Justia U.S. 5th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Defendant was found guilty of conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute at least five kilograms of cocaine and unlawful use of a communication facility, in this case a cell phone. Defendant appealed his conviction and sentence. The court concluded that there was sufficient evidence to support defendant's conspiracy conviction; the district court did not err by denying the motion to suppress where officers reasonably believed that they had probable cause to arrest defendant and the information found during the search of defendant's cell phone would have been inevitably discovered during the inventory of his car; and the district court committed no error in sentencing defendant.

Plaintiffs, a trade organization representing incumbent cable operators in Texas and an incumbent cable provider, appealed the district court's grant of summary judgment dismissing their claims that Senate State Bill 5 violated the First and Fourth Amendments of the Constitution or was preempted by federal law. SB 5 was aimed at reforming the cable service industry in Texas by creating a new state-level franchising system that obligated the Public Utility Commission (PUC) to grant a franchise for the requested areas if the applicant satisfied basic requirements. New entrants could obtain a single statewide franchise that avoided the expense and inconvenience of separate municipal franchise agreements across the state. Overbuilders could terminate their existing municipal franchise agreements in favor of the convenience of the statewide franchise. Incumbent cable providers, however, could not similarly opt out for the statewide franchise, until after the expiration of the municipal license. The court held that because the statute unjustifiably discriminated against a small number of incumbent cable providers in violation of the First Amendment, the court reversed.

This interlocutory appeal arose out of the deaths of two civilian drivers in a United States military supply-truck convoy in Iraq when insurgents attacked in April 2004. State tort claims were brought by or on behalf of spouses and family members of the decedents against KBR. KBR contended that the district court erred in denying its motion to dismiss and motion for summary judgment in which it argued that the Defense Base Act (DBA), 42 U.S.C. 1651-54, provided plaintiffs exclusive remedy and preempted all state tort claims that have been asserted. The court concluded that the DBR preempted plaintiffs' state law claims and therefore did not consider whether it had jurisdiction to entertain the alternative grounds on which KBR sought dismissal.

Petitioner petitioned for review of the BIA's decision that he be removed based on having committed an aggravated felony. Petitioner was charged and convicted of felonious sexual intercourse without consent. Petitioner did not "necessarily" commit the aggravated felony of rape, rather than a lesser crime. Because the court was not convinced that petitioner pled guilty to a crime that can be categorized as rape under 18 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(A), the court granted the petition for review and reversed the BIA's decision, remanding to the BIA.

Plaintiff brought suit against various officials arising from his name not being placed on the 2010 primary election ballot in Houston, Texas. Plaintiff's complaint was dismissed for failure to state a claim. The court held that no equitable relief was appropriate either because the relief was moot or because the court determined when examining the claims for damages that no constitutional violation occurred that would support such relief. The court also held that plaintiff lacked an interest protected by procedural due process and affirmed the district court's dismissal of that cause; plaintiff's interpretation of Anderson v. Celebrezze was not applicable; plaintiff's claims were rooted in procedural due process and his substantive due process claim failed; the dismissal of the equal protection claim was reversed and remanded where further proceedings were needed to determine whether plaintiff in fact submitted a proper application and, if he did, whether the Harris County Democratic Party Chairman purposefully discriminated or simply made an error or mistake of judgment; and the challenged election statute was constitutional.

Defendant, a prisoner in the custody of the United States, sought the court's authorization under 28 U.S.C. 2255(h) to file a second or successive petition to vacate, set aside, or correct his sentence in the district court where the sentence was imposed. After determining that defendant's petition would in fact be second or successive within the meaning of section 2255(h), the court denied his motion for authorization to file.

Plaintiffs, physicians and abortion providers, sued the State under 42 U.S.C. 1983 for declaratory and injunctive relief against alleged constitutional violations resulting from Texas House Bill 15, an act "relating to informed consent to an abortion." Plaintiffs contended that H.B. 15 abridged their First Amendment rights by compelling the physician to take and display to the woman sonogram images of her fetus, make audible its heartbeat, and explain to her the results of both exams, as well as have her sign a consent form. The court held that the enumerated provisions of H.B. 15 requiring disclosures and written consent were sustainable under Planned Parenthood v. Casey, were within the State's power to regulate the practice of medicine, and did not violate the First Amendment. The court also held that the phrase "the physician who is to perform the abortion," the conflict between section 171.012(a)(4) and section 171.0122, and the provision in section 171.0123 regarding the failure to provide printed materials were not unconstitutionally vague. Therefore, plaintiffs failed to establish a substantial likelihood of success on any of the claims on which the injunction was granted and the court vacated the preliminary injunction.

Plaintiff filed a lawsuit against several defendants, including Alfredo Moreno and Ronald Pucek, seeking injunctive relief and damages pursuant to the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 18 U.S.C. 1961-1968, and Texas law. On appeal, defendants challenged the district court's grant of summary judgment and order denying the withdrawal of their Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. The court affirmed the district court's denial of Pucek's withdrawal of his Fifth Amendment privilege where Pucek's withdrawal appeared more likely to be an attempt to abuse the system or gain an unfair advantage. However, the court reversed the district court's denial of Moreno's withdrawal of his Fifth Amendment privilege where the district court erred in denying Moreno's attempt to withdraw his assertion of the privilege more than a month before the discovery deadline. The court also reversed and remanded summary judgment with respect to both defendants.

Defendant challenged his 48 month sentence that he received after pleading guilty to the crime of illegal reentry of a previously deported alien following a conviction for an aggravated felony offense. The court held that the district court correctly applied the enhancement where defendant's conviction of attempted sexual assault of a child was a crime of violence within the meaning of U.S.S.G. 2L1.2(b)(1)(A); there was no procedural error where the district court did not fail to explain adequately defendant's sentence; and defendant's sentence was not substantively unreasonable where the district court balanced the 18 U.S.C. 3553(a) factors. Accordingly, the judgment was affirmed.

Court-appointed receiver brought suit against Wells Fargo for conversion and breach of contract with respect to a cashier's check purchased by W Financial Group that Wells Fargo reaccepted for deposit into an account other than that of the named payee, without the proper endorsement. The district court found Wells Fargo liable for conversion. On appeal, Wells Fargo argued that the district court erred in finding that it converted the check and in rejecting certain defenses. The court held that because Wells Fargo made payment on the cashier's check to CA Houston, an entity that was not entitled to enforce the instrument, Wells Fargo was liable for conversion under Tex. Bus. & Comm. Code 3.3420. The court also agreed that Wells Fargo was liable for conversion because it deposited the cashier's check without the necessary indorsement. The court further held that Wells Fargo could not rely upon the condition precedent in its Account Agreement to void liability for conversion of the cashier's check; the district court did not err in denying Wells Fargo's in pari delicto defense; and the court need not address the breach of contract issue. Accordingly, the judgment was affirmed.