Justia U.S. 5th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Defendant challenged the sentenced imposed on him after pleading guilty to illegally reentering the United States after deportation. Defendant contended that the district court erred when calculating his offense level under the Sentencing Guidelines, in particular by applying a sixteen-level adjustment on the basis of an Oklahoma conviction for domestic assault and battery. The court held that defendant's Oklahoma conviction was not a "crime of violence" within the meaning of U.S.S.G. 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(ii) and defendant's guideline range would have been considerably lower if the district court had not applied the sixteen-level enhancement. Accordingly, the sentence was vacated and the case remanded for resentencing.

Plaintiff appealed its First Amendment challenge to a newsrack ordinance enacted by the City in 2007. The ordinance required newsracks on the City's rights-of-way to meet certain material size, and placement standards and required publishers using newsracks to pay a permit fee. The court held that plaintiff's appeal was without merit where the City's ordinance's requirement were narrowly tailored to the City's substantial interests in public safety and aesthetics and left open the ample alternative means of distribution; the fees under the newsrack ordinance were consistent with the First Amendment because they defrayed the City's administrative costs; and as a content-neutral time, place, and manner restriction that did not leave enforcing officials with unbridled discretion, the newsrack ordinance need not contain an explicit provision for judicial review. Accordingly, the court rejected plaintiff's First Amendment challenges to the City's newsrack ordinance.

Petitioner filed an Emergency Motion for Stay or Alternative Petition for Writ of Mandamus, which arose out of petitioner's services as an expert in a trial. Petitioner subsequently sought appellate review of Chief Judge Edith H. Jones's Service Provider Continuity and Payment Order, which was issued after petitioner submitted a letter of resignation. The Order approved partial payment of petitioner's fees that were previously certified by the district court and also directed petitioner to continue work on the case. The court held that it was without jurisdiction to consider petitioner's appeal because the Order was neither a final decision of the district court under 28 U.S.C. 1291 nor an appealable interlocutory district order under 28 U.S.C. 1292, but rather an order issued pursuant to the Chief Judge's authority under the Criminal Justice Act, 18 U.S.C. 3006A(e)(3).

Debtor, a former company officer, allegedly attempted to obtain one million dollars by falsely claiming an ownership interest in the company and threatening public exposure of alleged illegal activity. After the debtor lost an arbitration proceeding, he then filed for bankruptcy. At issue was whether the company's attorneys' fees for the arbitration represented a nondischargeable debt under 11 U.S.C. 523(a)(4) or (a)(6). The court reversed and remanded the summary judgment rendered against creditors because the debt may have arisen for willful and malicious injury and may therefore be excepted from discharge by section 523(a)(6).

Defendant appealed the sentence imposed after he pled guilty to one count of conspiracy to posses with intent to distribute cocaine pursuant to a written, non-binding plea agreement. On appeal, defendant argued that the Government breached the plea agreement when the PSR recommended a higher base level than that agreed to by the Assistant U.S. Attorney (AUSA). Because the plea agreement entered into by the AUSA did not bind the Probation Officer from making sentencing recommendations in the PSR nor did it bind the district court, the court affirmed the sentence.

Defendant pleaded guilty to illegal reentry following a deportation after conviction for an aggravated felony. On appeal, defendant argued that his sentence was procedurally and substantively unreasonable. The court affirmed the sentence, holding that the district court did not commit procedural error with respect to the sufficiency of its explanation for the sentence it imposed; the sentence was not substantively unreasonable where the district court heard and considered defendant's arguments for a below-guidelines sentence, but it rejected them, determining that a within-guidelines sentence was appropriate in light of the Guidelines, the 18 U.S.C. 3553(a) factors, and the policy statements; and defendant's sentence was presumed reasonable because it was within the guidelines range.

Defendant pleaded guilty to one count of harboring an undocumented alien for financial gain. On appeal, defendant argued that the district court erred in denying her motion to suppress because the post-Miranda statements that she, her boyfriend, and the illegal alien made constituted fruits of the poisonous tree. The court agreed and held that defendant's post-arrest statements were inadmissible under the exclusionary rule where there was no indication that more than a few hours had passed between the Fourth Amendment violation made by police and ICE agents at defendant's home and the statements made at the ICE officer; the record did not reveal, and the Government did not raise, any intervening circumstances that would have broken the causal chain; and the court previously noted that the officers' conduct was egregious. Because neither of the attenuation nor the inevitable discovery exceptions to the exclusionary rule applied, the court held that the district court did not err in excluding the testimony of defendant's boyfriend and the illegal alien. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded for further proceedings.

Plaintiffs, and other owners of Dell Inc. common stock, alleged that defendants violated the securities laws between by fraudulently inflating reported revenues, engaging in erroneous accounting, and disseminating false information to the public. The district court granted defendant's motion to dismiss with prejudice and plaintiffs appealed. While the appeal was pending, plaintiffs moved in the district court for class certification and approval of a proposed settlement agreement. The district court certified a class and approved the class-action settlement. Two groups of objectors to the settlement subsequently appealed, claiming numerous deficiencies in the proceedings. The court held that appellants have demonstrated their membership in a class and have standing to bring their objections; the district court did not abuse its discretion when it systematically analyzed the proposed settlement under each of the Reed factors and found that none counseled against approving the settlement; the district court did not abuse its discretion in certifying the class as defined; the district court did not abuse its discretion in approving the settlement's claims-making process; the district court did not abuse its discretion in approving the elimination of the de minimus provision in the original plan of allocation; the district court's decision not to reissue notice or reopen the filing period was not an abuse of discretion; objectors presented no reason to conclude that the judgment was an abuse of discretion; and there was no basis for concluding that the district court abused its discretion in setting the amount of attorney's fees and in awarding interest in the fee award. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court.

Plaintiffs were involved in a vehicular accident with Bart Allen, an employee of Gator Sign Company, whose vehicle hit plaintiffs' car from behind when they stopped to make a left turn. Plaintiffs' motion for partial summary judgment on liability was granted, but a jury trial was conducted on damages, resulting in a verdict for plaintiffs for $38,500. Plaintiffs claimed that the district court should have granted their motion for a new trial. The court held that because the district court properly allowed the jury to consider defendants' medical expert witness's testimony, and with that testimony the record contained adequate support of the verdict, the court affirmed the judgment based on the damage award.

Plaintiff, who was incarcerated in the custody of TDCJ-CID, sought damages under 48 U.S.C. 1983, asserting that her constitutional rights were violated when her ovary and lymph nodes were removed without her consent during a radical hysterectomy. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the physicians who performed the surgery, holding that they were entitled to qualified immunity. In light of the circumstances, the court could not say that the law was, or was at the time of defendants' conduct, clearly established such that a reasonable official in the physicians' positions would understand that their conduct violated plaintiff's Fourteenth Amendment due process rights. Noting that the law governing claims involving unwanted medical treatment in the prison context was far from certain, the court held that plaintiff failed to rebut defendants' entitlement to qualified immunity on her Fourteenth Amendment claim and summary judgment was appropriate. The court disposed of plaintiff's other claims and affirmed the judgment of the district court.