Justia U.S. 5th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Two insurers disputed whether their respective insurance policies required them to defend the insured against allegations regarding an accidental death. Both insurers sought a declaratory judgment from the district court that their policies did not cover the underlying lawsuit. Alma Batie, daughter of Darline Rigsby, sued Preferred Ambulance in Texas state court on behalf of herself and as a representative of Rigsby's estate (the underlying lawsuit). After the district court ruled that each insurer must provide primary coverage for the accident, both insurers appealed. The court held that, for purposes of defining the scope of each insurer's duty to defendant, both Western World and National Casualty must provide primary coverage of the underlying lawsuit. Neither the exclusions in their respective policies nor the "other insurance" provision in the Western World policy limited either insurer's duty to defendant. Accordingly, to the extent that National Casualty had paid more than half of the defense costs in the underlying lawsuit to this point, it was entitled to contribution from Western World.

Defendant pled guilty to two counts of possession with intent to distribute heroin. Defendant appealed her sentence of 240 months imprisonment. The court held that because the sentence was not beyond the statutory maximum, Apprendi was not violated and defendant's sentence was affirmed. Because the death resulting enhancement, U.S.S.G. 2D1.1(a)(2), was imposed with strict liability, defendant had not proffered sufficient evidence to show the link between her drugs and Richard Reitz's death was inaccurate or unreliable, and she could not show the PSR was based on factual errors, the court affirmed the finding that there was sufficient evidence that defendant's drugs caused Reitz's death.

In a wrongful death action arising out of a helicopter crash, the sole issue on appeal was whether the district court erred in applying Louisiana's wrongful death statute rather than Florida's wrongful death statute. Decedent lived in Florida, he boarded the helicopter in Louisiana, and the helicopter struck a bird and crashed seven minutes after takeoff in Louisiana. Eight of the nine individuals on board were killed including decedent. The court agreed with the district court's analysis that Louisiana had the most significant relationship with the occurrence and the parties. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment.

Plaintiffs appealed the district court's entry of judgment in favor of defendants on defendants' statute of frauds defense to plaintiffs' lawsuit demanding specific performance on three Purchase and Sale Agreements (PSAs) entered between the parties for the sale/purchase of certain oil and gas leases. The court held that the trial court erred in holding that the lack of finality prevented consideration of the exhibits attached to the PSAs as a part of the contract to convey the property. The exhibits were specifically incorporated into the contract, the exhibits contained a sufficient legal description to meet the statute of frauds, and thus, the PSAs were enforceable by specific performance.

Plaintiff, a terminal and switching railroad operating in the City, brought a declaratory judgment against the City alleging that a federal statute preempted all City ordinances that affected its transloading operations. The railroad wanted to expand its operations and the City opposed the expansion, claiming it violated several municipal ordinances. The court reversed the district court's holding of no preemption as to the standard construction details and road grading ordinance, resting its decision on express preemption under the Interstate Commerce Commission Termination Act (ICCTA), 49 U.S.C. 10101 et seq. The court's express preemption holding only pertained to the road and paving areas used in connection with the TCB-MAALT-Halliburton transloading operation. This preemption rendered the City's appeal from the denial of its request for civil penalties for ordinance violations moot. The court reversed what the court concluded was likely a holding by the district court that there was express preemption as to the older, 20-acre transloading center and remanded for further proceedings. The court affirmed the district court's remaining rulings.

Defendant pleaded guilty to two counts of using a facility of interstate commerce to attempt to coerce a minor to engage in criminal sexual activity. On appeal, defendant challenged the sufficiency of the factual basis of his plea and objected to the procedural and substantive reasonableness of his sentence. The court held that the district court did not commit plain error in accepting defendant's guilty plea based on the facts in the record concerning his conduct towards the minors at issue. Although the court upheld his guilty plea, the court vacated the sentence because the district court improperly relied on defendant's rehabilitative needs in lengthening the sentence.

Defendant appealed his conviction for possession of five grams or more of crack cocaine with intent to distribute. Defendant argued that the district erred in admitting the crack cocaine and in admitting four photographs of defendant posing with a gun. Defendant was forced to undergo a proctoscopic examination under sedation pursuant to a warrant obtained on the police's belief that he was concealing crack cocaine in his rectum. The court found that the search was unreasonable but that the evidence should not be suppressed because the police acted in good-faith reliance on a valid search warrant. The court held that the district court abused its discretion in admitting the non-probative photographs but there was no reversible error because there was substantial evidence supporting defendant's conviction. Accordingly, the judgment was affirmed.

Plaintiff appealed from the district court's dismissal of his state-law claims against Stryker under Rule 12(b)(6). Plaintiff alleged in his complaint that a hip replacement product manufactured by Stryker malfunctioned and caused him injury. The court affirmed the dismissal of plaintiff's strict liability, design defect, negligence, and Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act (DTPA), Tex. Bus. Comm. Code 17.41 et seq., claims to the extent they were premised on a failure to warn or a marketing defect; affirmed as to plaintiff's breach of express warranty claims; and reversed and remanded the following: (1) plaintiff's strict liability and negligence claims, to the extent they were based on manufacturing defects that violated the FDA's Current Good Manufacturing Practices or are inconsistent with Stryker's manufacturing processes or procedures that were approved by the FDA; (2) his claim for breach of an implied warranty to the extent it relied on the failure to comply with the FDA's requirements; and (3) his DTPA claim, to the extent that it relied on a breach of an implied warranty.

This appeal arose from the district court's order dismissing plaintiffs' claim for lack of subject matter jurisdiction due to the Railway Labor Act's (RLA), 45 U.S.C. 151, 181, exclusive and mandatory dispute resolution process that applied to plaintiffs' claims. Plaintiffs argue that the RLA did not apply to them because they were no longer "employees" as contemplated by the RLA. Alternatively, plaintiffs argued that even if the RLA applied to them as former employees, they complied with the terms of their Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA), which allowed them to bring an action in federal district court pursuant to section 501(a)(1)(B) of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. 1001 et seq. The court held that plaintiffs were employees under the RLA pursuant to Supreme Court precedent. In the alternative, plaintiffs were explicitly looking for a "contracted-for" judicial remedy following an adverse RLA-established Retirement Board ruling without showing any of the narrow exceptions to RLA exclusivity. Therefore, the court declined to depart from established precedent preventing parties from creating federal court jurisdiction where there was none. Accordingly, the judgment was affirmed.

Plaintiffs filed this declaratory judgment action in federal district court in Mississippi, seeking relief against their longtime Costa Rican distributor. The district court dismissed the complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction over defendants. The court held that, even if defendants could reasonably anticipate being haled into Mississippi federal court, they could not reasonably anticipate being so haled to answer claims such as these. Seeing no constitutionally adequate nexus between plaintiffs' claims and defendants' Mississippi contacts, the court concluded that plaintiffs have failed to present a prima facie case that a Mississippi district court could exercise specific jurisdiction over defendants. Accordingly, the judgment was affirmed.