Justia U.S. 5th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs, Mississippi and Alabama residents, brought a Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), 28 U.S.C. 2671-2680, action against the Government for injuries allegedly related to their exposure to elevated levels of formaldehyde contained in the component materials of the Emergency Housing Units (EHUs) provided to them by the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) after Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. The district court concluded that the Mississippi and Alabama emergency statutes barred suit against a "private person under similar circumstances" and granted the Government's motion to dismiss. Because the Mississippi and Alabama emergency statutes abrogated the tort liability of a private person who voluntarily, without compensation, allowed his property or premises to be used as a shelter during or in recovery from a natural disaster, the Government's voluntary, cost-free provision of the EHUs to disaster victims, in connection with Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, was also immunized conduct under the FTCA. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's judgment dismissing plaintiffs' FTCA claims against the Government for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction and held that plaintiffs' remaining questions did not warrant certification.

Petitioners, the City of Arlington and the City of San Antonio, sought review of a Declaratory Ruling and subsequent Order on Reconsideration that the FCC issued in response to a petition for a declaratory ruling by a trade association of wireless telephone service providers, CTIA. In the proceeding before the FCC, CTIA sought clarification of Sections 253 and 332(c)(7) of the Communications Act, 47 U.S.C. 253, 332(c)(7), regarding local review of wireless facility siting applications. Both cities claimed (1) the FCC lacked statutory authority to establish the 90- and 150-day time frames; (2) the FCC's 90- and 150-day time frames conflicted with the language of section 332(c)(7)(B)(ii) and (v); (3) the FCC's actions were arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with the law; and (4) the FCC violated the Administrative Procedures Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. 500 et seq., because its establishment of the 90- and 150-day time frames constituted a rulemaking subject to the APA's notice-and-comment requirements. Arlington also raised a procedural due process claim. The court denied Arlington's petition for review on the merits. The court dismissed San Antonio's petition for review because the court lacked jurisdiction because San Antonio did not timely file its petition for review.

Plaintiff appealed the district court's entry of judgment as a matter of law as to his claims of sexual harassment, retaliation, loss of overtime, and for punitive damages. The court concluded that the district court correctly found that plaintiff did not present sufficient evidence to support his claims for retaliation, loss of overtime and punitive damages, but that the evidence presented did support the jury's conclusion that plaintiff was sexually harassed and that his employer failed to promptly respond to the harassment. Therefore, the court vacated the district court's grant of summary judgment as a matter of law and remanded to the district court with directions to enter judgment on those claims.

This appeal was from the grant of summary judgment in a diversity case in which plaintiff was a limited partner in a partnership that received a loan from defendant. The dispute stemmed from a limited guaranty agreement between the Bank and plaintiffs, who became a guarantor of the loan received by the partnership. At issue was whether the guaranty agreement only required payment from the guarantor once the balance of the outstanding loan was $500,000 or less. The district court ruled that the payment was immediately due regardless of whether the balance of the loan had been reduced to $500,000. Because the court found the language of the guaranty agreement ambiguous, the court held that the district court erred by accepting the Bank's interpretation and granting summary judgment. Therefore, the court vacated the summary judgment and remanded to the district court. Further, the court affirmed the district court's denial of the motion for leave to file a supplemental claim. Finally, the court vacated the order awarding attorney's fees.

This interlocutory appeal was brought by the Government to reverse the district court's order suppressing certain incriminating statements made by defendant. The court held that defendant was in custody at the time he made his incriminating statements where he was awakened from his bed, identified and handcuffed while more than a dozen officers entered and searched his home; he was separated from his family and interrogated by two federal agents for at least an hour; he was informed he was free to use the bathroom or get a snack, but followed and monitored when he sought to do so; and he was allowed to make a phone call, but only when holding the phone so that the agents could overhear the conversation.

Defendant appealed his conviction for wire fraud and his sentence of 30 months' imprisonment, as well as restitution. The court concluded that defendant understood his right to have a lawyer appointed and repeatedly asserted that he wanted to plead guilty and that he was satisfied with his counsel's representation. Therefore, the district court's Rule 11 error did not affect defendant's substantial rights and his conviction must stand. The court held, however, that the district court violated defendant's Sixth Amendment right to choice of counsel by denying his request to have counsel appointed to represent him at sentencing. Therefore, resentencing was required because deprivation of the right to choice of counsel was not subject to harmless error review. Accordingly, the conviction was affirmed but the sentence vacated and remanded for resentencing.

Defendant was convicted by a jury of defrauding Medicaid and Medicare of $1.4 million. On appeal, defendant argued that the evidence was insufficient; prejudicial evidence was admitted; the jury instructions were flawed; her sentencing level was erroneously increased for obstruction of justice; and the district court erred by denying her request for post-trial contact with a juror. The court affirmed the judgment because there was sufficient evidence to support the conviction and there was no reversible error.

Petitioner, a native and citizen of Mexico, appealed the district court's dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction of his 28 U.S.C. 2241 habeas petition challenging the removal order resulting in his deportation to Mexico. Petitioner argued that he was "in custody" within the meaning of section 2241 because he was being restrained from returning to the United States despite his wrongful removal. Because petitioner had failed to show that his deportation was the result of extreme circumstances or that he was subject to any restraints in Mexico not experienced by other non-citizens who lacked the documentation to enter the United States, he had not shown that he was "in custody" within the meaning of section 2241. Further, the district court did not have jurisdiction to review the final removal order pursuant to the provisions of the REAL ID Act, 8 U.S.C. 1252(a)(5). Accordingly, the district court did not err in dismissing the petition.

This case concerned a contract between the parties where defendant was hired to dredge a portion of the Houston Ship Channel and to construct containment levees and other structures at a disposal facility for dredge material. Defendant subsequently appealed the district court's denial of its motion for partial dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and motion for partial summary judgment. Defendant also appealed the district court's grant of the government's motion for judgment on the pleadings. The court held that the government's suit to collect the money owed by defendant was timely because it was filed within six years of the contracting officer's decision; because defendant had failed to show its set-off claim "beyond peradventure," the court affirmed the district court's denial of its motion for partial summary judgment on this claim; and the district court had subject matter jurisdiction over the government's claim for repayment it had overpaid defendant and the district court properly granted judgment in the government's favor on that claim. Accordingly, the judgment of the district court was affirmed.

Defendant was convicted of possessing with intent to distribute five kilograms of cocaine, importing cocaine into the United States, and conspiring to possess with intent to distribute over five kilograms of cocaine. Defendant appealed his convictions and sentence of three concurrent 125-month terms. The court held that the evidence presented was sufficient to support a conviction for conspiracy and that the district court properly gave the deliberate ignorance jury instruction. Accordingly, the district court did not err and defendant's convictions were upheld.