plaintiffs filed this action against several defendants, under 42 U.S.C. 1983 for violations of their Fourth, Sixth, and Eighth Amendment rights that arose out of their incarceration in New Orleans at and around the time that Hurricane Katrina struck the city. The court concluded that there was no doubt that plaintiffs suffered terribly while held in custody after Hurricane Katrina struck New Orleans. However, the court held that Defendant Gusman's failure to release plaintiffs fell within the emergency exception to the rule that a probable cause determination must be made within 48 hours, and Defendant Hunter's failure to allow plaintiffs to use cell phones was not objectively unreasonable in light of any clearly established law. Therefore, the court reversed and vacated the judgment of the district court and remanded with instructions to enter judgment in favor of Defendants Gusman and Hunter on all claims asserted by plaintiffs.

Appellants appealed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Tony Arcuri and the City of San Antonio on their claim pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 1983, that SAPD officers, led by Arcuri, violated appellants' Fourth Amendment rights by failing to knock-and-announce their identity and purpose prior to forcibly entering appellants' home to execute a search warrant. Taken together, the deposition testimony of officers and the City's admission that the search of appellants' home was conducted in accordance with SAPD policies, were sufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact on the issue of municipal liability. Therefore, appellants made the requisite showing to survive summary judgment on the issue and the court reversed and remanded.

Conoco appealed the district court's judgment confirming an arbitration award favorable to Rain. Conoco and Rain were parties to a long-term supply agreement, whereby Conoco agreed to sell all green anode coke produced at one of its refineries during a certain time period. The court held that, given the considerable deference afforded arbitration awards, Conoco's argument that the arbitrator exceeded his powers by failing to select only one proposal, which relied on paragraphs stricken from the final award in accordance with the Commercial Rules, must fail. The court also held that vacatur was no appropriate and the award must be enforced where the arbitrator laid out the facts, described the contentions of the parties, and decided which of the two proposals should prevail.

Plaintiff claimed and a jury found that he was constructively discharged from his UTSW faculty position because of racially motivated harassment by a superior. The jury also found that UTSW retaliated against plaintiff by preventing him from obtaining a position at Parkland Hospital after he resigned from UTSW. The court held that, although there was sufficient evidence to support the jury's verdict on the retaliation claim, there was insufficient evidence of constructive discharge. Therefore, the court vacated in part, affirmed in part, and remanded for reconsideration of plaintiff's monetary recovery and attorneys' fees.

Defendant pleaded guilty to unlawful reentry and was sentenced to 20 months of imprisonment. Defendant appealed the district court's application of an eight-level sentencing enhancement. The court affirmed the district court's judgment that defendant's prior Indiana conviction was an aggravated felony within the meaning of U.S.S.G. 2L1.2(b)(1)(C) where the offense included a term of imprisonment of at least one year. The court held that "term of imprisonment" in 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(G) referred to the actual sentence imposed.

Defendant was convicted of robbery in interference with interstate commerce, carjacking, the use of a firearm in relation to each of those offenses, and being a felon in possession of a firearm. Defendant asserted eleven claims of error, including claims related to the denial of his motion for a new trial; the denial of his motion to sever the charges against him; the failure to suppress his confession; a ruling in limine; prejudice in the jury venire of his second trial; his Batson v. Kentucky challenge; the denial of surrebuttal to the Government's rebuttal case in the second trial; the failure to grant his motion for a mistrial; jury instructions; and several other challenges. The court rejected all the challenges and affirmed the judgment of the district court.

The Board appealed the district court's decision granting summary judgment to appellees on the Board's claim that the EPA improperly exercised its power to veto a plan to reduce flooding in Mississippi (the Project). The Board claimed that the EPA was barred from vetoing the Project under section 404(r) of the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. 1344(r). As an initial matter, the court denied the Board's motion to supplement the record on appeal or, in the alternative, for judicial notice. In addition, the court concluded that the EPA waived its argument that the Board did not have prudential standing under the Administrative Procedures Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. 500 et seq. The court affirmed the district court's decision upholding the EPA's veto, as the record did not contain sufficient evidence to overturn the EPA's findings.